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2Abstract
This thesis deals with the topics of sex and society in the Lams of Plato with recourse to 
ancient historical context and modern critical theory. It examines reconstructions of 
ancient ‘sexuality’ (e.g. through Dover, Foucault and Davidson) with a view to increased 
clarification. The text of the Laws is considered, along with many of its literary qualities, 
its influences and the utopian plan that it entails. Plato's narrator, the Athenian Stranger, 
has proposed the remarkable theory that sexuality can be controlled through the 
manipulation of people's thoughts. The thesis is particularly interested in the manner in 
which sexuality is ideologically constructed. A significant portion of this inquiry deals 
with education in the hypothetical polis (Magnesia) and the part that this is designed to 
play specifically in terms of sex-role stereotyping. The Lam spins andreia as die ideal 
model for the Magnesians to imitate in their mandatory pursuit of arete. The 
reformulation of the Magnesian oikos and the ‘brave new femininity' that this plan entafis 
figure prominendy into this examination. Magnesian women must become more Eke 
(idealised) men in terms of ‘manly' enkrateia. They wiE combine aUeged elements from 
Athenian, Spartan, Kretan, Sauromatian and Amazonian women (plus Platonic 
philosophy) to attain dds new status. Men must become less Eke women are perceived 
to be. A law is drafted to ban same-sex activities, considered ‘womanish', but there is 
some uncertainty as to whether or not it wiE ever be enforced. Psychology and 
propaganda, reEgion, education, the famEy and government. wEl aE work together to 
affect the moral hygiene of Magnesia. The thesis investigates each of these topics, with 
recourse to material outside the Laws, Ei considering Plato's social/sexual construction 
dieory.
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7Currency Conversion
(late 5th- early 4th centuries)1
‘Money implies poverty’. 
—Iain M. Banks2
1 Athenian talent (36,000g silver) = 60 minai =6,000 drachmas 
1 mina (600g silver) = 100 drachmas 
1 drachma (6g silver) = 6 obols (lg each)
1 ICretan Stater (12g silver) = 2 Athenian drachmas
1 These are taken from Carradice (1995), p. 10-11, cf. Sealey (1990), p. 190.
2 (2001), p. 142, probably recollecting Marx’s (1909) famous axiom: ‘Property is theft’.
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‘For nothynge is more easye to be founde, then be barking Scyllaes, 
rauenyng Celenes, and Lestygones deuowerers of people, and suche lyke 
greate and vncredyble monsters; but to fynde ytysyns ruled by good and 
holsome lames, thatys an excedynge rare and harde thyngd.
—Sir Thomas More1
Plato's Laws is replete with subject matter of a sexual nature. While much of it (e.g. those 
sections deading with such issues as the role of women and same-sex) may seem apparent 
prima fade, much more emerges from a careful reading incorporating signifirant 
observations of critical authorities. It would be grossly inaccurate to assert that this 
thesis has dealt with every aspect of that which we would today refer to as sexuality that 
may be found in this text. The majority of salient points have been considered. This 
provides material for analysis sufficient to satisfy the constraints of doctoral research. It 
has also been a great pleasure to discover a wealth of information, too copious to be fully 
explored in a single treatise, which wdl provide mter'esting topics of inquiry for 
considerable time to come.
The approach used here combines elements of modern Cultural Smdchs, Feminist 
and so-called ‘Queer' Theory with the long-established methodologies of the Classics. In 
this way, the thesis brings to bear a potent arsenal of diverse scholarship on Plato's final 
opus. Some might rightly inquire why one should take such measures and consider the 
Laiws in the light of modern theories of sexuality. What could so ancient a text have to 
teU us about sex and society in the world of today? There is much to be gained from 
such an endeavour. Not only has Plato, in the Laiws, undertaken to thhoeieh about no less 
than the construction of a society from the ground up (surely a very i.-elevant issue for the 
modern world), he has also provided us with considerable insight into the subject of 
sexuality and the manner by which many aspects of it may be controlled and directed 
through methods like socialisation and the calculated influences of authority. 
Contemporary criticism, especially that which deals with the use of language with regard 
to sex, serves to illdminate this inquiry m ways that many traditional approaches alone 
could not. Plato was actively contributing to an ancient discourse on human sexuality. 
Our modern conceptions partake of the same Elte^ectdal continuum and our on-going
1 Utopia VII.3-8. The word ‘utopia’, if not the concept, appears to be More’s own invention (and not 
Plato’s). It is derived from the Greek ob Twtoc;, thus meaning, appropriately, ‘no place’.
9examination of it stands to benefit from a more hoEstic approach. Re-examining ancient 
ideas on this subject contribute to our growing body of knowledge.
Sex is a complex issue that has yet to be resolved. This examination of the Laws 
of Plato seeks to achieve a deeper understanding of sexuaEty as a natural phenomenon, 
as force for social change and itself as subject to change. A significant portion of 
Magnesia’s social programming is based on the control of human sexuaEty through a 
calculated scheme. The ‘artificiaEty’ or ‘constructedness’ of sexuaEty in the Laws as the 
product of directed sociaEsation towards clear ideological and philosophical ends should 
be emphasised. This bears particular relation to the modern, post-Freudian world. The 
thesis seeks a broader understanding by considering relevant contextual material to 
illuminate this inquEy. Such an undertaking wiE not only add to our overaE knowledge 
of the past but it may also shed some Eght on our present and future.
The chapters of this thesis have been divided along thematic Enes to provide a 
fakly comprehensive coverage of issues of sex and society in the Laws. The fkst chapter 
details the modern critical methodologies that wiE be utiEsed throughout the thesis as 
weE as providing some relevant background on the subject of ancient views on sexuaEty 
as we understand them today. Chapter II deals with the Laws as an historical artefact and 
providing relevant background information on the text and its place amongst the 
Platonic corpus.
The breakdown of the remaining chapters is as foEows. Chapter III examines 
the educational programme for Magnesia, of the city to be founded, as outEned by 
Plato’s narrator, the Athenian Stranger. It is here that he expresses the revolutionary 
proposition that women should be educated equaEy (or almost equaEy) as men. Chapter 
IV considers the Platonic concept of andreia (courage and/or manliness) which figures 
prominently in the philosophical framework of sexual ideals to be knpressed on 
Magnesia’s hypothetical citizenry. Chapter V looks into the ‘myth of the family’ and the 
values associated with it along gendered Enes. It considers the Magnesian famEy’s 
utiEtarian function in this hypothetical society. Chapter VI examines the role of women 
ki Magnesia and how that role is to be shaped both by the Platonic ideal of andreia and 
the physical constraints of the female sex—both perceived and otherwise. The final 
chapter deals with the complex issue of same-sex relations in the Laws.
The overaE aims of the thesis are several. Fkst, it is important that the Laws 
should be brought again into the Eght of scrutiny. As mentioned above, it is perhaps the 
least examined representative of Plato’s entire corpus. Yet, it has much to offer to almost
\
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anyone who would undertake to peruse it. The Lawr is one of the world's first examples 
of a written constitution (albeit hypothetical) and, as such, deserves considerable 
prominence for that fact alone. It explores many significant prospects of societal 
administration and social regulation that bear relevance to the modern world. Plato has 
demonstrated a number of methods by which a society may be dicected and controlled, 
along specific Enes, with the aid of philosophy, psychology and rhetoric. Some might say 
that the twentieth century (not to mention the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with 
revolutionary advents of constitution-building) has been largely characterised by just 
such an approach to the government of peoples. Surely the twenty-first century wEl
continue to proceed along a simEar path.
Whatever we may think about his methods, Plato appears to have had the noblest 
of ideas in mind hi composing his Lawr. Its end was conceived to be no less than the 
maximum degree of happiness and virtue for the hypothetical citizenry. The ‘second- 
best' approach is designed to correct human faiEngs with phEolcphicaEy enEghtened 
legal prescriptions. The administration of these by ‘a rigid theocracy' is perhaps a 
dangerous example in the wrong hands? The manner in which Plato's works have been 
employed, or might yet be employed, as always remains the domain of the current 
generation at any given time. TotaEtarian and democratic regimes in the past have 
exercised these ideas, in then- own ways, according to thek own particular ideologies. 
Plato's theoretical excursions may be fakly said to have provided a means by which to 
change the world. His tools are not weapons of war or implements of terror. Rather, he 
has demonstrated that words are the most powerful resource that humanity has at its 
disposal and that thek careful employment can change the way that people think? To 
change people's thinking is to change the world. These ideas wEl continue to induce 
Evely debates long into the future. But for now let us consider the Lawr, as the Athenian 
Stranger suggests, ‘beguErng the time with discourse, and so complete our journey at 
leisure'.?
2 Cf. Robinson and Groves (2000), pp. 124-9.
3 As Tathagata Buddha, the Father Buddha, said, ‘With our thoughts, we make the world' (Ch'eng-Sn
1979). ‘
4 Laws 625b6-8.
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Chapter I
Modern Theory, Ancient ‘Sexuality’
‘The past is a foreign country. They do things differendy there’.
-----L.P. Hartley1
‘We mythologists know very well that myths and legends contain 
borrowings, moral lessons, nature cycles, and a hundred other distorting 
influences, and we labour to cut them away and get to what might be a 
kernel of truth’.
----- Isaac Asimov2
‘Well, man, you’re doomed to repeat it otherwise. There’s continuity and 
there’s foolishness’.
------ Keith Richards3
Toward the Study of Culture
In November of 2001, a BBC2 television series on modern taboos pointed out that, 
roughly since the 1970s, male fashion advertisements and icons of pop-culture have 
become increasingly homoerotic. Perhaps surprisingly, these adverts are not geared 
exclusively toward homosexuals. Their primary demographic target consists of those 
men who would probably identify themselves as unequivocally heterosexual. This trend 
of increasing homoerotic representation shows no sign of subsiding in the near future. It 
is perhaps possible to speculate that certain shadowy members of the gay-male 
community have perpetrated some cunningly engineered conspiracy—but such a thing 
seems altogether unlikely. There must be some other reason why homoerotic imagery 
that idealises the male form in such a manner that could readily be construed as sexual is 
considered to appeal so positively (enough to sell clothes, jewellery, cigarettes etc.) to 
presumably heterosexual men. The BBC television programme, perhaps wisely, offered 
no explanation for this queer phenomenon.
No complete explanation is likely to emerge for some time yet to come. 
However, what this clear presence of homoeroticism, curiously aimed at heterosexuals, 
does perhaps hint at is the implication that the sort of paradigms that Western culture is 
currently utilising for the delineation of sexual categories are somewhat less adequate to 
the cause than might have been generally supposed. While such issues are examined
1 Qtd. in BBC2 interview, Sept. 2001.
2 (1996), p. 422.
3 Qtd. in Golden and Toohey (1997), p. 2.
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today within many institutions of higher learning and other similarly shhathe•hd venues, 
they remain unsettling conversation for the vast majority of other people (including even 
some of the academics who specialise in the subject). The reasons for this are numerous 
and complex. Ultimately, we must admit to some ignorance, at this stage in 
development, as to pe•hrishly how something so essential as human sexuality actually 
functions. This is why academics must continue to examine the matter as dioroughly as 
possible. It can only be to our benefit to plumb its depths, questioning our assumptions 
and past theories as we go, in seeking a greater understanding. The fact that most people 
tend to feel so strongly about this subject, despite our impoverished comprehension of 
its complexity, highlights the necessity for closer examination.
The ancient Greeks make an interesting port of call from which to embark on 
this ongoing examination. We know with a reasonable dege•hh of rhrtainty that their 
attitudes toward sex were different from our own. From there the matter of 
particularities becomes more difficult. Comparing modern sexuality with the ancient 
Greek equivalent presumes some clear understanding of the former by which to contrast 
the latter. It also assumes some understanding of the ancient Greek analogue and some 
general agreement on what the evidence that we have extant actually means. Acquisition 
of the one, sadly, seems to be almost as daunting a task as the other-. But the fact that 
the problem is difficult should not dissuade one from trying. It is probable that the 
illumination of ancient Greek sexual mores will also shed considerable light on modern 
sexuaHty. The ancient Greeks, free as they were from the Judeo-Christian ideological 
legacy as weE as having existed prior to and apart from the Renaissance continuum, may 
have much to teE us about this difficult subject. They lack the distorting influences of 
modern culture and society and their more ‘recent’ antecedents. The Greeks too had 
cultural influences affecting then view of sexuaEty. The examination of such things is 
the essential to the aims of this thesis.
Is either of these psychosexual states, ancient or modern, somehow more 
‘natural' than the other? This is probably not the case. Both surely indicate influences of 
various types whereby the given culture influences and conditions human psychology. 
The modification of human behaviour through cultural influences could be called 
‘natural' inasmuch as culture may be seen as an evolutionary development. Can one 
separate the natural (genetic) influences on sexuaEty from the external (cultural) 
influences with impunity? Whatever the totahty of thek relationship, the latter can 
certainly affect the former.
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This thesis operates under the premise that Classical scholarship should utilise 
such methodological techniques as Sexual Criticism and Cultural Studies. It is the 
purpose of this chapter, at least in part, to clarify this point in greater detaE and to 
expand on it. It would be erroneous to assert that the modern academic forces engaged 
in the Classics are exclusively occupied, ostrich-like, with sifting through the past without 
regard for the present or the future. The Classics in particular may be regarded as a 
means of ‘backing into the future'. That is, with scholarly recourse to the ancient past, 
we may project the course of events yet to come. Our contemporary rereading and 
reinterpretation of ancient texts serves to form our present intellectual tgitgeist as weE as 
laying the foundations for future ways of thinking. As Cartledge says, 'the ancients 
themselves not only invented the Western canon but constantly interrogated and 
reinvented it, and much of what we regard as modern Eterary theory traces its 
genealogies to ancient Eterary criticism and rhetorical theory'.?
Modern Cultural Studies is a distinct and separate area of academics. Under 
the influence of Foucault and others, EngEsh Lit., History and Sociology have adapted its 
methods. The study of the Classical world is ripe for approaches derived from Cultural 
Studies. Both it and the Classics are closely related and, by no means, mutually exclusive. 
The latter hold within their domain vast resources of cultural data that can yield an 
untold wealth of information about our world today as weE as help to shape the thoughts 
that bring about its future. We can never guess when some new innovation ?in the 
Classics may bear valuable fruit. The relatively recent advents of Cultural Studies and 
Sexual Criticism serve to bolster traditional methods and augment their potency for 
scholarly discourse. 'It turns out', as Cardedge says, ‘that, with the rise of gender and 
cultural studies approaches, its sophisticated sexiness and self-consciousness have more 
to say to us than to earEer readers'.? Our own self-reflection, through the appEcation of 
modern critical methodologies to the Classics, may be considered to be one of the most 
important cultural achievements that we have inherited from the ancient
It was not unknown to the ancients that a culture produces art.? We may broadly 
posit that the subjects indicated by the term art should comprise many phenomena such 
as Eterature, history, philosophy, painting, architecture etc. but it is not exclusive of other
4 (1998), p. 25. Cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 15 sq. who (having compared the trial of Oliver North to texts of 
Demosthenes and Plato) considers it beneficial to compare ‘modern representations’ with ancient 
equivalents—albeit with a clear understanding of the inherent differences between them.
2 Ibid. p. 26.
2 Cf. Auden (1973), p. 8.
" Cf. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics IV, 1 140a .
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disciplines or media. Skice art is always the product of individuals within a particular 
cultural context, the prospect that the art produced by a given culture bears certain of the 
ideas and ideals of that culture should not be cause for much surprise. Modern 
scholarship can deduce many things about the past based on its artefacts. By extension, 
numerous insights may be uncovered about our own culture either through examining 
our artistic and other productions or when viewing them in contrast to another culture— 
past or present. Yet the discoveries made by us today that yield insight into the distant 
past, along with our implicit connection with that past as part of a continuum, are 
oftentimes obscured by our own subjectivity (or the indirect influences of the subjectivity 
of one or more of our forebears).
There is no such thing as a disinterested reading. The subject of this thesis, the 
Laws (itself an interested artefact of the 4th century b.c.e.), was intentionally selected and 
it has been screened through the chosen ‘lens’ of sexuality and critical theory. Such 
choices reflect an interested reading of Plato, his thoughts and times. Even with the 
limitations imposed by these subjective selections, this particular re-reading of the Laws 
El respect to sexuaEty connects with a broad spectrum of thought both ancient and 
modern. The subject of human sexuaEty in this era is both topical and controversial.8 It 
is an aim of this examination that it should aspEe to a broad poEtical and social 
relevance. In this way, it wiE contribute to an on-going and enlightened discussion of a 
subject of such importance as sexuaEty in relation to culture and, to some extent, 
sexuaEty as the product of culture.
The modern EngEsh term ‘sexuaEty’ is problematic when used in relation to the 
ancient Greeks. Whenever it is invoked, the reader should understand that it refers to 
the equivalent paradigm (about which there is much contention) that was a feature of 
ancient culture and that remains somewhat elusive to our present understanding. There 
are a number of ways to deal with this problem. One may take a traditionally historicist 
approach and say that coming to grips with the impEcit otherness of the ancient Greeks 
requires a periodisation of ancient cultural and social institutions based on the extant 
sources and archaeology. One may choose to accept that thek otherness is also impEcitly 
beyond our comprehension. Thus ‘by ignoring the marked simEaeities between classical 
and modern cultures (and equaEy within the cultures of the Greek and Roman wnrldr)’, 
as Golden and Toohey say, some 'reconstruct or even invent an ancient world that is so
8 E.g., as I write these very words, heated political debates are taking place in both the United States 
and Great Britain affecting the future of homosexuals with regard to law and society which, if 
anything, indicates the tensions and uncertainties felt by many on this matter.
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foreign, so completely different in its characteristics as to be near impenetrable’." Other 
Scholars such as Foucault, Dover, Halperin and Konstan, adopting elements from New 
Historicism, attempt to formulate a theory of otherness based on their interpretation of the 
sources in accord with their own historical theories. This approach has been sometimes 
regarded as biased. In part as a reaction to these, Davidson has attempted to liberate the 
ancient sources from modern prejudices in order to produce a different model of ancient 
sexuality. His approach is also arguably subject to injecting modern prejudices even 
while seeking to exclude them. AE of these methods represent interested reconstructions 
(as does this thesis) but they also strive to broaden our understanding of a very complex 
subject. Each has its merits and demerits. AE contribute to the sum of our knowledge.
Dr-awing clear boundaries to delineate aE the facets of ‘sexuaEty' (ancient or 
modern) is a task that largely faEs to the psychologist, the cdltdrua theorist and the 
phEosopher. It is an ambitious endeavour. Before undertaking this examination of 
sexuaEty and society in the Laiws of Plato, it is first necessary to define the use of terms 
and to outEne some of the critical methodologies to be utiEsed. This appEes both to 
Classical scholarship and modern methodologies. Is ancient sexuaEty so different from 
its modern equivalent, in theory and in practise, as to present too much of an 
impediment to contemporary minds? Surely one must not proceed under such an 
assumption. To discuss this complex subject adequately, however, is almost Enpossibae 
without the use of precise technical language.
Feminist Theory and the Sexual Politics of Language
The terms ‘sex' and ‘gender-’ are often employed to mean more or less the same thing; 
i.e., the label for the category to which belong the classes ‘male’ and ‘female’?0 This 
should present a simple formula for distinguishing a nominal difference between the 
bearers of XX and XY chromosomes. From this point, however, things become more 
difficult. Along with the incipient chromosomal makeup of a given individual, in this or 
any culture, there are likewise myriad social and psychological conventions on what 
constitutes ‘being a man’ or ‘being a woman’. When one makes reference, for example,
"(1997), p. 1.
10 In my employment of the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’, as well as ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
throughout this thesis, I attempt to uphold a convention largely used by feminist critics today (cf. such 
notables as L. Irigaray and H. Cixous). ‘Male’ and ‘female’ therefore indicate biological categories. 
‘Masculine’ and ‘feminine’ may be seen as denoting symbolic or culturally constructed classifications 
within a given social or philosophical context.
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to a member of the female sex of, e.g. a Latin American nation of the early twenty-first 
century, a certain stereotype or archetype will emerge. This wEl differ from the same 
archetype for women in, e.g., Germany or France (or most anywhere else—although one 
should expect some simEarities across cultures). These cultural differences, however 
minute or grandiose, constitute another category caUed ‘sex-’ or ‘gender-roles'. In 
addition to these, above and beyond societal influences (yet affected by them) is the 
individual’s own ‘sexual identity’ or ‘gender identity' that fits into the greater category of 
‘sexuaEty’. This concept has a profound impact on an individual’s overaE self-identity and 
is influenced by and influences that sense of hoEstic identity.
The problem with terms such as ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ is that they frequently accrue, 
sometimes in vague and uncertain ways, bits and pieces of meanmg from aE over the 
super-category of sexuaEty and beyond. Frequently, aEowing for regional variance, these 
terms can gain poEtical weight and become the centres of heated debates even on 
matters of state poEcy. At the moment, North American academics seem to prefer to 
avoid the term ‘gender' in favour of ‘sex', in designating XX and XY individuals, and 
‘sexuaEty' as the label for the broader category of things entaEed by sexual difference. 
British scholarship currently appears to prefer the term ‘gender' for these same things. It 
is perhaps fak to hazard that there is something innately problematic about the impEcit 
assumptions made by either of these choices of terminology.
The original preference for employEig ‘gender’ may be considered, as Scott 
indicates, ‘one facet of what might be caEed the quest of feminist scholarship for 
academic legitimacy in the 1980s’?? It had come a long way up to that point of seeking 
greater academic legitimacy. Previously, from the Victorian era up to the 1960s, some 
type of ‘women's studies' had existed. Although popular moraEty often Emited this 
discourse to areas such as the particulars of chEd care, housekeeping and whether or not 
women should have the vote?2 Student and teacher activism in the 1960s and ‘70s 
brought this subject more decidedly into the Eght of day. Gender theory has undergone 
more transformations since the 1980s and the term ‘gender' has attained, as we have 
seen, varied levels of significance.
‘Gender' may be used to designate modes of behaviour involved in social 
relations between and amongst the biological sexes. Some might ask such questions as: 
'Does he/she behave appropriately for a boy/gkl? A man/woman?' There is an knpEed * 12
" (1986), p. 1056.
12 Cf. Hall (1992), p. 9.
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suggestion in these questions that we somehow know what it ‘means’ to be either. 
However, such matters are always part of an ongoing cultural debate. Society can set 
specific gender or sex roles that may be rigidly enforced at times and in such a way as to 
Emit participation by a given XX- or XY-enhanced individual in a particular context— 
pubEc or private. Gender may also be employed in the sense of rejecting biological 
explanations (or biologically based arguments) such as those that would support selective 
female subjugation on the grounds that women have the capacity to give bkth and men, 
while barren, tend to be physically stronger. ‘Gender’, as HaU indicates, then ‘becomes a 
way of denoting “cultural constructions”—the entirely social creation of ideas about 
appropriate roles for women and men’.13 * 15 16Thus construed, it may be regarded as a social 
category imposed on a (biologically) sexed Eidividual.'i
Part of the problem in the first place—a reason for carefuEy considering terms— 
has to do with the manner in which the sexes have been traditionaEy regarded. This is 
especiaEy true in the case of women. ‘In a sense’, as Butler states, ‘what women signify 
has been taken for granted for too long’. Unquestioned values encourage certain “bEnd” 
assumptions in terms of how people ‘construct’ sex roles in particular. As a 
consequence, women became ‘“fixed,” nor-maEsed, immobEised, paralysed in positions 
of subordination’?5 This is the product of language and the way people think with regard 
to language. The definitions of words thus shape the world that those words describe.
Several ideological camps have developed different approaches ki order to 
elucidate the matter* of dealing with the signifier ‘gender’ as a social construct. Theorists 
who examine patriarchy have elected to view the construction of gender in terms of a 
perceived male ‘need’ to dominate the female. Post-HegeEan approaches define male 
domination as the resultant psychological effect of a desh*e on the part of men to 
transcend thek state of aEenation from the reproductive act beyond then procreative 
contribution through sexual intercousse?6 The significance placed on the continuity of 
generation in this theoretical model tends to emphasise the primacy of paternity. It also 
denotes the real work (labour) and social reaEty undertaken by women in childbuth 
whEst relegating it to a secondary status.
FoEowing such a Ene of reasoning, one can argue that sex roles have been largely 
devised by the (male) rulers of a given society in nedee* to impress women into very cheap
" Ibid.
" Cf. Scott (1983), p. 101.
15 Butler (1995), p. 50.
16 Cf. O’Brien below.
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or slave-like labour. This type of labour, controlled by men and performed by women, 
however extends beyond biological sex, societal, gender or sex roles into the broader 
realm that could be referred to alternatively as ‘Gender' or ‘Sexuality’ (here capitalised to 
denote its broader status). This can generate some confusion when referring either to 
one’s gender to mean one's biological XX/XY status or to one's socially enforced role or 
to one's sexuality—however culturally constructed or natural. Gender could be any one 
of these depending on context. This thesis wEl utilise terms Eke ‘sex’, ‘sex role’, ‘sexual 
identity' and ‘sexuality' rather than ‘gender’, ‘gender role' and ‘gender identity'. This does 
not mean to suggest that ‘sex’ is somehow correct and ‘gender' is somehow not. These 
choices appear to allow for marginaUy more clarity in discussing these subjects but this is, 
as always, open to debate. As the post-staucdrl■aHsts amongst other argue, the use of 
language is as significant as the use of bodies with regard to the politics of sex. 17
Sex is not only a matter of discourse, as with women, it also possesses a sense of 
muthjelailtr.t8 Mrxidttfeemmists have claimed as their goal the liberation of the subverted 
labour of sexuality with a view toward freedom from male enforced dominance. 
Women’s liberation, according to O'Brien, resides in ‘an adequate understanding of the 
process of repr*oduction’ and an appreciation of the contradiction between the nature of 
women’s reproductive labour and male-generated ideological mystification’.1 *" Others, like 
McKinnon, look to subject/object relationships kivolved in the construction of sex roles 
within societal views of sexuality. They tend to adopt an hsphciaEy economic stance. 
According to McKinnon, ‘sexuaEty is to feminism what work is to Marxism: that which 
is one's own, yet most taken away’." She elaborates her point on subject./object relations 
as foEows:
Sexual objectification is the prknary process of the subjugation of 
women. It unites act with word, construction with expression, 
perception with enforcement, myth with reaEty. Man fucks woman; 
subject verb object.21
17 ‘To problematise the matter of bodies’, as Butler (1995), p. 51 says, ‘entails in the first instance a 
loss of epistemological certainty, but this loss of certainty does not necessarily entail political nihilism 
as a result’.
18 Ibid.
‘" O’Brien(1981), pp. 8-15,46.
M(1982), p. 518.
21 Ibid., p. 543.
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Sexuality, a construction of society, is here identified as a function of 
dominance/submission or subject/object relationships—generaEy designed to the 
greater benefit of the XYs. McKinnon and O'Brien are, at least in part, reacting against 
an orthodoxy that maintained sexuaEty was an inherent fact of nature around which 
social conventions ‘naturaEy’ formed. The notion that society, in no smaE part, 
constructs sex roles chaEenges this ‘essentiaEst’ or ‘fundamentalist’ view.
There is a clear indication amongst the Marxist-ferninists as to who is responsible 
for constructing the traditional sex roles. CapitaEstic patriarchy is seen to bear the blame. 
The Marxist-feminists reject the eslentiaElm of the argument that the necessities of 
reproduction ‘naturaEy’ determine the sexual division of labour under capitalism"? 
Marxist-ferninists have augmented their efforts by way of the works of the French post- 
ltr•ucturaElt phEosophers such as Foucault and Derrida. The former’s insistence that 
sexuaEty is constructed in historical contexts and his conviction that the current sexual 
revolution requites serious analysis resulted in many feminist critics making ‘sexual 
poEtics' the focus of thek attentions.22 3 This approach combines the examination of 
socio-economic contexts with the ‘psychic structuring of gender [or sexual] identity' .24 
Psychology entered the spotlight.
The Anglo-American school has worked largely in the area of psychological 
obj ect-relationships. Chodorow and GilEgan (who based her work on Chodorow) are 
two North American scholars who have greatly contributed to this research. They, like 
this thesis, are concerned with moral development and behaviourism and how these 
relate to the societal construction of sexuaEty "5 The continental (largely French) school, 
in contrast, is based on structuraEst and post-structuralist readings of Freud ki terms of 
linguistic theories. A key figure for continental feminists is Jacques Lacan"? Both of 
these schools of thought are concerned, as Scott says, with ‘the processes by which the 
subject’s identity is created; both focus on early stages of chEd development for clues to 
the formation of gender [or sexual] identity'."? Object-relations theorists stress the 
significance of actual experiences whereas the post-strucmraEsts emphasise language and 
communications in the development of sexual identity and sex roles. Both methods have 
then merits and demerits.
22 It is noteworthy that the sexual subjugation of women existed prior to the advent of capitalism and later 
continued even under ostensibly non-capitalist regimes.
23Cf. Scott (1986), p. 1060.
24 Ibid..
2® Cf. Chodorow (1978), p. 169.
22 Cf. Grosz (1990).
"7 (1986), p. 1062.
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Disagreements between these various scholarly approaches are a healthy sign and 
suggest that progress is being made, and will continue to be made, in this area. None of 
their theories necessarily helps one pin down any concrete and universal sexual language 
that can be employ in the discussion of ancient sexuality in relation to Plato’s l^aivs or 
anything else. Part of the problem perhaps lies in seeking such universalities (across vast 
gulfs of space and time) in the first place. The ongoing discourse on sexuality does, 
however, illustrate the importance of terminology and stresses the necessity of 
attempting to attain some degree of clarification.
It may be noted that the term ‘sex’ has at least the double meaning of that which 
designates XX and XY individuals as well as, in common jargon, being the customary 
signifier for the physical act of sexual intercourse. The term ‘gender’ can mean both a 
biological status and a broader reference to the cultural/natural phenomenon that one 
might also call sexuality. Gender, unlike sex, does not generally connote the act of 
intercourse itself—rather, it deals with physio-psychological issues relevant to it. Implicit 
in either term is the (modem) notion that one’s biologically sexual condition somehow 
must be a determinate factor in one’s psychosexual identity within specifically defined 
parameters.
In truth, both terms (sex and gender) are equally blurry in their ideological 
import. Sex, in common usage, has all the same signifying potential—that is, covering 
essentially the same areas of definition—as does gender. One could easily construe sex 
to denote a biological status exclusively rather than a psychological/social/cultural 
condition. Some will doubtless prefer to utilise gender in the scientific sense, as a clinical 
term, to denote a physical condition and/or a psychological condition. It is necessary to 
choose one term over the other, given die acknowledged importance of the employment 
of language in discussing these issues, for die sake of this thesis.
The reader should understand the use of the term ‘sex’, unless otherwise 
indicated by context, to signify the popular binary opposition of a biological condition 
composed of the two categories of male and female. It is always the case that any use of 
this word will also bear implicit connotations of its connections to the greater category of 
that which we call sexuality. An argument could be easily posited in favour of the term 
‘gender’ for this greater category. This thesis does not dismiss those who would prefer 
‘gender’ to ‘sexuality’ for these things. Sexuality, then, may be seen as encompassing a 
number of psychological conditions as well as physical ones. Sex, while indicating XX or 
XY status, is implicidy connected with sexuality.
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'Queer Theory’
Feminist rectiral theories, such as those mentioned above, inform my examination of 
Plato’s Laws. Another simEue methodological approach also Ogdehs prominently Eito it. 
‘Queer reading', or ‘queer theory’, as it has been caUed, arose as a form of criticism 
largely out of Marxist-Ohmcncst, cultural-materialist and Marxist-humanist traditions. I 
take exception to the term ‘queer theory' since it suggests another version that is 
‘normal’. I would prefer to employ a more general phrase such as ‘criticism of sexual 
identity’. ‘Queer', in any context, contains impEcitly negative connotations. ‘When the 
term has been used as a paralyzing slur-’, as Butler indicates, ‘as a mundane interpellation 
of pathologized sexuaEty, it has produced the user of the term as the vehicle and emblem 
of noe•maEsation’.2o This thesis strives to be no such vehicle. Even so, perhaps to 
highlight the inequity of the dichotomy between the ‘queer' and the ‘normal’, the former 
wEl be employed in discussing it here (sometimes with inverted rommas). Contrary to 
popular bhEhf, queer theory is not the sole domain of those who consider themselves 
homosexual. Echoing Athenian democratic sentiments, anyone who wishes may feel 
free to undertake such examinations utilising this theoretical approach.28 9 It does however 
tend to be the case, for whatever reasons, that shlf-idhntiO.ed homosexuals are the ones 
who mainly have recourse to it.
Central to this sort of reading are analyses that expose the Erner workings of 
norms and trends within given cultures. Science plays a significant role Ei such cultural 
ElquEihs, as does art30 Works by writers such as Oscar- WEde, Percy and Mary ShhUhy, 
VEginia Woolf, Tennessee WiUiams, Ezra Pound and Truman Capote ar-e fhetclh ground 
for undertaking a ‘queer reading'. These works of Hterature, whenever historically 
pubEshed, contain expressions of sexualEy, of same-sex e-elutions and of human nature as 
regards sex in general. Other notable examples include aE the ancient Greek writers 
mentioned in the next section, the Hebrew Talmud, Islam's Koran, the gospels of the 
Judeo-Christian Old and New Testament, the works of Shakespeare and MEton. One 
begins by taking any such work as may be replete with (or even largely bereft of) material
28 (1993), p. 223.
"7 Cf. my chapters II and VI for the Solonian phrase ‘anyone who wishes’.
® E.g. the famous Kinsey Reports of the 1940s that suggested, contrary to previous conventions, that 
homosexuality was more than merely a latent biological condition. Edmund Bergler, a leading 
psychoanalyst in 1954, stated that ‘Kinsey’s erroneous conclusions pertaining to homosexuality will be 
politically and propogandistically used against the United States abroad, stigmatising the nation as a 
whole in a whisper campaign’, (qtd. in Macherey (1978), pp. 59-60).
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relating to sexuaEty and exann^ies it as a product of a given culture and time in context. 
It is necessary to bear in mind that any such cultural artefacts wiE never reveal aE there is 
to know about human nature at any given time nor everything about sexuaEty.
We can take a lesson from more recent history as an example. A given society 
with particular views on sexuaEty that differed markedly from our own was that of Tudor 
England. In Bray's book, Homosexuality in Renaissance England, he foEows Foucault’s logic 
in saying that early-modern Britain did not possess the contemporary notion of 
‘homosexual'.3' There were such terms as buggery and sodomy but these were largely 
considered particular acts unto themselves and not necessarEy a class or mode of 
behaviour particular to an individual’s identity (except perhaps in the broader sense of 
one who is particularly lecherous).3" Such terms were part of a category that represented, 
as Bray says, ‘a more general notion: debauchery; and debauchery was a temptation to 
which aE, in principle at least, were subject'. Committing sodomy did not make one 
necessarEy effeminate and transvestism amounted to ‘a vice in its own right'.® It was not 
untE the 19* century, with cultural and technological forces at play, that the individual 
who engaged in same sex activity was perceived as a specific kind unto itself. The fact 
that the term ‘homosexual' was an invention of Victorian pseudo-psychology, and did 
not exist as a singular concept prior to that, is essential to this reading of ancient sources.
Modern concepts of sexuaEty—and particularly the notion of ‘homosexuaEty’— 
have arisen out of a lengthy historical process that incorporated features of Judaeo- 
Christianity and the epistemology inspired by it. The particular concept of the 
homosexual may be traced to the 1892 invention of one Charles GEbert Chaddock who 
is credited with having introduced the term by the Oxford English Dictionary (although the 
word itself did not actuaEy appear in the dictionary untE the 1976 edition).31 32 33 4 Prior to this 
advent, there was a notion of sexual ‘inversion’ associated with those who pursued same- 
sex relations. It was the dominant term used in regard to this state of ‘deviancy' 
throughout most of the nineteenth century. This idiomatic expression, as Halperin 
indicates, ‘referred to a broad range of deviant gender behaviour, of which homosexual
31 Cf. Foucault (1978).
32 The main reason that we have this information at all is because, at the time, the state felt compelled 
to torture it out of would-be offenders ostensibly lest the ‘wrath of God' be brought down upon the 
nation such as in the biblical examples of Sodom and Gomorrah (Davidson, 2001, p. 50).
33 Bray (1992), pp. 16, 34 and 88. This provides an interesting contrast with the Athenian Stranger’s 
condemnation of same-sex acts on the grounds that they are too pleasurable.
34 Halperin (1990), p. 15.
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desire was only a logical but indistinct group, while “homosexuality” focused on the 
narrower issue of sexual object choice’.®
The legacy of this distinction has been profound and far-reaching. A new 
taxonomy emerged in which a number of previous distinctions were obliterated in favour 
of a new and rather monolithic ideology. The differences between ‘active’ or ‘passive’ 
sexual parmers, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ sexual roles, ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ modes, 
pederasty and lesbianism that had traditionaEy operated in earlier discourses were all 
subsumed under a single category with relatively htde effort to distinguish one from the 
other® They were all deemed part of the same perceived dysfunction. This new 
taxonomy failed to evolve a clear technical language with which to examine human 
sexuality. Old prejudices reasserted themselves on the subject and made it, at the very 
least, a problematic issue for the academy in later times.
It is possible to posit, with relative security, that there was no such thing as 
ancient Greek homosexuslity. Our modern notion of homosexuaEty is a direct result of 
more recent historical processes. This highlights the necessity to avoid the term when 
talking of the ancient Greeks—‘same sex’ (e.g. intercourse, attraction, etc.) wiE have to 
suffice for this. The Victorians and thek immediate hens did not merely repress aE 
things sexual; they regulated and poEced sexuaEty through changing the cultural 
conventions. Through this process of altering the dominant cultural paradigms the 
homosexual, as Foucault says, ‘became a personage, a past, a case history, and a 
chEdhood, in addition to being a type of Efe, a Efe form, a morphology, with an 
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology... the sodomite had been a 
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species’.®7 The ‘homosexual’, thus 
clinically categorised, was isolated from normal individuals and ostracised as the 
quintessence of the other. On account of this active poEcing of this category by forces 
seeking what they perceived as ‘normaEsation’, individuals such as Oscar WEde and 
others of his feEow outcasts sometimes had cause to mourn. Our current conceptions of 
homosexuaEty are clearly derived from those of our Victorian forbears and this trend of 
thought foEows Eke a thread stretching from the distant past to the present. Evidence of 
this has inevitably been left behind ki texts as weE as in works of art.
One of the functions of so-caEed ‘queer theory’ is to expose and discuss issues of 
sexuaEty, including and beyond the role of women, in order* to take account of the often * * *
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 16.
37 Foucault (1978), p. 43.
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hidden ot neglected issues of same-sex relationships and their implicit ‘sexual politics' 
both within and without the ‘homosexual' sphere. Subject/object relations, performative 
models and linguistic usage figure prominently in this theoretical approach. Works of 
art, taken as a production of culture, reveal volumes about those who have laboured to 
produce them and those for whose consumption they were intended. This is particularly 
true of the subjects of ‘queer theory’. ‘We’, as Sinfield asserts, ‘don’t mind texts having 
political projects, of course; we believe that every representation, with its appeal for 
recognition—It is hke this, isn’t it—is poEtical'.3® The absence of a same-sex theme in a 
work of art may be just as important as its presence. If states of sexual orientation ar'e 
regarded as cultural constructs, then terms Eke ‘homosexuality’ and ‘hhteeoshxuaEty' may 
be cast as linguistic devices that demonstrate some of the sexual-pcHtical views of people 
of a given era and place.
Constructing Sexuality
Who would argue that Western attitudes toward sex have not undergone significant 
change in the last fifty years alone? One way in which the volatility of sexual values may 
be observed is through the significant shift in attitudes toward the (perceived) ‘natural’ 
roles of women and men that have taken place from the end of the nineteenth century to 
the beginning of the twenty-first. Presumably women and men have not changed 
considerably in terms of their physiological quahties in that span of time. Any significant 
changes will have been largely in psychology and, in terms of both cause and 
consequence, culture. Scrutiny of this situation has led some modern theorists to suspect 
that how we view ourselves as sexual entities is in no small part the result of social 
conditioning psychologically induced from an early age by the values and attitudes that a 
given society proffers for imitation/i In this way, a considerable number of people’s 
views on sexuaHt^r may be ‘constructed’ by a governing agency or a ruling class so 
inclined to undertake the regulation of sexual matters with propaganda and ‘spin'. Plato’s 
narrator envisions just such a method of social control, in the Imws, designed to be 
persuasive and to favour certam ideas and ideals over others. 38 39
38 Sinfield (1994), p. 38.
39 Examples of this abound. In a Carry On film from the early 1960s recently aired on the BBC, when 
the audience fails to turn up for a beauty contest, the impresario declares ‘Men not interested in 
girls...? I can’t believe it. It’s unhealthy’. Tongue-in-cheek or subtle socialisation? An often-played 
advert shows scenes of men and women romantically enjoying a holiday in the Bahamas, whilst a 
singer intones ‘what the world needs now is love, sweet love... ’ the small print indicates that the offer 
is valid for couples that include ‘one man and one woman only’.
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In a society that allows its citizens to question its values freely, individuals may 
assume a more active role in shaping the contemporary discourse on sexuality. 
Alternatively, a given society may prescribe its models of behaviour whilst precluding the 
free participation of others in that same capacity (e.g. Magnesia in the Jmjws). One way of 
constructing sexuality is for a society to define the accepted roles for men and women, 
according to specific criteria of norms, and then actively (and sometimes forcefully) 
encourage them to adhere to these models as if they were ‘natural’ law. The employment 
of specificaEy engineered language is as integral to this process of influence as are the 
performative models presented for imitation.
The observation that personal views of sexuality are in no small part a result of 
cultural and psychological factors imposed on the individual from outside him/herself 
not only applies to modern times. It should, if the theory is sound, hold true at aE points 
in the development of human civEisation. The process by which societal norms of 
sexuahty are implemented perhaps underwent a paraEel development concurrent with 
and integral to that of civEisation itself. It is ongoing. Therefore, the process by which 
sex roles have developed (or been constructed) within, e.g. the ancient Athenian city- 
state, Sparta and Krete make up significant elements of our common heritage. These 
and others have influenced modern thinking on sexuahty through their contribution to 
the connected continuum of human ideological advancement.
Amongst the ancient Athenians, Plato in particular has left no smaE mark on the 
subject of sexuahty and his narrator in the Law, undertaking no less than the creation of 
a new society, has outlined some specific sexual mores to be upheld by his hypothetical 
citizenry. A primary method, that he employs consists of redefining the virtue of 
‘manhnels’, in his own terms, and then enforcing the imitation of specific performative 
models for both men and women. This value system is to be inculcated by means of 
various civic institutions and official state doctrines on its ‘naturalness' and ‘correctness'. 
It provides a neat paradigm for a process of social control.
Nature probably plays more than a propagandistic role in constructing sexudhy? 
It is possible to assert that many of the psychological aspects of perceived sex roles are 
sociaEy defined according to relatively arbitrary values imposed by groups in power at a 
given time. The only ‘natural' sexual attributes, therefore, would appear to be those 
pecuhar to each sex as regards its differences relative to reproduction. It is also possible 
to theorise that, due to the two sexes’ various physiological differences, there are also 
some behavioural attributes that are sexuaEy specific. These fundamental attributes
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would appear to be, according to Darwinian evolution, somehow helpful toward the 
cause of human survival.
Sexual values and society are locked together in a close relationship. Advanced 
social units (e.g. city-states) regarded their own survival as the basis for their sexual 
regulations. This perhaps resulted in a particularly ‘manly’ concept of honour that is 
often associated with warfare.40 At some stage in our history the state and religion began 
to engineer moralities deliberately, on whatever metaphysical and authoritative 
groundings, that greatly influenced their societies’ views on sex. As Vance indicates, ‘the 
history of the construction of sexuality in modern, state-level society shows that sexuality 
is an actively contested political and symbolic terrain in which groups struggle to 
implement sexual programs and alter sexual arrangements and ideologies’.41 This appears 
to have held true as much for Classical Greece as for the cultures of today.
Amongst the natural influences affecting sexuality one might enumerate such 
things as the weather, geological phenomena, proximity to food/resources, genetics etc. 
Under the category of ‘nurture’ (culture) one might include politics, law, fashion, religion 
(cultic activity, mysticism etc.) along with the moralities favoured by these. Both natural 
and cultural influences have an impact on the sexual values of a given society. The 
points of convergence between them, as indicated earlier, may be so numerous as to 
collapse the apparent differences between these two categories altogether into a state of 
indeterminacy of meaning. Even if a culture has intentionally constructed its sex roles 
out of a perceived necessity for survival and self-perpetuation, one is not prevented from 
observing the particular social (artificial) response to natural phenomena. For example, a 
given culture may base its conception of manliness on a natural tendency for most men 
to be physically stronger than most women. Therefore, athletic prowess and martial skill 
would be important facets of sexual identity. In such a society, to have been born a male 
might automatically oblige one to partake of athletic and warlike activities in order to live 
up to the established ideals of masculinity. Or, a given society might do completely 
otherwise. It depends on the chosen set of values present in a culture in concert with the 
influence of natural factors.
Ancient Athenian Women and Men: (Re)constructing their Modes of Behaviour
40 Cf. my chapter IV and below.
41 (1995), p. 41.
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Philosophers, historians, orators, dramatists and others have all added to a cultural 
discourse on sexuality in the ancient worldA Such evidences as we have, however, only 
indicate what some people said and wrote. Their representations are often idealised or 
culturally biased in some way. Additionally, the reading of ancient sexuahty through the 
distorting views of modern thinking on the subject should be avoided as much as 
possible. Translating the term ‘sex', not only across languages but cultures and time as 
weh, presents a problem. This is especially true in the case of sex’s modern meaning of 
‘sexual intercourse’, or even ‘sexuahty'. The ancient Greek phrase xd d^poS'ldia, a 
general term used to express a number of sexual nuances including sexual intercourse, 
htee-a^r means ‘the things of Aphrodite’.
There is reaUy no direct translation for xd d^poSlOla into English except 
perhaps the archaic use of ‘venereal' that maintains in its etymology the divine name of 
Venus but now denotes a less than divine state. There is no truly equivalent term in 
ancient Greek for the Enghsh word ‘sex' in its common or scientific sense. Clearly, the 
modern impact of this term makes it largely useless as a viable translation for 
xd d^poOtda. The ancient Greeks spoke of what we think of as sex in relation to gods 
such as Eros and Aphrodite who functioned, at least in part, as mental abstractions for 
human decisions and deeds.4" These deities are ideologically integral to interpreting the 
cultural ethos and psychological world-views contemporary with those times. We have to 
make recourse to a similar abstraction in coping with their views. Pangle, in his 
discussion of this problematic concept, hhlpfuhy suggests for xd d^poScda the 
paradigm ‘erotic things’/" One must strive not to confuse this as being a perfect 
equivalent for the Enghsh ‘sex’ (even simply in the sense of fornication) but the Greek 
term may be construed as bearing comparable significance. The situation becomes much 
more complex when we compare and contrast the sex roles and sexual identities of today 
with those considered to have existed amongst the ancient Greeks.
What did they think about masculinity and femininity? Or, perhaps a better 
question would be: what were the dominant notions that they held on the subject, as we 
have them, amongst the extant texts? Absolute knowledge of these things is probably * 43
"" Some good examples of ancient authors who exemplify this Classical discourse on sex include, but 
are not limited to, the following: Plato, Aristotle (esp. Politics 1269b32-3 sq.), Aeschylus 
{Eumenides), Aristophanes (Lysistrata, Ekklesiazousai), Euripides {Medea, Alkestis and Hippolytus), 
Sophokles {Antigone, etc.), Herodotos (1.173.4,1.203,1.4.176, etc.), Thukydides (11.45, III.74.2), and 
Xenophon (esp. Lak. Pol. 1.9 and the Oikonomikos).
43 Cf. Aghion, Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 99-101 and 297-8.
"" 0980), pp. 515-16 n. 35.
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unobtainable. No comprehensive understanding of human sexuality has ever attained a 
consensus about aU the particulars of this vast and difficult subject and we should not 
expect the ancient Greeks to have done so either.4" The study of sexuality is an ongoing 
cultural discourse that remains open to many considerations and shows no evident signs 
of concluding. There is no reason to assume that the ancient Greeks should have any 
ready answers for us about how they viewed sex outlined in some categorical handbook. 
What we have is an imperfect picture of ancient sexual practices and values based on the 
words of certain authors. These, at least, indicate that private and social relationships 
between women and men were strikingly different from those of modern, Western 
civEisation.
Female participation in most levels of society outside the home seems to have 
been rather hmited. One gets the sincere Enprelsicn that most educated women in 
Classical Athens were non-ciiiznns.?? A rather rigid dichotomy allegedly existed and this 
was especially true amongst the upper classes. Ancient Athenian citizen-men lived at 
home with their wives and famEies but practised their careen primarEy in the public 
sphere of the polis. By contrast, citizen-women appear to have been generaUy restricted 
to the private sphere of the oikos (funerals, weddings and festivals being the major 
exceptions). This division of the sexes extended also into education and sex role 
stereotyping and, as with societies today, started from an early age. It is possible that by 
the fourth century some women were, from time to time, educated on an equal footing 
with males but no conventions mandated ttii^.?7 An example testifying to the existence 
of educated women in Classical Greece is the gravestone of Phanostrate, presumably one 
of the first female physicians in Ahenns.'1? The laudatory nature of her epitaph implies 
that not only was Phanostrate highly educated but that she was highly respected as weE. 
It would appear that she was something of an exception in this capacity or, perhaps, 
representative of some of the changes happening in the fourth century. Classical 
Athenian girls seem to have been, on the whole, significantly less educated than boys (if 
it is fair to say that they were educated at aE) though some were evidently taught to read 
and write. That they had some degree of education is impEed but not known*? * 2
45 The subject of continuity of change concerned the ancients from Parmenides and Heraklitos 
onwards; cf. Golden and Toohey (1997), p. 1.
46 For Aspasia, who was a Milesian, as the composer of Perikles’ funeral oration cf. Menex. 236b, on 
her eloquence and her role as Sokrates’ own mistress of rhetoric 235e. Diotima is also introduced in 
Plato’s narrative {Sym, 20Id) as a foreigner.
2 Cf. Pomeroy (1977), pp. 51-68, esp. p. 60.
48 Qtd. in Pomeroy (1997), p. 133. Also cf. Clairmont (1993), 2.890, mid fourth century Menidi.
49 They were most likely not instructed in the use of weapons. Cf. my chapter III.
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There appears to have been a popular (male) attitude to the effect that Athenian 
citizen-women, if not aE women, were ‘secretive’ and ‘cunning’. This may have 
developed because they displayed such quahties resulting from their enforced segregation 
in the private sphere. It may have also been largely a matter of (misrepresentation. 
Xenophon, through his narrator Ischomachos, wrote that ‘it is seemly for a woman to 
remain at home and not to be out of doors; but for a man to remain inside is a 
disgrace’.50 Women who were outside the usual boundaries of citizen-wives seem to 
have been either foreigners or prostitutes. It is difficult to separate the real, about which 
relatively Ettle is known, from ideahsed representations. The ruling male-ehte amongst 
the ancient Athenians seem to have considered this situation in which respectable and 
feminine women keep to the private sphere and men rule the pubhc to be the natural 
state of affairs.
How does one discuss ancient sexuaEty? As with the status of women in Athens 
and elsewhere, we seek to reconstruct an image, based on the extant sources, and then 
develop paradigms accordingly. Again, more than a httle significance resides in the 
manner of language that one employs. It should be stressed that no such terms as 
‘homosexual’ or ‘heterosexual’ existed in the ancient Greek world. For purposes of 
clarity, it is more correct to utihse ‘same-sex’ or ‘mixed-sex’ to denote the sexual relations 
that transpired between individuals. The ancients did distinguish between different types 
of sexual practise. The terms employed, as with their modern equivalents, were pohticahy 
charged and held broad social significance. Again, there are profound differences 
between their paradigms and our own.
This highhghts the necessity to clarify more of the incompatibihties inherent in 
reading one culture through the views of another. At this point in history, in the 
industrialised West, we have developed sub-categories unavaEable to the ancients that 
compose the greater category of sexuahty and denote several perceived types of sexual 
identity.51 Three major sub-categories have arisen to account for the dominant forms of 
sexual expression. ‘Homosexuahty’ is used refer to a state wherein one chiefly has sexual 
relations, emotions, thoughts and/or attractions to members of the same sex. 
‘Heterosexuahty’ refers to a state wherein an individual of one biological sex chiefly 
experiences such attractions, emotions, thoughts and/or deeds with members of the
50 Oik. VII.30. If an Athenian woman was seen outside at parties with men, it appears that this could be 
taken as proof that she was a courtesan and not a lawful wife; Isaios IIU3-14. Cf. my chapter VI.
51 My own feeling is that ‘homosexuality’, ‘heterosexuality’ and ‘bisexuality’ are altogether artificial 
constructions and that human sexuality is more like a continuum (or spectrum) between these perceived 
norms.
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other sex;—sometimes (inaccurately) called the ‘opposite’ sex. ‘Bisexuality’ tends to mean 
a state wherein these erotic sentiments are aimed toward member's of both the male and 
female sex (both together and/or separately) with whom one might engage in sexual 
intercoue■sh. There are other categories such as ‘transgendered’ and ‘eunuchdom' that 
skirt the edges of the modern tripartite definition and, there are others stih beyond 
th.ese.33 TUs tripartite system outlined above is the one that is mainly recognised but 
some will prefer- to envisage a bipartite system that excludes ‘bisexuahty' and refuses to 
acknowledge any other states than ‘homosexuality’ and ‘heterosexuality’ however defined.
Whilst modern pop-culture may jokingly refer to ancient sexuahty in terms of the 
stereotypes of today, any serious approach to the issue must consider the depths of 
complexity in appropriate detail Cantareha’s summary account of ancient Greek 
sexuahty stresses its difference:
The Greeks were rhetalnlr bisexual, in the sense that when they were 
boys they were loved by a man, while in the first years of their own 
adulthood they preferred to make love to adolescent boys. Later in hfe 
they chose women, and even when they wer-e married they were ahowed 
to have their paidikia.. .but even in ancient Greece, inevitably, there were 
men whose impulses were directed decisively if not exclusively towards a 
single sex (whether the female or the male).5"
Again, a term hke bisexual (as with homosexual or heterosexual) cannot truly apply to the 
ancient Greeks in the same manner as it is employed in modern Enghsh. However, 
Cantareha’s rather broad formulation neatly describes the situation as we understand it. 
Attempts have been made to reconstruct the sexual values of the ancients in terms that 
we can understand. The dominant trend in modern scholarship since the sixties has been 
to assert that the prunary sexual mindset of Plato's er-a consisted of a fairly rigid polarity 
in terms of sex roles and sexual practice. The boundaries of this paradigm are described 
as a mascuhne/artcve state and a feminine/passive state. 52 53
52 I hesitate to include other similar subjects as would sit under the broad category of ‘sexuality’ since 
some of them are illegal and/or immoral to the current mindset, nevertheless such a list includes, but is 
not limited to bestiality, necrophilia, sadism and masochism (separately or together), dominance and 
submission, fetishism of all sorts, cross-dressing and masturbation. The human mind seems quite 
imaginative when it concerns itself with the subject of sex.
53 (1992), p. 216.
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Foucault and Dover's model tends to depict sex not as a mutual activity between 
two equal individuals. It portrays it as something that is decidedly done to one by 
another.5" The sex act, so conceived, polarises and divides its participants into two 
distinct and opposite classifications. This view is ultimately phaUocentric and places 
greater significance on the active agents (penetrators) whilst marginalizing the passive 
recipients of penetration. As Halperin describes, ‘the imertive partner is construed as a 
sexual agent, whose phallic penetration of another person's body expresses sexual 
“activity,” whereas the receptive partner is construed as a sexual patient, whose 
submission to phallic penetration expresses sexual “passivity.”’?? The relationship 
between active and passive partners, perceived here in terms of dominance and 
submission, is characterised as that between a social superior and a social inferior. This 
sort of relationship is often seen as occurring between people of differing ages and social 
standings, thus pointing to a disparity in status.5"
There was a stage in their development when some citizen youths could 
undertake the ‘passive’ role with relative impunity. Later, when they reached adulthood, 
there appears to have been more of a stigma associated with anally receiving another 
man's penis. The ymposium and the gymnasium were primarily institutions of the upper 
classes that bore particular associations with lame-lex intercourse. Both of these venues 
provided occasion for male-male sexual desire to be physically reahsed within an 
acceptable cultural context. By at the early 6th century b.c.e., at least, some of the ancient 
Greeks seem to have regarded it as perfectly natural that an attractive male should arouse 
the same degree of sexual excitement in another male as one might expect would a 
beautiful woman.5" Interestingly, it appears that a same-sex lover was considered capable 
of the same obsessive longing, devotion and lelf-sacrifice that modern romantic Eterature 
associates with the passions between members of the opposite sexes.5" Even so, in 
relationships between adults and youths, sexual excitement on the part of a ‘junior’ 
partner appears to have been less than ideal.5" Sustained same-sex relationships, such as
2 Cf. Gf, p. 16, pp. 84-106 and Foucault (1984), pp. 46-7.
2(19)90), p. 30.
2 According to Foucault (1984), p.215, ‘sexual relations—always conceived in terms of the model act 
of penetration, assuming a polarity that opposed activity and passivity—were seen as being of the same 
type as the relationship between a superior and a subordinate, an individual who dominates and one 
who is dominated, one who commands and one who complies, one who vanquishes and one who is 
vanquished’.
2 GH, pp. 60-8.
58 Ibid. pp. 50-2, 123 sq.
59 In the Phaedrus (255d), Plato’s narrator has indicated that the boy-beloved cannot reciprocate eros 
for his lover but rather experiences a form of affection (philia) which can never be on equal footing
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that between Pausanius and Agathon in Plato’s Symposium (177d, 193b-c), were probably 
rather unusual. Some ancient Greeks and others appear to have regarded the concept of 
same-sex marriages as a source of humour and contempt?0 Broadly speaking, societal 
restraints present within ancient Greek culture appear to have both encouraged a certain 
type of same-sex indulgence whilst, at the same time, discouraging long-term 
commitments to such a lifestyle.
It seems to have been difficult for an Athenian man or youth to engage in love 
affairs with citizen-women since they were usually kept indoors and almost always under 
some kind of supervision.* 60 61 Owing to this segregation, it was perhaps easier for freeborn 
males to partake of erotic forays with members of the same sex (along with, potentially, 
non-citizen women and youths) without running the risk of ‘deflowering’ an unwed 
virgin or committing adultery with a citizen-woman—either of which could incur severe 
penalties?2 There were additional incentives for engaging in temporary (but accepted) 
same-sex liaisons with youths who had not reached their civic majority. Such 
relationships in ancient Athens seem to have held an educational aspect to them as well 
as the potential for social advancement.63 *Humphreys offers a formula to describe this 
phenomenon:
.. .a boy was first eromenos., the object of romantic passion, introduced into 
adult society by an older lover who took his father’s place as a model of 
adult behaviour; later he became a lover and educator of younger boys in 
his turn.. .he would not drop out of the life of the gymnasium and andron 
until some time after marriage, when his own sons were beginning to 
grow up... thus was regarded as the normal sequence of sex roles—
with the feelings of his adult lover. Cf. Xenophon {Symp. 8.21) where ‘the boy does not share in the 
man’s pleasure in intercourse, as a woman does; sober, he looks upon the other drunk with sexual 
desire’.
60 Xenophon {Lak. Pol. 11.12) makes the extraordinary ethnographical claim that, amongst the 
Boeotians, men and boys lived together as if married, cf. Symp. VIII.3-4 (although there is no way to 
verify this). Otherwise, the notion existed elsewhere as the subject of derogatory jokes, cf. Aristotle, 
Politics 131 lal6. It would appear that the Romans had a similar idea also reserved for the sake of 
ridicule, cf. the Life of Antoninus Elagabalus XI (c. 4d’-5th century, a Roman text of uncertain 
authorship), where some of Elagabalus’ male courtiers were reputed to have announced they had 
husbands (even if untrue, it indicates that the concept existed as a source of scorn).
61 Blundell (1995), p. 135, states that ‘Nowadays, there seems little doubt that sexual segregation did at 
least exist as an upper-class ideal’. Cf. Xenophon {Oikonomikos VII.30) where Ischomachos sums it 
up saying that ‘it is seemly for a woman to remain at home and not be out of doors; but for a man to 
stay inside, rather than devoting himself to outdoor pursuits, is disgraceful’.
62 GH, pp. 1-49-51 ; GPM, pp. 209-16. Cf. Ogden (1996) for the post-Periklean concerns for legitimacy.
" Gunderson (2000), p. 169. Cf. Aristopanes, Ekkl. 112-113, for the notion that same-sex intercourse
could be a means to social advancement in ancient Athens.
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mockery of homosexuals [sic] in comedy is directed only at those who 
deviate from this norm.6"
Eventually a freeborn male citizen was expected to marry and beget heirs. Long-term 
relationships between members of the same-sex would have been impractical to this end. 
We do not know how often an adult male might have continued to be an eromenos or 
erastes with other men in the symposion, the gymnasion or elsewhere.
Dover and Foucault's (re) construction of the sex roles of ancient Athenian men 
and women seems to stress the deviant quality of engaging exclusively in same-sex 
intercourse. Their theory posits that there existed two extremes into which most men 
would have fallen: the manly penetrator-s (often associated with hoplites) and the dnmanln 
kinaidoi. It supposes that, amongst the citizen-soldier class, displays of bravery and 
masculine prowess were the standards of behaviour. These idealisations sought to 
uphold a specific model for imitation, however imperfecdy, in reality. Dover argues that 
the ehlf-definition of the community as a Vigorous elite’ was a prevalent theme in terms 
of cultural identity.^ In the words of Xenophon, ‘the pursuit of honour (philotimid) is not 
a natural component of the irrational animals nor of all human beings; those who have a 
natural desire for praise and honour are at the greatest distance from cattle—they are 
considered to be men, no longer merely human beings'.6" Alskhcnee asks Demosthenes 
whether the Athenians would prefer to have ‘ten thousand hoplites Hke PhEon, with 
bodies as well-made as his and souls as disciplined, or thirty thousand kinaidoi. exactly Hke 
you?’"7
Certainly not every eromenos was regarded as a kinaidos. Both of these terms, 
consequendy, refer to the states of desiring and being desired. The term kinaidos may 
have indicated a sexual pathic given to repetitivelf grat^jF^-'ing the excesesve dessre for 
pleauure/i There is, however, no way of determining how often desires led to acts of 
sexual congress. Dover and Foucault thtt dee kiaaidss wss an adult mate-
citizen who preferred being passively peneteatad radier than enielging in active 
penetration. A key tenet of the penetrator/p^enetratea model is that the kinaidos was * 66 67 *
" Humphreys (1983), p. 17.
55 GPM, pp. 160-7.
66 Hiero VII.3
67II. 150-1. An important issue raised by this passage, to be later discussed, is that of self-discipline vs. 
the lack thereof.
55 Davidson (2001), p. 41.
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generally considered to be effeminate and 'womanish'.6? Dover asserts that the status of 
kinaidos was associated with sexual promiscuity, ‘womanliness’ and passively subjecting 
one’s self to another man's sexual penetration—incompatible and contrary to the manly 
role of the hoplite. The kinaidoi, as Foucault says, seem to have consisted of those who 
were ‘automatically assumed, according to the protocols that polarised penetrators and 
penetrateds, to desire to be penetrated by other men, which assimilates them to the 
feminine role’.* 70 71 * 73In a society where displays of bravery (andreia, which also means 
‘manliness’) were paramount, one who did not behave appropriately, or who did the 
opposite of what was expected, as Winner says (following Foucault's lead), might be 
subject ‘to symbolic demotion from the ranks of the brave and manly to be identified 
widi the opposite class of women’.7’
Societal forces reinforced the symbohc paradigms. Grosz, in keeping with 
continental academics, argues that ‘sexual difference was imagined in the past and was 
largely unconstrained by what was known about this or that bit of anatomy, this or that 
psychological process.. .it derived instead from particular rhetorical, cultural and political 
exigencies of the moment’.?? This may be an ovef-generaHsation and is somewhat 
reductive. It particularly stresses the significance of language in relation to sex. But 
practising the art of rhetoric or entering into the political arena entail more than words 
alone. There were models of masculinity that pubhc speakers upheld in terms of 
physical manner and deportment. This had broader, propagandistic effects on the 
populace as a whole. ‘Rhetorical theory and practice', as Gunderson indicates, ‘and their 
intetrelationlhip thus offer an overt example of the process of subject production'.?? 
What better way to advertise an accepted sexual norm than through the expected modes 
of behaviour of those persons most in the pubhc eye?
Performative modelling is one level of ancient sexual construction and personal 
psychology is another. Halperin maintains that ancient sexual relations functioned in 
terms of individual perceptions of power and status. These, he argues, were played out 
through acts that reinforced dominance and submission.74 Negative quahties are ascribed 
to the submissive partner. The penetrator/penetrated model suggests that an adult male
2 I will later argue that this appears to have more to do with their lack of self-control in respect to the 
pursuit of pleasure.
70 (1984), p. 220; cf. Davidson (1997), p. 169.
71 Halperin, Winkler and Zeitlin (1990), p. 178. Cf. too Plato, Timaeus 90e, where cowardly men are 
reincarnated as women. And cf. GPM, pp. 95-102.
n (1990), p.4; cf. Laqueur (1990).
73 (2000), p. 28.
74 (1990), p. 33.
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citizen subjecting himself to the role of being a ‘patient’ must have been publicly 
perceived as an abhorrent prospect. Winkler cites, in evidence for this, Aiskhines’ 
rhetorical encouragement to those who desire boy-lovers to seek out their quarries 
amongst foreigners and metics so that citizen-boys may avoid social demotion.75 76 * 78 *Dover 
and Foucault argue that men who had the desire to be penetrated by other men recanted 
the ‘proper’, mascuhne role, which was thought to be naturahy superior, in favour of an 
inferior, ‘feminine’ role.?? Aiskhines seems to confirm this attitude when he wrote that 
Timarkhos was ‘a man who is male in body but has committed a woman’s transgressions’ 
and, echoing Plato’s narrator in the Laws, ‘outraged himself contrary to nature’.7? We 
shah presently return to the case of Timarldios.
This theory of accepted ancient Greek social norms also extends to ‘boy love’. 
The object of desire in question would have been sociahy inferior and thus more readily 
subjected to the role of sexual ‘patient’ by an older male who would have been higher on 
the social scale. It must be stressed that ancient ‘boy love’ is not the same thing as the 
modern concept of paedophilia. The differences between ancient and modern culture 
preclude so easy a comparison. There are also problems with including ‘boy love’ in the 
same category as same-sex intercourse between wihing adults. At least, there is a 
difference between a wihing and an unwilling participant and it is difficult to determine 
(even for us today) exactly what age constitutes an ‘age of consent’.?* The active/passive 
dichotomy and the implicitly masculine role of the lover and the feminine role of the 
beloved may be applied to ‘boy love’ as well as to same-sex relations with older males. 
But was it a zero-sum relationship? The sheer amount of poetry and other literature 
devoted to the pursuit of youths seems to suggest something beyond this.7"
The penetrator/penetrated model is not an end to the discussion. It represents a 
major step in our understanding of ancient sexuality. Davidson objects that it is not an 
accurate representation. He argues that the problem lies in the interpretation of ancient 
sources through the distorting effects of modern values. Other influences may have also 
affected Dover and Foucault’s zero-sum model. Something Kke it may have been more 
so the case in ancient Rome, ‘where’, according to Davidson, ‘there does indeed seem to
751195. Attitudes on sex in Athens underwent a shift in the fourth century that Aiskhines perhaps 
reflects. In the fifth century, same-sex intercourse was possibly less of a problem amongst citizens.
76 Cf. pseudo-Aristotle, Problemata 4.26, discussed in Gh, pp. 168-70.
"1.185.
78 Sexual intercourse with children under the age of twelve was apparently considered ‘infamous’ and 
worthy of some kind of ‘social opprobrium’, Cantareila (1992), p. 42; cf. the case of Strato in Greek 
AMfiWogyXII.228. Even so, the law against sexual violence mentioned in Lysias, On the Murder of 
Eratosthenes, 32, does not seem to include children. Cf. my chapter V.
" Cf. Cantarella (1992), pp. 36-42, for a discussion of the sources.
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be evidence (still less than in modem cultures) of a metaphorical use of sex as 
domination and t:elumphy80 81 82The rhlutiveln more recent social force of homophobia could 
have iniluenchd Dover and Foucault’s theory.
It would be unfair to dismiss them outright. Their work represents the 
culmination of considerable thought and research on the subject. Davidson's theories 
too have their limitations. A new formulation that incorporates both academic camps 
seems to be the correct way to proceed. There is clearly something pertinent to the 
observation that the ancient Greeks (hspeciulln the Athenians) applied significance to 
sexual relations in terms of who was, as it wer-e, ‘on top'. Chelaln values were attached to 
the act of sexually penetrating another inalividdal, who, in turn had (not insignificantly) 
been penetrated by that person. But what does this mean? A re-examination of relevant 
sources is essential.
Ancient evidence is far from clear in indicating the precise quality of ancient 
sexuahty. If the sort of implications that Dover has proposed existed, then there should 
be textual material to sustain iECs view. Yet the ancient authors, as ever, are reluctant to 
lend so much unambiguous support. For example, Bain, after an exhaustive search to 
locate uses of the Greek verb pugi^o (TDYa2lco—to bugger), found only one Classical 
example. It occurs in an inscription on an harln Olflh-rhnturn cup from Gela in Sccian that 
reads ‘Who wrote iECs will bugger him who is reading it'. The context is lost and it might 
be referring to any number of potential situations about which we know nothing. 
Nonetheless, Bain writes that this repe-esents ‘clear evidence that such practices [i.e. 
aggressive uses of the verb] existed also in the Greek world'.8’ It is arguably the case that 
one instance of an aggressive use of pugfo did exist. We have no evidence of any others. 
It could just as easily be the case that the missing context of this one instance of the verb 
could indicate a playful, possibly even erotic, rather than aggressive usage. But this is 
presently unknowable and it is dangerous to speculate on such uncertain ground.
The zero-sum model is further problematishd when one considers another 
important term. Kinaidos (Ktvaal6n^) is, as Davidson says, ‘a veen rare word in classical 
Greek and its usage seems quite respectable’, at least, ‘respectable' compared to Dover’s 
interpretation of it®2 It is only to be found in Plato, Aiskhcnes and in one dubious comic 
fragment that would appear to make its employment as an explicit reference to anal
80(20(n), p. 28.
81 (1991), pp. 68-9.
82 (2001), p. 23.
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penetration rather doubtful.83 84 85 *Plato’s use of kinaidos in the Gorgias refers to an individual 
whose existence is devoted to the pursuit of pleasure and who lacks lelf-maltety 
(consistent with a similar theme in the Law) A A man who voluntarily surrendered his 
‘masculine' identity for the ‘feminine’ due to a lack of self-mastery in the face of pleasure 
could be regarded in a negative manner®5 Aiskhinel never uses kinaidos to refer directly to 
Timarkhos whom Dover and others assume to be a sexual ‘patient’ and therefore subject 
to ridicule. Instead, he makes reference to the kinaidia of Timarkhos’ patron 
Demosthenes and ‘here and elsewhere the word is associated with effeminate dress hke 
that of an adulterer, moichofdA The law quoted in Aiskhines, as Dover indicates, ‘said 
nothing of “unnatural practices”, “gross indecency”, and the likes and thus it appears not 
to have imposed any penalty on those who submitted to homosexual [sic] acts for love or 
fam®7
It may be irrelevant whether the kinaidos is penetrator or penetrated. What 
appears to matter most is his hedonistic pursuit of pleasure. It is this that is associated 
with effeminacy—a ‘womanish’ insatiabihty, especially, for sexual pleasure. The 
condition of being a sexual pathic was later described in the Aristotehan Vrohlemata as a 
state of ‘insatiabihty', or aplestia, rather than having anything necessarily to do with being 
penetrated by a man’s penis per .v.88 Effeminacy and ‘softness' then, in the case of the 
kinaidos have less to do with the perceived cultural stigma about being penetrated. It 
particularly indicates an inclination toward luxury and the pursuit of too much pleasure®9
Euruproktos (£i)pV7tpC0KT6^), hterahy ‘wide-arsed', may be ‘seen as an attack on 
whorishness (excessive penetration, or even what we would have to caU “anal 
eagerness”), rather than on the submission to another's penetrative actions in itself.90 
Again, the hnphcation appears to be that of partaking of sexual pleasure to excess. It
“ Phylarchus, FGrHftl, F45. Kinaidos may also be found in Plutarch’s Moralia 126a, 705e, but, even 
though it follows a similar tack to that of Plato and Aiskhines, I shall exclude this as being outside the 
temporal context of our concern.
84 Gorgias 493a-494e. Cf. my chapter VII.
85 Hypereides (fr. 215 DK) summons a personification of Nature as witness against an alleged kinaidos 
who has forfeited his manliness saying ‘What if we were conducting this case with Nature as judge— 
Nature who has distinguished male and female so that each performs its own proper duty and office— 
and what if I were to demonstrate that this man has misused his own body in a feminine way? Surely 
Nature would be shocked and astonished that any man would not think it a most blessed gift for him to 
have been born a man and that he had despoiled Nature’s kindness to him, hastening to transform 
himself into a woman’.
2 Davidson (2001), p. 23; Aiskhines 1.131, 171,11.99, 166.
2 GH, p. 23.
88 IV.26.
2 Cf. my chapter IV on andreia.
90 Davidson (2001), p. 22. Cf. Timaeus, in FGrH 566 F 1124b; Aristophanes, Acharnians, 106-7, 
Knights 720-1.
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does not seem to indicate that those who receive anal penetration are necessarily inferior. 
Neither does it specifically point to their ‘passive’ submission to a dominant penetrator. 
‘Wide-arsed’, however, is clearly an example of invective and may at least be said to stress 
the consequences of excessive penetration on the penetrated’s anatomy. It seems correct 
to view it as a form of comic ridicule directed at the penetrated. It is, however, more 
difficult to determine the degree of negativity that this term might or might not have 
denoted.
Katapugon (KatcOTfrycov) is another word that potentially presents some problems 
to the zero-sum model. It was employed to mean something Eke ‘lecherous’. When 
Lysistrata uses this term, for example, despairing of the female sex as ‘completely 
katapugon, she would seem to be making a statement -about women’s perceived lack of 
sexual self-control.9’ Dover has asserted that this usage in Aristophanes indicates 
contempt felt by the active penetrator for the passive penetrated and that katapugon here 
EnpEes a complete sexual pathic.91 2 *It is possible that an ancient Athenian audience might 
have recalled, at that point in the play, a stereotype of the sexual pathic, but there appears 
to be no firm basis to assume, therefore, that lechery necessarily indicates a pathic state. 
Just as some early twentieth century cinematic melodramas might recall certain popular 
notions of women being given to excessive fhghts of fancy or emotion, there is no 
reason to generaEse that people actually behaved Eke that, on the whole, or that those 
popular notions were somehow correct or accurate for describing a cultural norm.
Dover has translated the verb laikago (AoCiKdCco), employed in comic sources, in 
the aggressive sense of the modern EngEsh invective ‘fuck’. Despite the fact that Jocelyn 
has demonstrated that this word refers exclusively to fellatio, Dover insists that this 
makes no difference and has continued to render it as ‘get fucked’, etc.”® Some uses of 
laikasp may be said to denote disgust (whether the act of feUaitio involved men or 
women). But these, as Parker indicates, reflect certain ancient Greek notions on 
contamination and pollution {miasma) more so than anything else.94 There seems to be 
Ettle or no indication of laikago being employed to indicate aggression, dominance or
91 Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 137. Cf. Davidson (2001), p. 22.
92 GH, pp. 113, 142-3. He argues that, despite the word's general usage as ‘lecherous’, the ‘original', 
more specific reading referring to pathics could have been adduced by an ancient Athenian.
9® Jocelyn (1980). He acknowledges Jocelyn's insights in a supplementary note to the second edition 
of Greek Homosexuality (1989), pp. 204-5, but continues to support an aggressive meaning for the 
verb.
94 (1983), pp. 99-100. Cf. Aristophanes Knights 1288-9.
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submission. Dover's intractability on the matter is worthy of note as is his lack of 
evidence for refuting Jocelyn and Parker.
There is at least one potential example of aggressive penht:eation of one man by 
another that offers some evidence for the zero-sum theory to have functioned in a 
specific context. The notion that penetration could function as an act of domination is 
found in at least one source. We are told that there was a law in ancient Athens whereby 
a man who caught a seducer in the act of sexual lntercodese with his wife, mother, 
daughter or concubine was permitted either to slay the offender outright or, if he chose, 
he could maltreat the seducer in some humEiatlag manner.”5 Types of maltreatment 
could include shoving ‘radishes’ up his anus and forcefully hxteacling the offender's 
pubic hair.”6 The insertlve aspect of this procedure, if it was ever practiced in reality, does 
denote an aggressive form of penetration. But it refers to a situation in which dominance 
and submission of a particular sort are impEcilln occurring in a specific context beyond 
normative sexuahty.* 96 97 8The context is one of intentional humiliation with an express 
purpose of aggression. The same concept cannot be generalised to include aU incidents 
of sexual penetration. Some types may clearly be acts of dominance (e.g. in the instance 
of rape) but, in the case of a loving relationship, there is no reason to presume that sexual 
penetration should amount to annlding other one aspect of a mutually enjoyable 
experience.
Finding a zero-sum relationship in same-sex congress, by recourse to ancient 
conceptions of rape, is problematic but it is possible to observe some connection. 
Xenophon has drawn a comparison between same-sex intercourse and the sort of hybris 
related to rape. Does it support for the zero-sum model? He appears to vilify the (male) 
practitioners of same-sex, saying:
But you compel sexual relations before they are required, trying 
everything and using men as women; thus you educate (ft(XuC£sf£1i£) your 
friends, committing hybris against them through the night.”®
Omitowoju interprets this, according to Dover’s model, to mean that the ‘issue must be 
passivity and penetrability, which normatively characterise the female in sexual
" Lysias L49.
96 MacDowell (1978), p. 124. Cf. Aristophanes, Clouds 1083, Wealth 168; and Eubulus in PCG, fr.
106. Cf. Dover (1968), p. 227. Cf. my chapter V.
97 Cf. Davidson (2001), pp. 48-9.
98 Mem. II. 1.30.
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relationships and which insult a man’s or a youth's sexual honour’.99 100 101This passage does 
appear to be favouring sexual intercourse between a man and a woman over any other 
type. But Omitowoju may have erred in drawing such profound conclusions from 
Xenophon. Who is being condemned? Is it just those men who 'use men as women'? 
Might it not be those who are ‘trying everything and using men as women', and those 
who also ‘compel sexual relations before they are required'? In what way do such 
individuals commit hybris against their friends? Is it not because, presumably, in ‘trying 
everything' one might not only engage in penetrative sexual intercourse with one’s 
friends, but with their wives and children as well? Or does the hybris reside in the 
aslertivenesl of the act as Omitowoju suggests?10” The fault here seems to be that of an 
uncontrolled sexual appetite. Xenophon’s statements are subject to debate, but it 
appears rash to draw conclusions about a whole sexual mindset based on a few lines that 
ultimately reflect only one individual’s particular views.
The Athenian Stranger in the Laws also seems to contradict the zero-sum 
formulation in chctacterlsing the ‘active’ male partner, along with the ‘passive’, as being 
weak (in a sense more ‘fenunine’) in respect to his self-control over the desire for 
pleasures. He is not alone in reckoning that same-sex intercourse is exceedingly 
pleasurable and that the compulsive pursuit of it could amount to a loss of self-mastery. 
Xenophon’s Sokrates considered the transformation from self-mastery to the slavery of 
Desire to be instantaneous although habituation is considered to encourage and entrench 
such a state. ‘Miserable wretch’, he says, ‘are you considering what will happen to you if 
you kiss a beautiful youth: instantly to be a slave instead of a free person... ?’"°’
It is possible that one who proved to be a slave to pleasure could be construed as 
dangerous to the stability of the polis. Aiskhines alleged that Timarkhos originally held 
sufficient property to place him in the highest economic range, the liturgical class, but his 
‘madness' for erotic pleasure and aU forms of sexual indulgence caused him to consume
2(1997) p. 5.
100 On this same passage, she says (2002), p. 36, that Tt is hubris to use men as women, even in 
contexts where the sexual relationship is apparently neither coercive nor mercenary. Here the points at 
issue must be passivity and penetrability, which normatively characterise the female in sexual 
relationships and which insult a man’s or even a youth’s sexual honour precisely because it is treating 
them as if they had the sexual honour appropriate to a woman.’ While, in the main, I believe this has 
definite merits, I take issue with the unilateral view that such a model tends to uphold here and in 
chapter VII. Cf. also my chapter V for more on hybris and rape.
101 Mem. 1.3.11. Likewise, in the dialogue that Xenophon constructs between Sokrates and the pre­
Epicurean Aristippos {Mem. II. 1.1), Aristippos is charged with being ‘rather undisciplined’ in regard to 
‘practising self-mastery {enkrateia) over the desire for food, drink, sex, sleep, cold and heat and hard 
work’. He prefers to carry on in self-indulgence and personal comfort rather than uphold the city’s 
culturally approved norms of machismo.
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his paternal estate."^ In the selection of a general to defend the city or of a custodian to 
manage a farm, Xenophon indicates that someone who is an honourable master of his 
own pleasures should be preferred over the shameful slave to them—nowhere does he 
imply that same-sex intercourse is unnatural or disgusting or necessarily wrong.102 03 104 * 106It is 
the excessive pursuit of these pleasures that is deemed harmful.
Plato’s Athenian Stranger and Xenophon’s Sokrates are not alone in criticising 
the ‘penetrator’ in male, same-sex relations for faihng to master himself. Plato’s 
emphasis on the lover’s failure is perhaps somewhat more vehement than most other 
sources but it is by no means unique. Timarkhos’ friend Misgolas was allegedly the 
subject of ridicule in several comedies due to his excessive fondness for ritbara-hoys. 
Aiskhines refers to his comic reputation and condemns another of his friends, a known 
‘penetrator’, Eegesander, in the same terms as Timarkhos. Re asks: ‘tell me fellow 
citizens, in the name of Zeus and aU the other gods, since this man has defiled himself 
with Eegesander does he not seem to you to have prostituted himself with a 
prostitute?’"04 Theopompus condemns the Macedonian Companions as effeminate 
prostitutes and male-whore-keepers. Similarly, the men who take advantage of 
Agathokles’ ‘whorishness’ are criticised for their complete lack of self-control and Menon 
is harshly rebuked for having an eromenos older than him^j^elf?® ‘The negative portrayals’, 
writes Davidson, ‘of Tknarchus as enslaved to desire, of Eegesander or the Macedonian 
Companions as “prostitutes”, are not ameliorated one iota by allusions to their “positive” 
role as “penetrators”'."®6
Self-mastery when faced with temptation appears to be a more important feature 
of ancient Greek sexuality than the matter of who penetrated whom. One may posit that 
there were those who desired to be penetrated to an excessive degree and these were 
seen as particularly effeminate through their lack of self-control. But there were others 
whose desire for penetrating made them equally ‘effeminate’ in the eyes of their peers for 
the same basic reason. That there were ‘penetrators’ and ‘penetrateds’ is beyond doubt. 
The sort of emphasis that Dover, Foucault and others would propose was applied to 
them, especially in terms of dominance/submission and zero-sum, seems perhaps a bit 
slanted. The roles of penetrator and penetrated were important in other ways. Men
102 L595-105.
103 Mem. 1.5.1; Oik. XII. 13; Mem. 1.3.11.
104 ...rcpdq xdv ndpvov TteTopeuaOat; Aiskhines 1.70; cf. 41, 75, 107-8, 115; cf. too Aeschylus 
Agamemnon 1625.
103 Theopompus of Chios (b.376b.c.e), in FGrH 115 F224-5; Polybius VIII.9, 10; Xenophon Anabasis 
II.6, 28. Cf. Davidson (1997), pp. 165-6.
106 (2001), p. 31.
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penetrate women when engaging in mixed-sex coupling. It is reasonable to consider, in 
the case of same-sex couplings, that the question of who penetrates whom contains 
explicit assumptions about die sexual character of such persons in relation to traditional 
male-female idioms.
What we are left with is a conceptualisation of human sexuality, while in some 
ways evidendy quite similar to our own, that is strikingly alien in many others. There are 
at least some things that can be said with relative certainty. Marriage did not necessarily 
imply monogamy for either party (whatever the ideal). Sexual intercourse could and did 
transpire between members of the same sex and amongst mixed sexes. It might 
sometimes be potentially reproductive in certain instances or it might not. In the cases 
of men with women and men with men, somebody was, at some point or another, 
penetrating somebody else who was in turn being penetrated. A clear sense of negativity 
was associated with those who did these things to excess inasmuch as certain other 
people knew about it and chose to say anything. It may be diat the negativity that some 
have identified with the penetrated is the normal quality of reproach specific to those 
who were seen to be partaking too much of this type of sexual pleasure—just as there 
was a kind of reproach, as indicated above, for those who partook of penetrating others 
to a perceived degree of excess. The opposing theories of ancient sexuality demonstrate 
that it was at least as complex as its modern equivalent and underline the importance of 
continuing to seek clarification.
Conclusion
It can be deduced that sophisticated, socially defined sex roles existed amongst the XXs 
and XYs of ancient Athens. It cannot, however, be deduced to what degree these ideal 
roles were actually enforced or even popularly accepted. This chapter has sought to 
stress that no consensus on this existed amongst the ancients. Modern theory can help 
illuminate many of these issues. But we must take care to separate modern prejudices 
from the application of theory. This is not an easy task and it is not always possible to 
know when one is being prejudicial. Dover and Foucault’s theories perhaps reflect some 
bias (notably that of the male penetrator) whilst excluding arguments and evidence that 
undermine these. Davidson is also biased in his opposition to them. The matter is too 
complex to be summed up by unilateral views.
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AU of the statements that have been made in this chapter, grounded as they are in 
modern theory and ancient context, may amount to little more than sweeping 
generalisations. They probably represent only the ‘tip of the iceberg' of ancient sexuality. 
One considers the evidence available and attempt to reconstruct an imperfect image 
from it. A vast discourse exists today across many academic fields on the subject of 
sexuality and its relation to society and the individual. A comparable cultural discourse 
also took place in the ancient world. Then, as now, there were certain sexual 
conventions in effect but their conceptual evolution was (and is) in a state of perpetual 
flux and re-definition. This thesis addresses concepts of ancient sexuality that are 
present in Plato's Laws and contrasts these with related cultural data.
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Chapter II
The Laws in Context
‘Mankind will not be rid of its evils until either the class of those who 
philosophise in truth and rectitude attain political power or when those 
who are the most powerful in cities, under some divine dispensation, 
really get to philosophising’.
—Plato’
‘They’ve used genetics, physics, philosophy, literature, er, sport, aU to 
enhance the basic human condition and elevate it to the highest level... 
They’d be a worrying prospect, a potential iiber-race bent on domination, 
if they weren’t aU pacifists’.
-Dr. Who?"
Introduction; Manuscript Issues
This chapter considers Plato’s text as an artefact in context along with the holistic project 
of Magnesia as its subject. The Laws (NOMOI) was probably composed during the last 
twenty years of its author’s hfe (his death is given as c. 348 b.c.e.) and, as such, it is 
generally regarded as his final philosophical work.® It is thought to have been written in 
the 350s and early 340s, although, as Saunders indicates, ‘some passages may conceivably 
be earher’.* 4 This was a time in which the formal codification of laws and the production 
of printed matter were in vogue. As Nightingale says, ‘the Athenians had grown more 
“document-minded” and were beginning to place more trust in written texts’.® Plato, in a 
sense, was on the ‘cutting edge’ of this literary phenomenon® Elowever, despite the
’ Letter VII, 326a-b.
o Qtd. in Walters (2001), pp. 4, 12, in reference to a different but no less similar utopian scheme.
® The Minos is probably later than the Laws. So is the Epinomis but these two dialogues, although 
clearly inspired by Platonic thought, are generally considered to be works of other hands. Unless 
otherwise specified, all quotes from the Laws are taken from Burnet’s edition (1913). I frequently 
consult England’s edition (1921), and cite appropriately.
4 (1970), p. 26. He is referring mainly to such passages that strongly echo Platonic formulations 
elsewhere. This issue will be later addressed as is appropriate.
® (1999), p. 113. Cf. Thomas (1995), pp. 33-50, for a broader discussion of this. According to 
Aristotle (Pol. 1286a9-17), writing down the laws encourages fairness and is an essential basis for 
democracy and (1338al5-17) that writing is useful for household management, money-making, 
learning and political life. Gorgias (Palam. DK 30, fr. 11a) declares that ‘written laws are the 
guardians of the just’.
®There was also, at once, a sense of distrust of the written word, cf. Thomas (1995), p. 35 sq. on Plato 
and his ‘elitist’ criticism of writing in the Phaedrus and elsewhere, and see below.
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greater cultural emphasis on the written word, the transmission of his text presents us 
with several uncertainties from the point of its debut.
A ‘rough’ version of the manuscript of the Laiws may have come into the 
possession of PhEippos of Opus, a member of the Academy, who probably edited and 
arranged it in some way. The extent of his involvement is a complex matter and fraught 
with historical uncertainty. PhEippos, according to Morrow, ‘is apparendy the same as 
the phEosopher referred to in the Suidas (s.v. (»iA..5c5'O(1o<^) who divided the Laws into 
twelve books (adding the thk'teenth, i.e. the LEpinomis, said to be his own composition) 
and is probably identical with PhElppus from Medma mentioned by Stephanus of 
Byzantium [7th c.e.]'? The sources from late antiquity, however, had a less than accurate 
picture of Plato’s era.
The Laws’ aUeged editor is likely the same O?AlUnEO£ b M£aSutOoQ whom 
Proclus (5* c.e.) described as a mathematician and student of Plato’s.® The Index 
LLmtlanensis identifies him as both Plato’s pupE and secrhlarn (^C^UYYi(^8i^L)Q) toward the 
end of the Athenian phEosopdhr’s Hfe.” None of the extant sources suggest that Plato 
had two students by the name of PhEippos. Alexander of Aphrodlsias referred to him as 
the OIXutotco^ b kxotipo; nAbxccovo;.7 8 9 10 * 12Diogenes Laertius (3rd c.t.) is unfortunately our 
eaedest source on the transmission of the text of the Laiws. He wrote that PhEippos of 
Opus ‘revised' or ‘copied the Laws whilst they were stEl in wax'.” This has snmelknes 
been taken to mean that PhEippos acquired Plato’s wax-tablet manuscript after he died to 
have it copied and that he perhaps edited the text in its final form.
The author of the 'Prolegomena, probably embemshlng on what he read in Proclus, 
wrote that Plato left the Laiws not onan uncorrected but also ‘confused', saying that ‘if the 
work now seems properly organised, that is not due to Plato, but to a certain Philippos 
of Opus, who later became the successor CSlbLboxo^) to Plato’s school’.’2 In many 
respects, he appears to have got it wrong. His reports, as Taran says, ‘about the 
unfinished state of the Laws is in aU Ekeiihoocl only an inference of his based on a
7 (1960), Excursus F, pp. 515-18. Taran (1975), p. 124, agrees that he was probably the philosophos of 
the Suidas.
8 Com. In Euclid, LXVII.23-68; Cf. Taran (1975), p. 126.
9 Morrow (1960), p. 515, Ind. Here. Col. III.36-41. He is likewise identified as an dcrpcXoyoc; as well 
as a parapegmatist (one who observes both star and weather signs).
10 Alex. Aph. In Me/eor. 151.32-152; Taran (1975), p. 118.
n dl.37; toE; N6poi); p.e/tfeyp<a.()ev, 6vx<a; kv xppco
12 Prol. In Plat. 25; hSiopOcxVTOUc; Kai cruyKexvpkvooc;; Taran (1975), pp. 128-9, indicates that the 
author of this text was not, as has sometimes been assumed, Olympiodorus (5”' c.e.), but a neoplatonist 
from Alexandria—possibly Elias or one of his contemporaries—who misinterpreted Proclus..
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conflation of Proclus’ first argument against the Platonic authorship of the EpinomifA 
Philippos was never in fact placed in charge of the Academy. Speulippos, Xenokrates 
and then Polemon succeeded Plato in that order. As for the reputed degree of disorder, 
Aristotle never referred to the Laws except as if they were the ipsissima verba of Plato. The 
Suidas consequently, mentioning only the division into twelve books, does not directly 
state that there was any rewriting involved.* 1 2"
The degree to which PhEippos edited the Laws, if at aE, remains a subject open to 
speculation. There is nothing in Proclus about the alleged state of disorder in which 
Plato left his final work. The division of the text into chapters probably occurred after 
PhEippos' lifetime and it may have happened significantly later than the fourth century 
b.c.e.1" The phrase ‘in wax' may or may not refer to wax-tablets. It could be taken 
metaphoricaEy to mean that the Laws lacked editing. It could also indicate that PhEippos 
was left in charge of ‘tidying up' the drafts and then takEig them to the copy house. 
According to Diogenes Laertius, ‘some say that PhEippos transcribed (|i.£T£Yo°j)£V) 
Plato’s Laws which were £v KYlpc^’.1" The term (l£T6ypcX<J)ew could mean ‘to 
transcnbe/copy' as weE as ‘to rewrite/correct’.1" It appears unEkely that Diogenes meant 
the latter.1" It may not be possible to know whether the text as it stands is Plato’s work 
in toto or what parts of it may have been solely authored or at least modified by PhEippos 
or later hands. However, ‘in wax’ probably should be taken to refer to Plato’s drafts, 
composed on relatively inexpensive wax-covered tablets, on which the text would have 
been written and edited prior to being sent for copying onto expensive papyrus. 
PhEippos' role appears to have been to copy Plato’s final draft (perhaps replete with 
numerous corrections in his own no doubt ‘characteristic' handwriting) into a more 
legible form for the copyists to transcribe. If he was in fact Plato’s personal secretary 
and confidant, such a degree of involvement seems perfectly reasonable and altogether 
necessary.
The Magnesian Project
2(1975), p. 128.
” Ibid. p. 130, n. 543; although the division into chapters was probably a later advent.
l2/W.p. 130.
2 m.37.8-10.
2 Cf. LSJ s.v. jLxe,ic£Yp<a.<)co.
2 Taran (1975), p. 130, n. 543, gives other contextual examples of Diogenes’ use of this verb.
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The question of authenticity of authorship is not the principal concern of this 
thesis. It presumes a prion that the Laws is Plato’s and that it was his final work. As 
such, it reveals a new phase in terms of both his literary style and philosophical approach. 
It differs significantly when compared to the Apology, Republic or any of Plato’s earher 
works. The Laws falls into the category of the so-called ‘late dialogues’. In these the style 
is plainer and, as Saunders says, ‘analysis and exposition far outweigh dramatic interest’.? 
The sense of difference is heightened by the fact that the character of Sokrates is 
altogether absent altogether from the Laws. Ee was a mainstay of Plato’s dialogues who 
appeared, albeit in a diminished capacity, even in the Sophist, Statesman and Timaeus 
(although he is absent from the dubious Epinomis)A° In his place as the principal speaker 
of the Laws we have the somewhat didactic persona of the Athenian Stranger 
(A0EINAIO2 SENOS) who bears a strong similarity to Plato’s Sokrates. This elderly 
gentleman meets up with two other characters (Megillus the Spartan and Kleinias the 
Kretan—also identified as elderly) on the road from Knossos. They are on a pilgrimage, 
to an unspecified ‘chapel of Zeus’ when the three of them faU to discussing good and 
bad laws.?’ The other two interlocutors request that the Athenian Stranger, who has 
displayed a superior understanding of wise legislation, outhne the laws that would make a 
good constitution for a hypothetical colony.
This discourse, being on the very nature of law and government, had and stEl has 
wider pohtical ramifications. It was written in an era when ‘colonies were springing up ah 
over the place’, as Robinson and Groves say, and ‘discussion about what a “perfect” 
society would be hke was quite a practical concern and not just an academic exercise’.?? 
Another potential inspiration for such a discussion was in part hostihty felt by the author 
against the Athenian democracy and its imperiahstic ambitions. Perhaps, as Brisson says, 
the Laws was ‘proposing a reactionary adaptation of the Athenian legislation of Plato’s 
time’.?® This enmity on his part may have been exacerbated by the judicial murder of 
Plato’s famous mentor Sokrates at the hands of the Athenian law courts in 399. 
Toynbee, going further than Brisson, has even suggested that the Laws reads ‘almost hke 
a dehberate rejoinder, point for point, to the eulogy of Athens in Perikles’ Funeral
19 (1970), p. 22; for a fuller summary of the division of Plato’s dialogues cf. Crombie (1962), p. 9 sq. 
and, more recently, Kahn (1996), pp. 45-48. But he has not abandoned ‘dramatic interest’ altogether.
20 See above on the Epinomis.
o’ 625b—possibly near or in the famous Idaean cave re-discovered in the 9th century c.e. On the age of 
the interlocutors in this dialogue, cf. 625b, 685a, 712b, 770a, (that they are older than Magnesia’s 
proposed Guardians of the Laws—themselves at least fifty) 820c, 821a, 846c.
oo (2000), p. 50.
o® (1998).
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Speech'."4 This conclusion is excessively reductive and no longer taken seriously in 
modern academia; however, it still has some merits. Plato's Sokrates scathingly criticises 
Perikles’ scheme of paying jurors in the Gorgias. There he indicates, as Ostwald 
paraphrases, that the ‘commons are like animals that Perikles corrupted instead of 
tamed'."® The Laws does in fact address many of the fundamental issues of the role of 
government and citizens. Whether it is specifically a ‘reaction' to the faults of democratic 
Athens-fz/w-Perines is another matter that will probably never be fully resolved.
Plato’s criticisms of Athenian democracy are well known and can be seen in the 
Republic and elsewhere.24 * 6 Since these are delivered in the media of the dramatic dialogue 
(and not in outspoken comedic performances or public speeches), Ober describes Plato 
as fitting ‘the role of the tejectlonlst external critic’."’ This means that he was more 
detached in his criticism than, e.g., Aristophanes, who may be characterised as an internal 
‘immanent' critic of democracy. Amongst its other negative qualities, Plato perhaps felt, 
as Ostwald says, that the Athenian democracy represented ‘a force imposing a tendency 
to conform to an establishment mentality dictated by the ignorant mob and stifling rather 
than nurturing the intelligence of the educated citizen'."8 It is, as always, dangerous to 
speculate too much about an ancient author’s motivations. One should hesitate to 
attribute the inspiration of his final work to any specific cause or event. Plato was always 
interested in the philosophical underpinnings of law and morality. His complaints 
against democracy make up a significant part of the Laws context, as they must, but 
remain only a part of the ‘big picture’.
Magnesia and KaHipolis
The Laws represents no less than tire theoretical founding of a new and experimental 
type of city-state. The plan is more than a little reminiscent of that outlined in the 
Republic—although the differences are profound. The interlocutors generally agree that 
any polis governed by laws (as opposed to righteous philosopher kings/queens under the 
guidance of transcendenaiUy ineffable 'Goodness') can never be an ideal state. It will
24 (1972), pp.90-92. Cf. Thuc. 11.35-46 and Macdonald (1959), pp. 108-9 for a criticism of Toynbee’s 
view and cf. my chapter III on education, esp. the part about the ‘Best and Truest Tragedy’.
2® (1983), p. 225; cf. Gorgias 515e.
2® Cf. esp. Rep. VIII.558c5-6, where it ‘distributes a kind of equality to equal and unequal alike’. Cf. 
my chapters III and IV.
2 (1998), p. 49; cf. pp. 45, 143.
2®(1986), p. 83.
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always be second-best C8htixhpo<)).77 Where law governs, injustices invariably trunsplce. 
The ideal state should be governed by just men and women who share t^^ih property 
communally (as in the Kallipohp without recourse to mundane laws. There is no reason 
to assume that the Lmws might somehow shrae as a constitution or legal code, added as 
an afterthought, for the fabled Kallipolis of the Republic. Magnesia and Kallipolis are by no 
means the same place. The proper uppdcation and execution of the Athenian Stranger's 
plan of constitution is meant to engender an increasing desne to seek the realisation of 
the ideal. Through growing understanding, the laws of Magnesia may be improved along 
with the subjects they govern. Magnesia may become more Hke Kallipolis over time.
Some of the differences between them are rather striking but it would be 
dangerous to jump to the hasty conclusion that the former was written as a sort of 
working constitution for the latter. Brisson believes that the Lwws is an attempt to 
modify the unrealistic expectations of the Rspublic and, as such, it ‘must be read as an 
original project for the organisation of the City, which takes into account the 
developments found in the Kimaeus, Critias and PbilebufP It is true that the Raws and the 
Republic both deal, at least in part, with the founding of new societies that could be 
considered rather, if not wholly, utopian.
The Kallipolis of the Republic represents the ideal and unrealistic form that a state 
might take whereas Magnesia of the Raws signifies a condition that is more realistic yet 
somewhat less than the ideal. ‘The state that Plato describes in the Laws is therefore not 
a Utopia’, as Morrow says, tit has a definite location in Greek space and time'?1 The 
Republic (probably written in the 380’s and/or 370’s) is imaginary and represents a quest 
for the definition of Justice more than a practical guide to ideal government. The La^ws} 
also describing an imaginary city, is not centrally concerned with finding a moeullr 
absolute definition—although it presumes the existence of such a thing'.
There are other significant points of connectivity between these two mythical 
poleis. Kallipolis is to be a society governed by philosopher-kings (and queens), with 
absolute uuthtnirc?r are trained to know the moral ideals for their society as well as
being exposed to the Form of the Good that imparts to them such knowtedge?7 These 
art sometimes called the ‘Perfect Guardians’ and comprise a very small and ehte class. * * * * * * *
29 On this designation see Laws 739, 807b. Interestingly, the Athenian Stranger discusses the attributes
of an ideal vs. a second- and third- best state not only in terms of the moral behaviour of their citizens
but also in terms of private vs. communal property.
30 (1998).
31 (I960), p. 11. That is, it is hypothetically situated on Krete.
32 Republic 484, 519-20, 540.
33 Cf. Rep. Books V-VII, for the training of these philosopher-kings (-queens), esp. 473 sq.
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The ‘Auxihaiy Guardians’ are less thoroughly trained in philosophical matters and serve 
their masters and the state in the capacities of administration, maintaining civil obedience 
and order and undertaking the defence of the state in times of confEct.^ These 
‘Auxiliary Guardians’ possess only a partial comprehension of the reasons behind the 
rules they enforce and lack the greater apprehension of their metaphysical foundations— 
as opposed to such superior understanding found in the ‘Perfect Guardians’.34 5 36 * 38 39The third 
class of the Kallipilis contains everybody else: farmers, artisans, merchants, clerks etc. 
They must willingly and wholeheartedly submit to the rule of then 
philosophical/metaphysical betters and, with few exceptions, are not generally educated 
in the ways of the ‘Perfect Guardians’. The Republics narrator expressed his doubts 
about the proposed enterprise saying that a city Eke the Kallipilis ‘can be found nowhere 
on earth.. .perhaps there is a pattern for it laid up in heaven’?3
By contrast, the Laws does not seek to estabhsh a perfect pilis on earth but sets 
about the task of detaEing a next-to-perfect code of laws by which an imperfect, human 
society may be governed. We should not, as Field says, ‘draw any conclusions about a 
possible change in Plato’s views... we are expressly told that the provisions of the Republic 
stEl represent the ideal, but are not regarded as practicable in these circumsrances’.33 The 
importance of written law is brought to the forefront and, while there is some mention 
of rulers with superior moral knowledge, the nukterinis council does not function in 
precisely the same capacity as philosopher kings/queens. Law is supreme, albeit less 
than perfect, and serves as the instrument for the moral and social regulation of society. 
Sufficient commentary on its theory and execution is provided as guidance for the future. 
The Athenian Stranger says that we should ‘order our private households and our public 
societies alike by obeying the immortal element within us, giving the name of law to the 
ordering of understanding’?® The laws of Magnesia, grounded in eternal truths, govern 
the entire Efe of the community and they embody and express the philosophical vision of 
the Good.
Magnesia will have a command economy. There are to be four property classes 
of citizens in addition to a fifth class—the slaves—who do all the banausic work whilst 
their masters go about the pursuit of arete? These classes are based on income and the
34i?ep. 414sq., 440-41.
35 Rep. 428,430, 537 sq.
36 kv ohpavcp Iccog napdSevypa dvOKeiuar—592a-b.
” (1969), p. 74.
38 Tty roh von 6tavop,fiv frcovopd^ovimc; v6|xov—714a 1-2.
39 Cf. Xen. Lak.. Pol. VII. 1-3, for a similar situation reputed amongst the Spartans.
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stewardship of property. There is the possibility of advancement and non-lateral mixing. 
Members of the highest of the four property classes are to be matched together for 
marriage with members of lower classes, and so on, in order that there be balance within 
the stated This ‘enlightened' policy of eugenics is something of a change from that 
found in the Republic where the different ‘metals’ of the three classes were expressly 
compelled to avoid intermingling. The ‘best’ could only breed with the ‘best’ etc., 
according to a calculated scheme, in temporary relationships designed to produce 
offspiing.40 1 42 43 44 45
Balance is to be maintained in Magnesia through permanent marriages with an 
economic basis in latld-divlsCon0’o Each of the 5040 land units is divided into two parts 
and no citizen may have more land than any other. Any population surplus exceeding 
that which can be reasonably contained within the 5040 family units wiU be shipped off 
to a colony?/ Here too is another difference in terms of Magnesia’s semi-private 
landholdings based on the family unit as opposed to the communal property of the 
Republic!1 One may refer to them as ‘semi-private' since these lots can never be 
purchased or sold. Land division is one of many areas of Hie directly regulated by the 
Magnesian state.
The Laws, as Saunders says, ‘gives a powerful impression of the range of activltiel 
under the control of nomos (custom, law, habitual practice etc.) in one sense or another'?/ 
As in the Republic, there are to be Guardians of the Laws whose job it is to poHce the 
Magnesian state in every conceivable way and enforce the law in both public and private 
spheres. Men and women will have to regard them as figures of state authority as they 
have the power to fine and detain lawbreakers in accord with the city's statutes. There 
wiU also be female Marriage Guardians (a'l xSv ydpcov Kfi^l^id), Market Wardens
40 Laws 772e7-e4. If the wealthy only marry the wealthy and the poor marry only the poor, in time the 
division between the classes will be so great as to cause tensions and possibly class conflicts which 
Plato rightly seeks to avoid (cf. 744a8-745bl).
41 Rep. 459d-460b; cf. 546al-547a6 for the infamous ‘Nuptial Number;’ there are numerous works 
dealing with this complex passage among which include, but are not limited to, Aristotle, Pol. E 12. 
1316a4 sq.; Macrobius Somn. Scip. II11. 10 on the so-called ‘Great Year’ or ‘Cycle’; Proclus In. 
Remp. II p. 38; cf. Adam’s edition of the Respublica (1891), p. 79 sq.
42 Cf. Laws 684d for the difficulty of land distribution; there are 5040 (a number divisible by 12, 10, 
etc.) administrative units for land-holdings by the citizens of the city (737e); each lot supports one 
family, the number of families is meant to remain at more or less a constant of 5040 (740b-c): one of 
the male children will inherit the holding and the females are given in marriage where appropriate; 
excess offspring will be obliged to emigrate (740d-e, 741). Cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.9, VII.3-6 and Polyb., 
Hist. VI.45, 3-5, for a (reputedly) similar situation of land allotment in Sparta. Cf. my chapter V.
43 Cf. my chapter V for more on this curious land-division as well as Aristotle’s objections to it.
44 Cf. my chapter VI.
45 (1970), pp. 5-14
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(&yp|::kxv6j.O11), City Wardens (dcUT^DVdlXOll), Rural Wardens C&YPOvOxoi) and various 
other bur•eadce’ats to regulate and overset the numerous slaves, the city's educators, other 
non-citizens and the orphans.4?
Perhaps Plato had a model for his Guardians (both in the Republic and the Lmws) 
in the form of an Atheniun institution that reputedly existed before Perikles. In the 
council of the Ae•hopagos, as it was prior to Ephialtes (early 5* century b.c.e.), there may 
have been such guardians. Aristotle says that Solon ‘assigned the couneti of the 
Areopagos to the duty of guarding the laws (ETC Td VOpotyuXcXKeiV), acting as before as 
the supervisor (kTtio'KOCOQ) of the constitution'. He goes on to indicate that Ephialtes 
reduced its authority over guarding the coustildtiou and assigned some of them to the 
councd of the five hundred and others to the demos and the popular courss/i It is 
possible that this alleged instilutiou of the pre-Periklean Areopagos was the inspiration, 
or at least an iuspleatiou, for the Athenian Steauger’s Guardians of the Laws.4® Cicero, 
deavdn luOuenced by Plato, commends ‘the Greeks’ for establishing officers called 
V0J.0(t)C)XaK£<;, who guarded the text of the laws, observed the actions of citizens and 
called them to obedience.4. Cicero, who did not have access to to modern archaeology 
and computers, presumably knew less about the uncient Greeks than we do. However, 
despite our techuolnglcal advances, it is not possible to suy whether such guardians 
existed in ancient Athens to influence Plato or not?0 His nomopbylakes probably have 
more in common with Sparta’s epborsR As Morrow says, they add a Rakonian 
‘monarchical elemem in the city’.ii Their superiors in Magnesia also recoUerl other 
Spartuu elements rather than Alhiellietl.47
Above aU the various guardians, and drawn from the eldest of the Guardians of 
the Laws, is the nukterinos council or so-called ‘Nocturnal Council’.45 * 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 Its geroutocrutie 
character is one of muun points of similarity to the Spartan gerousia, the members of
45 On the selection and education of these Guardians of the Laws, cf. (for the female guardians) 783d
sq. 794a sq., 930a sq., 932b-e, (and generally), 968c sq.
47 Ath,. Pol, VIII.4; cf. Plut. Solon 19.2. For the Areopagos prior to Solon, see Aristotle, Ath. Pol. III.6; 
and for the reference to Ephialtes see XXV.2. Cf. Diod. XI.77.6, who adds a ‘moral’ to the story, 
saying that Ephialtes was punished for ‘attempting such lawlessness...he was done to death by night’.
48 As has been proposed by Chase (1933), p. 135. Of course, we don’t actually know whether or not 
this institution of guardians in the Areopagos actually existed. Cf. Morrow (1960), pp. 211-214.
49 De Legibus 1II.46. He may, in fact, be speaking of those in the works of Plato rather than an actual 
practice by ‘the Greeks’.
50 Cf. Cawkwell (1997a), pp. 115-30 for a fuller discussion of this issue.
51 Cf. Hodkinson (2000), pp. 56-57 on the ephors and their role in enforcing Spartan sophrosyne.
52 (1960), pp. 526. Cf. Richer (1999), pp. 99-100.
53 Cf. my chapter III and below.
54 Cf. Laws 908a, 909a, 95 Id sq., 961a sq. and 968a. For a similar ‘Nocturnal Council’ of Atlantis, cf. 
Critias 120a sq.
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which were also required to be over the age of sixty 55 * 57 58 * 60The Athenian Stranger says that his 
nukterinos council wUi function in a ‘watchdog’ capacity, ideally just making 
recommendations, and will serve to keep the ship of state £on course’,®* Its powers, as 
with the geriusia, are considerably broader than this innocent-sounding statement 
suggests. Its membership includes the eldest Guardians of the Laws and the ministers of 
education past and present. These influence such areas as education, music, choruses 
and aU civic events that involve the inculcation of morality and ideology. The nuktennis 
council also has also been afforded the unique authority, only on rare and special 
occasions, to alter Magnesia’s laws.
Brisson proposes the term ‘Vigilance Committee’ instead of the more traditional 
rendering of ‘Nocturnal Council’. As he indicates, this body ‘sees to it that the laws of 
the City are based on the order manifest in the universe, [and] becomes the most 
essential element in the project of the The term nukterinis ‘connotes the of
wakefulness’ and, indeed, the ‘Vigilance Committee’ is meant to meet each day from 
before dawn until the sun has rism® Morrow suggests that the lnspiraticn for this 
“Vigilance Committee’ must be the Academy itself since, as he says, ‘its studies bear an 
unmistakable resemblance to those cultivated in Plato’s Academy, and the purpose they 
are intended to serve is identical... viz. to apply philosophy to the saving of the city- 
state’® Like the Academy, the members of the <Vigilaere Committee’ wiU have been 
inducted into the innermost mysteries of philosophy. Also, not unlike certain of the 
Academy’s membership, they too hold real legislative and administrative powers over the 
state®
Where is Sokrates?
There is an observable shift in Plato’s literary style from the mythical and dramatic 
qualities found in the early and middle dialogues to the more didactic and expositionary 
character of the later dialogues and, in particular, the Laws. The total absence of 
Sokrates, who has been a constant throughout aU of the other extant dialogues of Plato, 
stands out. As mentioned earlier, he plays a diminished role in the Siphist, Statesman and 
Timaeus; however, he is present and active. The Athenian Stranger in the Laws performs
55 That is, if Aristotle and Plutarch are to be believed, cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1270b; Plut. Lyk. 26.
® Laws 960-65.
57 (1998).
58 Ibid. On the name nukterinos cf. Laws 968a; for their meeting time cf. 95 Id.
®(1960), p. 509. .
60 See below.
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the part usually delegated to Plato’s Sokrates and does this with a style of character 
altogether familiar and reminiscent of the fictional Sokrates. There is relatively little 
discussion, however, amongst the interlocutors and the Athenian Stranger spends most 
of his time delivering a lecture on his second-best state.
Since Plato died before editing significant portions of the laws, it is impossible to 
know for certain whether he had meant to change the name of his principal character. 
Perhaps he intended for the finished piece to have Sokrates as its narrator and he never 
got around to changing the name of the Athenian Stranger in the drafts. This seems 
improbable. It seems more likely the case that he intended the work to be published 
with his primary speaker named ‘the Athenian Stranger’ and that he presumed his 
audience would immediately recognise Sokratic elements in him anyway. Sokrates would 
certainly have been a stranger to Krete. Why resort to such a conceit? Might there be 
political reasons? Perhaps the Athenian Stranger should not be identified with the 
historical Sokrates at all. His choice of ‘Athenian Stranger' might constitute a bit of 
literary license on Plato’s part. We may never comprehend his motives for doing this— 
however interesting they may be to ponder. It would seem erroneous to presume that 
the absence of a designated Sokrates somehow indicates that the Laws is fraudulent.
What could have prompted Plato, late in his career, to lay aside his earlier style in 
preference for a more straightforward manner of address? It does represent a ready 
medium in which to get across ideas whilst hunting dissenting influences. Perhaps there 
was a more ‘human’ reason. Given the approximate dates for the Laws, it is certainly true 
that Plato was getting on in years. He would have been in his late seventies or early 
eighties when the majority of the text was written. He must have known that his death 
was not far away. Could it have been the case, as Taylor suggests, that Plato did not 
'want to look farther and farther into “the beyond,” but to come down to earth and 
realise some of the truth he has seen'?* This has some merit but one cannot know with 
certainty.
It is true that the vast majority of the text deals with many subjects that could be 
considered mundane. The Laws is mostly legal code and legal theory. Even so, in a 
significant portion of book X (885-907) the Athenian Stranger exposits some inspired 
metaphysics on the nature and immortality of the soul, general cosmology and the gods. 
Likewise, in book I (644d sq.), he delivers what is perhaps the only moral fable in the 
whole of the Laws, on the somewhat depressing subject of how mortal beings are mere
61 Qtd. in Hamilton and Cairns (1989), p. 1225. 1
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‘puppets of the gods’. Potentially these two sections bolster Taylor’s claim that Plato's 
change in style reflects his desire to leave bhdiud some of the truths that he hus gained in 
the clearest possible terms for future generations. However, it seems that he is stiU 
looking into the ‘beyond’ when one considers the philosophical backdrop of Mugnesia. 
The undhelring motivations that powered Plato’s textual dynamics ure always fertile 
ground for inquiry. Definitive conclusions on the matter are somewhat more rare.
Myth and Paramyth
The change in style prompts questions. For example, what does it mean to suy that 
Plato's literarn mauuer wus more or less mytbic at uny given time? The subject and 
treatment of myth in the works of Plato is complex. One might ask, in u manner rather 
Hke that of Sokrates, what is meant by the term ‘myth’ and how, therefore, should one 
discuss it? Graves gives a list of that which he considers to be not ‘true myths’, amongst 
which ure ‘philosophical allegory', "political propaganda', ‘moral legend’ and ‘reuHstic 
fiction’.6? This is a rouseraative reckoning and would appear, on the one hand, to 
exclude any would-be ‘myths’ about whose Ete:earn inception, us works of fiction, 
something is known. On the other hand, it accepts and includes a number of myths 
whose origins are historicaUy obscure.®3 A receul rh-definitiou is more inclusive in scope. 
Burkert, probably the greatest Hving expert on ancient Greek reHgion, says that ‘myth is u 
truditlonal tule with secondary, partial reOereuce to something of collective importance’.* 63 64 
This theory excludes Platonic mythmaking. However, one is lucEeed to wonder 
precisely when a fable or tale becomes traditional. EstabEsdiug what is meant by 
‘collective importance' also seems equivocal.
It is possible to posit a broader interpretation of ‘myth' us a concept to include 
sufficieutln ‘mythological’ material of various sorts. Such luslauces of Platonic 
mythologizing occur at points where he has chosen to adapt certain lraditinnully cultural 
tales, modifying them appropriately according to his philosophical agenda. There are 
also some ‘myths’ that Plato appears to have originuted (whether unique creations or 
pecuHar adaptations) spt^^;ii^Lr^ilUn for his own euas. These that he originated or modified 
may not have been lradltioual when he wrote them down. The fact that maun Plutonic
“ (1960), p. 12. All of which, fit the spectrum of Plato’s mythologizing.
63 Homer and Hesiod apparently qualify as ‘true myths’ since the authors seem to have fashioned their 
literary works based on pre-existing myths and presumably did not originate the mythic tales 
themselves.
64 Qtd. in Bremmer (1987), p. 1.
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myths (such as that of Atlantis) have since become traditional after Plato’s lifetime 
further problematises the issue of defining what we mean by a ‘traditional tale’.
Plato too has played a role in the definition of myth. He has drawn the 
distinction between a story that may or may not contain relevant philosophical or ‘truth’ 
value and ones with an essential quality that determines its philosophical worth.65 ‘Plato’, 
as Buxton indicates, ‘takes important steps towards systematising two distinctions 
between muthos and logos', that between muthos as unverifiable discourse and logos as 
verifiable discourse, and that between muthos as story and logos as rational argument’.66 67
However, Plato’s method for classifying myths according to their value does not appear 
to be consistent. For example, the types of tales that are to be banned from the Kallipolis 
are referred to as logoi. But these also include the sort of muthoi that are told to children 
under the broader designation as logoi™ Given the nature of the dialogue form (discussed 
below), Plato is under no obligation to be systematic across individual dialogues.
The techne of mythologizing, for Plato the writer and philosopher, amounts to a 
sort of tool with which he may shape an argument and deploy it for specific goals. In the 
haius, as we shall see in later chapters, this is deployed specifically to affect Magnesian 
sexuality. Many myths that belong to the traditional canon of the ancient Greeks find 
their way into the Platonic corpus and, as such, serve a variety of philosophical ends. 
These often come from the works of Homer or Hesiod and Plato’s narrators frequently 
have some critical comment to make about diem or through them.68 The poets, however 
divinely inspired, are deemed to lack the appropriate understanding to deploy their myths 
correcdy. ‘The philosopher’, as Murray says, ‘is aware of the approximate status of his 
myths, whereas the poet is not’.69 Plato’s Sokrates criticises the use of myths that miss 
the mark in terms of truth-value—e.g. that portray the gods and divine heroes as ugly or 
immoral.70 The perceived danger of such myths is that they present potentially harmful 
models for ordinary people who lack die proper philosophical training to make the 
necessary distinctions. The imitation of these must be curbed in utopia. ‘In short’, as
65 Cf, Phaedrus 275b3-c2 for a discussion of this principle of veracity as a touchstone for determining 
the difference between logos and muthos.
66 (1995), p. 12. Cf. Brisson (1982) pp. 111-112.
67 Rep. 376e6-377a8.
68 Such as his modification of the myth of Ganymede at Laws 636d as well as Sokrates’ critique of the 
myth of Kronos and Zeus at Rep. 378a2.
69 (1999), p. 261
70 Rep. 377d9-e3
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Morgan states, ‘only myths conducive to virtue will be allowed, as when Odysseus 
commands his heart to endure in difficult circumstancel'.7o
There are myths that Plato appears to have originated himself for the express 
purpose of forwarding his philosophical agenda. Some of these include, for example, 
such instances as the Fable of the Cave, the Line, the Metals, the ancestor of Gyges of 
Lydia (the tale of the ring of invisibility), and the metaphysical Myth of Er in the Republic, 
the Two Horses of the Phaedrus, the Myth of the Uranian Age and the Puppets of the 
Gods in the Laws. Some of these (e.g. the Myth of the Metals) may be considered 'noble 
lies' or exhortatory fables designed to persuade. It is clear in aU of these instances of tale 
telling, as Hesk says, that ‘certain situations make lying a moral necessity’ for Plato's 
narrators.7/ They are designed not only to persuade, but also to do so with correction as 
the goal.
A broader type of Platonic myth making may also be seen in undertaking such a 
work as the Republic itself or, for that matter, the Laws. The whole business of creating 
(albeit theoretically) an artificial, utopian society is itself a sort of mythologizing on a 
grand scale. The creation of the Republic was so vast a project that, in order to meet the 
requirements of the dialogue, it marks one of the major stylistic changes in Plato’s 
writing.71 72 3 It might be fait to regard the character of the Republic and Laws as on a par with 
that of Homer’s Iliad or Odyssey. They are aU epic-length fictions that, in describing 
mythical events and persons, entail a comparable level of sophistication. Whereas 
Homer's myths belong to ages past, Plato’s transpire in a hypothetical future. Both are 
vehicles of moral and metaphysical guidance.
It would appear, as Murray says, that ‘Plato’s concern is not so much to free the 
mind from myth, but rather to appropriate myth from the hands of the poets and 
construct new myths that wiU serve the interests of philosophy'.’4 The emphasis lies with 
jo-value (truth-value in terms of philosophical worth and instructive potential) as 
opposed to muthos--v^hie (one could say story- or entertainment-value or persuasive value 
devoid of instructive potential). While these Platonic myths might not be completely 
trudiful, they need not be. The ends are deemed to justify the means. These myths are 
ostensibly intended to fulfil their function of imparting a higher, philosophical truth to
71 (2000), p. 162.
72 (2000), p. 152; cf. pp. 153-201 on Plato's use of‘noble lies’ and below. 
7® See below.
7“ (1999), p. 257.
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those who experience them/® When employed on a hypothetical populace (whether 
Magnesia of IKallipolip, they entail specific agendas and have been c^i^l^r^^l^^tt^<a to achieve 
these with effective persuasion.
Platonic myths fall into several recognisable categories.'® As Morgan says, ‘we 
can aistlugulsd three classes: traditional myths such as those told by the poets, 
educational mnlds fEuI are iuleuded to exercise social ,coutrnl, and philosophical myths, 
which are tied to logical analysis'.75 * 7 78 79Even these distinctions may be loo rigid. How, for 
example, should we label uu instance of myth told by the poets but altered or amended 
by Plato’s uarralor? Are not aU Platonic myths somehow ‘lied lo logical analysis’ 
anyway? AU of his uses of myth uppear to serve nuh distinct purpose or another— 
however much they may traverse the boundaries of various imposed categories.
The Myth of the Metals in the Republic is a He that clearly seoaes the purpose of 
exercising social control. Myths of this type, as Hesk suys, ‘ure not to be criticised if the 
“untruth” of the story conveys a deeper moral tedthy7® Beneath the Myth of the Metals 
there is u meaulugfdl pdiaosophcraa argument, based on logicul analysis, on the manner in 
which humanity ought to be governed according to a specific philosophical agenda. The 
myth muy be little more than a clever eucourugemeut designed to persuade people to 
follow the rules on the merits of u fuble, yet it hus ‘tr•nth-vulde’ inasmuch as the (virtuous) 
ends anticipated justify the somewhat duplicitous means of their accomplishment. The 
exhortulorn type of myth (ukln to the ‘noble He’) is u leitmotif in the Laws. They are 
designed to persuade ‘the many’ whose business is not to comprehend the deeper 
phllosophy behind the prhsceiptinus and proscriptions of the laws. The deeper 
philosophy exists behind the myth but at a level un-accesslble to most.
‘Fables’ of one particular sort have u prominent place in the Laws as well as in the 
second-best polis. They will be employed propagandssticaUy as u meuns of social cnulrol. 
The use of these, already broached elsewhere in the works of Plato as ‘noble Hes', 
corresponds both to known (or ut leust reputed) Atheuluu and Spartan practices/i It
75 This also serves to distinguish Platonic (or philosophical) mythologizing from the methods employed 
by the sophists. ‘The contrast’, says Morgan, ‘is not between truth and falsity or verifiability and non­
verifiability, but between well-intentioned philosophical persuasion and sophistic browbeating’ (2000), 
p 166.
Such as Frutiger’s context-driven categorisation of allegorical, genetic and parascientific myths; Cf. 
Morgan (2000), p. 161.
77 Ibid., p. 162.
78 (2000), p. 154.
79 Powell (1994), p 284. He says that ‘Spartan official deceit including not only lying to helots as to 
whether they would be rewarded or killed, and misleading other enemies in wartime (a practice which 
Xenophon commended explicitly to non-Spartans), but also lying to their own citizens about the
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becomes the chief business of the Magnesian government to mould the characters of its 
subjects and the Laws’ interlocutors deem the employment of ‘fables’ to this end 
justifiable. It is nowhere suggested that Plato has overturned the basic tenet, elsewhere 
espoused and extolled, that only the one who knows what Justice is can be just. The 
Athenian Stranger’s policies, however totalitarian they may seem, are said to aim for the 
hypothetical Magnesians’ maximum attainment of arete.
He uses the term paramyth to describe the preambles to the various laws that will 
be read to the Magnesian citizens. Paramyth (TC<apat|i.b0tot) may be loosely defined as 
‘encouragement’ or ‘persuasion’, and its use here combines philosophical, rhetorical and 
mythical quaiities/0 The legal preambles possess a kind of ‘mythological resonance’ and 
thus fall into the broader category of Platonic mytholggizing.* 81 82They are reminiscent of 
the philosophical exhortations in the Republic. The Athenian Stranger indicates that the 
lawgiver should not threaten the populace with rules or merely prescribe his 
philosophically sound decrees, but that he should give encouragement (Tapap/lWiag) 
and appropriate degrees of persuasion (720a.'l-)^)S2 Paramyth is seen to have a positive 
effect inasmuch as it is undertaken for the benefit of the subjects in question. Many of 
these subjects are unable to engage in the more complex philosophical discussions that 
underpin the laws that these preambles introduce. Paramyth is calculated to persuade 
them to undertake an appropriate, philosophically sound course of action whilst 
concealing the deeper tmths that they cannot readily comprehend.
A related use of myth in Plato concerns the theme of philosophical ‘play’. ‘Play’, 
according to Morgan, ‘can be a childish game, an educational tool, or a metaphor for 
philosophical activity’/® The educational programmes of the Republic and the Imws 
depend on types of structured play (TCaiSud) in order to ensure psychic harmony. The 
games that Plato’s narrators propose that children should play are designed to promote 
the attainment of an idealised state of the psyche. This is one level of ‘play’ as 
mythologizing inasmuch as it becomes a vehicle, Hke myth, for dehvering a philosophical 
message.
outcome of battles involving Spartan forces’. Cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 136, 157-62 on this. Cf. Thuc. 
IV.80.3 sq., Xen. Ages. 1.17, Hell. 1.6.36 sq., IV.3.13 sq. On the ‘noble lie’, cf. Plato, Rep. 398b-d, 
414b-c, 415c and 459c.
® Cf. LSJ, s.v. TapaguOia.
81 Brisson (1982), pp. 200-2.
82 He contrasts, in the Laws (719e-723c), the manner in which a slave-doctor gives only prescribed 
treatments to a sick or injured slave whereas a doctor for a free citizen engages in a discussion and 
explanation of the treatment with the patient in order to persuade him/her that it is for their benefit.
22 (2000), p. 168.
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At another level ‘play’, not unlike ‘noble lies’ or paramyth, becomes a sort of 
secondary metaphor concealing complex ideological underpinnings. It can be, through 
role-playing, a method of philosophical argument. ‘Play’ may embody critical seriousness 
and sort out an issue by utilising role-playing as a type of logical analysis. As Morgan 
says, ‘in this respect it is analogous to philosophical myth’.®4 A prominent example 
occurs in the complicated discussion on whether or not same-sex relations should be 
permitted or not in Magneaia?5 The discussion appears to be largely hypothetical and it 
is worked out through logical analysis. It is a sort of monolithic role-playing game. It is 
not perhaps role-playing in the modern sense of Dungeons & Dragons, or corporate 
strategising; rather, the participants engage in a philosophical game of ‘what ifs?’ led by 
Plato’s narrator whereby an important issue may be explored. The theme of ‘play' as a 
kind of philosophical exercise, especially in contrast to the ‘seriousness' that such ‘play' 
might imply, may be seen throughout the Platonic corpus^ In fact, ‘play’ as a means of 
approaching a problem or administering philosophical pharmaka has much in common 
with other instances of mythologizing in Plato. 8’ Not unHke the creative works of the 
Republic or the Laws, in Platonic ‘play’ at large an imaginary ‘something’ is called into 
existence and then used to advance a philosophical agenda.
The Dialogue Form
Plato’s method of presenting his philosophical discourses in the form of dramatic 
dialogues connects significantly with his use of myth. He, as Dover indicates, ‘sets out 
these “Socratic dialogues” in purely dramatic form, sometimes in near-dramatic form 
enclosed within the narrative framework’.8® Plato borrows from a number of literary and 
dramatic traditions in formulating his genre of philosophical writing.84 85 86 * 88 9 As with many of 
the myths that he employs, he did not originate the dramatic dialogue. Precedent for it 
may be found in Homeric dialogues, the speeches of Thucydides, the Dissoi Logoi of the 
sophists and Athenian stage drama. There is every reason to believe that these were all 
important influences on him.
84/W., p. 169.
85 Laws 636cl-6. ‘whether one ought to regard these things in a playful way or seriously'
(nal^ov'ra eire araouSdCpvTX); I discuss this passage in some detail in my chapter VII.
86 Cf. e.g. Rep. 424e5-425al, Meno 79a7, Crito 46d4-5.
®7 Cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 151 sq.
88 (1980), p. 105.
89 Ruby Blondell has recently published a new book, The Play of Character (2002), of which I have not 
yet had the opportunity to take full notice but which deals with many of the literary aspects in Plato’s 
dialogues discussed below.
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Thucydides expresses what Immerwahr calls ‘philosophical truths’ along with 
historical theories. 90 The Dissoi Logoi does so even more self-c^onsst^ic^i.lsly.91 92 93 94Both 
package theit messages in the accessible drama of the dialogue form. The feature of 
accessibility is an important part of it. Drama has a wider appeal than dry dialectic. It 
also has certain advantages in terms of a more formal approach to philosophy. The 
dramatic dialogue allows Plato’s narrators to deal with a problem from many angles. 
They are able, as Guthrie indicates, ‘to set out opposing theories, to show that neither is 
wholly right and to conclude only that the matter needs more thought’.** This represents 
a major stepping-stone to more sophisticated levels of philosophical analysis.
The Platonic dialogues demand certain imaginary concessions on the part of the 
reader (or auditor) to the effect that a fictional event, related to drama, epic and myth, is 
transpiring. It is within this imposed context of a fictional event (the dialogue) that 
Plato’s narrators and characters undertake to philosophise. The Platonic tradition of 
employing myths and parables to provide reasoning by analogy may be therefore 
extended to the mythic framework of the dialogue itself. It is a kind of fictional episode 
out of which one is invited to derive some philosophical experience. One may interact 
with a Platonic dialogue through one’s own independent thoughts as well as by imitation 
(mimesis) of the methods and virtues presented. It is left to the audience to take away 
what they wM, although their choices are often directed along specific hnes.
Some causal factor for Plato’s choice of literary style may be derived out of 
Sokrates’ preference for dialogic discourse in his pursuit of wisdom. Sokrates had 
employed oral discussion as his characteristic mode of philosophical activity. As a 
Platonic character, he variously expressed the limitations of die written word inasmuch 
as it cannot answer questions or engage in interactive discussions with the a hving 
audience. Interacting with a hving audience was his philosophical modus operandi™ 
Unlike Sokrates, Plato devised a more formal means of getting across his messages. His 
approach is striking. Even the earher dialogues, which are largely ‘conversations with 
Sokrates’, indicate Plato’s ‘involvement with philosophy in a more technical sense’.** 
Other philosophers such as Solon, Pythagoras and Empedokles of Akragas had utihsed
90 (1973), p. 23. Cf. MacDonald (1959) for a comparison between Laws 704a-707c (later discussed) 
and Thuc. 11.35-46.
9* Cf. Thomas (2000), pp. 88, 130-1.
92 (1978), p. 16.
93 As Thomas (1994), p. 37, indicates, ‘Plato’s authoritarian scheme in the Laws, intended to control 
every aspect of citizens’ lives, does not, so far as I can see, think entirely in terms of written laws’. Cf. 
Laws 822d sq., 788b, 793a-d.
94 Kahn (1996), p. 53
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the artistic (and somewhat traditional) medium of poetry in order to convey their ideas. 95 
Plato’s dramatic dialogue form would appear to represent a quantum leap beyond the 
methods of these others in terms of getting a philosophical agenda or message across 
vast gulfs of space and time.
Plato’s narrative style of composing his dialogues, as indicated by stylometrical 
research of the last two centuries, appears to have altered twice in terms of a markedly 
observable shift. The first significant one is concurrent with the Republic. This came, in 
part, from the literary requkements imposed by the scope of the project and its scale 
compared to previous dialogues. We can note a similar situation in the Laws. The other- 
change occurred sometime between the Theaetetus and the Sophist when, as Kahn 
indicates, Plato ‘began systematically to avoid hiatus and hence adopt more unnatural 
word order and sentence structure’.96 97 98These too may be observed in his final work.
There are at least three different types of dramatic dialogue (other than the 
temporal ‘early’, ‘middle’, and ‘late’ distinctions) in Plato’s corpus?1 They are aporetic (e.g. 
Luuthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Lysis) when they present insoluble problems for 
consideration and conclude in perplexity. The protreptic ones explore inconclusive 
arguments whilst exhorting the interlocutors (and so the audience/reader) to continue in 
their philosophical inquiries. Dialectic, from the Greek meaning ‘conversation’, (such as 
in the Republic and the Laws') is the third and most developed type. It is possible that the 
dramatic style of presentation in the Laws deserves to be designated as division rather than 
dialectic?* This is due to the fact that there is virtually no dissent or criticism expressed by 
the Athenian Stranger’s interlocutors. Rather, Plato’s narrator ‘divides up’ all of the 
various subjects that he wishes to discuss and presents them as a monologue of ideas. 
Technically, the philosophical style of the Laws qualifies as a revised version of dialectic.
Sokratic dialogues typically contain elenchos—that is, a procedure of interrogation 
that leads to refutation.99 Not aU of Plato’s dialectical discourses seek to refute an 
argument without positing something new in its place. Dialectic is die most well known 
Platonic method by which, through argument and mutual criticism, philosophical truth is 
to be ascetaainetd.1®0 All of these styles (aporetic, protreptic, and dialectic with or without
95 ‘Some of the most influential of those whom we now categorise as early Greek philosophers’, as 
Murray (1996), p. 18, says, ‘wrote in verse’.
96(199<5), pp. 44-5.
97 This ordering of the Platonic dialogues is given in my chapter 1; but cf. ibid., pp. 37 sq. for some of 
the problems involved in drawing definitive dates for each dialogue.
98 Cf. Morrow (1960), pp. 506 n. 12, 573-5.
99 Rutherford (1995), p. 76.
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elenchos and division) depend on the dramatic dialogue form and could not function in the 
same way without it. This is due to the rhetorical and conversational elements intrinsic 
in Plato’s chosen medium.
In his various dialogues, the dramatised persona of Plato as a character is either 
completely absent or plays no active roee.wl Yet, in another sense, Plato is wholly 
present. He is the ‘puppet master' who sets the scene for the dialogues and it is he alone 
who chooses the words of the players. Lhtl innovative adaptation of the dramatic 
dialogue, the sole means of revealing Plato's philosophical thoughts apart from his 
letters, places him in a mixed category. Is he the first serious academic philosopher? Is 
he not also a literary theorist who has pioneered a new, hybrid genre? Plato's usage of 
the dramatic dialogue as a medium in which to convey philosophical ideas began a trend 
that was to have profound implications on the history of Western philocpphy?39
As mentioned above, the dialogue form has the advantage of involving and 
engaging the reader/auditor in a very direct way precisely because of its dramatic 
qualities. The vividness of the scenes (i.e. two or more persons in a setting having a 
discussion) draws the observer into the dialogue in much the same way that one is 
vicariously drawn into a play being performed or (today) a film being watched. 
‘Philosophy presented this way’, as Rutherford says, ‘is more accessible, more enticing, 
than formally presented system-building or ex cathedra exposition’.™. Plato’s method 
contrasts sharply with the ‘oracular’ style of Herakhtos, the divinely inspired utterances of 
EmpedokLes or the mind-teasers of Zeno—while incorporating certain elements from all 
of them. There are stH ‘oracular pronouncements’ of a sort in Plato. These come as 
philosophical ‘truth' and the higher virtues imparted by metaphysical entities such as the 
Forms. There are a number of poetic influences in Plato as well as a fair share of mind-
104teaeers.
The dramatic dialogue form reveals other literary borrowings that contribute to 
its total effect. Plato has incorporated other works and genres into his dialogues in 
numerous ways. Examples include the transplantation of texts in whole or in part (as in 
the funeral speech in the Menexenus which echoes other examples of this genre and the 
many quotes from Homer and other poets throughout the corpus), incorporation by
101 Plato is said to be present at Sokrates’ trial {Apology 34a) and was reported to be physically unwell 
at the time of his mentor’s death {Phaedo 59b).
'°7 E.g. Aristotle, Cicero, Berkeley and Hume, to name a prominent few, have employed this medium 
in their philosophising.
16(199^^5), p. 8.
i°4 Cf. e.g. the closing passages from the Euthyphro as well as the slave boy’s geometry lesson in the 
Meno.
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allusion (as in the many allusions to Euripides’ Antiope in the Georgias). Also, as 
Nightingale says, ‘Plato can target a genre by incorporating the discourse, topoi, or 
themes that are peculiar to it and readily identified as such: when CaUias’ slave slams the 
door in Socrates’ face at the opening of the Protagoras, for example, we are confronted by 
a topos from the genre of comedy’.*05 Numerous poets are quoted in the dialogues as 
authorities on ethical mattery.106 When cited, Plato’s characters metapoeticahy recite the 
piece in question as part of their dialogue.
Tliis technique of incorporating literary borrowings appears to play an important 
and functional role in Plato’s philosophising. It may be the case, as Nightingale writes, 
that the audience or reader ‘is meant to hear both a version of the original utterance as 
the embodiment of the speaker’s point of view (or ‘semantic position’) and the second 
speaker’s evaluation of that utterance from a different point of view’?®7 A probable goal 
of such ‘novelistic hybridisation’, as Nightingale and others call Plato’s intertextual 
borrowings, is the illumination of one discourse by means of another-. This occurs with 
his incorporation of works of poetry, speeches and comedic techniques employed to 
advance a philosophical agenda.
In the Laws, the dramatic dialogue form adapts certain techniques from the field 
of rhetori*.®8 This appears in the preambles to Magnesia’s code of laws that are to be 
read before the assembled pubhc as a means of information and pe^i^'suai^ioyOy9 The 
Athenian Stranger indicates that he got the idea for these legal preambles from the 
musical and rhetorical practice of dehvering a proem before the main musical piece or 
oratorical speech*® he says that, as with both music and rhetoric, the preamble serves 
as ‘a kind of artistic preparation useful for the further development of the subject’?**
Why should the ‘subject’ require ‘preparation’ in order to be more receptive to 
the dictates of the laws? Written law, as the Athenian stranger says, is a ‘tyrannical 
prescription’ (TUpp<o,viK6v £7ttTYy|Ca—722e); it ‘orders and threatens hke a tyrant or 
despot who writes his decrees on the waU and is done with it’ (859a4-6). The lawgiver 
can ‘soften’ the impact of these with recourse to persuasive preambles—the language of * 10
®5(1197), p. 6.
®6 Murray (1996), p. 18. Such instances include, but are not limited to, Republic 331a, 33 Id, 334a-b; 
Protagoras 339a-341e, 343d-347a; Meno 95c-96a.
®7 (1997), p. 6.
®8 Cf. Statesman 303e-304e, rhetoric is described as a subsidiary aspect of the science of politics but it 
persuades ‘through mythological speeches and not through instruction’. The Laws would seem to 
represent a new level to which this sort of mythologizing has been taken.
10’£oww718b-723a.
i® 722d, 723c-d.
"i 722d.
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which is more exhortatory than pie;scntitiA^^^e.119 ‘The basic structural differences between 
die polis in Magnesia and the polis of the Republic, as Yunis indicates, ‘reveal the reason for 
the turn to rhetoric in the Jv^w/d? The citizens of Magnesia are not to be philosopher 
kings/queens with the full power of started1* Magnesia is to be a htnited democracy. The 
majority of people will be directed and exhorted to follow the laws without question. 
The rhetorical qualities of the legal preambles are designed to aid the Magnesian 
government in keeping the majority of its populace in line.
Each preamble represents a piece of calculated rhetoric. Failure to take the 
‘advice’ offered in the preamble and thence breaking the law wiU incur severe penalties of 
a punitive as well as psychological nature. A Magnesian lawgiver will address 
himself/herself to the hypothetical populace, reciting the preambles and stating the laws 
and injunctions and these will be publicly inscribed for aU to seed? The legal preambles 
are not merely there to persuade. They are also there to instruct and function as one of 
many forces in the mass education and inculcation of the citizens.*® The fact that the 
Laws itself is required reading for the hypothetical Magnesians underscores the persuasive 
effects of the written text, in concert with living speech, as a kind of ‘drug’ (pharmakori) 
acting on their pyychat1
Plato’s narrator describes the legal preambles with an analogy to a doctor of 
slaves—who prescribes his treatments without explanation—and the doctor of a free 
man who provides an adequate (albeit incomplete) explanation of why the medicine or 
treatment regimen is good for the patiensd1® It is observable that the analogy breaks 
down somewhat, e.g. the lawgiver does not engage in one to one dialogue with the 
citizens, but addresses them en masse. As Nightingale says, ‘the good lawgiver creates his 
preludes and his legal prescriptions long before he comes across any “patients.”’** 
Through his deeper comprehension of the science of medicine, the ‘free doctor’ is at 
once instructing and persuading the patient. The Magnesian lawgiver, with his/her 
deeper understanding of the science of politics, delivers the preambles as persuasive 
pieces of instructive advice to a populace that, on the whole, lacks the lawgiver’s 
specialised techne.
*2 Cf. Nightingale (1999), p, 117 for comparisons with the Statesman and Morrow (1960), pp. 552-60 
for more on this aspect of the preambles.
‘9® (1996), p. 212.
114 Laws 691c-d, 713c, 874e-875d and see above.
*( Laws 822e-823a.
”( Yunis (1996), p. 214. Cf. my chapter III.
117 Cf. Nightingale (1999), pp. 117-18, Hesk (2000), p. 152-4 on Plato’s ‘pharmacy’ and cf. my chapter III. 
ll®Laws 857c-e.
119 9(999), p. 118.
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The preambles are clearly meant to render the audience favourably disposed 
toward the speaker and to instruct, in albeit a superficial way thus facilitating general 
comprehension, about the virtue of the particular law being introduced. The lawgiver 
who will read the preamble is being cast in the role of a teacher. They are compared with 
‘a loving and intelligent father or mother'.*2. The lawgiver may be seen as a parental 
figure (a sort of ‘good shepherd’) that, through the benefits of greater wisdom, seeks to 
help others. The ‘evangelical’ connotations of this have not been overlooked. Yunis 
considers Plato’s legal preambles to have stepped into a fourth state of rhetoric outside 
the traditional modes of the deliberative, the judicial and the epideictic. He suggests that 
it might possibly represent the first systematised example of ‘preaching’ as a rhetorical 
form.*21 * *They do, in fact, exhort the Magnesian subjects to obey the laws through the 
backing of religious authLOit.ty.122 Not un^Hke the later Christian art of preaching, Plato's 
employment of calculated, instructive discourse is designed to communicate divine 
matters. The need for mass-appeal direct thek verbal ‘packaging’. This, along with 
Plato's adaptation of the dialogue form and legal preamble, constitutes another
• • • • 123interesting innovation.
Law and Custom
The concept of a legal preamble is conceptually related to the later notion of preaching. 
They are not the same thing. Something similar may be said of Plato’s understanding of 
the concept of law as opposed to our current paradigm. The title of Plato’s text, the 
Laws (NOMOI), itself presents a problem of translation for readers in the modern age. 
The word nomos held multiple connotations and a fluid range of meanings for the ancient 
Greeks.*24 It may have originally had something to do with ‘assigned pastures’ and 
‘appropriate dweUing places' but later came to mean something more Hke ‘common
120 859a; cf. 923a-c for this propagandisticaUy ‘parental’ theme and cf. my chapter V.
121 (1996), pp. 229-30.
122 Lumv 715e-716b.
’”3 The general impression, as Yunis (1996), p. 236, indicates, is that ‘religious experience was 
conveyed through texts only among esoteric groups such as Orphics and Pythagoreans’. 
i”4 It related particularly to sex, as Cartledge (1993), p. 64, says ‘in the rhetorical discussions of sexual 
matters there are ‘explicit or implicit manipulations of the polar opposition between “nature” [physis] 
and “culture” [nomos]’. Cf. Pindar, ff. 169.1-4 where ‘Law is the king of all, of mortals and of 
immc^ila^ls...’ and Hdt. Hdt VII. 101-4, where Demaratus tells Xerxes that the Greeks ‘are free—yes— 
but not entirely free, for they have a master and that master is Law (nomos), which they fear much 
more than your subjects fear you’.Cf. my chapter I.
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usage’ or ‘custom’ as well as ‘law’ and ‘ordinance’.125 Nomos may also be used to denote a 
‘tune’ or ‘melody’ and this twist of meaning becomes a favourite source of puns in 
Plato’s Nomoi (700b, 722e, 734e, 775b, 799e).126
Themis is an older legal term that expresses a law, as Jones indicates, having been 
‘given by someone, prince or priest, specially endowed with insight to express the divine 
will’.127 It was Zeus’ discretion that Agamemnon had been granted the authority to issue 
his themistes that were more like advice than decrees to his subjects.128 Similarly, Zeus 
gave authority to Minos, in his capacity as judge of those who enter the underworld, in 
the issuing of themistes in answer to the appeals of the dead.129 Here is an ideological 
connection with the Laws. The Athenian Stranger also considers his nomoi to have been 
‘divinely’ inspired. This, evoking the connotations of themis, has a persuasive quality not 
unlike the ‘noble lie’ or legal preamble but it also seems to reflect the deeper, mystical 
connection between law and divine (Platonic) Reason.
Other terms add to this discussion. Thesmos eventually came to be accepted for a 
law as opposed to the law amongst the ancient Athenians.130 A clear distinction seems to 
be lacking. We have in the same sentence of a speech of Andokides reference to the 
thesmoi of Drako and the nomoi of Solon.131 This is perhaps because the laws of Drako 
each began with the word thesmos. MacDowell (echoing Ostwald’s definition) suggests 
that nomos could be distinguished as ‘a term for a norm of action recognised by a society, 
what is agreed to be the right thing to do’ as opposed to thesmos as a judgement or 
decree.132 However, this distinction is arguable and, as Jones says, ‘there was probably no 
period when the two words \nomos and thesmos\ were not roughly interchangeable’.133
125 LSJ, s.v. vdgog. Cf. Humphreys (1987), p. 214, who says that the ‘idea that nomos was originally 
connected with land division is not implausible (though a connection with division and distribution of 
sacrifical meat is also possible; the earliest surviving use of the term, in a fragment of Hesiod, 322 
MW, refers to sacrifice) but an early association specifically with written law cannot be maintained’.
126 Cf. Todd and Milled: (1990), p. 12.
127 (1956), p. 28.
128/ZzW IX.99.
129 Od. XI. 569-70: OeuiorenovTa itoow...o'i 5fe |±iv Sixag eixovto dvaxTa. Cf. Aghion, 
Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 171-3
!j0 Nomos, as used in Aristotle, Pol. IV.4 3-7, perhaps comes nearest to approximating the Roman ius.
1311.81.
132 MacDowell (1978), p. 44. If he is correct in his assessment, then nomos may by symptomatic of 
‘the change to a democratic attitude, and implies that the validity of a law depends rather on its 
acceptance by the community than on the power of a ruler’. Clearly the acceptance of the ‘rightness’ 
of the laws introduced by the Athenian Stranger by the citizenry of Magnesia is importance, but their 
‘tightness’ is predetermined by philosophical/metaphysical imperative. Cf. Ostwald (1969), pp. 20-54.
133 (1956), p. 33; cf. Dem. XXIII.51: vdgog AptixovTOg and ibid. 62: Oecrptig also of Drako’s laws. In 
a passage from Empedokles (Diels, B9), themis is contrasted with nomos to mean, perhaps not 
surprisingly, something equivalent to physis.
*
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Tn the latter part of the fifth century', as Dover says, ‘the realisation that a law, 
custom or usage must have had an origin at a point in time aroused great interest among 
intellectuals and expressed itself in argument about physis (‘nature') and nomos (‘usage', 
‘custom', ‘practice', ‘convention', ‘law’)'.134 E.g., Demokritos considered it a natural 
phenomenon that all creatures should beget offspring and rear them but that it was a 
matter of nomos that human parents should expect some returns on their effort.135 
Demosthenes indicates that Nature herself wiU move citizens in the manner that is best 
but the good citizen should lead the city by argument and expaanation.136 * * * * *Nomos was 
often contrasted, especially in 5?’ century Greek discourse, with physis; ‘the latter 
represents underlying reality, and the former denotes the patterns by which men try to 
shape dks'.t?7 There was a perceived connection between nomos and physis
Efforts were made to clarify the specific functions of nomos. In his speech, On the 
Mysteries, Andokides wrote that ‘henceforth the archdns shall not make use of unwritten 
law (<3c^p^<(C(^Cp v6pcp); but the decree (\|Tfj(j)CTliX) of the Assembly is to have greater 
authority than either the rule of the executive council or that of the demesmen’.*3? This 
reform set the seal on the revised law code adopted by the restored Athenian democracy 
it zC?/2 b.c.e ?.nd, as Ostwald says, ‘marks the conclusion of a curious development in 
Atheman political terminology'.*? From this time the principal meaning of nomos, in both 
legal ' and non-legal spheres becomes something Hke ‘statute' or ‘law'. It signified an 
enactment (normally a written or inscribed one) that had either been included in the law 
code at the time of its ratification or had been added to it through the elaborate 
legislative process known as VO|LO0Eaa<n.i43
‘ In- the earner part of the 5* century, the terms nomos and psephisma could often be 
seen to overlap. Either word could be employed by ancient Athenian writers (along with 
the more archaic thesmos) in order to denote various shades of the concept of ‘law’. 
Ah,ern"?ts were made at the end of the 5? centiuy to clarify the semantic fields of nomos 
and psephisma as well as to codify the laws and iron out their inconiisteneiet?41
75.
135 E27S (DK)
136 VIII.72.
'3' Cartledge, Millett and Todd (1990), glossary p. 231.
13® Andokides 187; cf. also 85 and Dem. XXIV.30.
•^HW), p. 1; cf. Hignet (1952), p. 300.
'I® For this legal procedure in the 4® century, cf. Dem. XXIV.20-23 and see Kahrstedt (1938) pp. 1-25. 
Hignett’s view (1952) that the decree in Andokides 1.83-4 is the first instance of this procedure must be 
modified in light of the objections raised by Harrison (1955), pp. 33-5.
14' Cfi Nightingale (1999), p. 105 and Rhodes (1991), pp. 87-10o. These events may have had an 
.’T.,fl')'5.,^ce on Plato’s Laws in terms of their being a written legal code.
I '
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Thereafter, as MacDowell indicates, it ‘was normally assumed that a law (nomof) was 
something more fundamental and more permanent than a decree ipsephismtdfAs 
Humphreys says, ‘nomos had to be something which did not easily change... the laws of 
Solon could be called nomoi because they had been established for a long tkne’.142 43 A law 
made a rule concerning some specific activity whereas a decree specified action to be 
taken in a particular instance. The term nomos continued to carry its other non-legal 
attributes both inside and outside the courts of law.*44
The notion that nomos can mean both something hke ‘law’ and something Hke 
‘custom’ to the ancient Greeks begets a daunting challenge. How does one approach 
Plato’s use of this term throughout his final opus where this problematic term appears as 
the title itself? In the works of Plato there are variegated uses of this expression with 
similar but distinct shades of significance. Some examples include a) a conventional 
linguistic usage (Krat. 384d7, 388dl2, Tim. 60e2), b) a customary practice (Symp. 182a7, 
Laws 795al), c.) a conventional belief (Gorg. 482e6, Laws 889e6, 890d4, 6, 904a9), d) a 
norm of individual conduct {Rsp. 587c2, 604al0, b6, 9, 607a7, Lolit. 291e2, Laws 674b7, 
835e5, 836e4), e) a religious practice {Phaedo 58b5, Phaedr. 256d7) and a condition of 
lav/ and order {Rsp. 587al0, Laws 780d5, 904c9). There is, in Plato and elsewhere, the 
distinct sense that ‘law’ is impHcitly connected with ‘custom’. There was also, in Plato’s 
era, the connotation that their ‘constitution’ was derived out of some ancestral practice 
that provided the law with a legitimate foundation—having been drawn from estabhshed 
customs.
Nomos in the Laws must be something more profound than ‘custom’ alone. 
Laws that had been largely unwritten in actual practice wH be incorporated into the 
Magnesian constitution. ‘This paradoxical idea is made exphcit at 793a-d’, as Nightingale 
says, ‘where the Athenian [Stranger] indicates that “unwritten laws” (dcypacjxx vdpijia) 
are “ancestral customs” that hold the lawcode together from the very beginning and 
form the very foundation for the constitution; though they “will make the lawcode 
longer” (j.iOCKpo'TSpo)^ TOlfj tob^ v6|OOUC;, 793d5), he adds, the unwritten laws must 
not be left out’.*45 This represents a more formaHsed legal system and an advanced step
142 (1978), p. 45, Cf. Cartledge, Millet xnd Todd (1990), pp. 231-2 and 237.
143 (1987), p. 217.
E.g., xs Humphreys ibid, p. 218, sxys ‘We should therefore be wxry of supposing that for Herodotus 
the Indian nomos of eating the dead xnd the Spxrtxn nomos of fighting on xgxinst overwhelming odds 
were different kinds of principle...noma represents an incalculable element of human behaviour’.
(1999), p. 101. However, the Athenian Stranger’s recourse to ‘ancestral customs’ in this discussion 
is possibly more propagandistic in intent than a statement of belief. See below on Plato’s preference 
for political science over ancestral law.
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in political science. The inclusion of 'unwritten laws’, along with preludes for all the laws 
(all publicly inscribed similar to the custom at Gortyn), reveal a significant shift from 
Athenian pra^c:t:^t^^446
The rapid changes in government at Athens in the later part of the 5* century 
brought this issue of the ‘ancestral coeitisusioe’, or ‘ancestral law' (7lcC'TpiOg vop6>£), to 
the forefront for many.*”7 There was an intellectual opposition to the restored 
democracy in Athens at the end of the 5th century. Amongst this group, as Finley says, 
'the appeal to the ancestral constitution retained vitality'?”8 It was generally agreed that 
Solon founded the Athenian politeia. It is therefore not surprising that Plutarch wrote his 
biography whereas Kleisthenes only gets notable mention. Isokrates and his followers, 
ostensibly eschewing oligarchy, favoured a ‘mixed constitution’ that hearkened back to 
some non-specific, idealised pa^^tzt”9
Plato took a different approach to the issue. He was about eighteen when 
Kleitophon moved the amendment that opened the debate on the subject of the 
‘ancestral constitution'?5? As a member of one of Athens’ more prominent political 
families, Plato had close personal connections with some of the chief players and a keen 
eye for the relevant events. When the time came, he virtually dismissed the ‘historical' 
discussion with contempt. His philosophy of government never rested on ‘ancestral' 
argumenrt?51 Certainly Plato reveals conservative tendencies and his views may have also 
been informed by recourse to an idealised vision of the past. In the Statesman we have a 
possible answer to the debate. Perhaps building on the works of Gorgias and the 
soplisstt,146 * 148 * * * 52 Plato's narrator espouses a novel concept; having established that there is a 
science (epist^eme) of politics, he posits that the proof of a correct constitution is that it be 
based upon science and scientifically administered. The question of whether or not it is 
historically well grounded becomes largely irrelevant. In his dialogues Plato's narrators
146 See above on the preludes and their persuasive intent.
547 Cf. Rhodes (1981), pp. 115, 376-7.
148 (1986), p. 50. Although Platt’s ai.ap)roachi tt) it is marked^^^ different.
149 The Isokratean passages on ihe i^r^^^^t^lolt constiSutifn’ mo aasembled and examined in Jost (1936), 
pp. 140-45. Cf. Rhodes (1981), pp. 323, 371-2,421,429-30 on Plato’s characterisation of Athenian 
politicians and views on oligarchy.
I® Aristotle, Ath. Pol. XXXIV.3. Cf. Rhodes (1981), pp. 375-7.
I®' There are exceptions, as indisartd aaooe. E.g., Ss’on ii mantioned aightten times in the exa^nt 
Platonic corpus with casual and friendly references. He was a good lawgiver, the alleged source of the 
Atlantis myth, a gnomic poet to be quoted and reputed to have been an honourable ancestor of Plato’s 
mother, Periktione. His legalistic theories represent a kind of ‘ancestral law’ that might be seen as 
influencing Plato. Cf. Lambert (1993), pp. 316-17. Cf. Hartog (2002), pp. 217, 219 on the Atlantis 
myths and their potential historical connections with Solon.
152 The Dissoi Logoi, the only text of the sophists to survive, also posits a hypothetical society that is 
antithetical to Athens (although not completely opposite), cf. Thomas (2000), pp. 130-1, 231.
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typically support a particular formulation of aristocratic rule over any other type. The 
difference between his aristocracy and that of the real world lies in the role of philosophy 
in law. ‘Correct’ rulership is, rather strikingly, a science practised by those who have 
been properly educated to do so.153 154
In the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger demonstrates that formal legislation in a 
democratic assembly is actually unnecessary and potentially a very dangerous thing 
(293b-299a). His analogy describes hypothetical legislators passing and modifying laws 
on medicine and navigation—subjects about which they know Ettle or nothing—and 
how such a process will never successfully navigate ships or cure sick people. The 
proposed laws on medicine and navigation are to be displayed on kyrbeis (as laws were 
posted in Solon’s day) and on stelai (as in Plato’s). The best constitution therefore is that 
which is based on science informed by the superior insights of philosophy. ‘That is 
always Plato’s answer:’ as Finley says, ‘of all existing constitutions, even the best are mere 
imitations of the true constitution; the debate over ancestral constitution is a waste of 
time or worse; constitutions cannot be judged by reference to this or that past hero or
• • ■» 1S4constitution.
The laws of Magnesia are philosophically inspired in their creation. Above and 
beyond all else, it is Philosophy (with its attendant sciences) that is to be the ultimate 
standard on which the rule of nomos is based. The laws’ changeability is extremely limited 
with little or no legislation allowed and only the philosophically illuminated nukterinos 
council permitted to alter them. As Nightingale says, ‘the lawcode is conceived as a 
distinct genre of writing which is not only elevated above all other modes of discourse 
but is accorded an almost scriptural status’.155 Nomos here means something like 
rationally, scientifically and philosophically derived laws with permanent binding force. 
The Magnesian nomoi have regard for ancient custom and ‘unwritten laws’, but these are 
subordinate to the scrutiny of science and the rule of Reason {logos}. If a historical law is 
found to be philosophically sound, then it will be utilised.156 Plato’s narrator is no 
stranger to borrowing from useful sources. He has repeatedly availed himself of the 
wealth of information present in existing legal codes.
153 The Magnesians will not only study law. Plato’s narrator, as Nightingale (1999), p. 103, says, ‘even 
explicates the precise goal of this activity: one “studies” the law in order to become a better person and 
a better judge of the other kinds of logoi'.
154 (1986), pp. 51-52.
155 (1999), p. 102; cf. Laws 858a-859a.
156 As the Athenian Stranger has done in the case of Solon’s laws, cf. my chapters V and VI.
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Kretans, Spattans and Pythagoreans
It is impossible to gauge the influence of aU the factors that might have affected Plato's 
thinking. Even so, there are a number of interesting points of connection that may 
enrich our understanding of the Laws. The designation of his hypothetical colony and its 
placement are not insignificant. The name ‘Magnesia' does not itself appear until Book 
VIII, at 848d and thereafter is brought up again at 860e, 919d, 946b and 969a. The site 
for Plato’s Magnesia is described as being on a plain in Krete about eighty stadia (about 9 
or 10 miles) from the coast, along the river Lethaeus (Hieropotamos), with plenty of 
trees and access to a good harbour (704b-70cc).157 The Athenian Stranger enjoins his 
hypothetical colonists to honour any local divinities worshipped by the earher inhabitants 
of this same site. This may indicate, as Morrow says, ‘that Plato remembers—or 
imagines—an ancient Kretan city named Magnesia’.158 No evidence has been found in 
the region that Plato’s narrator has delineated but much archaeological work remains to 
be done on Keete?))
Why might Plato want his Magnesian colony to be situated in such a place? 
Potential answers to this question may be derived from both within and without the text 
of the Laws. At the beginning of Book I, the Athenian Stranger mentions that the 
Kretans follow Homer in ascribing the origin of theit laws to Minos, the son of Zeus. 
The latter would reportedly hold court with his son every nine years to give him legal 
advice on the government of the kingoom.1® He later indicates that ‘the laws of Krete 
are held in exceedingly high repute amongst all the Hellenes’ (631b). This appears to be 
a mostly true statemen).1* According to Herodotos (1.60), the Spartans of his era 
maintained that their Lyykourgan legislation was derived, in part, from that of Krete. 
Aristotle discusses an attempt to make not only Lykourgos but also Zaleukos and 
Charondas dependent on one Thaletas who was a legislator of Gorten.152 Aristotle rejects 
this tradition for chronological reasons but agrees with the tribute to Krete that such a
157 Plato’s Magnesia will not build a navy. Cf. Macdonald (1959), pp. 108-9 on this as a ‘conservative ’ 
prejudice’ against Athenian democracy and empire through naval power.
158 (1960), p. 31. There is an ancient inscription from Magnesia-on-the-Maeander (3rd b.c.e.) in Asia 
Minor that records its foundation by colonists from the original Kretan Magnesia, cf. Kern (1900), p.
17, lines 7 sq. This inscription is likewise discussed by Wilamowitz (1895), 177-198. For another 
account of this same tradition see Strabo XIV, 1.2. Also, The Palatine Anthology (VII. 304) preserves 
a grave inscription of a man from Kretan Magnesia.
’5y For the current status of Kretan archaeology, cf. httspdlwww.interkriti.org/archaeolo.html.
*55 624a7-b3, cf. Odyssey XIX, 178-9.
*5i Cf. Polyb. VI for a more negative view of Kretan tradition.
*®2 Pol. 1274a, 25-31. This Thaletas is the Melic poet who was meant to have established the naked- 
boy dances (YopvoraxiSiai) at Sparta. Cf. Rep. 452c.
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tradition implies. He says that ‘the true statesman wishes to make his citizens good and 
obedient to the laws; we have a good example of this in the Kretan and Lakedaimonian 
legislators’.*6®
The Athenian reformer Solon (c, 640-c. 560 b.c.e.) was reputed by some to have 
been helped in lawmaking by the Kretan Epimecid^dc^s®6* This perhaps reflects more of 
what was believed rather than what was necessarily true. The admiration that it reveals 
for Kretan legal traditions appears justified by the inscriptions that have come to light in 
the past century. The Code of Gortyn indicates that the Kretans were not only superb 
legislators but had developed their skills over a long period of time.165 An inscription 
from Dreros, probably not later than 600 b.c.e., was discovered in the 1940s that 
represents, as Morrow says, ‘an early source of the polis type of constitution which 
became a common feature of the Greek states in the classical period’.*®® Saunders has 
likewise pointed out that a number of the statutes in the Imws of Plato have much in 
common with Kretan legal traditions and, in this way, ‘it is not only geographically that 
Magnesia is close to Gortyn’.*®’
Plato’s interest in Krete is not a late development exclusive to the Laws. In the 
Protagoras, Sokrates claims to believe that the love of knowledge was more ancient and 
more truly cultivated in Krete and Sparta than in any other part of Greece (342a-343b). 
This particular passage is not without its elements of humour but may reflect genuine 
admiration for the Kretan and Spartan traditions. Plutarch later tells us that, under 
Plato’s influence, Dion of Syracuse sought to establish a constitution ‘of the Spartan or 
Kretan type, a mixture of democracy and royalty, with an aristocracy overseeing the 
administration of important affairs’.*6® There is more of a Spartan influence to be seen in 
the Republic, but both of these ancient cultures had an effect on Plato’s utopia-buiiCgng.*ls
The idea of a ruling, aristocratic elite is certainly a prominent theme in the Laws. 
Perhaps more importantly, both Krete and Sparta had experienced the effects of 
deliberate attempts at societal control through the advent of legal codes.*’® Sparta, in 
particular, had undergone a number of constitutional reforms with results that were
*3iV/A. Edi. 1102a, 8-11.
164 Plut. Solon 12. Plutarch’s source was likely an ancient one, possibly Theopompos; cf. Diog. 1.109.
165 Cf. Halsall (1998), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/450-gortyn.html for the dating of this 
ancient legal code’s inscription to the middle of the fifth century.
^UdO), p. 20
[67 (1991) p. 347. This issue of Kretan influences is taken up later throughout my thesis.
16® Dion LIIL2.
169 Cf. Rawson (1969), pp. 65 sq. for more on Sparta and the Republic.
*7° The written laws from archaic Chios (c. 600-550 b.c.e.) may have been another constitutional 
influence as well as those from Dreros.
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obseer^bkb'l1 This was possibly a major reason why it was worthy of study. Plato’s 
Sokrates praises Krete and Sparta on various occasions and, in the Lepubliy, he cites ‘the 
Kretan and Spartan constitution’ as an example of the best of the imperfect forms of 
governmcnt/i The main fault of these constitutions was their warlike inclination.
These interests in Krete and Sparta had a noticeable effect on other members of 
his Academy. The second book of Arierorle's Politics contains a lengthy account of Krete 
with a careful comparison of Kretan and Spartan institutions and discussion of their 
historical relationship?™ On this, Jaeger has posited the opinion that the materials used 
by Aristotle in this section of the Politics were assembled during the period of his 
residence in the Academy, as he says, ‘when Plato was working on the Raws and Kretan 
and Spartan institutions were a favourite subject of discussion’.171 172 173 74 175 176It may have been the 
case that Plato and the Academy were attempting to retro-engineer an ideal government 
based on existing models of past experiments in governmental reform.
As indicated earlier, the Spartan government underwent a series of revisions and 
constitutional reforms (one might say ‘calculated social engineering’) followed by some 
marked success as a consequence?™ It is impossible to say with certainty what prompted 
Spartan constitutional reforms. In the 7* century, there had been, as Whitby says, some 
‘internal wranglings over the constitution’ as well as, perhaps more profoundly, the 
Messenian revolts which seem to have necessitated some deliberate cultural re- 
or dering? a primary result of these reforms appears to have been the achievement of a 
more tightly controlled society in which the lives of most citizens were subject to some 
type of intense scrutiny and regulation. This process involved, amongst other things, the 
inculcation of accepted vtitues along with a considerable deal of exposure to the state’s 
official ideologies.
A number of the Athenian Stranger’s policies in the Laws appear to reflect 
Spartan ways of thinking both real and 'imagined. I examine many of these instances of
171 Ibid. pp. 4-6 for an outline of reforms attributed to the mytho-historical Lykourgos by the fifth 
century. The fact that Spartan laws were unwritten (as opposed to the Code of Gortyn or the laws of 
Chios or Dreros) appears to represent a degree of sophistication removed from written legal codes, but 
the theoretical structure of the Spartan state proved interesting to Plato and many other ancient Greeks.
172 Rep. 544c; cf. too Crito 52e.
17311,5 seq.
174 Jaeger (1923), pp. 300-301, n.l
175 Cf. Powell (1994), p279. On Spartan constitutional reforms and political history, cf. Hdt. 1.65; 
Thuc. 1.12.3, 18.1; Xen. Lak. Pol. X.8; Plato, Laws 691e-692a; Aristotle, Pol. 1313a; Plut. Lyk. II, VII, 
XI.
176 (2001), p. 9. It was surely a combination of these and other matters (e.g. the defeat by Argos at 
Hysiae c. 669—Pausanias II.24.8) that led to the changes.
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similarity throughout this thesis where applicable.177 Although Sparta and Magnesia have 
different ends to their respective ways of life, the Spartan influence appears to be quite 
strong. According to Finley in the Laws Plato seems to have ‘combined much Athenian 
private law with a social and political structure that more closely approached Sparta, in so 
far as it resembled any existing Greek system’.178 His version is a unique synthesis of 
these and other elements.
A group of philosophers who, nearly a century before Plato’s time, reputedly 
took both a theoretical and a practical interest in politics, similar to Plato, were the 
Pythagoreans. Iamblichos (4th c.e.) reported that Pythagoras himself paid special 
attention to Kretan and Spartan legislation.179 Volumes could be (and indeed have been) 
written on the potential links between Plato and the Pythagoreans. It is not the purpose 
of this thesis to explore that murky realm. Pythagoras was reputed to have had political 
dealings in Sicily, Lampaskis and Kroton (to name a few such places), and he may have 
held a particular interest in the constitutional formulations of Krete and Sparta. The 
indications that we have suggest a highly political aspect to early Pythagoreanism. That 
Pythagoras influenced Plato is generally acknowledged.180
So, why place Magnesia on Krete? Plato’s interest in Krete and Sparta seems 
beyond dispute. This appears especially true with regard to the codified structure of their 
legal codes and their methods of social control. The Athenian Stranger borrows a great 
deal from perceived Kretan and Spartan traditions in framing the constitution for his 
Magnesia. Perhaps there would be equal reason to deposit Magnesia in Sparta rather 
tiian Krete. It is possible that he chose Krete because the region was relatively isolated 
and less of a military target than Sparta at the time of the Laws’ composition. The pursuit 
of arete demands uninterrupted leisure.
The Laws, the Academy and Political Theory
The Laws contains all manner of legislation dealing with virtually every aspect of a 
society. It includes, but is certainly not limited to, such subjects as trade, taxes, welfare,
177 Cf. Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977), p. 91. A notable similarity between Sparta and Plato’s 
Magnesia, is the implementation of a state-sponsored system of education Sparta was the only ancient 
Greek society that had a state-run system of education.
178 (1986), p. 136
179 De vita Pythagorica XXV seq. On some of the pros and cons of using Iamblichos as a viable source 
on the Pythagoreans, cf. de Vogel (1966), p. 20 and esp. Appendix D, On Iamblichus, p. 204. Also cf. 
Kingsley (1995) on recent archaeological data that provides stronger links between the
Neopythagoreans of Iamblichos’ time and the earlier Pythagoreans than had been previously supposed.
180 Cf. e.g. Burnett (1920) and Kingsley (1995).
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education, marriage, the rearing of children, penal codes, governmental organisation and, 
as particularly concerns this thesis, moral and sexual conduct. The statutes are presented 
in a didactic format with intermittent interpretations. The initial chapters of the text, as 
well as some of the closing chapters, contain the largest portion of the theoretical 
discussions on subjects relating to government, law and philosophy. Plato’s interests in 
philosophy included the theoretical side of politics to no small degree. This is especially 
true of the Lams which is particularly concerned with the proper government of an 
idealised polis. Plato’s Magnesia is a work of fiction. Its theoretical contemplations find 
their corollaries in the real world of politics and society only by way of metaphor and 
analogy.
Despite this, the political impact of the Laws on real societies and poleis may have 
been profound. Plato’s aristocratic Academy is thought to have entertained many 
political connections. Perhaps the Laws have served as a handbook of guidelines for its 
members. These academics appear to have been renowned for their expertise in political, 
legal and constitutional studies and, as such, may have been retained as advisors to a 
number of communities in the ancient work!181 Their interests and activities, along with 
Plato’s, point to a kind of indirect practical agenda behind his theoretical works.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the political activity of the 
Academy remains a controversial and disputed subject. This thesis does not seek to 
resolve the issue. Elements of uncertainty make their political activities only a potential 
context against which to view the Laws, but the implications of this are worth 
consideration. Much of the Academy’s alleged political activity hinges on the validity of 
Plato’s letters—especially the fifth (in which he introduces his student Euphraios to King 
Perdiccas of Macedon), the sixth (in which he recommends two of his pupils to King 
Hermeias of Atarneos) and the famous seventh letter to the Dionian party that ruled 
Syracuse.
There is no indication that the authorship of these letters was regarded with 
scepticism in the Classical era and this fact lends them some credibility. It was in the 
fifteenth century c.e. that Ficinius condemned letter XIll as false, followed two centuries 
later by Cudworth.®2 Attacks on the validity of the Platonic letters reached its climax in 
the nineteenth century as did attacks on the validity of the Lawr.183 The same critics of
181 Morrow (1960), 8-9.
182Cf.Bluck(1947), p. 174.
183 Cf. ibid. pp. 175-181 and Morrow (1962), pp. 5-16, for a breakdown of the arguments and ancient 
corroborative evidence. Most importantly, perhaps, is that all the Platonic letters are listed in the canon
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the letters also cast doubt on the authenticity of the Parmenides, Sophist, Kratylus and 
Philebus for similar stylistic reasons. In later decades, these have found more favourable 
light in the eyes of the critics. Their previous errors may have been due in part, as 
Morrow says, to a failure to appreciate ‘the changes which Plato’s style had undergone 
between the Republic and the L/W.’4 The hypersensitivity of some nineteenth century 
philologists has since given way to more modern critical methods that tend to embrace 
most if not aU of the Platonic letteri.* 1?5 Morrow, who accepts all of them with the 
possible exception of the first, says that the others agree ‘in thought, style, and diction’ 
with the acknowledged works of the author? He indicates that this is especially true of 
the seventh letter. It is doubtless that the subject of authenticity wiH continue to haunt 
Platonic scholarship well into the future. It is reasonable to proceed with the assumption 
that the letters (especially the key political ones such as the seventh) are probably valid.
The contextual effect of the Academy’s political entanglements on the Laws must 
remain theoretical. This does not, however, mean that these alleged involvements were 
not significant. The Laws, by nature, is a highly political text. The context in which it 
was conceived and created may have been no less political. Many later authorities have 
thought so. The Academy, according to Vatai, ‘made a name for itself in the fourth 
century by the lawgivers it sent to assorted Hellenic cities’.’?’ Plutarch, who identified 
himself as a Platonis^ gives a favourable account of Academics in positions of power. 
He regarded these as justly opposing the dangerous influences of the Epicureans who, as 
he says, ‘if they write in such matters at all, write on government to deter us from taking 
part in it’.’8?
Plutarch mentions the Academic Arietoeymoe who reformed the constitution of 
Arcadia, Phormio who modified the heavily oligarchic rule of the Eleans, Menedemos 
who was sent to the Pyrrhaeans, Eudoxos who legislated for his fellow Knidians and 
Aristotle who gave laws to the Stagnates and Macedonians.’? It can be safely assumed 
that these philosophers benefited both from Plato’s teaching as well as the financial and 
other support of then aristocratic families (excepting Eudoxos and Aristotle who were 
more, so to speak, bourgeois). Eudoxos (4? c.e.) was already established as a famous
drawn up by Aristophanes of Byzantium (3rd b.c.e.) and also in the canon of Thrasylius (T‘ c.e,). The 
Laws would probably have been cast out of the Platonic canon by the same nineteenth century 
detractors had not Aristotle vouched for it (see above).
184 (1962), p. 8.
l’5JW.,pp. 10-11.
186 Ibid.., p. 16.
l®7 (1984), p. 93.
I88/Wv. Col., 1127a.
™ Ibid., 1126c-d.
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mathematician and philosopher and, as such, did not depend solely on the auspices of 
the Academy. Aristotle, while not of the same social class as Plato, had little trouble in 
finding a place amongst Athenian ehtes and, later, the courts of aristocrats and autocrats.
Perhaps the Academy's most noteworthy alleged success involved Hermeias the 
tyrant of Atarneos. Hermeias had risen from the merchant class to dominate his polis}'30 
He appears to have cultivated a close relationship with two of Plato's students, Erastos 
and Korsikos. As scholarly representatives of the famous Academy, they could have 
been valuable advisors as well as providing good spin for the tyrant.190 91 192Plato had 
requested that Hermeias look after his students, who were somewhat lacking in worldly 
experience, and extend to them his protection.'92 Securing from Hermeias his aegis over 
Erastos and Korsikos, themselves two leading citizens of Skepsis, also seems to have 
secured the protection of Skepsis itself. If so, this induced a condition in which the two 
philosophers could undertake whatever reforms (or experiments) in Skepsis, and later 
Assos, that they wished with considerable ease. Hermeias evidently benefited from his 
pursuit of philosophy and its application to government as he reportedly took up 
geometry and dialectics and may have pursued his studies even after the novelty wore 
off.'® Arius Didymus, the Augustan-era stoic philosopher, offers an account of the 
effect that the Academy's agents produced on Hermeias:
Into the surrounding country he made expeditions; and he made friends 
of Korsikos and Erastos and Aristotle and Xenokrates; hence aU these 
men lived with Hermeias... he listened to them... he gave them gifts... he 
actually changed the tyranny into a milder rule; therefore he also came to 
rule over the neighbouring country as far as Assos, and then, being 
exceedingly pleased with these same philosophers, he allotted them the 
city of Assos. He accepted Aristotle most of all of them, and was very 
intimate with him.'94
190 Cf. Jaeger (1923), p. 112. He had allegedly bolstered his political successes with a title purchased 
from the Persians.
‘9' Ibid. pp. 112-113
192Zfe-VI, 322e.
'99 Ibid. 322d, unlike the tyrants of Syracuse.
'9' Jaeger’s translation and restoration (1923), p. 114-15. From Didymus col. 5.52, Diels-Schubart.
79
The degree of validity represented by this fragment is subject to debate. Even so, both it 
and Plato’s sixth letter seem to corroborate significant political involvement on the part 
of Academics.
Some of the more ambitious members of Plato’s mostly aristocratic Academy, we 
are told, tried to establish themselves in the roles of tyrants. Some evidently succeeded. 
Klearchos, who studied under Plato and Isokrates, was regarded by the latter as the 
kindest, most humane and most liberal student in the school.’® This future tyrant was 
sponsored for Athenian citizenship by Timotheos in 375, and in 362 Klearchos named 
his son after the famous Athenian general.’®* However, after gaining his tyranny, 
Klearchos earned the disfavour of the Academy, as well as that of the philosopher 
Chion, through his harsh policies and his abusive treatment of local aristocrats.
Other Academics allegedly sought their own crowns. Timolaos of Kyztkos 
followed in the pattern of Klearchos and revealed a different personality once he had 
assumed power. We are told that he went from being a benevolent distributor of free 
grain and money to suddenly overthrowing the constitution of Kyzikos.’®’ Euaeon of 
Lampaskos was another Academic who reportedly attempted a similar rise to power. His 
tactics involved loaning money to his native city and, as Athenaios says, ‘taking as 
security the acropolis which he retained with the design of becoming tyrant, until the 
people of Lampaskos combined to resist him; and after repaying his money they threw 
him out’.’®
The Academic Chaeron of Pellene may have been more extreme than Klearchos 
or Timolaos. As tyrant, he allegedly banished all of the male nobility, redistributed their 
land to their slaves and forced all of the aristocratic women to marry the newly freed and 
propertied slaves. This seems rather unlikely and may represent Athenaios’ attempts at 
slandering the Academy with embellished half-truths. He seems to be sneering when he 
says that ‘these were the beneficial results he derived from the noble Republic and from 
the lawless IljW’® Timolaos of Kyzilcos, Euaeon of Lampaskos and Chaeron of 
Pellene were all three used by Sophokles of Sunion’s legalist, Demochares, as exhibits to 
justify the ban on philosophers at Athens in 307/6. Chroust, after giving a Hst of Plato’s 
disciples and associates, concludes that ‘one could justly refer to the Platonic Academy as
’66 Isok.£p., 7.135.
’66 Cf. Dem. XX.84; on his son’s name see Vatai (1984) p. 88, n. 158.
’67 Athenaios XI.509 sq.
’6/7W. 11.508 sq.
199 Ibid. 11.509 sq. Cf. Paus. VII.27.2; Athenaios 11.508d-509b. Both Chaeron and Timolaos appear to 
have received Macedonian assistance.
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the “seedbed” of political tyrants'.20® But should one conclude such a thing? Political 
enemies of the Academy might have desired to spread such a view. It can be said with 
certainty that the Academy was well connected to the political landscape of ancient 
Greece from its inception.
Much more could be said about their other potential political dealings but will be 
omitted here for want of space and time. One could mention Plato's own involvement 
in the political affairs of Sicily and his frequent dealings with the Pythagorean 
philosophers there who sought influence over the courts of Dionysius I and II?0' There 
are also the more famous, if perhaps less dramatic, undertakings of Aristode in the 
Macedonian court, tutoring prince Alexande?.20? Likewise, one could mention the 
continued political influence of the Academy after Plato's death when it came under 
more direct control of his aristocratic family. It seems to have had political interests 
above and beyond the purely theoretical and, as such, it may have exerted influences over 
the real world. One cannot begin to calculate the potential effects of this Academic 
political interference but it may be more profound than we have yet to realise. The Laws 
should probably be read in light of the evident political interests of the Academy. One 
must acknowledge the theoretical nature of such a claim. It is a shadowy context, at best, 
against which to consider the Laws but politics and philosophy persist in making strange 
bedfellows.
Conclusions
The Laws is, in many ways, dramatically different from many of its Platonic 
predecessors. It provides a working constitution by which a colony may be founded and 
a polis may be managed. It reveals an interesting and dramatic study into the very heart 
of that which makes a society function—the essence of law, government and morality. It 
may be regarded as a theoretical approach to social engineering in which many important 
social ideas are examined. The Athenian Stranger utilises a political methodology, 
involving complex psychological theory that wiU be deployed to achieve maximum social 200 201 202
200 (1962), p. 586.
201 On Plato and the Pythagoreans in Sicily etc. cf. Cicero, Rep. 1.10; Fin. 5.29.87; Tusc. Disp.
1.17.39. On Plato in Sicily, cf. Nepos, Dion 2; Plut., Dion 4.1-3; 5.4-5; 11.2; 13.1-4; and cf. Plato, 
Letter VII. '
202 Cf. Green (1974) for the view that it was through Aristotle’s friendship with Hermeias {gratis Plato) 
that the former got his introduction to the court of Macedon—given that Aristotle and Hermeias were ’ 
good friends and Hermeias and Phillip II were good friends.
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control. This is particularly observable, as the following chapters will consider, in the 
realm of sexuality. The laws and institutions of Magnesia strive to inculcate a particular 
ideology in its subjects that is intended to encourage their (mandatory) pursuit of 
Platonic arete. It is a second-best solution to that offered by the Republic—a more 
‘realistic’ utopian vision. It is fortunate that no one will be made to live in his polis if 
they do not wish to do so and he has included no plans for it to undertake expansion.203 
The Magnesians are to remain isolated in their ‘brave new world’ and only defend 
themselves if attacked. They are, so to speak, ‘pacifistic supermen’.
The Lairs has a great deal to say about human psychology, society and sexuality in 
particular. The attainment of a total psychological control over the sexual appetites 
figures prominently into the Athenian Stranger’s formulation of arete. The implicit value 
of this virtue is to be accepted unconditionally by his hypothetical subjects. Magnesia 
will be a city-state whose government concerns itself directly in the private lives of its 
citizens and pays special attention to their psychosexual development. The express 
purpose of such careful regulation is the production of the maximum degree of 
happiness and excellence in the populace as a whole. The end of the project is at least 
benign if not benevolent.
Magnesia is purely hypothetical. The Lairs is a philosophical discourse that is 
couched within the imaginary landscape of dramatic fiction. There is no indication that 
Plato ever planned to put his theories into practice as outlined in the text. His narrators 
tell a story that describes how one might construct a near-utopian polls and govern it 
through law and philosophy. It also represents a professional plan of constitution 
complete with an outline of governmental bodies and complex programmes for social 
control. It is a mythic tale designed to instruct. It could also have been employed as a 
guide to political theory and practice. The reported activities of Plato and his students 
suggest this possibility. We should keenly regard his historical context, perhaps recalling 
Wordsworth’s encomium with a critical eye, ‘while the lunar beam of Plato’s genius, from 
its lofty sphere, fell round him in the grove of Academe, softening their inbred dignity 
austere—’.204
203 Migrating colonists might spread Magnesia’s ideology through a form of cultural imperialism, but it 
seems unlikely that they would spread it beyond their particular colonies.
204 (18 88), pp. 532-3, from his Dion.
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Chapter III
Educating Magnesia: Developmental Psychology and Sex Role 
Stereotyping
‘So long as the young generation is, and continues to be, well brought up, our 
ship of state will have a fair voyage; otherwise the consequences are better left 
unspoken..
—The Athenian Stranger1
‘Know you not, therefore, that the beginning of every task is the most important 
part—especially for any creature that is young and tender? For then is it best 
moulded and takes well the form that one wishes to impress upon it’.
—(Plato’s) Sokrates2 3
Introduction
No examination of sexuality in Plato’s Magnesia, as outlined in the Laws, could approach 
the subject adequately without taking into account die important part that education 
plays in the formation of its citizens’ sex roles. Plato’s innovations in pedagogy are 
extremely advanced by modern standards and this holds especially true when they are 
viewed in contrast with developmental psychology. One of the principal aims of the 
Athenian Stranger’s educational programme is to encourage a type of psychological 
development along specific sexual lines. He has identified die ideal sex roles that his 
hypothetical subjects should adopt and designed a state-sponsored system of education 
in order to inculcate these from the earliest possible age.
Plato’s influence on modern educational theory and practice has been undeniably 
profound. Few if any of his ancient contemporaries (including especially Isokrates, 436- 
338 b.c.e and Xenophon, c. 428-c. 354 b.c.e.), have undertaken to develop a more 
comprehensive and practicable pedagogical metiiodology. No other single individual’s 
effects on pedagogy have been as far-reaching as his. Whether Beck’s claim that 
‘virtually all idealistic theories of education may be traced back to him’ is completely 
accurate, it nonetheless conveys a sense of Plato’s significance to the development of our 
modern educational ideologies? Not only has he theorised a working pedagogy for pre­
1 Laws 813d2-5.
2 Republic 377al2-b3.
3 (1964), p. 238.
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primary, primary and secondary education, with the foundation of the Academy Plato 
may be said to have invented the University as well.4
The philosophical aims of Plato's pedagogical system overshadow its practical 
applications. Those who praise his innovations have sometimes ignored the 
metaphysical aspects that underpin his philosophy. Whether in the Protagoras or the 
Timaeus, the Republic or the Laws, the telos of a Platonic education is to induce a state of 
Reason's rule over the psyches of those educated. The achievement of a healthy condition 
of civic and other virtues must be regarded as secondary to this. Since the Classical era, 
both liberal and conservative regimes have adapted elements of Plato's pedagogical 
philosophy to their own ends with varying effects that extend beyond the scope or frame 
of this thesis. Plato may claim the dubious distinction of having introduced educational 
censorship through the expurgation of ‘dangerous' subject matter from the school 
curriculum, but he has also had the revolutionary temerity to suggest that females ought to 
have the opportunity to be educated more or less equally with males. Theirs is a separate 
but ‘equal' education with some limitations (e.g. Magnesian girls have the option to 
refrain from the study of horsemanship and the arts of war if they so choose) but the 
core curriculum of arts and sciences, as in the KallipoUs, is extended to both sexes—as is 
the option to continue their education beyond the secondary level. Why does the 
Athenian Stranger in the Laws deviate so profoundly from the known standards of Greek 
culturee®5 6The answer appears to be more utilitarian than egalitarian.
Plato’s theories on education are impressive and did not appear ex nihilo from a 
cultural vacuum. Many of his notions necessarily derive from his own educational 
experiences particular to his position within Athens’ liturgical class.® His contact with the 
educational traditions in democratic and aristocratic contexts was fundamental in shaping 
his views. Sparta too, as we shall see, plays a major role in his thinking. As we have seen 
with other subjects, it is worthwhile to consider some of the cultural backdrop against 
which Plato has formulated his theories. This chapter examines the educational system 
of Magnesia, in its broader context, in keeping with the overall theme of this thesis with 
regard to sex and society.
4 Burnet (1930), p. 311.
5 Cf. my chapters V and VI.
6 Cf. Davies (1971), pp. 332-5, on the wealth of Plato’s family and its status of Solonian heritage. 
Ariston claimed descent from the god Poseidon by way of Kodros, the last king of Athens, and Solon 
was allegedly an ancestor of Plato’s mother, Periktione. Pyrilampes had been an ally of Perikles and 
was sometime ambassador to Persia. Cf also Miller (1997) on Pyrilampes and Lambert (1993), pp. 
316-17
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Hellenic Education: the Plato Connection
The Athenian education, in its varied forms, particularly informs this examination of 
hypothetical Magnesia. The Spartan system also appears to have had a major influence. 
‘It is generally agreed’, as Nightingale says, ‘that the constitution outlined in the Laws is 
characterized by a blend of Spartan and Athenian elements, with Athens making the 
largest contribution to the mixture’.7 It is not the case that Plato has merely copied the 
Athenian education and then added Spartan and other elements. His narrator has taken 
these ideas and advanced them to a much more sophisticated level altogether.
This system of education with which Plato would have been most familiar was 
itself largely the product of the wealth of empire. His experiences were peculiar to his 
class. In democratic Athens, education was not free and its quality depended heavily on 
the finances of the student’s family. Despite this, perhaps for the first time in history 
more than a few had the opportunity and the means to be educated. This marks a 
significant historical advancement. In earher times, education was much less accessible 
or, when available, widely un-availed due to socio-economic circumstances.8 9 The 
‘programme’ developed for upper class Greeks in the Archaic age set the standard for its 
democratic successor. Some time during or before the era of Homer and Hesiod (c. 9th- 
8th b.c.e.), youths of high social standing had tutors/slaves to instruct them in letters 
(mainly poetry), numbers and the arts of martial combat. These subjects may be 
reductively designated as music and gymnastics—whilst the former was mainly put to use 
(unprofessionally) at the symposia, the latter was meant to improve one’s warlike skills.
The 6th-5th century equivalent to this has been called the ‘Old Education’. The 
term derives from a passage of pseudo-Xenophon’s Athenian Constitution generally 
referred to as the Old Oligarch? ‘The Old Education, combining physical exercise and 
cultural interests, is now rejected by the common people’, complains the Old Oligarch, 
‘they disapprove of it because they know that they cannot cope with it’.10 It appears to 
provide good evidence for retrospective attitudes (whether literal or literary) about fifth- 
century Athenian democracy and empire. But is it, as has sometimes been assumed, a
7 (1999), p. 100.
8 Some of ‘the Greeks were literate’, as Beck (1964), p. 75, says, ‘as early as the fifteenth century, but 
Linear B was not widely, if at all, known in the Dark Ages’. Cf. Harris (1989), pp. 45-48 for a broader 
discussion of pre-Classical education.
9 Hornblower (2000), p. 363, indicates that this ‘nickname’ appears to have originated with Gilbert 
Murray (1897), but he adds that ‘no-one is quite sure’.
10 Pseudo Xenophon, Ath. Pol. 1.13. This is probably best characterised as a comic/satirical or Tudic’ 
statement, but it may portray a kernel of the truth about older practices.
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fifth-century text that represents a reality of the tkne? Hornblower has recently cited a 
number of linguistic and ideological issues that suggest a later date—probably mid- to 
late-fourth century.” If this is so, then the Old Oligarch, as he says, 'becomes a valuable 
document about fourth-century attitudes to imperialism’ but should be regarded as a type 
of later ‘nostalgia’ and therefore not an accurate picture of fifth-century Hfe.’2 This is not 
to suggest that something hke the Old Education did not exist.
A comparable pedagogical experience seems to have been exclusive to Athenian 
aristocratic elites prior to the democratic reforms of the late 6®’ to early/middle 5th 
centuries. The tradition probably continued amongst the upper classes for some time 
thereafter. The study of letters and numbers made up less of its curriculum (although 
these will have been a part of it) than of ‘music’ and athletics/gymnastics. It seems to 
have been designed with the express purpose of preparing upper class, male youths for 
the aristocratic way of Hfe.* 12 13 * * 16Plato’s Sokrates favours a traditional curriculum involving 
‘gymnastics for the body and, for the soul, music’ in the KallipoOlsSA The training in 
‘music’ superficially covered all aspects represented by the Muses. Basic arithmetic and 
geometry were included in this as was history, poetry and mythos. Significant emphasis 
was placed on that which we think of today as music or, that is, poetry sung with musical 
accompaniment.’® As Griffith indicates, recitations of Homer in particular, an integral 
aspect to this education, ‘served as an ideological reinforcement of aristocratic values and 
processes, a reinforcement endorsed at both public and private levels’.’®
Aristophanes provides a nostalgic look at the kitharistes’ school in which 
aristocratic youths were taught music in the CloudsS1 This tradition is perceived as 
extending back into and beyond the 5th century to an idealised ‘Athens of old’. The 
transition to the Democratic or New Education appears to have been sparked by social 
and economic causal factors. The growth of trade in the 6* and 5th centuries contributed
” (2000), pp. 365-76.
12/W.p. 379.
13 ‘This was a life of leisure', according to Beck, ‘in which physical activity, games and chariot-racing 
were the chief daytime diversions, while in the evenings their cultural life centred around the men's 
club, in which song played an important part', (1964), p. 79.
” Rep. 376el-3; cf. 398c sq., 522a; Protag. 326a sq.; Crito 50d, Theaet. 206a; Laws 654b sq. 660c sq. 
Cf. Burkert (1972), pp. 369-71, for an anlysis of ancient musical theory in regard to Plato and the 
Pythagoreans. On the further relationship between music, number and metempsychosis, cf. also Pindar 
Ol. 2.56 sq. (fr. 133), Bmpedokles Katharmoi, passim, Hdt. II. 123 and Plato Phaedo 81b, Menex. 81a, 
Phaedrus 248d, Rep. 614 sq., Gorgias 525c.
i® Castle (1961), p. 74.
16 (2001), p. 34. Cf. Graziosi (2002), pp. 18-40, on Homeric recitation.
” 981 sq.
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in no small part.’® The burgeoning responsibility of the citizen elite caused by the 
flowering democracy/emphe in the 5th century may have increased the demand for 
widespread literacy. Being able to read and write, as Thomas says, ‘was generally seen as 
a positive force for democracy and its rule by written law’,’® These and other factors 
eventually brought about some significant revisions to the curnculnm of the Old 
Education as Democracy spread the privilege of learning to a broader demographic than 
had previously been possible. The ‘democratisation’ of education resulted in a similar 
‘aristocratisation' through the assimilation of upper-class ideals by some of the newly 
educated, and newly wealthy, populace. The time of Perikles (d.429 b.c.e.) probably saw 
the Athenian democratic education at its height. A new system emerged to cope with 
increasing demands for higher learning and a number of schools were founded. There is 
evidence of these dating back to the aristocratic era and possibly even to the middle of 
the 7th century.® More is known of schools from the 5* century onwards?’
Education became more diversified and available to classes of society that had 
previously been excluded from it. Not everyone, however, was literate. Unlike the 
modern world, being functionally illiterate did not severely limit one's participation in the 
polis. Dramatic performances and public debates were readily accessible to the majority 
who were probably limited in their ability to read?? The growth of education in the 
democratic era, as Harris writes, ‘is clearly connected with, or part of, a growth in the 
non-aristocratic citizen's belief in his own worth and his own rights and duties'.?® 
Literacy could aid in social advancement. It would have helped some citizens deal with 
the finer complexities of government and, by extension, serve to protect their democratic 
rights from tyranny. A similar attitude to this, as we shall see, is likewise present in the 
Laws. * * * * * * *
18 Cf. Vidal-Naquet (1977), pp. 107-8.
'5(1994), p. 35.
20 The Athenian Stranger (Laws 629a) says that Tyrtaeus was a native Athenian who later moved to
Sparta and Pausanias (IV. 15.6) maintained that he taught at Athens; cf. scholia on Laws 629a. But this 
is generally not believed to be true; cf. Marrou (1982) p. 17, who indicates that ‘it seems unlikely that 
Tyrtaeus was an Athenian’.
” Herodotos (VI.27) describes a disaster that befell a school of the Chians in 494 b.c.e. According to 
Plutarch (Themistokles 10), the Troizenians provided schools for their Athenian guests in 480 b.c.e. 
Thucydides (VII.29.5) also reports that Thracian mercenaries, in the employ of the Athenians, 
massacred all the boys in a school at Mykalessos in 413 b.c.e. He says that ‘this was a calamity 
inferior to none that had ever fallen upon a whole city, and beyond any other unexpected and terriiole'. 
This passage contains the earliest use of StSacrcdtXeiov to mean school; cf. Beck, 1964, p. 78.
22 Thomas (1995), pp. 150-1. Many who could not otherwise read or write could probably sign their 
own names as evidenced by examples on ostraka.
23 (1989), pp. 62-3.
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It is thought that the children of wealthy Athenians began their education earlier 
and finished later than those of the lower classes.24 The system was not rigidly formal or 
especially organised. There was little or no state supervision. The reason for this, as 
Ober has proposed, is perhaps because a more formalised system would have been 
regarded as antithetical to the popular democratic ideology of civil liberty.25 It was largely 
left to the individual (male) citizen, rather than to the state, to provide an education for 
himself or his offspring. A paidagogos (possibly a slave who was incapable of manual 
labour)26 could be retained to see to the daily rearing of a child aged seven or 
thereabouts. The paidagogos would take him to school and supervise aspects of his moral 
development.27 Such paid tutors or slaves (grammatistai, kitharistai and paidotribai) 
instructed their pupils in letters, music and gymnastics respectively.28 Assuming his 
resources permitted, a father might continue his son’s tutelage for several more years, at a 
sort of ‘secondary’ level, from the age of twelve theoretically up to twenty-one.29 When a 
student had passed from being a child (Ttotiq) to s ‘young man’ ((TEipcXKlOV) he might be 
released from his paidagogos and schoolmasters to commence with his induction into 
public life.30 It is thought that the term for ‘young man’ ((lEipdCKlOV) could imply 
anything from age fifteen to twenty-one depending on the individual in question.31 On 
reaching their civic majorities, many citizen-youths would have entered into an 
apprenticeship for a trade or joined the military.32
Athenian youths in the later half of the fourth century, at least, had to undergo a 
period of military training known as the ephebeia (£01j{3£lOi).33 There is some evidence of
24 Beck (1964), p. 81. This stands to reason given the ‘capitalistic’ character of democratic Athens
25 (2001), p. 189; he says that ‘doing so would have had distinctly anti-democratic implications in 
terms of limiting the freedom of each citizen to identify and pursue somewhat different conceptions of 
his (individual) good’.
26 Cf. pseudo-Plato Alkibiades 1122a-b, where a slave of Perikles, one Zopyros the Thracian, 
considered too old for work, was sent to be Alkibiades’ paidagogos.
27 Castle (1961), p. 63.
28 Cf. Prot. 326. It is unclear whether these subjects were taught at the same time or in the order 
indicated above. Aristophanes Clouds (960 sq.) suggest that at the age when philosophy was being 
taught, gymnastics and music were being learned concurrently.
29 Cartledge (2001), p. 82.
30 Cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. IIJ.l and Plato Laches 179a.
31 Beck (1964), p. 95, n. 6.
32 Vidal-Naquet (1977), p. 107, indicates that ‘to practice a manual craft did not disqualify citizens 
from enjoying their full political rights’. But it could be a propagandistic point in legal attacks by other 
citizens, cf. my chapters V and VI.
33 Hesk (2000), pp. 87 sq. is critical of Vidal-Naquet’s assertion that the ephebeia existed in the 6th and 
7th centuries. However in the 5th century, as he (p. 87) says, ‘this idea of an “in-between period” 
involving institutionalised practices and associated stories that were anti-hoplitic gain credence when 
we think of the deceptive behaviour of young male characters in Attic Tragedy’.
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the existence of this from about 371/0 b.c.e.,34 but, according to Marrou, ‘it did not 
receive its full form until much later, immediately after the defeat of Chaeronea (338), 
after a law for which Epikrates seems to have been responsible and which was passed 
between 337 and 335’.35 But did this law establish the ephebeia or merely modify a pre­
existing institution? Reinmuth agrees with the 371/0 date for its existence but whether 
this represents the earliest instantiation of the practice remains uncertain.36 He also 
indicates that ‘one might with some justification propose the period after the Persian 
War’ as the time of the ephebeia’s inception.3’
Aiskhines the orator spoke of a similar system in which he partook as a youth 
saying that he served for two years after his childhood as a peripolos of this land’.38 39He 
uses the word sunepheboi, describing his participation in this institution, in reference to 
himself and his age-mates. Perhaps, in this respect, Aiskhines was something of a 
pioneer.® This term may or may not be the same as the later ephebeea.40 41 42Sunepheboi. may 
refer to a voluntary body of youthful ‘territorial guards’, at a time when Athens could not 
afford to pay for foreign soldiers, that later grew into a proper institution. ‘The ephebeia 
was a programme of military training’, according to De Marcellus, ‘but authors of the 
early to mid-fourth century state, both directly and implicitly, that such training does not 
exist’.4” Isokrates, from whom we might expect some insight into this matter, makes no 
mention of it. He says that his students acquire virtue, ‘having just emerged from 
boyhood’, whilst most other youths waste time at drinking parties and in soft living.'’ 
Plato’s narrator in the Laws seems unaware of any such existing institution in Athens. In 
Megillus’ discussion of the Kretan agelai and the Spartan agoge, which would seem to be
34 Aiskhines, On the Embassy 167.
35 (1982), p. 105; on Epikrates' law, cf. Harpikration's Lexikon, s.v.Epikrates.
36 (1971), pp. 123-4; he proposes, in the light of these inscriptions, that ‘the &p%ovxe£ to whom 
Aiskhines appealed as witnesses to his service (2, 167) as a frontier guard along with his cmvfe<)TPot, 
can be no other than the kosmetes, among others, and that the existence of the same organization which 
is attested in 361/0 must be extrapolated at least to ca. 371/0, some ten years later'.
37 Ibid. pp. 137-8.
38 On the Embassy 167. Plato, in the Lams, refers to the Magnesian equivalent of the ephebeia (the 
agronomoi) indicating the etymological meaning of peripolos saying that they ‘circle around' the city 
first in one direction and then in the other (760b); see below. Cf. Xen. Mem. IV, III.6.10 and Kyr. 
12.9-12, and Aristotle, Rhet. I.1360a for a similar tack on rural guardians and cf. Ober (1985), pp. 92-3 
for a comparison between Plato's agronomoi and the ephebeia.
39 Cf. De Marcellus (1994) p. 35.
'®Ibid. pp. 37-8.
41 Ibid. p. 30.
42 Antidosis 286-90; cf. also Xen. Mem. III.5.19
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the opportune moment to bring it up, there is no reference to any Athenian ephebeia?3 
This would seem to support a later date for its official inception, but the issue remains
controversial.
At some point, then, in the fourth century (at least post 371/0 and very possibly 
post 338/7), when a male youth attained the age of |4Etp<dKlOV, he would lead a life apart 
for a period of time before gaining fuU admission into society. He might not be allowed 
the status of citizen until he had served his ephebeia. Each year the demes drew up a list of 
ehgible youths, about to reach thek civic majority (or ‘manhood’, fs()TlljO<q—generally 
fifteen to twenty-one), and then submitted it to the Eouk for approval. Aristotle tells us 
that an ephebe ‘cannot go to law either as a defendant or as a plaintiff, unless it is a matter 
of upholding an inheritance, arrangmg the affaks of an hekess, or a priesthood related to 
the clan’.43 4 45 46 47 * 49The period of ephebeia ended when one of several eventualities occurred. It 
could conclude with entry into the hopHte phalanx, the Athenian navy and/or marngge.®5 
Until the ephebeia was over, the young man's relationship to the polis was equivocal. As a 
pedagogical institution, it certainly played a significant role: it appears to have been one 
of the few truly organised aspects of ancient Greek education outside Sparta.® The 
ephebeia also incurred other, more unsavoury comparisons with Spartan practices.4'
Here is a significant connection with Plato. The poHcy of mandatory military 
service in the Laws, except for the potential inclusion of women, readily corresponds to 
the Athenian ephebeia?* The fact that a text of Plato’s, composed in the 350’s and early 
340’s, contains an outUne for something like the ephebeia is historically int^^eet^tigi4^.® 
Although, as we have seen, there is evidence for ephebic-type training in Athens as early as 
371/0 (and possibly even earher), it does not seem to exist as an official institution until 
Epikrates' law dated between 337 and 335. The fact that Plato's writing and the ephebeia 
coincide suggests that these ideas were ‘in the ak’ at this time. Even if Epikrates’ law 
only modified the existing institution of the ephebeia, Plato’s propositions in the Laws,
43 666e sq.; cf. De Marcellus (1994), p. 30. Also at Laches 179a, Lysimachos' expresses the wish that 
there should be something constructive that his teenage sons could be doing other than gambling and 
drinking.
44 Ath Pol. 42.5.
45 Vidal-Naquet (1986), p. 107.
46 Cf. Cartledge (2001), pp. 82-3.
47 Cf. Hesk (2000), p. 87, oh these and Winkler (1990b), p. 34. But, as Vidal-Naquet (1986b), p. 
142 indicates, ‘What is true of the Athenian ephebe at the level of myth is true of the Spartan kruptos in 
practice'.
4® Although, it may be derived at least as much from the Spartan krypteia and the Kretan agelai. Cf. 
Laws 760b; and Vidal-Naquet (1986), pl07 sq.
49 Cf. my chapter VI on the Amazonian ‘ephebeia
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based on Kretan and Spartan customs, might have been an influential factor. It is a 
tantalising suggestion but, for the present, must be relegated to the speculative realm.
The activities undertaken by youths during their ephebeia amounted to a type of 
military education that probably also served as a process of socialisation. It is not 
dissimilar to the practice of mandatory military service in some nation-states of the 
modern era. Troops known as peripoloi existed in Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars 
but, as indicated above, it is unclear whether or not the ephebes were amongst them at that 
time.® In the fourth century, the ephebic peripoloii would have undertaken their service in 
the forts surrounding Athens including the Panakton, Dekeleia and Rhamnousg' Their 
role at these forts appears to have been mainly for the purposes of training or, 
potentially, as backup support in the event of an attack. Young men in their ephebeia 
tended to enter actual combat only under exceptional circumstanees.50 51 2 After about two to 
three years of his ephebeia, an Athenian youth stepped into his mature, civic role both as 
heir and citizen.
Female youths did not undertake an ephebeia and their education was even less 
comprehensive than that of males. There is a whole tradition of oral composition by 
women about which we know next to nothing?3 This suggests that a kind of learning 
experience existed specifically amongst women from a very early date. The poet Sappho 
(721 century b.c.e.) stands out as one of our best exemplars to indicate that at least some 
women were well educated even during the archaic age®4 But being educated on an 
equal footing with males in any century hardly seems to have been the norm.55 56Many 
women might have learned rudimentary reading and possibly writing. Some may have 
studied poetry. Subjects such as rhetoric and mathematics appear to have been taught 
almost exclusively to male®.5® Nevertheless, an example testifying that there were some 
highly educated women in the mid-fourth century b.c.e. may be seen in the gravestone of
50 Ober (1985), p. 92.
51 Ibid. p. 93. Cf. also p. 135, 223 sq. The ephebes were trained at the Mounichia and Akte forts, p. 90,
52 Cf. Thuc. 1.105.4, Lysias, Funeral Oration 50-53 when some youths (whether epheboi or otherwise) 
were compelled to enter combat during the Peloponnesian wars. Cf. Vidal-Naquet (1986), pp. 106-8, 
112-113 on similar practices in Krete and Sparta.
53 We hear of songs sung by women at the loom from Homer (Od, V.61, X.221). There were also 
funeral dirges and ritual hymns, cf Thomas (1995), pp. 105-6.
54 Sappho, ‘who presumably learned to read and write well either in Lesbos or in Sicily during the last 
quarter of the seventh century’, as Harris says, ‘should be regarded as exceptional though not unique, 
her family having been a privileged one’ (1989), p. 48 and n. 13. Cf. Thomas (1995), pp. 102-3.
55 Cf. Pomeroy (1977), 51-68, esp. 60.
56 Foley (1985), p. 231.
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Phanostrate who was a female physician in Athens at that time.5’ It is difficult to draw a 
clear image of women’s level and manner of education as it stkl remains largely based on 
an argument from slence. ‘What is interesting about this controversy’, as Pomeroy says, 
‘is that, numerous though they probably were over the years, the women, absent or 
present, were not noticed by our ancient authoritiest.53
Most Classical Athenian girls, if they undertook, any studies at ah, had severely 
limited ‘educations’ compared to that of their brothers, fathers and husbands. It may 
have been necessary for upper-class women to learn reading and writing to some 
de-gree.57 58 9 * * 62 63But they were generahy not instructed in the use of wt^a^poonnn There is much 
contention about that which they did learn. Plato has provided some anecdotal evidence 
that, muddies the picture rather than clarifying it. His narrator remarks at Laws 658d that 
‘educated women’, as with most common people, regard tragedy as the best form of 
entertainment. This may not speak weU of their education given some of Plato’s writings 
about tragedy.®’
Whether or not women were permitted to attend dramatic performances is the 
subject of an ongoing debate in modern scholarship. A dialogue in Aristophanes’ Peace 
seems to suggest that they did attend, but it could be interpreted either way. Io a scene 
from this play, Trygaios and his slave throw barley {krithai) into the audience making a 
bawdy pun to the effect that the women did not receive any but ‘come night, their 
husbands wll give it to them’ {krithe—p&mO?2 As Goldhll suggests, the passage may 
mean ‘not that the women were absent but that they were sitting too far back to catch 
the barleyseeds’ but, as he also indicates, ‘this sexual humour clearly does not depend on 
the presence of women in the theatre’.®® The passage does not confirm their presence or 
refute it.
There are two other tantalising pieces from Plato which imply that some women 
might have watched dramatic performances, but both of these occur in hypothetical
57 ‘Phanostrate, a midwife and physician lies here. She brought pain to no one. Dead, she is missed by 
all'; Qtd. in Pomery (1997), p. 133. Also cf. Clairmont (1993), 2.890.
58 (1975), p,.80.
5 As Thomas (1995), p. 153, says ‘Women with the privilege of acting without a kyrios or guardian are 
sometimes literate, sometimes not'.
5 Beck (1964), p. 85 sq., asserts that ‘women attended the theatre and were expected to appreciate the 
plays, which require for their understanding a thorough knowledge of mythology; hence many of them 
must have learnt their mythology at home, and where else but from a study of the poets?' However, 
Beck's conelusions .are by no means definitive. See below.
5* Tragedy {Philebus 48a) is said to produce mingled pleasures and pains and {Republic 602b) therefore 
not to be taken seriously. Cf. Republic 394d sq. and Laws 816d sq.
62 962-7.
63{W94),pp.348.-9.
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contexts and cannot therefore be taken as definitive.64 The passage from the Gorgias 
criticises popular rhetoric aimed at women, men, adults, children and slaves without a 
proper respect for the consequences. The other one, from the Laws, posits that the 
wrong kind of rhetorical performance (of which tragedy is a part) can badly influence 
both women and men. But this comes within a discussion about the types of drama to 
be permitted in the hypothetical Magnesian state and there attended by members of both 
sexes. The other passage from the Laws mentioned above (658d) might not refer to a 
performance context at all. The Athenian Stranger’s comments, in saying that educated 
women enjoyed tragedy, may not refer to a theatrical audience at all but to a much 
smaller category of ‘reading (female) public’.65 We cannot say with certainty that women 
were allowed to attend the theatre based on the material available. If Plato was making 
reference to a ‘reading (female) public’, then that would at least seem to presuppose a 
form of education available to some women.
It is tempting to propose that, in Classical Athens, most women whose education 
rivalled or surpassed that of men were foreigners to the city.66 But this is, as indicated 
above, not provable at present. Foreigners are seen as having different customs 
especially in regard to women. Xenophon’s idealised account of the Spartan system 
envisions a type of institutionalised, physical training to have existed for women—but 
not training in the arts and sciences.67 His reports, although perhaps more the product of 
imagination than fact, suggest that it might have been easier for the Athenians to deal 
with such a revolutionary topic as the education of women, however limited, if it took 
place outside of Athens.68 Examples of highly educated foreign-women such as Aspasia, 
Diotima and later Phanostrate seem to be specially singled-out exceptions rather than the 
norm.
Xenophon’s Oikonomikos, an idealised vision of aristocratic domesticity, offers an 
indication of the level of learning available to Athenian citizen-women—at least those of
64 Gorgias 502d and Laws 817b-c.
65 Goldhill (1994), p. 350.
66 For Aspasia as the composer of Perikles’ ‘Funeral Oration’ cf. Menex. 236b, on her eloquence and 
her role as Sokrates own mistress of rhetoric 235e. Diotima is also introduced (Sym. 201d) as a 
foreigner.
67 Lak. Pol. 1.4 sq. He tells us that the Spartan reformer Lykourgos considered motherhood to be a 
woman’s primary function. So Lykourgos reckoned, like Plato, that they would be better suited for this 
purpose if they were in good shape. To this end ‘he insisted on physical training for the female no less 
than the male sex’. As always, Xenophon’s reports on Sparta are probably not an accurate 
representation thereof. Even he admits that its constitution has probably changed since the alleged 
reforms of Lykourgos, Lak. Pol. XIV. 1-3.
68 Perhaps it is for this very reason, at least in part, that Plato has placed his two fictional texts that 
support the education of women sufficiently far enough away from Athens to be at a safe distance. E.g. 
Magnesia is to be on Krete and the Kallipolis is utterly imaginary—but both are clearly not in Athens.
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the upper-middle to upper classes—of the late 5* to the early/middle 4* centuries. In 
this treatise on the proper execution of household affairs, the characters of Ischomachos 
and his fifteen-year-old wife are both assumed to possess a degree of literacy such as 
would at least be sufficient to administer the matters of the oikos. His unnamed wife, in 
particular, seems to have had some type of education prior to her marriage. 
Ischomachos gives her his accounts and lists to manage thus indicating that her level of 
literacy was sufficient to cope with theee.69 70 71Did she learn her letters (and presumably 
numbers as well) at home at the hands of her mother or father? Did a private tutor teach 
her or did she attend school? It is difficult to say for certain but there is no definitive 
indication that Athenian females attended schools.'®
If we conclude anything about the education of women in Classical Athens from 
the example presented by Ischomachos' wife,” then there is reason to suspect that 
citizen-women of the highest property classes may have had some limited education that 
prepared them for a life of domesticity in the oikos rather than participation in the public 
sphere of the polis—the domain of men.72 73As wkl be presently discussed, the role of 
Spartan women somewhat bent this rule in comparison to other city-states.'® But their 
unique status appears to have been only a partial exception. Ancient Athenian women 
■participating openly in the public sphere (who were not of the lower classes and doing 
menial labour or engaged in prostitution) tended to be found mainly in works of fiction, 
myth and speculative philosophy.
Post-secondary education was available to certain male individuals in the 
democratic period. A youth or adult could pursue academic subjects such as political 
science and rhetoric, assuming his or his family's finances allowed, through attending 
lectures by sophists and symposia with philosophers. Some special few could have learned
59 Oik. ix. 10; most of the Oikonomikos represents a kind of ‘education’ for women inasmuch as 
Ischomachos goes about instructing his wife on the administration of the household.
70 Cf. Harris (1989), p. 96, esp. n. 140. There are some tantalising examples from red-figure pottery 
(mentioned in both Harris and Beck) that seem to indicate some women were taught by tutors or were 
themselves tutors—but this is by no means certain.
71 The real Ischomachos was thought to have possessed an estate at one time valued at more than 
seventy talents, a princely sum, according to Davies (1971), pp. 265-268.
72 ‘The public world of the Greeks’, according to Redfield (1977-8, p. 160), ‘was always restricted to 
men; a man’s public relations were with men, and his relations with women were private relations’. 
Rosaldo (1974, p. 36) suggests that ‘women’s status will be lowest in places where there is a firm 
differentiation between domestic and public spheres of activity and where women-.are isolated from one 
another and placed under a single man’s authority, in the home’. See my chapters IV and V.
73 Cf. Cartledge (1981), p. 85, where he discusses the extreme views of Spartan female ‘liberation’, 
along with some counter-arguments, and concludes that a balance, or synthesis, of these was probably 
the case. As Cartledge (2001), p. 84, also says ‘a Spartan woman’s primary role was not, unlike that of 
her Athenian sister, the performance of strictly domestic tasks—though she was expected to be able to 
run a home... rather, the . goal of her life was childbearing (teknopoiiay.
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the finer points of philosophy by becoming part of the ehte circles of such notables as 
Parmenides and Sokrates. Plato’s Academy and, later in the fourth century (335 b.c.e.), 
Aristotle’s Lyceum provided more comprehensive venues for post-secondary education. 
The sophists continued to provide another avenue pf study.’4 Some youths also had the 
option of becoming medical doctors. Hippocratic institutions of medical training existed 
in the Classical era (outside Athens) at Knidos and Kos.’® In Athens and abroad the arts 
of rhetoric, history and literature could be learned from the Hkes of Isokrates and the 
sophists whilst mathematics, science, astronomy and philosophy were generally covered 
in the curricula of the Academy and Lyceum.’®
The Athenian education was not comprehensive and, except perhaps for the 
advent of the ephebeia in the 4th century, not particularly structured. This was probably 
the norm for most ancient Greek city-states—with one notable exception. The Spartans 
appear to have been amongst the first to make education compulsory and to organise it 
in a thorough manner.” As Cartledge indicates, it was ‘compulsory for ah boys from the 
age of seven until they attained their socio-pohtical majority (as opposed to physical 
maturity) at age eighteen’.’® The potential education of Spartan females is a subject of 
some debate and is discussed below in relation to Plato’s approach in the Laws?
The Spartan education was a proper institution of the polis. They referred to it as 
the agoge., which means a ‘leading’ or ‘raising’. The agoge, in keeping with their national 
character, appears to have been quite rigid and hierarchical. It consisted of letters and 
the building of endurance through sport and martial activities. Above and beyond ah 
other known educational institutions in ancient Greece, the Spartan bears closest 
similarity to the Magnesian system in Plato’s Laws. Due to the numerous similarities 
between them, it is perhaps best discussed point by point in relation to the Laws. The 
fact that the Athenian Stranger borrows so heavily from Spartan institutions is perhaps 
not striking. Thucydides says that ‘they from childhood seek after manliness through * * * * * *
'' The educational potential of sophists is, of course, not highly regarded in the works of Plato. Cf. e.g. 
Hipp. Maj. 281d, 283a; Protag. 312a-c, 316d; Soph. 223b, 233c. Isokrates is likewise (following 
Plato's lead) harshly critical of their abilities and claims as teachers in his Against the Sophists (c. 390s 
b.c.e). Xenophon too upbraids the sophists—if only to dissociate his own methods from theirs 
{Kygeneticus XIII. 1-7).
'5 Marrou (1982), pp. 46, 1^2^3; the first recorded schools of medicine in ancient Greece were located 
at Kroton (Hdt. III. 129 sq) and Kyrene (III. 131).
'5 Beck (1964), pp. 141-142. Post-secondary education in grammar was also taught by some of the 
sophists, notably Prodikos (143).
” It should be noted that our sources on this (such as the pro-Spartan Xenophon) may have ‘coloured' 
their representations somewhat—but there does appear to be some consistency amongst the sources to 
the effect that the Spartans did have an actual system of education. Cf. Michell (1964), pp. 165 sq.
'5 Cartledge (2001), p. 83.
'5 Cf. too Kennell (1995) for a broader discussion of this complex issue.
A®
95
laborious training’ and this seems to have impressed Plato.80 Magnesia’s educational 
programme, like that of Sparta, strives to inculcate qualities of virtue and manliness in 
her citizens. Both systems appear designed to promote these virtues along specifically 
sexual lines. But the Magnesian system takes this to another level.
Platonic Pedagogy
Certain thinkers (e.g. Xenophon, Isokrates Plato and Aristotle) in the fourth century 
perhaps felt that the democratic system had failed to offer a substantive education in the 
appropriate civic virtues.81 In each case the particular author, as Ober says, ‘was 
concerned with establishing (in theory) a formal educational system that would ensure 
that experts were responsible for inculcating the youth with the “right” ethical and 
political values’.82 Plato’s version is the most comprehensive and probably the most 
renowned—then as now. His narrators have outlined a curriculum for learning, with 
especial emphasis on morality, which undergoes development throughout his works. It 
is in the Laws that they provide the most details about the Platonic course of study. We 
are told in the Republic (and elsewhere) that it is difficult to find a better system than the 
one that entails ‘gymnastics for the body and, for the soul, music’ (376el-3). This 
‘mantra’ echoes the paradigm of the idealised Old Education of Athenian elites but 
evinces characteristically ‘democratic’ qualities in terms of the breadth of subjects 
covered and the range of students to be taught.
In both the Republic and the Laws the musical education comes first. ‘Music’ 
includes many subcategories such as poetry, literature and lyrical recitation. The 
character of Sokrates indicates that great effort must be undertaken to screen the 
‘musical’ material. He perceives it as having a profound influence on young minds.83 A 
proper ‘musical’ education is seen as making children more ‘civilised’ and ‘balanced’ 
through their desire to imitate the good deeds represented by the paradigms represented 
in fictional stories.84 The mimetic theory of learning applies as well in the Laws as 
elsewhere.85 Gymnastics, as with ‘music’, has the quality of imparting temperance and
80 11.39.
81 Xen. Kyr., Mem.; Isok. Areop.; Aristotle, Pol. Cf. Too (2001).
82 (2001), p. 189.
83 Rep. 377b sq.
84 Protag. 325d sq.
85 On the importance of |xi|XT]aiq to learning, cf. Rep. 395c sq., 602a and Soph. 267e; this principle is 
explained less in the Laws than elsewhere but appears similarly applicable (cf. Laws 667d. sq., 669b, 
798d sq.). Interestingly, as Motluk (2001), pp. 23-26, indicates, scientific research has recently
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other beneficial characteristics to the psyche along with its important role in strengthening 
the body®6 The psyche is targeted as the first to be put into a state of (Platonic) order.8' 
The health of the body is, at best, considered secondary to this—although, both body 
and mind must work together toward the telos of arete. The Magnesians continue to study 
music and gymnastics at later stages in their tutelage.
A fundamental tenet of pedagogical theory in the Republic is that a child should be 
educated from the earliest possible age when the mind is ‘best moulded and takes well 
the form (xh)JIO<;) that one wishes to impress upon it'.® This aphorism introduces 
Sokrates' argument against the ‘damaging' effects of poets such as Homer and Hesiod 
who teU ‘false' tales that may impair an impressionable pyyche. Despite its literary 
prejudices, the theory points to an understanding of the processes of learning and 
developmental psychology. Plato expands his overall theory of education in adapting it 
to the second-best state in his final opus. Magnesia must be ‘free, enjoy inner concord 
(L^-terally “be a friend to itself'), and possess intelligence'.®® The educational system is to 
be the primary means of imparting all of these aspects to the citiijsmgg The importance 
of early education is stressed here, as elsewhere, as are the value of its content and the 
quality of subject matter to be studied. The Athenian Stranger stresses the need for 
engaging in both physical exercise and intellectual pursuits in concert. He, as with 
Sokrates, is more interested in the ‘musical' aspects of education and the official 
paradigms there represented for imitation.
The aims of Magnesia's system of education, as Beck says, lie ‘in the production 
of civic efficiency and political leadership, quahties which demanded the power to judge 
wisely and to make right decisions'.®' Like Sparta, the Magnesian education is provided 
at the expense of the polis and is compulsory for all citizens (804d). This wiH be
suggested that the reactions of a certain set of neurons (called ‘mirror neurons’) within the human 
brain, in response to the words/actions of other human beings, strongly favours an ‘imitative’ theory of 
learning.
86 Rep. 410c, Protag. 326c (cf. Laws 743e ad 839e). It is ‘manly’ to be physically fit, cf. my chapter 
IV.
87 As Nightingale (2001), p. 139, says ‘they are not taught to develop their own ideas [initially] but 
rather to absorb and enact a specific ideology’. She discusses the importance of indoctrination in the 
early stages of education in the Kallipolis.
® Rep. 377al2-b3; Cf. also Protagoras 326cl-3, where ■ the best education comes to those who begin 
earliest in their studies; and see below on this theme in the Laws.
88 Yunis (1996), p. 212. Cf. Laws 701d and 693b-c.
Concord and intelligence may be obvious virtues imparted by the system of education, but 
‘freedom’ can be regarded both in contrast to slavery as well as, somewhat paradoxically, the correct 
submission to proper authority (762e) and this is one area that the educational system will inevitably 
reinforce. Cf. Yunis (1996), p. 215-216.
8’ Beck (1964), p. 255; cf. Isokrates Panathenaicus 30-2.
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accomplished, in a characteristically un-Spartan manner, with recourse to the Athenian 
practice of written law.®2 The Athenian Stranger unequivocally states that ‘every man and 
child according to their abiHty must of necessity be educated since they belong more to 
the state than to those who begat them’.®3 The Athenian Stranger’s comments seem to 
reverse Sokrates’ pronouncements in the Republic that compulsory education leads to a 
type of ‘slavishoesst in character and that only those who are wiUng should therefore be 
taught (536d-537a). There are, necessarily, some disadvantages to hving in the second-best 
state.
Magnesia’s educational programme is to be implemented at the earliest possible 
stage in order to achieve the best possible results. This “get ‘em while they’re young” 
approach in the Laiws goes beyond previous Platonic expressions of the same theory. The 
Athenian Stranger maintains that the education and preparation of future Magnesians 
should be initiated whilst they are still within the womb. It suggests that Plato may have 
thought of an embryo, at some stage in its development, as capable of learning. This is a 
strikingly modern stance and would appear to go beyond other ancient theories on the 
development of the focttsis.94 His awareness of its educational potential may stem, as 
Rankin suggests, from Demokritean influences identifiable in the creation myths of the 
Tirnaeus?3 In Magnesia, a child wiU be ‘educated’ from the point that its mother is 
identified as pregnant.
The Athenian Stranger, having invoked some curious analogies on the benefits of 
motion in the raising of birds (789b5-d8), postulates the rules on pre- and postnatal care. 
He proposes that pregnant women should not engage in excessive sexual pleasures 
(792e2-6). ‘A woman with child’, says he, ‘ought to go for walks, and when a child is 
born she should mould it Wee wax, while it is stkl supple, and through the first two years 
of Hfe keep it wrapped up’ (789d8-e3). This metaphor of ‘moulding’ appHes to body as
52 Cf. my chapter II.
53 804d4-6. As Cartledge (2001), p. 84, says ‘there was no State (with a capital ‘S') in a post- 
Hobbesian sense in Classical Greece'. Rather, there was the koinonia of citizens whose interests 
overrode those of the individual.
54 Plato's own thoughts about the development of embryos are the subject of much debate but Rankin 
(1968, pp. 36-37) maintains, along with Michael of Ephesus (1s‘ century c.e.), that Plato most likely 
was a preformationist. This means that he thought certain ‘seed-organs', carried within a fluidic 
substance, assemble the embryo inside the womb. Praechter (1928, pp. 18-30) has argued in favour of a 
postformationist theory, similar to that of Aristotle's, whereby a ‘postformed' embryo, delivered whole 
from the male semen, ferments to ripeness within the womb. Cf. also Lesky (1950), p. 20, who follows 
Praechter's view that Plato was not a preformationist. For Aristotle's postformationist theory, cf. Hist. 
Anim. 721bll.
55 (1968, pp. 36-37); cf. Tim. 18c sq., 86b sq.
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well as mind.96 The mandatory prescription of exercise for pregnant women, as well as 
the theme of female athletics, may represent a borrowing from the Spartan system.97 98As 
is to be the case with Magnesia, Spartan eugenics were also concerned with maximising 
the efficiency of ‘offspring production’ or teknopoiia?* They allegedly encouraged 
pregnant women to exercise and eat healthy foods.99 100
During the early stages of development, a Magnesian child must not be exposed 
to the damaging effects of excessive luxury or be ‘spoilt’ by too much pleasure. The 
Athenian Stranger insists that ‘luxury makes the characters (TOC T|0T})1<)() of the youth 
fretful, bad-tempered and inclined toward overreacting to trifles whilst the opposite 
extreme, excessive savagery, makes them slavish’ (791d5-8). He cites the Persian King 
Kyros as an example of one who had received a proper and well-disciplined education.101 
He, however, paradoxically neglected the upbringing of his own children in turn. Plato’s 
narrator says that Kyros, overly busy with his military campaigns, let his children be 
reared in luxury by ‘women and eunuchs’ who pampered them and left them bereft of 
discipline.102 He indicates that this led to disaster for the Persian court.103 Such a view 
probably reveals a particularly Greek bias rather than actual ethnographic fact.104
The Magnesians will be compelled to eschew luxury and all other excesses. The 
Athenian Stranger favours a tough, ‘manly’ educational regimen like that of his idealised 
Persians of old (e.g. Kyros but not Kambyses), ‘a hard method’, he says, ‘one capable of 
producing shepherds who are absolutely robust and capable of sleeping out in the open, 
even passing the night without sleep, and of fighting a campaign’.105 A Magnesian child 
must not be brought up with a mindset of habitual complaining. Their education 
encourages them to maintain a sort of emotional middle ground that avoids all extreme
96 ‘According to psychoanalytic theory’, as Chodorow (1974, p. 45), indicates ‘personality is a result of 
a boy’s or girl’s social-relational experiences from earliest infancy’. So, early influences must be 
important to the development of sex roles and how they are defined.
97 Hodkinson (2000), p. 228.
98 Cf. my chapter V.
99 Cartledge (2001), p. 116.
100 On Aristotle’s distinction between virtue of‘character’ (ethos) and of‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ (dianoia), 
see e.g. Nik. Eth. 1103a3-10.
101 Cf. Hdt. III.68-88 for his rather martial representation of the traditional Persian education.
102 Cf. Xenophon’s Kyropaideia I. 2 seq. for the educational system developed by the Persians. But 
Xenophon and Plato do not cite the Persian education (as Herodotos has done) as being a major causal 
factor in their defeat at the hands of the Greeks. See below.
103 Laws 694dl-695bl, 728e5 sq., 744d3 sq. Briant (2002), p. 193 sq. discusses Kambyses and the 
‘decadence’ associated with his reign by the Greeks in their media. Cf. Briant (2002), p. 193
104 Plato may have had a more direct insight into Persian affairs than many considering that his 
stepfather, Pyrilampes, was ambassador to Persia from about 450 (Davies, 1971, pp. 329-335); cf. 
Charm. 158a; but such close contact could also feed prejudice. Cf. my chapter IV.
105 Laws 695a; cf. Briant (2002), pp. 194-5.
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states of mind.106 107 108 109 110Their upbringing cannot aim only for ‘money-making or physical 
prowess, or even some mental accomplislhment devoid of reason and justice', since it is 
‘vulgar and illiberal, and utterly undeserving of the name “education.”'1®7 As Nightingale 
indicates, one who is ‘servle and illiberal is, by definition, not free'?0®
The Athenian Stranger's theoretical approach to education in the Lams is, in many 
ways, more developed than any equivalents in previous texts. An innovative strategy 
involves the use of structured play as part of the educational process. In order to be 
‘good at any pursuit', the Athenian Stranger says, ‘one must practice that pursuit from 
infancy' (643b4-6). He offers hypothetical examples of future builders getting their start 
with toy houses, future farmers playing at tilling the soil with toy tools, future carpenters 
playing with rules and measures and future soldiers learning the art of riding at an early 
age?" In this way, a child's future role in society may be stereotyped and reinforced 
along specified lines of development.
A child's natural enthusiasm for amusement is to be routed down productive 
channels. The games that Magnesian children play are to remain unaltered from 
generation to generation, Hke those of the Egyptians, unless the city's rulers deem 
otheraile?16 The Athenian Stranger discusses some specific games that Magnesian 
children should be encouraged to play as part of their education. These include the
106 Laws 792a sq.; In Aristotle’s Politics (1336a35) there is the indication that ‘the people in the Laws' 
are wrong for stopping their children’s tears. It is not the act of crying to which the Athenian Stranger 
objects. He says that crying doesn’t sound pleasant but its harmful quality lies in the fact that it can 
damage a person’s character. Crying too much as a baby may, through habituation, carry over into 
adulthood to produce adults who are given to excessive complaint—presumably harmful to the pursuit 
of arete.
107 Laws 643e9-644a6. On the avoidance excessive wealth in order to build a good character, cf. 
Republic 422a 1 sq. In Herodotos, Kroisos advises Kyros on how to make the Lydians soft and easy to 
rule saying that he should ‘command them to educate their sons to play the kithara, pluck the lyre and 
practice retail trade’ (1.155.4). Cf. Kurke (1999), p. 76 on this.
108 Nightingale (2001), p. 141 ; she says that the Platonic implication that Athenian democratic elites 
engaged in banausic ‘wage-earning’ by profiting from their educations and thus ‘working for the 
multitude, is a bold piece of rhetoric that collapses traditional hierarchies’. Cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 121, 
136. The term ‘banausic’ is derived from metallurgy, cf. Kurke (1999), pp. 44-45 on its etymology.
109 ‘So, we should try, by means of their games (Sid t5v TaiSimv), to direct the pleasures and desires 
of children toward the state at which they should arrive as their ultimate goal. Indeed, foremost we say 
that education consists of the correct nurture that most strongly draws the soul of the child at play to a 
love of that pursuit over which, when he becomes a man, he must have excellent mastery’ (643c8-d4). 
Aristotle {Pol. VII.1336a29-34) is in agreement with the basic structure of this scheme. Cf. also Tim. 
69c-e, 90 sq. The application of toys to encourage learning at an early age has some scientific backing 
in the modem age. Experiments with rodents have found that greater brain mass is developed by those 
rats in cages where toys have been placed as opposed to those without them, Swerdlow (1995), pp.l9- 
20.
110 798b7-d6; Cf. Kurke (1999), p. 251, on his recourse to the Egyptians in the context of games. At 
Phaedrus 274c5-d2, Sokrates also indicates that the Egyptian god Theuth ‘invented number and 
reckoning and geometry and astronomy and, in addition, petteia [a game like draughts] and kubeia 
[dice-playing], and especially writing’.
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sorting of fruits and other items such as garlands, boxers and wrestlers (these presumably 
by sight only), and bowls made of bronze, silver and gold into their appropriate groups 
based on likeness and difference.111 The purpose of these is to acquaint the children with 
basic rules of order and arithmetic. There is also the strong possibility that these games 
may be used to test a child’s aptitude for various tasks and thereby determine his/her 
role later in life within the hierarchy of Magnesian society.112 The philosophical 
underpinnings of this innovative theory remain the idealised goal of #t?/&113
Magnesian boys and girls from the age of three up to the age of six are to 
congregate at their respective tribe’s temples and engage in some kind of playful but 
structured interaction intensely supervised by their nurses.114 The Athenian Stranger 
almost appears to us as ‘a modern functionalist—an anthropologist king—he’, as Golden 
suggests, ‘identifies certain qualities and consequences of children’s play and then 
prescribes accordingly’.115 Structured play is, similarly, employed by modern 
educationalists as an expedient means of inducing mental growth at an early age and to 
develop and refine important learning skills. A modern type of directed play, for 
example, involving the sorting of objects into categories of ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ (e.g. shells, 
leaves, buttons and geometric shapes), may be employed to help children improve their 
reading and arithmetical abilities and, as Gilpatrick indicates, to promote a ‘perfect 
attention to details’.116
The law will compel a Magnesian child’s nurses to carry it about all die time until 
it can stand on its own or until it reaches die age of three (789e3-9).117 The nurses and 
children will be observed altogether ‘by the twelve women appointed for this purpose’ 
who each serve a one-year term allocated by the Guardians of the Laws
111 819b-c. Cf. Kurke (1999), pp. 289-90, for astragaloi (knucklebones and/or dice), a game played by 
Athenian children in the Classical era that probably helped them learn rudimentary mathematics.
112 In the Statesman (308d), the Eleatic Stranger has suggested to Sokrates (with a positive affirmation 
from the latter) that children should be tested by trained educators through the use of games. Cf. Rep. 
536d-537a, where children in the Kallipolis will be tested by their ‘voluntary’ participation in games.
113 ‘The education that we are talking about would be’, says the Athenian Stranger, ‘that which trains 
them from childhood in excellence (arete), making them eager and desirous to become perfect citizens, 
understanding how both to rule and to be ruled with justice’ (pexd Siktiq- -643e5-9).
114 794a sq. Cf. 808c-d for the analogy between a ‘herd’ of children and that of beasts. This recollects 
the Spartan ‘boy herd’, cf. Cartledge (2001), p. 83.
115 (1990), p. 54.
116 (2000), p. 13.
117 Kleinias, the Kretan interlocutor, affirms that this and other similar rules ‘were spoken reasonably’ 
and would likely work well if they were continually enforced from the founding of the Magnesian 
colony (790c4). This discussion of K'iVT|au;, along with that at Timaeus 89a, provides fertile material 
for Aristotle’s doctrine of K&Qotpau; at Poetics 1449b27.
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(o'i VOOlOjbXaKEp) for each of the twelve The Athenian Stranger says that ‘all
children, especially the little ones, benefit both mentally and physically by being nursed 
and by being in motion all night and all day and they should live, if it were possible, as if 
they were always sailing’ (oO,OV &£l 7CAoV'TOt<4—790c6-8)?19
The Magnesians will build structures for public gymnasia as well as schools in 
three districts within the city..118 * 20 121 122 123 124 *There wT also be training-grounds, “courses for horses” 
and land set aside for an archery range.1"1 Teachers will be hired from abroad and paid 
out of the city’s treasury?® These must be non-citizens since Magnesians are forbidden 
from taking up any labour other than that which encourages the pursuit of arete. The job 
of managing and administrating the city-state is counted as a Virtuous’ profession and 
there will be a Magnesian archon (dpcov) of Education, a citizen, to oversee the 
programme of learning?® His role appears to be more managerial than labour-intensive 
and comes with considerable prestige. Attendance in schools for both sexes is 
compulsory since the future of the state depends heavdy on the education of all its 
populace?24 The Athenian Stranger outlines the selection process for various citizen- 
educational officials (including athletic officials) to this end?® Citizen-women may 
occupy some of the supervisory positions mentioned above but the teachers, as was the 
case amongst the Spartans, must be non-citizens. Since there were foreigners amongst
118 794a8-b2. The Athenian Stranger provides guidelines to ensure that every official fits into the 
hierarchy of authority and is always to be held accountable for her actions (794b sq.).
' 19 He also states that the best cure for a sleepless child, as well as for someone who has the 
‘Korybantic Condition’, consists of a rocking motion and humming a type of tune (790d4-e4). This 
condition was cured homoeopathically by the regular music and dancing of the Korybantic ritual. For 
an alternative interpretation cf. Linforth (1946), pp. 121-62.
120 804c2-7. According to Nigel Spivey (interviewed in Channel 4 2002c) the gymnasion was 
effectively one of the things that made a Greek polis.
121 764c, 779d and 804c.
122 804d . This practice too has Spartan overtones, cf. Michell (1964), pp. 40, 168 sq., 180.
123 765d5. This official must automatically be over fifty since he or she is chosen from the Guardians 
of the Laws (755a) and he will later come to sit on the nukterinos council (951d-e, 952a, 961a).
124 Plato’s apparent advocacy of compulsory education at state expense, probably derived from the 
Spartan model, was clearly ahead of its time. As S. Cole (qtd. in Foley 1985, p. 231) says ‘subsidised 
education is introduced in many cities in the Hellenistic period, and it is clear from epigraphical 
evidence that young girls as well as boys benefited from these local schools’. The third century c.e. 
writer Cassius Dio (LXXXI. II) says that the emperor Marcus Aurelius (reigned 161-180c.e.) was the 
first to provide a form of education completely at public cost. However, this was not compulsory and 
we likewise hear of no legal machinery of compulsion in Classical Athens or elsewhere except Sparta; 
cf. Cartledge (2001), p. 85.
I® 764c5-765d3. The Athenian Stranger’s loose style of classification, with brevity of detail, is typical 
of the Laws. The author’s main concern here seems not to have been to distinguish between the arts 
and gymnastics, but to provide a general impression of the ‘Ministry of Education’. Cf. England’s 
(1921) note on Laws 764e2.
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whom were educated women, there is every indication that they too will teach in 
Magnesian schools.126
Competitions and performances of many types are to involve Magnesian youths 
of both sexes in extra-curricular activities that further the cause of their education and 
advance their stereotyped sex roles. The Athenian Stranger proposes that young people 
should dance together in the nude with a view to choosing their future marriage 
partners.127 128 129Plutarch (whether truthfully or wishfully) describes a similar procedure 
amongst the Spartans whereby young people danced and exercised in the nude as 
‘incitements to marriage (raapopiriiTiKCX Tpdq ytipov)', and these ‘urged them on not with 
mathematics but with love (EpccuKalc;) and, as Plato says, with necessity'."2® The 
Athenian Stranger does not state the requisite ages of the participants in such affairs but 
one assumes that they would have at least reached puberty by the time they partake of 
the nude dances. These are not to be j^oo'&-pp^n;^coced orgies. The Athenian Stranger 
asserts that the performances should remain within the limitations of propriety and, to 
that end, appoints state officials to supervise them."29 The practice of socially sanctioned 
(and state enforced) nude dances for the youth, in order to encourage marriage and 
reproduction, reveals a somewhat manipulative quality. This underscores their 
significance to the system of education: they wTl promote the official ideal of mixed-sex 
coupling from an early age.
Such events are designed to bind the community socially and religiously as well as 
being educational. Like their Spartan and other equivalents, these Magnesian dances will 
mimic actual warfare in a dramatic comext.13. Ohier activities follow along similar lines. 
The Athenian Stranger describes the rules for racing competitions and indicates that 
‘prepubescent girls wTl compete unclothed in the double-race, the “horse-race” and the 
long distance race; those from thirteen up to those awaiting marriage may compete until 
at least eighteen but not beyond the age of twenty', and significantly he adds, ‘let these 
matters regarding races both for men and for women be the same'.131 The necessity for
126 Cf. my chapter II.
127 771e5-772a3.
128 Lyk 48b8-c2, citing Rep. 458d. Cf. Michell (1964), p. 46-9.
129 The magistrates in charge must be under the age of forty; cf. 764e sq.
130 Michell (1964), p. 187. We also have reports of other similar dances and ‘games of armour’ in 
which both sexes partook: e.g. the Kretan and Spartan Hyporchema (Lucian, De salt. XVI, Athen. 
XIV, 630d-e), and the Spartan Hormos or ‘String of Beads’ (Lucian, De salt. II).
131 833c8-d6.
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females to engage in the generation of offspring dictates the legal ages of their 
participation in these athletic and martial activities.132 133 134 135 136 137
Platonic Utilitarianism?
When at leisure, Magnesian youths of either sex are exhorted to pursue the ‘best possible 
pastimes’."33 In all activities, both sexes are carefully supervised and regulated.1"4 The 
Athenian Stranger posits a policy of equal education and physical training. He says that 
‘my law applies to matters concerning women as well as men, and women must be 
trained equally; and without reservation would I make this same argument that neither 
the practice of horsemanship nor of gymnastics would be suitable for men but unsuitable 
for women’."® He cites the example of the Sauromatian women who reside around the 
Pontus as evidence of the benefits of sexual equality in the martial arts and other aspects 
of daily hfe."®
His deliberate and particular inclusion of females in the public sphere of 
Magnesia deviates markedly from known standards of practice in ancient Greece. It 
suggests the revolutionary notion that women possess the same (or a very similar) 
capacity for learning as men. The Athenian Stranger’s primary argument for equal 
education may be largely described as utilitarian. He is not subscribing to the same 
notions as those represented by 19th century Utilitarianism. There are clear similarities to 
be seen in Plato’s second-best polis with regard to the principles of women’s suffrage and 
state-supported education for all. But Mill had also ‘argued on Utilitarian grounds for 
freedom of speech and expression and for the non-interference of government or society 
in individual behaviour that did not harm anyone else’.1"7 These libertarian aspects of 
Utilitarianism are altogether incompatible with, if not inimical to, Magnesian values. The 
relative status of the sexes is not equal and women’s ‘suffrage’, what there is of it, is
132 The ‘upper limit’ for women getting married appears to have been around the age of twenty 
amongst most of the ancient Greeks, as Cartledge (2001), p. 116, indicates, cf. my chapter V.
133 803c6-9. He is not especially specific here, aside from the activities mentioned above, but one 
expects that the Magnesians will be equipped with a kind of Platonic formula for gauging the relative 
arefe-value of their activities.
134 942a6-7.
135 804d6-805a3. Cp. Theat. 175a and cp. Aristophanes Vesp. 1010.
136 ‘It is the height of folly.. .for men and women not to fall in line and engage in the same pursuits with 
all their might; it is the case now that, with the same expenditure, and with the same effort, almost 
every state turns out nigh half of what it might have been—a strange blunder for a lawmaker to make’ 
(805a4-b3). Cf. my chapter VI.
137 British Library (2002) http://pages.britishlibrary.net/mikepymm/utilitar.html
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designed to serve the greater purposes of the city-state’s efficient functionaitty?® Since 
teachers are already being paid to educate males, the Athenian Stranger decides that, for 
nearly the same cost, females could also be educated. Society would reap a double 
benefit. This economic use of the sexes, here called ‘utilitarian’, hedges on universal 
suffrage but falls rather short of the mark.
Magnesia will save resources through another form of sexual ‘equality’ by 
mandating that its women dine alongside men at the communal messes (GDO’C'iiTia) 
rather than each household preparing individual meals at home?3? The Athenian 
Stranger finds the common meal to be a useful means of training his hypothetical 
citizens in the inculcation of civic virtues. While most notably found amongst the 
Spartans, common meals took place in many ancient Greek and other city-states as well. 
Communal dining appears to have existed on Krete, from which the Spartan version was 
possibly derived, and in Mfietos, Thurii, Megara, Thebes, Oinotria, Carthage and on the 
island of Lipara.138 * 40 * 142While it is clear that this institution served a civic role of binding the 
community through shared meals, it also had an educational quality. The Spartan 
syssition, as Michell indicates, ‘was looked upon as a school of manners and deportment’ 
as well as a means of induction into the accepted mode of public discourse??'
The Magnesian equivalent takes full advantage of this—with certain 
modifications. During such common messes, one might expect feUow-citizens to ‘quiz’ 
one another on various subjects relevant to civic ideology, encouraging them by 
repetition and the force of peer pressure. They will be under especially heavy scrutiny 
whilst they dine and ‘train’. Magnesian syssitia have at least one major difference from 
their Spartan counterparts. These were a form of ‘institutionalised pederasty’, according 
to Singor, and inducted youths as erastai from the age of twelve?44 The educational 
programme incorporated into Magnesian syssitia wiU advance the official mixed-sex ethic. 
Same-sex intercourse is to be strongly discouraged?®
138 Cf. Tyrrell (1984), p. 33, for a discussion of the ‘suffrage’ granted to Female Guardians in the 
Republic.
1® Laws 625c sq., 633a, 780b sq., 781c sq., 806e sq., 839d and 842b.
140 On Krete (Aristotle, Pol. 1272a), Miletos and Thurii (Plato, Laws 636 sq.), Megara (Theognis, 
CCCIX), Thebes (Polyaenus, II.3.2), Oinotria (Aristotle, Pol. 1329b), Carthage (ibid. 1272a) and 
Lipara (Diod. Sic. V.9.4).
I'" (1964), p. 94.
142 (1999), pp. 78-9. Cf. Bremmer (1990), p. 137, where he indicates that Spartan boys ‘were allowed, 
even encouraged, to visit public messes’ for sexual purposes.
I*® Cf. my chapter VI.
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From the age of six, Magnesian boys and girls are to be separated during their 
respective xducationa.?4 This is designed to promote the ideal differences between the 
sexes and their officially approved sex roles from an early age?4® It highlights the 
Athenian Stranger's plan of ‘sex-role training' through controlled social interaction.?? 
But his method differs markedly from other systems. The practice of separating the 
sexes was also found at Athens when some upper-class boys might have gone to be 
taught music and the arts at about the age of six whereas the girls' ‘education' from that 
age appears to have consisted largely of domestic duties (see abovel.?7 Xanophoa’s 
idealised Spartan system provides perhaps the best example of institutionalised training 
of women outside Plato's works—but not in the arts and sciences. The Magnesian 
system again appears to be more similar to that of Sparta where, according to 
Hodkinson, ‘all girls, rich or poor, underwent a uniform, public physical trtraiag'.l45 It 
should be noted, however, that the precise nature of this training is a subject of debate.?? 
In Magnesia, women partake much more of the pubhc sphere than in Athens or Sparta 
but they still must perform their mandated task of teknopoiia.
Like both the Spartan and Athenian upper-class citizenry, the Magnesians 
undertake their specialised pursuits and training whilst slaves perform the necessary 
labour. An organised regime is laid out for the Magnesian citizens including not only a 
comprehensive survey of the arts and sciences (icpdc; §£ Td jIOCOflgOtTO) but also the use 
of weapons for both sexes}?50 The Athenian Stranger considers traditional Greek customs 
of education to have been largely misunderstood and therefore poorly developed. When 
Kleinias the Kretan inquires about these ‘misunderstood customs', he explains that he is
?4 Cf. Hdt. 1.131 sq. for a parallel here with separation of sons from fathers.
?5 As Chodorow (1974), p. 53, indicates, the social construction of sex roles for women depends 
heavily on their relationships with other females from an early age. The same also applies to the 
development of masculine identity.
?6JWW.p. 54.
Blundell (1995), p. 132.
148 (2000), p. 227; cf. Euripides’ Andromache 597-600, for their participation in racing and wrestling; 
some post-Classical sources indicate other such practices as running, wrestling, discus and javelin 
(Plut. Mor. 227d; Lyk. XIV.2-3; Cic. Tusc. Disp. 11.15; and Schol. in Juvenal IV.53); and even 
partaking of the pankration, boxing, hunting and warfare (Propertius III. 14.1-20).
149 Xen. (Lak. Pol. 14,1 sq,) tells us that Lykourgos regarded motherhood as a woman’s primary 
function. He reports that Lykourgos thought, not unlike the Athenian Stranger, that they would be 
better suited for this purpose if they were in good shape. To this end ‘he insisted on physical training 
for the female no less than the male sex’. Cf. Cartledge (2001), p. 83, for an account of Xenophon’s 
idealisation of Spartan values; and Cartledge (1981), pp. 89 sq. for Xenophon’s pro-Spartan bias.
150 ‘Boys are to spend their time with boys and likewise girls with girls; each should be instructed in the 
arts and sciences, and the males should be sent to the teachers of horsemanship, archery, javelin 
throwing and slinging; likewise, if they are at all agreeable to it, the girls should be sent to the 
lessons—most especially in the use of weapons. Truly at present the customs concerning such matters 
are misunderstood by nigh everybody’ (794c2-d3).
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referring specifically to the training of young people of either sex in the use of weapons 
and their methods of practice. In Magnesia, they are to be trained to use weapons 
ambidextrously?51 The Athenian Stranger seems to think that ambidexterity can be 
taught if encouraged from an early enough age. The children’s nurses are under orders 
to ensure ‘that all the boys and all the girls will have feet and hands that are 
ambidextrous’?52 This is thought to give them an advantage in fighting. ‘If someone 
should grow up’, says the Athenian Stranger, ‘possessing the nature of a Geryon or a 
Briareus, such a one should be able to hurl a hundred javelins with his hundred hands’?53 
Male and female officials are to be appointed to keep watch over children’s studies and 
to observe the games. These ‘war games’ and other martial practices figure prominently 
as an essential feature of young Magnesians’ psychosexual development. In addition to 
physical training, they also serve to define many of the characteristics of their respective 
sex roles.
While there can be little doubt that the social systems of Sparta and Krete left a 
positive impression on Plato, he seems to have regarded them as being, as Rawson says, 
‘on the right lines but too obsessed with war’.154 Magnesia will not be obsessed with 
conquest, as we have seen, but military training figures prominently into its pedagogical 
regimen. Women of the second-best polis, similar to Spartan women, will not neglect the 
arts of war in their education.155 However, unlike most women in the ancient world, they 
are to have the opportunity to be taught on an equal footing with men. Those female 
Magnesians who display an aptitude for these subjects will be singled out for training 
‘while still girls and when grown to womanhood’ (except during their mandatory 
childbearing years), at state expense, for military service. This is for their own 
educational benefit and the common defence of the polis.156
Their training includes military drills, forming marching ranks and the bearing of 
arms. These and other factors add elements perceived to be ‘masculine’, in the 
traditional sense, to the sex-role that has been reformulated for Magnesian women. It
151 794d5-795d5. The passage in Aristotle’s Politics (1274bl2 sq.) in which Plato’s views on 
ambidexterity are regarded as heresies is generally considered spurious. Aristotle does take issue with 
Plato on this subject and expresses his own ideas at Nicotnachean Ethics 1134b33, and De Part. Anim. 
666b35 sq., where he says that the natural superiority of the right hand to the left is evidenced by the 
fact that it receives more blood; cf. also ibid. 684a26, and also De An. Incessu 705b 13, where he 
discusses this subject at length.
152 795d2-4.
153 795c5-7.
154 Rawson (1969), pp. 65-66.
155 814c2-4.
156 813e-814a.
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comes at the loss of other, more traditionally 'feminine’ traits deemed undesirable?57 
This plan (though radical in its outcome) is clearly predicated on traditional stereotypes 
that are revealed in the Athenians Stranger’s use of language. If they were not so 
educated then, he says, whenever danger threatens ‘they would flee to the temples, 
massing around every altar and shrine, and drown the race of humankind in the disgrace 
of being the most craven of aU creatures in nature’.?® This is intolerable for the female 
citizens of the second-best state. Its women must be equipped to defend their 
homeland.
The education afforded Magnesian women is remarkable. In addition to the 
spear and javelin, they may also practice the art of horseracing if they so choose.?5? The 
Athenian Stranger envisages en masse military manoeuvres involving ‘men, women, and 
children’??0 Magnesian women may celebrate martial deeds in song and will be eligible to 
receive state honours on the same footing as men/?. This is not insignificant. The 
military plays a key part in terms of indoctrination, social control and scrutiny. Magnesia 
is not meant to pursue military conquests?^ Despite its pacifist foreign policy, there will 
be numerous soldiers in the second-best state. Many of them also serve the efficient 
function of policing the civilian populace. Magnesia seems to offer some degrees of 
sexual equality whilst at once limiting individual freedoms for both sexes. They will be 
subject to many controls and regulatory influences. The Athenian Stranger’s deliberate 
inclusion of women in the military, especially in terms of its educational aspect, is more 
economical than egalitarian.
The Magnesian education is the principal instrument of social conditioning and it 
is designed to undertake this role with uncanny sophistication. It places much greater 
emphasis on the scrutiny and management of its youths during the course of their 
education than was apparently the case in any other ancient Greek city-state including 
Sparta. The Athenian Stranger’s methods are, nonetheless, compatible with Spartan 
customs in terms of dealing with the high-spiritedness of youth through agencies of 157 158 159 160 161 162
157 Inverted commas here, as elsewhere, are deployed to indicate the constructedness of these concepts.
158 813e4-814b7.
159 834d3-7. Spartan women, according to Plutarch (based largely upon Xenophon’s idealised views), 
learned how to manage horses and drive chariots in procession (Life of Agesilaus XIX.5). Athenaeus 
likewise reported that Spartan women raced two-horse chariots at the Hyakinthia, a festival to Apollo 
and Hyakinthos (IV.4, 139c-f). The facts were probably different, but it reveals an interesting insight 
to know that some men thought about women in this way.
160 829b5-c5.
161 829e4-5, 802al-5 sq.
162 Tt is our object to avoid war entirely, if we can’, the Athenian Stranger explains, ‘so soldiers must 
get their training in sham-fights and the like’ (829a8-bl). Might they make pre-emptive strikes in the 
interest of security? Cf. my chapter II.
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socialisation. ‘The Spartans', as Powell says, ‘recognise the intense wilfulaess of that age, 
its particular tendency to commit hybris and its especially strong craving of pleasure; least 
leisure is allowed and the greatest number of strenuous activities is imposed'.?®3 
Magnesia's policy of holding the wifulness of youth in check, as with the communal 
messes, is designed to promote harmony within the city amongst its citizens.1?4 This 
peaceful state of affairs should furnish sufficient leisure for the adult citizen populace 
(and especially older citizens) to engage in those pursuits that the Athenian Stranger has 
deemed virtuous. Activities such as ‘sham fights' and other martial training promote 
physical development whilst suppressing bybris through keeping the youths busy. They 
will also be ready for war if necessary.
There is a clear division of the sexes observable in the martial realm. Elements 
of choice and compulsion apply in different ways to both sexes. Cerraia educational 
activities are to be compulsory for males but, to some degree, optional for females. It is 
a point of inequality that underlines Magnesia’s basic ideology. Citizen males are to be 
sent to ‘the teachers of horsemanship, archery, javelin throwing and slinging' whether 
they want to or not—and they wiU be encouraged from an early age that it is virtuous 
and manly to desire to do so. Magnesian females are to learn aU the arts and sciences, 
just as their male counterparts. However, as we have seen, they have a choice in terms of 
their military traininLg.* 164 165 The Hix appears to be drawn roughly around the age of the 
ephebeia where young Magnesian men must perform their military service and women 
must begin considering the prospects of teknopoiia (760b). Female citizens wil have the 
right to undertake a similar ephebeia ‘if they are at all agreeable to it', but they are required 
to spend at least a whole decade of their lives in the act of producing and rearing chidren 
before embarking on any potential military career. That option does appear to be open 
to them after having birthed the requisite number of offspring.
This disparity between the compulsory military education of male citizens and the 
optional one for females is clearly due to the fact that women are the ones who 
necxssariy bear chidren. Since ‘the age hmit of marriage for a girl is to be from sixteen 
to twenty years of age' and for men tliirty to thirty-five (752b2-9), it stands to reason that 
a Magnesian female might be getting married and starting a famiy at the same time as her
7® Powell (1994), p. 277. It is important to consider that these views on Spartan values have been 
largely derived from Xenophon’s idealised accounts and therefore may not represent actual practices. 
Cf. Xen. Lak Pol. III. 1 sq.
164 The Athenian Stranger seeks to strengthen the Magnesian citizens’ solidarity, in Kretan and Spartan 
fashion, through the mandatory attendance of citizens at the communal dining tables (806d-807a).
7® In the real world, rhetoric and mathematics were taught exclusively to males, cf. Foley, 1985, p.
231.
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male age-mates would be out learning the javelin and horsemanship. Despite the degrees 
of equality extended to Magnesian women, the ‘products’ of their labour, as Rosaldo 
says, ‘tend to be directed to the family and the home’.166 Since they will be prepared for 
their role as ‘mother’ from an early age, one expects that the significance of teknopoiia will 
comprise a major portion in their socialisation. It defines many of the limits of their 
femininity and imposes implicit and explicit assumptions that accompany their sex.167 
That is, their role in society will almost always be contingent on their maternal function. 
The greater part of a man’s sex-role, in turn, stands in relation to this as the paternal 
counterpart.
A Magnesian woman could perhaps postpone her wedding at least until the age 
of twenty and use that time to learn more than the rudiments of warcraft. Thereafter she 
would be pressed into the service of producing children. The Marriage Supervisors and 
Guardians of the Laws will enforce this. These women will have an especially potent 
influence on young brides.168 Their role is also educational. In addition to monitoring 
and extolling the accepted feminine virtues, the Marriage Supervisors—themselves 
mothers—will also provide them with an experiential model for imitation.169 Being 
young and impressionable, they may develop relationships of emotional attachment to 
them and will probably identify their own roles through them.
Whilst pregnant or busy with the work of rearing children, a Magnesian woman 
would be in no physical condition to partake of a military career. However, after having 
given her mandatory ten years of service to the city-state as a mother of children, she 
could then potentially choose to learn more martial skills if she so wished. This might be 
the Athenian Stranger’s intent since the Guardians of the Laws, who should theoretically 
have the most intense military training, must be over die age of fifty (755a), and therefore 
in the particular case of women would be beyond the age of mandatory childbearing. 
There is every indication that the only Magnesian women who will be able to participate 
in the public sphere of military and state activity would be either un-wed heiresses and, 
perhaps more likely, women who have passed the childbearing age. This is a profound 
statement of the importance of teknopoiia as the defining factor of a Magnesian woman’s 
sexual identity and role in society.
166 (1974), p. 34.
167 Cf. Butler (1995), pp. 50-1.
168 Cf. my chapters V and VI.
169 Chodorow (1974), pp. 65-6.
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Magnesian Music
As part of their curriculum in the ‘arts and sciences’ (TjDO^ SS TCd poOpilOCTO), 
Magnesians wil study music, poetry and literature. This increased emphasis on letters 
varies considerably from the approach espoused by Xenophon’s Sokrates who favoured 
only the most cursory exposure to these subjects.1?” The Athenian Stranger deems them 
to be essential to education especiaUy in its early stages. Magnesia’s state and religious 
officials wil regulate aU subject matter. He has indicated that the types of music to be 
taught must be carefully chosen according to their moral value as they provide paradigms 
for the citizens to imitate??' This concurs with a similar Isokratean pedagogical view- 
expressed when he, as Beck says, ‘adjures Demonicus to acquaint himself with the best 
things in the poets, should he aspire to nobility of chnrncter’ll77 Magnesia’s system, 
although its aims are comparable, is less inclined toward rhetoric than that of Isokrates. 
173 As Nightingale indicates, the imitation of ‘good’ models represents the first stage of 
Platonic education and is compatible with simiar Athenian ideals. At secondary and 
post-secondary levels however, as wil be shortly considered, Plato’s approach aims to 
detach the capable student from the material realm and to train him/her in logic and 
abstract thinking?7?
The musical regimen of Magnesia ought to be, as Bury says, ‘used as an 
ennobling educational instrument, promoting self-control’; it must not excite ‘vulgar 
sentiment and passion’?75 * *Different songs and dances wil be chosen according to their 
rhythm, meter and content so as to properly correspond with the sex of the individuals 
learning them. The songs for men must embody characteristics such as ‘magnificence 
and that which inclines toward courage’ (&v6p£l(X)?7i They wil impart appropriately 
masculine values?7? The ones for women wil favour ‘that which is orderly and 
moderate’?78 Both types of song denote the ideal modes of behaviour that the Athenian
170 Geometry was to be studied only superficially (Mem. IV.vii.3), arithmetic was to be learned only to 
avoid difficult labour (IV.vii.8), and astronomy to know the hours, dates and seasons (IV.vii.4).
171 654e sq, 668a, 798d-e.
172 (1964), p. 118; Isokrates To Demon. 51. Cf. Phaedr. 279a for Isokrates’ favourable mention.
173 Gunderson (2000), pp. 163-5, indicates that masculine performative models existed for (male) Attic 
rhetoricians in accord with which they should deliver their speeches in the assembly or in some other 
public context. That is, their manner of presentation was judged, in part, on the degree of manliness it 
conveyed.
174 Nightingale (2001), p. 148.
175 (1999), p. 45, n. 1; cf. 800b4-801a7; cf. too 812blO-813a4.
176 Cf. my chapter IV.
177 Cf. 802e8-9.
178 xb SS npdq K6ajiiov Kat aco()fp)v—802e9-10
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Stranger prefers to associate with either sex respectively." ?? In modern terms, these 
sanctioned paradigms expose the Magnesians to psychodynamicaUy experiential forces, 
through the media of public performance, which are designed to shape their sexual roles 
from an early age.* 180
Magnesian boys and girls put on armour and perform choral dances both to 
entertain the public as well as to hone their individual fighting skills??1 These armed 
performances appear to have been derived in part from the Kretan ‘games of armour’ of 
the Kuretes, the games of the Spartan Dioskuri (Kastor and Pollux), and those of Athena 
the Virgin at Athens.182 * 184 * *There are two kinds of dances identified in the Laws as beautiful: 
the warlike Pyrrhic and the peaceful PEmmeleia. The Pyrrhic which represents the imotic^n of 
fighting, and... of fair bodies and brave souls engaged in violent effort’, is specifically 
devised to impart courage. The Emmeleia, or pacific dances, signify ‘the motion of a 
temperate soul living in a state of prosperity and moderate pleasures’?83 Indecent dances 
are identified as those that concern ugly bodies and reflect negative mentalities along 
with those that incline one toward comic laughter.1"4 The Athenian Stranger has 
addressed regulations for female performances and male performances, necessarily based 
on their sexual differences. Idealised masculine and feminine characteristics are 
identified. The rhythms and modes of musical accompaniment are designed to impart 
them through the process of imitative learning.
The initial music of Magnesia’s official canon wil be chosen by a select group of 
citizen-men over fifty who may consult with the composers but hold the final say 
themselves?85 Once the songs and dances have been chosen, they must remain rigidly 
unchanged unless the Vigiiance Committee decides it is appropriate to alter them. New 
ones may be introduced only if they adhere to the established doctrines and gain official 
recognition. Those that somehow attain inclusion later must bear considerable
"" cf. 814d9-816d2 for the types of dances that will and will not be permitted; also, see below.
180 Chodorow (1999), p. 130.
181 796b3-c2.
"2The Kuretes were mountain spirits who protected the infant Zeus. They were represented in art as 
youths dancing the 7iupp'l%T|. On the armed drama of the Dioskuri, cf. Athenaeus iv, 184f. The 
Augustan scholar Dionysius of Halicarnassus (VIL72) says that Athena invented the 
kvdTtXiot; 6p%Tat<; to celebrate the triumph of the gods over the giants. Cf. Jeanmaire (1939), pp. 421 
sq. who refers to Kretan dances and other such institutions as a kind of ‘club masculin’. Cf. Aghion, 
Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 192-4.
Le Balet Comique de la Reine (2002), artsci.washington.edu/drama-phd/bcpllaws.html
184 Laws 814-16e.
802a-d. This committee on musical/literary standards may well be the nukterinos council itself. We
are not told. But there is every indication that they would be made up from the ranks of the Guardians 
of the Laws.
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resemblance to the accepted musical canon. Strong restrictions are placed on those who 
compose music, poetry and literature to ensure that they do so according to state’s high 
standards. No composer or author will be allowed to show their works to other citizens 
until these have met with the approval of the appointed musical judges, the archon of 
Education and the Guardians of the Laws?®6 The Athenian Stranger indicates that he wiU 
employ a technique developed by the Egyptians in order to prevent novel and harmful 
types of music from corrupting the prescribed regimen.?87 The rules of music and dances, 
as with aU of Magnesia's laws, wil be consecrated to the gods and divine spirits. Altering 
them in any way without the sanction of the state and its religious leaders may result in 
the offender being excluded from ceremonies. If the malcontent persists in this 
subversive enterprise, he or shx wil run the risk throughout their whole life of being 
prosecuted for impiety.®
Magnesian chidren of both sexes lx/am music from an early age through their 
mandatory attendance at religious festivals with parents and nurses. Later, they wil be 
taught letters for three years from the age of ten and lyre playing from the ages of 
thirteen to sixteen (809e8-810a3).18? The Athenian Stranger says that, ‘as regards letters, 
they must work to become suffic-endy able both to read and to write', but those whose 
progress is slower wil not be required to learn to read swifdy or to write beautifuUy 
(810bl-5). This is coasrstear with his policy of keeping track of crri2eas' capacities to 
learn, mentioned above, and educating each according to his/her perceived abilities.
Some of the subject matter for Magnesia's schools wiU include phiosophical 
discourses along with other poetry and prosx that is simiar in character.1?0 Magnesia's 
canon of pedagogical texts would appear to include aU the works of the Platonic corpus as * 188 * 190
'8® 8OlclO-d6-vog.o06i;aQ Tiepl xd gouaiKd xal xdv xij<; rcaiSeiaQ feemgeAT|xtfiv.
l®7 799al-2; cp. 656d sq. He also says that the Spartans and Kretans did similarly in their refusal to 
allow innovation to dance and song (660b). This, as with Egypt, may represent Plato’s idealised view. 
Note that his policy on games staying the same, mentioned above, also alluded to a similar practice 
amongst the Egyptians. Recourse to ancient Egyptian customs may have appealed to Plato because as 
Nightingale (1999), p. 119, says, ‘it involves establishing fixed laws governing the creation of and 
participation in all areas of artistic endeavour... [and] these laws are inscribed and placed in temples, 
and have such force that they positively preclude any alteration and innovation’.
188 799a4-blO--6'nKX<; daepeia^ 6rd plot) Tonvtiq xc5 k9eeX|caavxi napfe%£W. The penalties for those 
found guilty of this charge include exile and potential execution.
77 Lest they be d%6pevro<; (‘uneducated’ or unmusical, also wretched—654a); on this cf. Thomas 
(1995), p. 123.
190 811 e 1-812a3. Perhaps Plato did not anticipate that this method of teaching through reading 
dialogues might pose an ultimate threat to undermine the authority of teachers. ‘If dialogues taught a 
way to teach oneself, as Brant (1998), p. 76, says ‘ironically, Plato could make all other teachers 
redundant’. He indicates that this problem was resolved in favour of pedagogical authority by 18® 
century scholars on the grounds that an outside opinion might be more informative than one’s own 
alone.
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well as the Lam itself. One assumes that such works as the Apology, Krito and Euthyphro 
would comprise one level of education, according to the students’ capacity or degree, 
whereas the Republic, Statesman and Timaeus would probably make up another, higher 
level. If the teachers do not happen to approve of these literary choices and do not make 
an effort to leam them, they wil not be permitted to teach. They wUl be carefully 
screened before being allowed to practice their craft in Magnesia. The canon of texts is 
to be carefully monitored along with aU material that students read in general. They are 
not to memorise and recite a wide variety of material lest it imbue them with conflicting 
and potentially dangerous ideas.'?'
Plato has apparently recognised, long before Chomsky, that institutions of 
learning may serve as an effective ‘filtering system for alternative truths’.'?2 The inclusion 
or exclusion of given ideas in accredited schools allows the polis a powerful lever of 
pubHc control. It apphes to all media and would appear to be especially true in terms of 
the presentation of sexuahty in its officially accepted form—as seen in the types of song 
mentioned above. The Athenian Stranger apphes this principle of ideological censorship 
to most aspects of his educational regimen. Potentially ‘dangerous’ subjects merit close 
regulation by the Magnesian legislators in a manner strikingly similar to that of the 
Republic.
Dramatic performances in particular that come from outside Magnesia are to be 
highly suspect and safeguards wil be employed against the threat of foreign artistic 
influences that could ‘damage’ the Magnesians’ psychai. There is a difference here 
inasmuch as some dramatic modes are to be granted a degree of legitimacy in the second- 
best state that were forbidden from the Kallipolis}93 The Magnesians wil study their own 
laws as a means of improving civic virtue and their ability to discern the various logoi with 
the aid of philosophical reason (957c-d). This wil provide them with an ‘antidote’ 
{alexipharmakon) against ahen discourses and recoUects Sokrates’ statements on the nature 
of written texts as ‘drugs’ (pharmaka) that influence the psyche in the Phaedrus (275a-b)??4 
The Magnesians wil memorise the lawcode and study the official canon of literature, as * * * *
191 81 lal-b5. This attitude reflects the contempt shown at Phaedrus 275a for versatile dilettantes. Cf. 
Heraklitos (fr. 16): TCroupaOir vSov ob SiSdaxei; cf. 819a for the Egyptian approach to teaching a 
variety of subjects.
192 (2002).
193 Cf. Rep. 398a-b
194 Cf. Nightingale (1999), p. 103, Hesk (2000), pp. 151 sq., pp. 159-63, and Derrida (1981) s.v. 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’.
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Nightingale says, so that they ‘can serve as an ever-present standard for measuring all 
other modes of discourse and thought’.19S
It will be necessary for the citizens, as part of their education, to learn about 
comedy so that they know to avoid behaving in such a ludicrous manner themselves.196 
Slaves and foreigners will be hired to perform in this capacity. Citizens will not be 
allowed to be actors since this, like other types of employment, is deemed to be harmful 
to their pursuit of arete. Anyone who writes a comedy to be performed in Magnesia (and 
he appears to be referring to citizens here) must be over the age of fifty and gain the 
approval of the archon for Education (829c-d, 936a-b). Any aspiring authors must also 
have attained some esteem in the eyes of the city before they will be permitted to 
undertake the writing of a Magnesian comedy (829c-d). ‘Only the “good” may write 
comedies’, as Nightingale says, ‘presumably because they alone will use ridicule 
correctly’.197
As concerns the genre of drama in general, ‘no serious attention should be 
granted to it nor should any free man or woman be seen learning it’ for purposes of 
imitation (816e8-ll). One wonders whether any of the Magnesians would have the 
encouragement or the inclination to compose drama. Any citizen who chooses to do so 
must take care lest it interfere with their pursuit of arete and, therefore, would not be 
expected to take their dramatic interests too seriously. Their particular style of dramatic 
writing must be particularly virtuous.198 While the Athenian Stranger does allow for this 
eventuality, he is insistent that the comedies must ‘never be allowed to ridicule any of the 
citizens, either in words or by way of imitation, whether it be with or without passion’ 
(jAtfpce 0D|XCp—935e5-6).199 Neither should the audience derive too much pleasure from 
these.200 Only non-citizens or purely fictional characters that have no discernable 
analogues in Magnesia may be subject to comedy’s piquant wit. These must be moderate
195 (1999), p. 103.
196 816d3-13. Nightingale (1997), p. 175 n. 10, suggests that ‘Plato did not think when he wrote the 
Republic that watching comedies could help to learn the nature of base and ridiculous characters’. Cf. 
Rep. 396a, where Sokrates indicates that it is necessary for the citizens of the Kallipolis to know of 
‘base’ and ‘mad’ people so as to avoid imitation of them.
197 (1997), p. 185. Cf. my chapter VI for more on this in relation to andreia.
198 Cf. Halliwell (1998), pp. 64 sq. for comparisons with Aristotle’s Poetics.
199 Cp. Ar. Eth. Nik. 1128a20 sq. and Pol. 1336b2 sq.
200 As Halliwell (1998) p. 63 indicates, the ‘correct and laudable species of pleasure will be the result 
simply of the artistic presentation or moral truth—the dramatic portrayal, for example, of virtuous 
men’.
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and there is every indication that ridicule will not be permitted at all in Magnesian 
comedies.201 202 * * 205
The Athenian Stranger indicates that some tragedy and serious drama may be 
acceptable so long as they do not teach harmful lessons that might destabilise the 
Magnesian peace?”2 He has composed some lines to address any would-be dramatic 
performers who seek a stage in Magnesia, saying:
Most excellent of strangers, we ourselves, to the best of our ability 
produce tragedy altogether the fairest and the best; indeed all our 
constitution has been framed as a representation of the most beautiful 
and best life that, in reality, we assert to be the truest tragedy (817a9-b6).
This preamble to the law may be just another ‘fable', a ‘noble lie' designed to back up 
state policy as being for the benefit of the populace.2”3 But it appears to serve more than 
a propagandistic function. It may be read as a statement of belief that holds Magnesia 
and its laws to be the paradigmatic expression of aesthetic and philosophical virtue—a 
paradigm compared to which and with regard to which all other (lesser) works of art 
must be judged. Nightingale favours such a proposition. ‘Here', as she writes, ‘Plato not 
only denies that tragedy is truly “serious,” but confers on his own creation the title of 
serious tragedy'?”4 In this political respect, a comparison may be drawn between the 
Athenian Stranger's speech and Perfides' funeral oration in which the Athenian 
constitution was referred to as both a model for (as well as an ‘edru^atioid to) all the 
Greeks?”®
Magnesia, unhke Athens, has sterner safeguards to protect its ‘truest tragedy' of a 
constitution. Before a dramatic piece may be performed, it mmt tefjst meet widi th<2 
approval of Magnesia's rulers. To do so, it must not contradict any of the city's laws,
201 Cf. my chapter IV for more on this.
202 81 7bl-d4; Ci Rep. 394d, 606c; Phil. 48a.
2m Cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 136, 157-62, for the Athenian Stranger’s employment of‘noble lies’ as 
characteristically reflective of Spartan propagandistic policies more than Athenian.
(1997), p. 88.
205 Thuc, 11.35 sq. Cf. Ober (1998), pp. 45, 143. Cf. Toynbee (1972), pp. 90-92, for the view that 
Plato is reacting against Periklean views. It should be noted, however, that Plato has probably not 
written this or any part of the Laws in direct response to a speech given fifty years prior. It was 
possibly the case that he was responding to the publication of this same speech in Thucydides and the 
views contained therein. As Stadter (1959), p. 108, says, a ‘comparison of the points made by the 
Athenian Stranger with passages from the “Old Oligarch” makes it clear enough that Plato is merely 
airing longstanding conservative prejudices against the contemporary interpretation of a view of 
Athenian democracy and the source of its strength—naval power—which can be traced back well into 
the fifth century which Plato found intolerable’.
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institutions, ideals or values.206 207 208This suggests that only a select few (if any) tragedies 
could be performed ia Magnesia and one expects that such events would not be 
especially frequent. When it portrays human sexual relations, the drama and literature 
permitted in Magnesia must uphold officially sanctioned mores along with offi^cially 
permitted expressions of ‘cultural fantasy’ and erotic ideals. Since mixed-sex coupling 
within the legitimate bonds of marriage is the preferred form of sexual expression, the 
accepted literary and dramatic canon must encourage this norm. This will influence the 
developmental psychology of the Magnesian citizens so that they, as Chodorow says, ‘are 
lilrely to build such norms (directly or indirectly, positively or negatively) into their sexual 
orientation and object choice’?”7
The dramatic and literary arts are not the only ones to be carefully regulated by 
the Magnesian state. The Athenian Stranger indicates that some sciences may be suitable 
for certain students, but an in-depth study of them would be unsuitable for others. This 
higher learning includes the study of logic, arithmetic, measuring the length and surface 
of solids and the motions and courses of the stars in depth (817e6-818al)?06 These 
subjects will be studied to some degree by all students during their time in Magnesia’s 
schools and, as such, fit into the overall curriculum of the Magnesian education. However, 
their intensive study is limited only to those students who demonstrate a natural aptitude 
for them. This will be identified at an early age and encouraged along specific fines of 
development. ‘Indeed’, says the Athenian Stranger, ‘the majority should not labour to 
grasp all these subjects with precision, rather, only a certain few’ (818al-3). Later we 
learn that these special students are the ones being groomed to serve as Guardians of the 
Laws and members of the Vigilance Committee (962c, 965a sq.). They alone have the 
fullest and most complete education over and above their fellow Magnesians.
Educational Symposia', the Fear and the Shame
206 In the same speech to potential performers, the Athenian Stranger says, ‘so now, oh children and 
offspring of the mild Muses, first display your works beside those of ours before our rulers; and if your 
speeches seem the same as ours or better than ours, then we shall grant you a chorus, but if not, dear 
friends, then we can never do so’ (817d4-9).
207 (1994), p. 38.
208.. .Xo^uopol pkv Kat Kept dpiOpoup £v p.d0riga, pexpTiTiKf 6k pf|Koug Kcd hmurckSov Kai fidGou 
q &>g kv afi 8et)xepov, xpVtov 8k xOv dcnpcov rceptdSou apdp &XXr|%a d)g t£<ukk TCooeet^uGai.
Cf. Rep. 526c, 527d-530c and Epin. 990b.
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The Athenian Stranger proposes a revised version of the aristocratic symposion for the 
second-bestpolish The Magnesians are not permitted to partake of alcohol until the age 
of eigjhteen and are encouraged to drink only in moderation until old age.209 10 211 212The 
controlled drinking party is an institution designed to educate the citizens into being 
courageous in the face of physical danger and to discourage them from illicit pleasures. 
A good legislator can make a person proof against all manner of things (of the first kind, 
i.e. of dangerous people and things), says the Athenian Stranger ‘by putting him into a 
state of fear within the strictures of law' (647c3-4). This is half the battle. They may 
overcome cowardice when faced with peril but must also learn to be moderate 
(cdxjipcov—647d3-4) and have self-control sufficient to stave off the desires for activities 
deemed shameless.21" The primary purposes of educational symposia are to promote the 
official values associated with sophrosyne and to encourage andreia. Three powerful forces 
will be brought to bear in achieving this end: fear, shame and calculation.^" Shame, 
through dishonour (or the threat thereof, figures prominently in the equation of a 
controlled drinking party.213 The Athenian Stranger notes that drunken individuals 
sometimes require strong negative reinforcement such as the threat of displeasure from 
officials who have some control over their daily lives along with the pubHc reproach that 
this accrues.
The Athenian Stranger’s method has particular recourse to the socially influential 
forces of shame and fear. In Magnesia, the ‘best people’ are said to hold ‘()<5f3oc^ in the
209 This is derived from mostly aristocratic customs and, as Murray says (1990), pp. 149-50, ‘the 
fundamental potential for opposition between drinking-group and democracy is clear. However much 
the fifth-century democracy might try to provide public dining rooms and public occasions for feasting, 
the symposion remained largely a private and aristocratic preserve’.
210 ££ Theognis 509-510, 837-840 for a similar statement of moderation in drinking. Laws 666a-d 
entails these legal regulations of age and also details the choruses composed of Magnesians over the 
age of forty who, as Lissarrague (1990), p. 10, says ‘may “invite Dionysus” to “relieve the desiccation 
of old age”.. .wine warms the soul and removes its stiffness, just as it removed its worries.. .making the 
old man happy in his life and newly sociable’ and ‘his soul, once again pliant as that of a child, can be 
reshaped, and its malleability has a direct effect during religious observances: it allows the old man to 
sing and to dance, which are important social activities’. This is a reward for following Magnesia’s 
rule of moderation in drinking.
211 The subjects should become ‘fearless’ (&j>opog) in the face of pleasure (648b9-c3). Cf. Lak. Pot. 
III.5, for a similar goal set by the Spartans.
212 ‘Calculation’, (XoYiagdq), also renderable as ‘reckoning’, is identified with Reason’s ‘golden 
chord’ that guides the souls of mortals along the right path in the ‘puppets of the gods’ myth that fits 
into this broader discussion on the educational benefits of drinking parties (644cl2-645c8). ‘When 
XoyiLcpd^ has become the Soypa of the polis', says the Athenian Stranger making a musical pun, ‘it is 
named “law”’ (644dl-3). N6po(; can, of course, also mean song.
213 If a reveller is not willing ‘to obey those [in charge] and the officials of Dionysus, who are aged 
upwards of sixty years, then he must bear shame (cdayovTi) equal to and greater than those who are 
disobedient to the commanders who are the officials of Aries, the god of war’ (671d9-e3).
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greatest esteem, calling it Ot’lSchc;’.214 This reflects both Spartan and traditionally Homeric 
values associated with accepted social behaviour.215 It is perhaps another example of the 
ongoing programme of Pakonisation in Magnesia. Xenophon wrote of Sparta that ‘there, 
great aidds stands beside great obedience’.216 A kind of ‘shame-culture’ featured 
prominently in Spartan civic ideology. Aidds entails the fear of public censure for 
breaching protocols. It served in many Greek poleis, as Richer says, as an ‘embedded 
means’ of controlling citizens’ behaviour.217 218In Sparta, the privileged relationship of 
phobos with the authoritative ephors is underscored, as Mactoux indicates, by ‘the spatial 
contiguity of the place where ephoric power was exercised’ and the temple of deified 
Phobos™ The Athenian Stranger recognises how potent a force such as shame/modesty 
can be when yoked with religious/state authority. 'Aidos/ aischune are here persistently 
related to fear of the external sanction of disgrace’, as Cairns says, ‘but the creation of a 
sense of aidds which can withstand the influence of alcohol also suggests the acquisition 
of an instinctive disposition towards self-control’.219 220This, in concert with calculation, 
will advance the Magnesian ethic of sophrosyne™
In order to achieve complete courage (dtvSpela), according to the Athenian 
Stranger, the citizens should be exposed to temptations in a controlled context similar to 
military training. They must overcome ‘the manifold pleasures and desires that exhort 
one to behave shamelessly (dtVCXlO'X'UVTeLV) and to do injustice’ (dtSlKElV—647d4-5). 
This recalls the equation between the excessive partaking of pleasure and the sort of 
negativity perceived in femininity.221 The desire to engage in same-sex intercourse, for 
example, is identified as both shameless and immoderate.222 The educational institutions 
of Magnesia will undertake every effort to seek its elimination from the earliest possible 
point. The supervised symposion provides an ideal venue for this.
The Athenian Stranger maintains that, when they have practised sufficiently, they 
will build up resistance to the effects of drink. Learning self-discipline under these
214 Laws 647a.
215 Richer (1999), p. 97. Cf. Plut. Mor. 7e and Iliad VI.441-2
216 Lak. Pol. II. 2. Phobos had his own temple in Sparta and was probably attended by an all-male 
priesthood; relatively little is known about the religious features of Aidds, but Richer (1999), p. 93, is 
‘tempted a priori to see in Aidds a form of Phobos for the use of women’.
217 (1999), p. 99; Xenophon also stresses that the Spartan education aimed at ‘inspiring great reserve 
(r6 ociSeiaOai ’ia%up(o<; fep<|)uaai) in its subject youth (Lak. Pol. III.4).
218 (1993), p. 280.
219 (1993), pp. 374-5.
220 647a, 649c-d.
221 Cf. my chapters IV, VI.
222 This topic is discussed in greater detail in my chapter VII.
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constraints is thought, by extension, to reduce the Hcelihood of their indulging in 
excesses under normal circumstances. Having suffered together through the symposion, 
the Magnesians are seen to benefit from an increased concord: they will ah be ‘drinking 
buddies’ with a firm foundation of friendship. They wih have proven themselves to be 
good citizens too if ‘they were interacting through the entire party according to the rules 
(KCXTd VOJIOVC,), and were obedient whenever the sober directed the drunk’ (671e9- 
672a3).
An official observes the interactions of his subjects who are exposed to the fear- 
causing pharmakon?23 He engages in ‘encouraging, admonishing, rewarding and 
punishing’ the subjects until they behave appropriately. The sober symposiarch deploys the 
forces of fear, shame (modesty—fear of censure) and calculation at his disposal. He/she 
has the authority of both age and position from which to dole out either rewards to those 
who behave properly or punishments (through dishonour and the resulting shame of 
public reproach) for those who refuse to submit to authority. ‘Disobeying his orders’, as 
Lissarrague says, ‘results in exclusion from the banquets, hence social isolation’.223 24 This 
sort of psychologically harsh penalty is typical of Magnesian policy.
Immoderate sexual pleasures are especially targeted. These must be tightly 
controlled. The only acceptable form of sexual expression is that between a man and a 
woman within the sanctioned bonds of matrimony. There is every indication that male 
participants in the symposia will be encouraged to recognise women as the appropriate 
objects of legitimate sexual desire on which to focus their moderated desire for 
pleasure."25 It is not stated, but female participants will probably experience comparable 
sex role instruction in their separate symposia. They wiil all be strongly discouraged from 
choosing partners of the same sex.226 Those that fail to do so wfll be identified and 
presumably dealt with. Both Kleinias and the Athenian Stranger agree that this process 
could serve as an ‘acid test’ that would benefit the polis. MegQlus the Spartan is notably 
laconic throughout the discussion and drops out altogether from Hies 642d4, in Book I,
223 Ts there a drug ((lappaxov) of fear that some god has given to humankind’, the Athenian Stranger 
asks, that ‘ultimately brings the bravest of mortals into absolute terror?’ (647el-648al). Kleinias 
decides that there is no such drug in existence but he readily agrees to the proposition that a good 
legislator ‘would be glad to be able to get hold of an “acid test’” (p&oavoq) of the courage and 
cowardice of his citizens (648b 1-2). Cf. Cairns (1993), p. 374 sq. on the symposiarch. One suspects 
that Magnesia, not unlike some modem governments, would similarly employ such things as cannabis, 
‘magic mushrooms’, L.S.D. and others were they available.
224 (1990), p. 9.
This bears similarity to Freud’s account of the male psyche which, as Chodorow (1994), p. 25, says 
‘represents women, and especially the mother, not only explicitly but implicitly, or latently, as object’.
226 841a sq.
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to the middle of Book III—mcluding all the discussions that take place on controlled 
drinking parties and same-sex intercourse.227
The Magnesian symposia are perceived as a benefit to citizens—providing they 
succeed in meeting the criteria that have been established for judging their courage and 
self-control (or likewise their ‘cowardliness/unmanHness quotient’). They have the 
opportunity to hone and improve their skills of moderation. The test will also identify 
and catalogue those with cowardly natures and thus provide a sort of index of 
courage/manhness, and the lack of such qualities, that also tracks those who reveal signs 
of ‘inappropriate’ sexual desire. It will provide a handy compendium of psychological 
profiles of the subjects involved and this presumably includes all citizens. The Athenian 
Stranger maintains that the test could work on groups of people of different numbers 
from ‘one to a few to as many as one might desire’ (648c8-dl). It wiU be Hke a normal 
symposion or andron—but with a twist. He has taken a traditional cultural practice, which 
doubtless served its own purposes of sociaHsation, and turned it into a proper ‘engine’ of 
social control and induction into the political community of Magnesia.228 229 2301Symposia were 
not in themselves political;’ as Murray states, ‘indeed they are connected with politics 
only in the sense that the hetaireia begins from the drinking group, and is based on 
relations formed in the symposion'™ This feature of political sociaHsation observable in 
the Athenian symposia would seem to apply more to their counterparts in Magnesia.
The Athenian Stranger points out some of the effects of drunkenness with great 
accuracy.2"0 His account focuses particularly on the loss of inhibition under the influence 
and how this can reveal the participants’ true nature. As Lissarrague indicates, Plato’s
227 The Athenian Stranger is critical of Spartan, Kretan and other traditions involving drink but he 
specifically indicates that the Spartans err in insisting upon enforced sobriety and thus not learning 
control over their pleasures as well as pains (639e). Megillus points out that, since his family were 
(conveniently) proxenoi to Athens (642b), he has seen much drunkenness—at the Great Dionysia as 
well as in the Spartan colony of Tarentum—but ‘with us’, he says, ‘no such thing is possible’(637bl- 
6). Hodkinson (2000), p. 196, admits that we do not know whether they partook of alcohol excessively 
or moderately. There is evidence for either possibility, but most sources about ancient Sparta indicate, 
in his words, ‘a degree of individual discretion’ that seems to have operated ‘within a setting that 
imposed strict social sanctions against excessive drinking’. Also cf. Michell (1964), pp. 289-90, for a 
survey of the sources.
228 Cf. Hodkinson (2000), p. 216, who indicates that ‘As the prime locus for the practice of 
voluntaristic, reciprocal commensality among private groups of peers, the symposion was associated 
above all with the wealthy elite’.
229 (1990), p. 150.
230 ‘When a man drinks it [wine], does it first make him immediately cheerful more so than before, and,
the more he partakes of it, by as much is he filled full of good hopes and of capability in his opinion? 
And finally indeed is such a one, reckoning himself to be clever, filled with complete license of the 
tongue and a lack of inhibition (fse^ee'oGt^f^i.i^c;), completely fearless, so that he will both speak anything 
without hesitation and also in the same way behave? Everyone, I believe, would agree with us that this 
is so’ (649a9-b6). Cf. Boyancd (1951), pp. 3-19, for Plato’s accurate description of the effects of 
alcohol. -
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narrator ‘claims that wine can disclose another's character'.231 232 233 234 235A keen observer may 
perhaps note certain motivations and desires present—hitherto submerged by the 
harnesses of sober self-restraint—that then emerge to reveal themselves. A drunken 
individual, with inhibitions lessened by the effects of alcohol, might act out such illicit 
inclinations in the presence of others and so reveal his or her hidden qualities. (Hence 
the later Roman axiom: in vino veritas/) The Athenian Stranger suggests that an untested 
person who secretly harbours excessive desires might wait for an opportune and 
clandestine moment to act on them. Such a person might cheat, steal or rape secretly 
away from the condemning eyes of society, and is thus regarded as shameless."3"
Plato's narrator anticipates that a broader approach, akin to the supervised 
symposion., could be implemented on his hypothetical populace at large®33 He has 
introduced a means of psychological manipulation, embedded in state institutions and 
designed to enforce the official value system. Many of Magnesia's laws and customs, not 
unlike their Spartan equivalents, deploy elements of shame and the fear of shame as 
negative reinforcements to ensure obedienee®34 As Cairns indicates, ‘we are dealing with 
a concept of aidds that is comprehensive in its scope, covering both respect for one’s 
fellows and one’s superiors and consciousness of one's own status as affected by the 
opinions of fellows and superiors'."35 The controlled drinking party provides a paradigm 
by which Magnesia’s citizens may be educated (or inculcated) into a particular mode of 
discourse and ideology. The fact that this is to be accomplished largely through the 
employment of powerful psychological pressures of a potentially insidious nature does 
not seem to concern the Athenian Stranger.
The Guardians of the Laws and the Nukterinos Council
The Athenian Stranger may have anticipated George Orwell by two and a half millennia 
in terms of their mumal agreement that there will arise those in society who tend to be
231 (1990), p. 9.
232 650a2-5; he says that it would be better to know this about a person before placing him in charge of 
one’s sons or daughters.
233 Tf some state pursues the practice, which was just now discussed, with law and order as an example 
worthy to follow, that they exercise it with care for the sake of moderation (ton acD()poveiv), and if 
that state permits other pleasures in like manner according to the same argument, as a device for the - 
mastery of them, then in every case this same example must be followed’ (673e3-e8).
234 Richer (1999), p. 100, indicates that ‘Aidos had a wide sphere of influence at Sparta, then, in 
connection with both men and women, and the importance of the concept in Spartan customs 
(supervised by the ephors) appears clearly established’.
235 (1993), p. 376.
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‘more equal’ than others.2® The Athenian Stranger sometimes refers to this as the ‘rule 
of symmetrical inequality’"37 and it applies to many things."® The ‘best of the best’ in 
Magnesia occupy the highest offices in the land. It is they who wiU be afforded the most 
comprehensive form of education available. This class of rulers includes the Guardians 
of the Laws and the members of the nukterinos council. The education of the former is 
the same as that of the latter up to a point. They, however, wfil be expected to continue 
their studies in greater depth. Their preparation closely parallels that of the Guardians of 
the Laws and the Philosopher IKings/Queens of the Republic. As with these, the 
Magnesians are not limited by sex in the choice of officials for duties of state 
administration.2"9
The cbX.oyoc; VUKTEpivd), or ‘Vigilance Committee’ as Luc Brisson has called 
it, wfU be made up of ten of the most senior Guardians of the Laws and the archons of 
Education past and present (951d8-e4).2"9 Magnesia is a gerontocracy, comparable in 
many ways to Classical Sparta, and its elderly leadership exert considerable regulatory 
power over aU state institutions such as education, choruses, music, educational drinking 
parties and others that inculcate morality?41 This synod of Magnesia’s elders has a more 
intense and deeper education than the majority of their peers (965a7-9). The ranks from 
which they are chosen constitute a class unto itself having been especially trained from 
birth for their future role in government.
The Athenian Stranger indicates that a list must be kept of the intellectual and 
moral capacities of eligible citizens from whom to draw the Guardians of the Laws and 
thence the nukterinos council (968c9-d3). Part of their special educational regime requires 
them to travel abroad in order to observe the laws and customs of other peoples. They 
wil return and make their reports to the sitting Vigilance Committee. On reflection, 
some of these foreign practices may be applied to Magnesia as is deemed appropriate 
(951a sq.). This freedom to travel and learn wil only be granted to senior Guardians of 
the Laws and * * * * * * *
"6 I borrow the phrase ‘more equal’ from Orwell’s Animal Farm and 1984. On the Athenian
Stranger’s formulation of relativistic equality cf. Laws 744b sq., 757; cf. too Rep. 557a, 561b-563. 
237 &px<dq (6<;...x<5 dviom £u|r[r£xpcp
22® E.g. funerary honours and state positions, cf. 744c4 and below.
239 He says that ‘the law has already granted him permission, and still gives permission, to choose 
whomever he wishes of the men and women of the state for that public commission’ (813c6-9).
240 On the selection and training of this committee, cf. 951d-e, 952a, 961-69.
241 Powell (1994), p. 280..
242 Cf. Xenonphon (Lak. Pol. XIII. 10-11), for similar travel restriction in his Lykourgian Sparta.
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Many aspects of the Vigilance Committee’s education are omitted from the Laws. 
We are told some of it and may deduce much of the rest. Their command of the arts of 
statecraft must necessarily be excellent since they must be better versed in the letter and 
spirit of Magnesia’s laws than most. The members of the nukterinos council are to ‘posses 
a more accurate grasp of arete, both in word and deed, than the majority of people’ 
(964d4-5). It follows that they, above and beyond all others, should uphold Magnesia’s 
sexual mores in exemplary manner. They must be paragons of civic virtue in the second- 
best state. In order to achieve this extraordinary feat, they undergo intense training and 
scrutiny for at least five decades. One of their primary subjects of study will be dialectics. 
They have to understand that the four virtues of Reason, Courage, Moderation and 
Justice are truly one virtue and ‘how this is so’.243 They must pay attention to the many, 
but always strive for the ‘One’. Although the word ‘dialectic’ is not actually employed in 
the Athenian Stranger’s discussions here or elsewhere in the text, the method of practice 
that he has outlined is unmistakable.244
The rulers of Magnesia must also be able to relate their philosophical insights on 
‘the Beautiful and the Good’ to the practice of governance.245 This represents one of the 
more esoteric aspects of their education and clearly distinguishes them from the rest of 
the citizenry who, we are told, ‘follow only die pronouncements of the laws’.246 The 
Vigilance Committee’s candidates undertake a thorough study of divine matters so that 
they might come to an understanding of the mysteries of philosophy. Some of these the 
Athenian Stranger has discussed in Book X, but it appears likely that they will utilise 
other Platonic resources as well.247 None may serve even as a Guardian of the Laws 
unless he/she has first learned about divine matters.
The Athenian Stranger mentions several subcategories of this education in divine 
matters that will bring about a superior skill of governing for the members of the 
Vigilance Committee and, to a lesser degree, the Guardians of the Laws. A primary 
feature is psychical metaphysics, or the nature of souls. They must learn that the soul is 
the most ancient and divine (TtpeapfixaTdv TS Kai 08l6xaTOV) of things whose motion
243 963a7-l 1, cl l-d2, 965b5-9, 965c9-e4, 966a5-10; cp. 631c sq. As opposed to five cardinal virtues in 
the Protagoras (cf. Protag. 349b, 359a).
244 Cf. Rep. 484, 537b sq., where dialectics are described, as Bury says (1999, p. 555, n. 3), ‘as a kind 
of induction (owaycoYri) whereby the mind ascends from “the many” particulars to “the one” universal 
concept or “idea”: a comprehensive view of the whole that marks the dialectician
(b auvoKXiKdg SiaXeKxiKdq)’.
245 ...rcepl KaXou re Kai dcyaGou—966a5-10.
246 966c5-7.
247 This includes the text of the Laws itself and potentially the Republic, the Timaeus and others— 
966cl-9.
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(kIvtoiQ) is engaged in ‘perpetually providing being’.24® They should understand that the 
soul is immortal, reincarnates and ‘rules over all bodies’?* Since the motions of celestial 
objects are caused by Soul and governed by Reason, they also undertake a rigorous study 
of astronomy, geometry and other such sciences that demonstrate this divine principle^0 
Finally, they must attain a profound comprehension of musical theory and then be able 
to ‘apply it harmoniously to the institutions and rules of ethics’.222 This esoteric learning 
of metaphysical matters appears to be a primary dividing point between the upper and 
lower echelons of the Magnesian government since any who cannot grasp these deeper 
things will be limited, at best, to lower ministerial positions.
Conclusions
The Magnesian education is designed to be fairly comprehensive—even by modern 
standards. It begins earher than virtually any other known educational system available in 
Plato’s era and includes subjects that would be both famihar and unfamiliar to his 
contemporaries. Plato’s pedagogical approach in the Laws places considerable emphasis 
on the sciences and those subjects that today we might designate as the ‘liberal arts’. The 
Magnesian education comes at state expense and, whatever else its goals may be, it is 
designed to promote literacy and numeracy for all citizens. This is a remarkable 
proposition given the era in which it originated. Primary education is to be available to 
members of both sexes at aU levels and includes, for those with the aptitude for it, the 
option of post-secondary training in many subjects. Arguably, the Magnesian education 
favours males over females by way of the limitations imposed on the latter through the 
state-mandated necessity of childbearing. More or less equal educational opportunities 
are ultimately afforded both sexes—even if the women take up their advanced military 
training up to ten years later than the men.
The educational system of Magnesia appears to have its roots in the earlier values 
of the idealised, aristocratic Old Education. There are numerous aspects of the Athenian 
democratic education and especially the systems of Sparta and Krete;. Magnesia is, in 
many ways, a selective synthesis of aU these. The sum is greater than its parts. Plato’s 
narrator includes many subjects outside the aristocratic, democratic, Spartan and other
248 dfevaov ohaiav frc6picrev—966dl2-e3
249 967d4-8; cf. 903d.
250 966e3-967el; cf. 818a sq. and Rep. 607b-c.
251 967e2-5; cf. 710a and Rep. 399.
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curricula. In a sense, he has ‘democratised’ the idealised and aristocratic Old Education 
and ‘arfstocratised’ the democratic equivalent. Making all of his citizens into a ‘virtuous’ 
elite and educating them along Spartan regulatory lines facilitates this.
There is a discernable stratification to the levels of the educated in Magnesia. 
Common citizens obtain a basic grasp of letters and arithmetic as weU as a broad, if 
somewhat cursory, understanding of aU subjects taught in schools. These comprise the 
largest single group. The Guardians of the Laws (including upper and lower echelon 
magistrates) comprise the next degree with the more thorough studies of their advanced 
curriculum. The third and highest degree of education belongs to the members of the 
nukterinos council who possess the most complex level of education in preparation for 
their important role as rulers of the second-best state. The aims of this education overall, 
as with most of Plato’s dialogues, is to produce rational and virtuous souls whose 
existence wih be metaphysically harmonious.
The Magnesian education takes full advantage of a range of psychological 
influences, such as shame and fear, which it can exert on the developing minds of its 
subjects. It particularly strives to inculcate the value of mixed-sex coupling within 
legitimate marriages. Many institutions of the polis target sexual mores and punish those 
who deviate. Their means are intrusive and thorough. Above and beyond his numerous 
innovations in pedagogy, the Athenian Stranger seems to have presaged 
Victorian/Judeo-Christian values of heterosexuality—without, that is, possessing the 
same concept. As was discussed in chapter I, the ancient Greeks behaved in a ‘bisexual’ 
manner in terms of erotic choice. Plato’s Magnesian education will be one of several 
agencies that seek to alter this through such sophisticated techniques as performative 
modelling, threat of public censure and numerous other forms of psychological coercion. 
The legacy of Victorian pseudo-science has demonstrated the effects of a comparable 
practice beyond Plato’s wildest dreams. We are now living in a culture produced by such 
deliberate attempts at the direct social engineering of sex and we have yet to fully 
comprehend the consequences.
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Chapter IV
ANAPEIA: A Special Definition for Magnesia
‘I deny that confidence and courage are the same thing, and it follows that those 
who are courageous are confident but not all the confident are courageous. 
Confidence, like power, may be born of skill, or equally of madness or passion. 
But courage is a matter of nature and of the proper nurture of the soul’.
—(Plato’s) Sokrates1 2
‘.. .in all the human societies we have ever reviewed, in every age and every state, 
there has seldom if ever been a shortage of eager young males prepared to kill 
and die to preserve the security, comfort and prejudices of their elders, and what 
you call heroism is just an expression of this simple fact: there is never a scarcity 
of idiots’.
—Iain M. Banksi
Introduction
It is the purpose of this chapter to consider the idea (and ideal) of ‘manliness’, as it 
emerges in the Lams, and to contrast it with relevant historical material. It will 
demonstrate that the concept of manliness (AvSpElOC) is fundamental to Plato’s Magnesia 
in many significant respects. The Athenian Stranger’s definition represents a unique 
modification of existing cultural ideas. His conceptualisation of AvSpetca is, as in the 
Greek world, strongly connected with the broader notion of 
(goodness/virtue/excellence). The versions of AvSpEia and dtp£Tf| in the Lams, while 
grounded in cultural context, are peculiar to the Athenian Stranger. As was explored in 
the previous chapter, Magnesia utilises sophisticated means of psychological 
manipulation, on a mass scale, to inculcate its accepted values. Its methodologies entail 
such features as, in today’s terminology, sex-role stereotyping and performative 
modelling. Official opprobrium and the force of law enforce and promote these.
Magnesia’s interest in policing the sphere of civic ideas applies particularly to Platonic 
‘manliness’.
In the modern, industrialised West such terms as ‘masculine’ and ‘manly’ may be 
seen as referring to a certain psychological/physical state meant to comply with 
identifiable (albeit widely contested) standards. Whilst members of the female sex may
1 Protagoras 351a4-b2.
2 (2000), pp. 336-7.
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sometimes be construed as ‘manly’ or ‘masculine’ (e.g. perhaps female athletes, 
businesswomen and world leaders), these adjectives are normadvely linked with the male 
sex. This is part of our linguistic construction of sexuality. Numerous such sexually 
delineated characteristics present the males and females of a given culture with accepted 
paradigms for emulation. The ancient Greeks placed a somewhat greater emphasis on a 
naturally assumed sexual association between courage and proper modes of masculine 
behaviour. There were, then as now, particular and largely unwritten rules of custom 
that encouraged sexually specific conformity.
In the Laws, as in ancient Greek in general, the word for ‘courage’ and the word 
for ‘manliness’ are frequently one and the same. The ancient Greek word for courage 
((dvSpeia) likewise denotes manliness. The adjective (dvdpeioQ) can also mean ‘manly’ 
or ‘masculine’ in addition to such things as ‘vigorous’ or ‘courageous’. The terms used 
for either concept signify accepted modes of sexual behaviour? The Athenian Stranger’s 
definition of dcvSpeia in the Lams carries with it implicitly sexual characteristics in 
concert with the usual Platonic prescription of moderation, self-mastery, resistance to 
pleasures and, as such, connects with the broader concept of dtpeTT). It may be further 
clarified with recourse to the cultural backdrop that informed these notions.
Ancient Greeks and Barbarians
The Lam proposes a society that places severe limitations on the sort of,things that today 
we would consider essential freedoms. Magnesia’s citizens, in addition to exemplifying 
the ideals of ‘self-harmony’ and ‘intelligence’, must also epitomise the virtue of ‘freedom’ 
as well.3 4 The concept of freedom, for the ancient Greeks as for Plato, should be 
regarded contextually in contrast to the state of slav^^y^® Such values have been 
represented in ancient art, literature, history and philosophy. The ethic of 
manHness/courage appears to have had a high degree of consistency in the surviving
3 There is something vaguely like this in contemporary English usage. The words ‘virtue’ and - 
‘virtuous’ contain within them the Latin base ‘vir’, meaning ‘man’, and are more directly derived from 
the Latin ‘virtus’, which means, not unlike its ancient Greek equivalent, both ‘manhood’ and ‘courage’. 
Other examples of this include such sexually implicit terms as virility and virile not to mention 
virulent. The Stoics later appear to have connected courage and virtue along similarly sexual lines. 
Edwards (2002) suggests that ‘Virtus’, amongst the Romans of the 1st century c.e., was a ‘manly’ 
quality that women could sometimes possess (mainly Seneca’s relatives) but not un-problematically. It 
was more readily associated with the ideal role of men.
4 (701dl0-ll) nbTiCoq vopoOTOuiifevri tcdXu; fcXeuor|£pa io huoai xod <t>iZr| hamp xat vouv fe^er. 
3 Yunis (1996), p. 215. Platonic freedom must also be construed, paradoxically, as the rational 
submission to proper authority (762e).
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texts. These socially accepted ideals amongst the ancient Greeks appear to have resulted 
in no small part from the constraints necessitated by the political circumstances of the 
era. ‘The continued existence of a Greek city-state’, as Dover says, ‘depended ultimately 
on the military qualities of its adult male citizens’.® A military defeat could (and often 
did) result in the physical destruction of the fabric of the city itself and sometimes, in 
consequence, the mass slaughter of all adult male citizens and the enslavement of the 
women and children. Occasionally such a defeat entailed the extermination of all male 
children as in the mythical account of the fall of Troy.6 7
The wretchedness associated with this fate, and especially that of being enslaved, 
is highlighted numerous times by Hekuba in Euripides’ play of the same name.8 * 10 * 12In his 
Andromache, considerable grief accompanies the heroines’ imposed state of servitude? 
Since these plays were performed for fifth-century audiences, we can assume that the 
prospect of a citizen-woman becoming a slave through conquest was regarded as one of 
the more horrible possibilities that could ensue from warfare—for the survivors. While 
women could be regarded as a type of commodity amongst the ‘spoils of war’, men and 
male children were seen as potential threats to the victors. Menelaos, about to slaughter 
Hektor’s son Astyanax in the Andromache, declares that ‘it is foUy to let enemies born 
from enemies hve, when it is possible to kill them and remove the fear from one’s 
house’.*® He, as with aU of the other male offspring of Troy, must be destroyed because, 
as Anderson says, ‘according to Menelaos’ wicked logic this second child of Andromache 
is an enemy and a threat’.** Greeks of the 5th century appear to have followed this 
tradition to varying degrees. In war, one city-state might visit considerable violence on a 
conquered enemy. They would have expected no less to be visited on them if 
conquered. Harsh necessity demanded much in the preparation for combat and defence 
of the homeland.
Athens alone was at war no less than three out of every four years between 500- 
322bc.e.*2 One can extrapolate a comparable state of affairs in many Hellenic poliis.
6GPM,p. 161.
7 These fears are expressed by the women of Troy at IliWN}.238. Such a doom was inflicted upon 
Skione by the Athenians in 422 and on Melos in 416; on Hysiai by the Spartans in 41I, on Plataiai by 
the Thebans in 3I3 and upon Thebes, in turn, by Alexander the Great. See also Polybios 11.58, 9-12 sq, 
for the similar fate that befell Mytilene.
8 Mossman (1995), pp. 23 sq. Cf. Eur. Hikuba 60-1, 98-103, 156-61, 234-5, 332-3, 444 sq., 459-6, 
550-2, I41, I98, 809 sq., 821-3, 881, 905 sq., 1289, 1293-5.
®Anderson (199I), p. 141. Cf. Andromache 14I-53, 155, 555-6, 5II-8, 583.
10 515-16.
“ (199I), p. 139.
12 Cartledge (2001), p. 82.
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Encouragements for young men to become manly warriors must have been intense. A 
man's courage might especially be judged according to the state of his physical prowess 
and readiness for combat. His skill with weapons and his ability for wise council in 
discussing martial matters and those subjects that might help to ensure the state's 
continued survival would be highly prized.® A good citizen-soldier was meant to be 
prepared to sacrifice not only his own hfe, if necessary, but also to be proof against cold, 
heat, hunger and thirst as well as enduring without sleep or extended respite.13 4 * 16A man 
might have been encouraged from an early age to pattern his life after the likes of a 
Menelaos or a Herakles (who allegedly never shed a tear despite his misforrtunc^js.-® 
Manly men were tough and did not cry or bemoan their occasional iU fate. Living a ‘soft' 
or luxurious lifestyle, or being brought up without the painful experiences that resulted in 
increased endurance could be seen as opposed to the manly ide^all/.6
It would be erroneous to speak generally of ‘the ancient Greeks' as if they were a 
single nation-state with common values (if indeed modern nation-states may be said to 
share a unified value system).17 * 19The differences between Athens and Sparta alone reveal 
two quite diverse societies.® However, a common self-image of manliness appears to 
have been a unifying factor in the special relationship between the Greeks and their non­
Greek, ‘barbarian' neighbours. Certainly Greeks fought against Greeks in the Hellenic 
world and one city-state probably reckoned the manliness of its men with regard to that 
of a rivaLi6 If the enemy could be counted amongst the ‘sons of Hellas', that was one 
matter. Barbarians seem to have represented a different and more intense level of 
otherness. Herodotos' account of a speech by the Athenians to a Spartan envoy, who 
feared that Athens would aUy with Persia, encourages Greek unity against the enemy on
13 These traits are praised both by Herodotos (111.4.1) and Xenophon (Ages. X.l) where the ‘good man’ 
is described in terms of ‘endurance, valour and judgement when discussion is necessary’. Cf. too 
Demosthenes xxiv.I03, 119 sq. (along with Aiskhines III. 175 seq.), where defectors from a military 
expedition are listed alongside parricides and hoodlums.
14 Xen. Hell, v 1.15.
* Eur. Her. Fur. 1354 sq; Soph. Track. 1071-5, 1199-1201.
16 Cf. Demokritos B182; Eur. frags. 233, 236,237, 238, 239, 240; Soph. El. 945; Xen. Mem. ii 1.28, 
Kyneg. 12.9; Ar. Clouds 965, 987, 1044-105; and esp. Plato, Laws 69.c sq, 695b sq. where the ‘manly’ 
education of Kyros is contrasted with that of his sons who were ■ raised in luxury by ‘women and 
eunuchs’ and thus grew ‘soft’ and decadent. Cf. Republic 407b sq. on how arete is not promoted by 
excessive attention to the body.
17 Cartledge (2001), p. 84-5, discusses the ancient concept of the koinonia (community/commonweal) 
of citizens vs. the modem post-Hobbesian State.
* Cf. my chapter III.
19 The Hellenistic kingdoms, in many respects the heirs of Athen’s legacy, often consisted of a minority 
of Greeks ruling over a mostly alien populace. Amongst them there was, as Browning (2002), p. 261, 
says, ‘an almost exaggerated emphasis on Greekness’.
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the grounds that ‘there is a Greek nation—our shared blood and language, our common 
temples and rituals, our similar way of life’.20
Aristotle provides an insight into this view in the altered political landscape of the 
fourth century. He asserts that ‘it is right that the Greeks should rule over barbarians’ 
since it is right for superiors to rule inferiors.21 This has a decidedly propagandistic tone 
and similar expressions may have served as rallying-points for nationalistic sentiment. As 
Hall says, ‘Greek writing about barbarians is usually an exercise in self-definition, for the 
barbarian is often portrayed as the opposite of the ideal Greek’.22 Many so-called 
barbarians existed from which the ancient Greeks might draw their self-definition 
through otherness. However, a particular group of them seems to have been most 
prominent to this end. It was the wars with Persia in the early 5th century that provided 
the Greeks with a common foe against which to measure their collective martial (and 
masculine) worth. As Dover indicates, the Persian king had become ‘within the space of 
a single generation, the heir to all the monarchies of the Near East’.23 The threat of 
‘barbarian hordes’ overrunning Greece and destroying Greek ways of life was deployed 
propagandistically after these conflicts were concluded.24 This negative image of the 
Persians, found in Attic literature and drama in the second half of the 5th century, served 
to bolster support for the Athenian democracy/empire, as Nippel says, ‘based upon 
victories in the Persian wars’.25
One level of this propaganda involved the assimilation of the barbarians into an 
effeminate abstraction that stood in sharp contrast to the opposite, masculine abstraction 
reserved for Greeks. It played on views about the superiority of manly self-mastery over 
the ‘effeminate’ and ‘slavish’ failure to be a master of self. Although the Barbarian-Greek 
polarity was probably not restricted to Athens, it reveals a particularly Athenian bias.26 
The banished tyrant Hippias had brought the Persians to Marathon in 490 in an attempt 
to retake his lost power. ‘The subsequent rise of the barbarian in the Athenian 
imagination’, as Harrison says, ‘occurred in tandem with the demonisation of Athens’ 
sixth-century tyrants, the Peisistratids, and the development of a self-conscious
20 VIII. 144; But which was their common language? Different forms of local dialects were labelled 
‘Greek’ selectively, cf. Davies (2002) p. 166 sq.; on the structure of Hellenic collective orientation in 
the 5th century, cf. Davies (1978), pp. 21-48 and Dover (1974), pp. 3 sq.
21 Pol. I.1252b7-9. His Macedonian allegiances may be showing here.
22 (1989), p. 1.
23 Dover (1974), p. 6.
24 Cf. Hall (1989) and Harrison (2002) p. 7, 166,261, 291; and see below.
25 (2002), p. 291.
26 Cf. Hall (1989), pp. 16-17 on this view in other poleis.
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democratic ideology’.2’ In this respect, perceived barbarian/aristocratic decadence is 
conceptually related to both the alleged crimes of Timarkhos and the Athenian Stranger’s 
formulation against same-sex intercourse in the Laws?* Attitudes of this kind figured 
into the imperial and post-imperial political landscape of Athens and were therefore 
present in popular discourse®9 The Persians are often represented in Greek literature of 
this era as being ‘soft’ and given to excessive luxur®.27 28 29 30 * 32 33‘Certainly’, as Briant indicates, ‘the 
idea of the oriental courts, ruined by luxuriousness and women, formed a convenient 
“philosophy of history” for the Greeks, who knew that they were incapable of 
conquering that vast empire on their own’.3*
The Persian barbarians were the recognised enemy of Hellas in the 5®’ century 
and that alone may have constituted sufficient cause to represent them as an inferior 
type. However, the actual reasons behind such a view are deeper and more compeex.3? It 
is clearly present in influential media such as art and literature. For example, the famous 
Eurymedon vase portrays, on one side, a Persian soldier leaning over with hands 
upraised in an expression of fear. He is shown m flowery, Asian attire. On the other 
side, a manly Greek approaches in plain, democratic cloths. He is reaching out with one 
hand apparently to grab the enemy whilst the other hand holds his half-erect penis. The 
inscription reads ‘I am Eurymedon. I stand bent over’.3® The viewer seems invited to 
understand that the Greek is about to penetrate the Persian who is displayed in a 
comically receptive position. One may readily draw a broader political significance from 
this graphic scene. ‘This expresses the exultation of the “manly” Athenians at their
27 (2002), p. 4.
28 Cf. my chapters II and VII.
29 Cf. Hall (1993), p. 110 and Halperin (1990a), p. 266. As Harrison (2002), p. 4, indicates,
‘Aeschylus’ celebration of Athenian and Greek victory in his Persians (472) contains many of the 
contrasts between Asia and Greece that were to be developed by later authors: between the 
unaccountable monarchy of the Persians and the effective, accountable democracy of Athens, between 
the slavish masses of the king’s vast flotilla and the small band of Greeks, each ‘the lord of his oar’, 
between the empty pomp of the Persian court (with its deference to god-like kings and the excessive 
authority of royal women) and the masculine simplicity of the Athenians.’ See below.
3 Cf. Ktesias Persika (FGrH 688 f 1-44); Xen., Kyropaideia 111.1,13 on the Persian’s effeminate garb 
and VIII.8.16 for the soft luxury associated with Persian furniture; Aeschylus’ Persai (in particular 
816-17, 179,719, and 755 where Xerxes is said to have a lack of manhood—anandreia); Cf. also 
Herodotos IV. 172.1 and Xenophon’s Anabasis 1.7.4 and III.2.16.
3* (2002), p. 210. Cf my chapter IV for more on Greek views of Asia.
32 As Miller (2000), p. 413, says, ‘while an important role in the articulation of Greek ethnic identity 
was played by the successful repulsion of the Persians in 490 and 480/79, Greek sense of ethnicity was 
not event-driven so much as a function of large-scale socio-economic developments’. The Roman 
historian Livy (1® b.c.e./c.e.) explains cum alienigenis, cum barbaris aeternum omnibus Graecis 
bellum est eritque (XXXI.29.15); cf. Eur. Hekuba. 1199-1201.
33 Miller (1997), figs. 1 and 2. It is probably a patriotic allusion to battle of the river Eurymedon in the 
early 460s; cf ibid. pp. 11-12. Cf Bovon (1963), pp. 580 sq. on Greek representations of Persian attire 
and its reception.
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victory over die “womanish” Persians,’ as Dover says, ‘it proclaims, “We've buggered the 
Persians!’”®4
They were often represented in Athenian literatum as having a characteristically 
tyrannical government that, as a consequence, made them slavish, Euripides reflects this 
negative portrayal (perhaps echoing the beliefs of many Greeks) with the dramatic 
expression that ‘amongst the barbarians all are slaves but a single man'?® A particularly 
potent formula emerged as means of rallying people in support of the Athenian 
democracy/empire in its opposition to Persia. If the barbarians allowed themselves to be 
ruled by tyranny, as slave®,® then it was a small imaginary step to the notion that the 
Greeks ought to be in charge of these ‘slaves'?' It was also a contributing factor that, in 
Greece, many of the slaves were non-Geeek®®
The author of the Dissoi Logoi, one of the few surviving sophistic texts, argues 
that the different and sometimes shocking customs of other ethne do not support the 
proposition that there are universal rules of human behaviour.34 * * * * 9 * 41This insight appears to 
have been largely ignored. Many other sources contributed to the propagandistic 
discourse on Asian inferiority with sweeping generalisations based on perceived Greek 
norms. When Demosthenes in the 4® cnuiury pleaded for Athenian assistance for the 
Rhodians who were trying to liberate themselves from the Karian satrapy, he refers to 
them as ‘slaves of barbarians, slaves of slaves'?® Slavery of the sort perceived to be 
characteristic of barbarian tyranny was essentially opposed to the dominant Athenian 
democratic ideology. An important claim, as Hall says, ‘with which the Athenians 
authorised their democracy was that it ensured freedom for all, instead of the slavery they 
believed other political constitutions infliciee on aU but the ruling nliie'?l
The fact that the free male citizens of Athens themselves amounted to another 
type of ruling elite, with an abundance of (often foreign) slaves under their own
34 GH, p. 105. But cf. Davidson (2001), pp. 3-51 for an alternative view.
® Eur. Helen 276; the single ‘free’ man was, of course, the Great King himself. Interestingly, the 
importation of democratic institutions into the heroic cities of drama (e.g. the Argive assembly voting 
in Aeschylus’ Snpp, Theseus’ disquisition on democratic theory in Euripides’ Supp., an evidently 
kingless Athens in Eumenides, and the procedures of debate and voting in Euripides’ Orestes) provide 
a very telling anachronism. Euripides is considered to subvert the Barbarian-Greek polarity, cf. Said 
(1978).
® E.g. Euripides’ Hekuba 328 sq., 1199-20; Helen 276.
3’ Cf. Iphigenia in Aults 1400, Telephus, fr. 719 TGF, Thrasymachos, fr. 2 Diels.
® Cf. Nippel (2002), p. 291.
39 Cf. Dissoi Logoi 2, 9 sq. and Thomas (2002), p. 128. She indicates (p. 130) that this attitude of 
cultural relativism is implicitly shared by Herodotos—but he is more subdued in his approach. On this, 
cf. too Harrison (2002), pp. 5-23,
4® XV. 15
41 Hall (1989), p. 193.
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subjugation, concerned them to a significantly lesser degree. Since female Athenians of 
the citizen class had no acceptable means of directly participating in the affairs of the 
polis, being limited to the roles of wife and mother in the oikos, their ability to partake of 
the politics reserved for the Vigorous elite' was, in some ways, on a par with that of the 
resident aliens and slaves. This seems to be an integral feature to the formulation that 
‘effeminacy' somehow equals ‘slavishness', since being Hke a woman also meant limited 
enfranchisement.
Homer, widely regarded by Greeks of the Classical era as a teacher of proper 
morals and values, upholds this connection between slavery and un^nairni^ness.42 43 44 45 * 47 48 *‘For 
Zeus', says Odysseus' swineherd Eumaios, ‘who views the wide world, takes away half 
the manhood of a man that day he goes into captivity and slavery'.*® The fifth-century, 
Athenian association between barbarity, slavishness and effeminacy reveals an important 
set of binary oppoiitions.4* The imaginary attraction of the perceived barbarian into the 
same subordinate sphere as women and slaves may, at one level, be regarded in terms of 
theit mutual status as the other in respect to Athenian citizen-men.45 It was perhaps 
especially the class of Athens' ruling male elites to whom the antithesis of barbarian 
slavish effeminacy (e.g. &v8peicc) would have been a particularly important value.
Other works of literature illuminate this particularly Athenian mindset. The 
Persians, as Harrison says, ‘provides not only a guide to the parameters of the political 
culture of Aeschylus' day, but also to some of the most potent themes in fifth-century 
Athenian self-definition'.*® The play may be regarded as representing the struggle 
between democratic ideology vs. the threat of tyranny.*7 Queen Atossa's dialogue, at lines 
230-45, speaks glibly of her son's plan to conquer and subjugate ‘that Athens'.*® The 
Greeks could imagine the sort of catastrophic changes that a Persian victory might entail. 
Freedom of speech, an important democratic value of the Atlieninns,4® would not be
42 Cf. Dover (1974), p. 2 and Graziosi (2002), pp. 150 sq. on Homer's divine associations .
43 Odyssey XVH,300-320.
44 Interestingly, this association then would seem to suggest that the Athenian Stranger' in the Laws is 
(atypical amongst Plato's protagonists) upholding a basically democratic Athenian value in embracing 
a policy of manliness that is starkly opposed to effeminacy—itself connected with a type of slavery
45 As Cohen (2000), p. 11, says ‘the latest clarion call urges a move beyond binary thought and 
consideration of the opposition of the Greek self and Other', as she continues, ‘nonetheless, such 
opposition was an especial characteristic of the Classical Greek world'.
'*(2000), p. 48.
47 Jones (2002). Cf. Osborne (2000), p. 23 sq. and Cohen (2000), p. 11, on the dangers of 
overspeculation on the Greeks and the other.
48 Harrison (2000), pp. 56-57. This scene, as he indicates, ‘reflects and develops the shared prejudices 
and assumptions of author and
“5 Cf. Herodotos V.78.
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possible under a Persian monarchy® Their form of government was perceived as 
inimical to the Athenian value of isonomia}^ Aeschylus’ play, amongst others, represents 
Persian citizens as slavish presumably in consequence of their being subject to tyrannical 
rule.5?
The cultural interplay between Athens and the East went significantly beyond 
drama and history. Asian fashions appear to have been popular amongst the ‘jet-set’ of 
Athes®.® Those who favoured them were sometimes subjected to popular scorn. As 
Geddes indicates, negative assumptions about ‘the character of Ionian and Phrygian 
people were transferred to styles of architecture and music as well’.* 51 52 * 54 Oriental products 
were sufficiently visible to provoke opinionated responses.55 Plutarch teUs us that the 
Odeon was ‘said to be an exact reproduction of the King of Persia’s pavhion’ and, on 
account of this, the comic playwright Kratinos chided PerDdes who had directed its 
construction.56 * *The Spartan Pausanias, at the beginning of the 5* century, was accused 
of Medism in part because he had adopted a Persian style of dress and other manners. 
Although acquitted, he was not allowed to return to his previously high level of social 
standing.®
Standards of acceptable clothing, as with music and architecture, amount to a 
kind of rhetoric that, in the eye of the beholder, upholds or decries a given value system. 
In Athens during the 5® century, the dominant styles reflected the democratic principle 
of isonomia. It manifested through a common plainness of garb.® This and other 
phenomena, such as the similar plainness of fifth-century funerary ornamentation, seem 
to reflect popular attitudes in favour of equality and against the unequal ostentation
3 Herodotos (VII.8) says that Xerxes summons his elders to council ‘so as to learn their opinions and 
inform them all of his wishes’. Cf. Harrison (2000), p. 86.
51 Ibid., p. 77. Cf. Aristophanes, Lys, 614-35 and Hdt. III.80.6.
52 E.g. the Persian woman in Atossa’s dream is proud to serve under the yoke of slavery (192-7) and, in 
ref. to the Greeks, she says ‘. ..who is set over them as shepherd and master of their host? Of no man 
are they called the slaves or vassals’ (241-2). Contrast with Herodotos Histories, when Artabanus 
alone dares to speak against Xerxes’ proposed expedition, the king un-democratically ignores his 
advice with a thymos-\aden rebuttal (VII. 10-11).
33 As Miller (1997), p. 38, points out, by the middle of the 5th century ‘a large amount of Persian 
jewelry and clothing now in the Greek world had glutted the market’. Some of this would have been in 
the form of ‘spoils of war’. But most of the Persian commodities available for Greek consumption 
were supplied by trade according to demand.
54 Geddes (1987), p. 319.
33 As with the Amazons, contempt was sometimes mingled with admiration. Cf. my chapter VI.
33 Life of Perikles xiii; ‘he tunes the shell he trembled at before’.
3’ Thuc. 1.95.1-2. Median attire apparently also incorporated eyeliner and rouge, cf. Xen. Kyr. 1.3.2.
33 Geddes (1987), p. 330; Cf. Herodotos III. 80.1-6 for a statement of this Athenian value of ‘equality’ 
as a rebuttal to the Persian Otanes.
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perceived in tyrannical poleis™ Even Athenian aristocrats tended to dress plainly when 
not performing ritual functions® Wearing luxurious attire in Athens might have been, at 
times, tantamount to loudly broadcasting an anti-democratic protest.
The perceived negative influences of Asian music, as with clothing, relate 
particularly to the Lams. Plato, who at times shows great respect for certain Persian 
traditions, seems to favour a pro-Hellenic hard-line on the matter regarding andreia. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, the songs for Magnesian men must exemplify 
‘magnificence and that which inclines toward courage' (dcvSpeta)® They are seen to 
impart appropriately manly values by way of imitation.* 60 * 62 Those for women should 
characterise ‘that which is orderly and moderate'® They wTl expressly not be Hke those 
found amongst Asian peoples. Rather, the music of Magnesia wiU probably reflect 
Spartan tradition more so than any other type®
In fifth-century Sparta, as Marrou indicates, ‘Tyrtaeus' elegies were stH the most 
popular songs in the repertoire, but that was because of their moral tone and because 
they made good marching songs'.6® This type of music was designed to make a powerful 
impression. ‘It was a dreadful but inspiring sight', says Plutarch, ‘to see the Spartan army 
marching off for an attack to the sound of the oboe'.6® Plato's musical preferences for 
Magnesia least resemble the Persian styles (and evidently much of the Athenian as weU), 
since his narrator locates the quality of andreia particularly with the Spartan tradition. It 
seems somehow fitting that an idealized view of the Spartans should represent, for some, 
the epitome of HeUenic manliness.
We saw some of the associations in the democratic era with same-sex intercourse 
as a cause/product of tyranny in chapter I. As indicated earlier, something simUar seems 
to have happened with regard to Persian ‘effeminacy'. The sort of luxurious H^^style 
perceived amongst Persian eH.es perhaps readily recoUected the ‘bad old days' of 
Itingships in Athens. The democratic response was to demonise such things that
™ Jones (2002). Cf. Whitley (2001), p. 366, where, in funerary arrangements, ‘plainness is the keynote 
of the early fifth century’. A similar state of democratic burial shall exist in Magnesia (958 sq.)
60 Geddes (1987), pp. 325-6.
3i Cf. my chapter III on music in Magnesia’s educational system; Plato’s Sokrates had forbidden Asian 
musical styles to young people in the Kallipolis (Rep. 398d-399a). Aristotle, perhaps in keeping with 
his native Macedonian as well as his adopted Athenian values, also upholds this at Pol. 1340a-b, 
1342a-b.
62 Laws 802e8-9.
6® 86 npd^ Kdopiov Kcal a<5(|)pov—802e9-10
3’4 629b. Cf. 653c-660c and see Barker (1984) pp. 141-56 on Magnesian music.
63(1982), p. 21.
® ®i6A 22.
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advertised such blatant inequality. Conveniently, it also happened to make good 
propaganda for the democracy and its successors. A popular view of the Persians seems 
to have resulted that portrayed them as paradigmatically opposed to Athenian democratic 
values. Their perceived effeminacy was only one aspect of the equation, but it was an 
important one.
The Athenian Stranger seems to be expressing the same formulation that 
associates Persians (barbarians) with perceived feminine characteristics in order to 
indicate the slavish antithesis of his ethic of dtvSpeicc. He indicates that the Persians 
failed to halt their downward spiral into decadence and that they are ‘currently tainted by 
an excess of servitude among the populace and an excess of despotism amongst their 
masters'.®' Much of this, he maintains, has happened on account of poor education. 
Isokrates agrees on this point and Xenophon corroborates the ethnographic view of 
Persian ‘decadence' and ‘slavishness’ due to excessive luxury.* 5 6 7®
The Athenian Stranger cites an example of a ‘bad’ form of upbringing as 
evidenced by Kyros' children who were reared in a life of luxury with disastrous 
consequences (694dl-8). ‘It was a womanish education', says he, that made his children 
‘soft' and given to excesses. This stands in stark contrast to the upbringing of Kyros 
himself which the Athenian Stranger regards as having been sufficiently ‘manly' due to 
the hardships that he had to endure whilst growing up under military conditions (694e'l - 
4). Kyros, being busy with state affairs and military campaigns, ‘faded to notice the 
corrupted education of his children by women and by eunuchs'.® Such an unruly 
condition must not come to pass in Magnesia. The laws and institutions of the state 
prefer that all its citizenry receive an appropriately ‘manly’ upbringing.'®
One can only derive so much of a context for Plato’s version of andreia in the 
Lam from cultural sources at large. Io many ways, this task is more improbable than that 
of simply expressing the Athenian Stranger’s definition. Whilst the Athenian Stranger's 
attitude toward the Persians is positive at times, his definition of andreia draws them into 
a typically Athenian association between uo-malMness excessive pleasure, and luxury.'* 
These things are said to make a person's character ‘soft’ and slavish and are thus inimical
67 Lows 697c; 698a.
5 A?^a^/^II1.T27. Cf. Isokrates IV. 152 for his condemnation of corrupt Persian educational practices.
® 695a5-b; but cf. Briant (2002), pp. 208-10 for the view that is a highly prejudicial representation.
7® Cf. my chapter III.
71 Cf. my chapter VI; see Laws 694dl-695bl, 728e5 sq., 744d3 sq. for examples of the Athenian 
Stranger’s ‘even-handed’ approach to the Persians (cf. Hdt. III.68-88) along with my ■ chapter II on 
Plato's family’s Persian connections.
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to Magnesian values.’? Plato’s definition of andreia in the Laws is clearly rooted in the 
contemporary values of his culture and times.
Manly Unity, Effeminate Indeterminacy
There appears to be an ancient philosophical context out of which the Athenian 
Stranger’s approach to sexuality is partially derived. Aristotle’s Metaphysics provides a 
review of allegedly earher theories. There he (or his editor) has set down a ‘Table of 
Opposites’ that was allegedly advanced by the Pythagoreans and which may have found 
its way into the later philosophy of Plato and others.’® It is a paradigm that finds 
particular reflection in the Lawsl' This table contains ten pairs of universal principles 
arranged in the following manner:
Limit (TCpocq) I Unlimited (drCEipCOv)
Odd (flepimdv) | Even (dpTlOV)
One (§v) I Many (TAef0oq)
Right (6e£i6v) | Left (&pC<TC£p6v)
Male (<dppev) | Female (OfjAA))
Resting (ijpetiTofiv) | Moving (KlVOVpsVOV)
Straight (eb^0b) | Curved (KapTtfiAOV)
Light (<j»C) | Darkness (CKOTOg)
Good (&ya06v) | Bad (KCXk6v)
Square (TETT<dYUtVOV) | Oblong (kT£p6|XT|Ke£)
The polar relationship between ‘female’ and ‘male’, as with the other attributes listed in 
the columns of the Table, is not coincidental. Other aspects of this regarded sexual 
characteristics as metaphysically projected onto the mathematical qualities of number.’®
72 791d5-8.
’3 Metaphysics A.v.986a22sq. It is also possible that this ‘Table of Opposites’ may have been an 
invention of the fourth century although it appears to be intn^^n^^^ally Pythagorean in character. Cf. 
Burkert (1972), pp. 51 sq. who maintains that it was authentic and an influence on Plato, saying that 
‘the “table of opposites” is quite closely connected with Academic doctrines: we have here a 
continuous transition between Pythagorean and Platonic’.
’4 It is worth mentioning that Aristotle described Plato, in terms of his philosophy, as ‘in most respects 
a follower of the Pythagoreans’ (Met. A.v, 987a30). See below.
75 Cf. Burkert (1972), pp. 125, 133 and 369 sq. on these mathematical qualities and their relationship 
with Platonic metempsychosis, music and other subjects.
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Ancient numerology posited odd numbers as naturally masculine and even numbers as 
feminine. Plutarch provides further insights into this subject in his treatise On the Letter E 
at Delphi™ While he (c.46-c.l26 c.e.) was writing considerably after the time of Plato and 
Aristotle, his numerological reasoning appears consistent with the line of thought implicit 
in the Table of Opposites. It is altogether possible that much of the contemporar-y 
numerology of his era was derived in no small part from it and other Pythagorean 
formulations. According to the Table, odd numbers share a common likeness with the 
male reproductive principle and even numbers the female.76 7
The placement of ‘female' in the same column as the ‘unlimited' (dtcetpcov), as 
with ‘male' in the ‘limited' (Tlpca^) column, is significant. In ancient Greek philosophy, 
as Lovibond indicates, the ‘unlimited' can signify not only that which is indeterminate in 
a numerical sense (e.g. that to which no definite number has been assigned) ‘but also that 
which is undetermined in a more general sense of being formless, of not possessing a 
definite character'.78 *If we interpret the first pair of principles in the Pythagorean Table 
in such a way, the qualities listed in each column take on a theme established by the 
initial opposition. The category of ‘male' is affiliated with form and order whereas the 
category of ‘female' is associated with the opposite tendencies—lack of order and 
formlessness. Femininity, thus construed, is relegated to a negative condition in the 
sense that it stands opposed to the characteristics of purposive, orderly activity.
This sort of mentality would consider women to be naturally disinclined toward 
order. A comparable notion appears in the Laws. The Athenian Stranger indicates that:
.. .not only is the disorganised supervision of women half the problem, as 
one might presume, indeed this female nature, as far as we're concerned, 
is inferior toward the pursuit of virtue to that of the male sex—in this 
much it differs twofold.'®
76 VIII.388a-e. Epsilon = 5. There he says that ‘...no even number united with even gives an odd 
number, nor does it ever show any departure from its own distinctive nature, being impotent through its 
weakness to produce the other number, and having no power of accomplishment; but odd numbers 
combined with odd produce a progeny of even numbers because of their ever-present generative 
function'.
” This sort of rationale connects with the medically erroneous opinion that the father was the true 
parent of the child and that the mother merely provided a receptacle in which the foetus is nourished.
Cf. Aeschylus, Eumenides 658-61 and Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium 715a20 sq. Cf. my 
chapters III and V for some of Plato's potential views on the matter.
Lovibond (1994), p. 92.
Zaw 781bl-4.
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But this notion about the ‘natural’ inferiority of women is introduced, seemingly, to 
invite its refutation. He realises that citizen-women have been severely limited in their 
participation in the public sphere, saying that ‘the species (y&VO£) of our human race 
naturally more secretive and cunning, the female sex, because it is weak, has been 
wrongly left behind in a state of disorder due to the misguided concessions of the 
legislator’.80 81 82 83He seems to be suggesting here that the character of women is primarily due 
to the socialising aspects of custom (VO|JL«5<^). Women are stiU seen as more ‘naturally’ 
inclined toward a disorderly state of the psyche than men but this is evidently not a 
terminal condition. It may be overcome through the effective instantiation of Reason’s 
rule. Women are thought to have the ability to become virtuous on a par with men but 
they are perceived to have greater difficulty by virtue of their femininity. Perhaps, as 
Lovibond claims, ‘a successful outcome is equated in Plato’s imagination with a 
successful establishment of the male principle in its proper position of command’.®1
Other potentially Platonic connections with the Pythagorean Table of Opposites 
can be observed in both the Republic and the Laws, A prime example occurs in artistic 
representation.®2 Dramatic performances that might portray a woman in a state of 
misfortune, grief, sickness, weeping or demonstrating the ‘love of childbirth’ were 
banned from the Republic, They were seen as representing certain destabilising qualities 
that would be inappropriate for the citizenry of the Kallipolis (395d5-e3). Such states of 
mind as excessive emotionality, instability and unpredictability are considered ignoble 
and analogous to ‘inferior types such as women, slaves and worthless mobs of men’ 
(431b9-c3). Poetry in general is similarly targeted as dangerous since it introduces 
instability through vicarious experiences of excessive emotionality (605c-607a). Sokrates 
pointedly indicates that rationality ‘is the part of a man, while the other [emotionality] is 
the part of a woman’ (605el). AU citizens of the ideal polis are exhorted to guard against 
the lure of strong feelings.
This theme is taken up along similar hnes in the Laws. Such emotive tragedies, of 
which the Athenian Stranger says ‘educated’ women were especially fond, along with 
ridiculing comedies, are mostly banned outright from Magneaia.®3 He supports the idea
80 Ja0par6xepov paXXov Kat fejuKAorccfaxpov —781a2-4. For a discussion of this passage cf.
Annas (1976), pp. 307-21, and esp. pp. 316-17.
81 (1994), p. 94. ‘
82 For a broader discussion of passages in Plato that exhibit characteristics of the Pythagorean ‘Table of 
Opposites’, cf. Irigaray (1985), pp. 188-99.
83 On tragedies cf. 658d3, and 817c4-5 sq. These passages, along with Gorgias 502d, have been cited 
as evidence that Athenian women were admitted into the theatre in Plato’s time. Cf. my chapter III
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of his hypothetical citizenry learning about the imitative arts of both comedy and tragedy 
but only inasmuch as to avoid the imitation of either. They are perceived to constitute a 
severe obstacle in the pursuit of arete for those who are meant to be seeking wisdom.8* 
The imitation of these variegated and contradictory subjects is forbidden to male and 
female citizens alike. They may view them with some degree of propriety, moderation 
and a heavy degree of state supervision. Acting in aU Magnesian dramas is limited 
exclusively to ‘slaves and strangers who do work for hire’ (816e5-6). Free citizens may 
learn about the imitative arts, but they are strictly forbidden from engaging in their 
practice (816e). Perhaps it is in respect to their diversity (associated on the Table of 
Opposites with femininity) that dramatic performances and emotional poetry are at odds 
with an ideal of ‘mascuHne’ unity. The quality of TCTnKHtot, which makes women’s 
experience and behaviour an interesting subject for drama, is deemed a potentially 
hazardous moral example for the Magnessim®®
The masculine norm that the Athenian Stranger espouses is expressed in terms of 
unity and determinacy. It may be construed as the formative force that constructs Order 
out of Chaos, converting a body of diverse material into a unified whole and thus 
representing a positive ideal. By contrast, the concept of femininity is perceived as 
steeped in plurality, incoherence and indeterminacy. ‘Singleness’ (^CTcA-TTj) of 
purpose—as with dialectics—encourages the mind to proceed from diversity to unity. 
Magnesia’s citizens have as their mandated goal the achievement of just such a unified 
state of mind, with Reason ruling over the appetites and desires. Slaves and metics 
perform menial tasks forbidden to the citizens for whom leisure and the pursuit of arete 
are uompultorn® They are to be educated into a state of ‘doxastic’ enkrateia that, as 
Lovibond says, is ‘the practical self-mastery which is the mark of the virtuous man as 
such’® Doxastic self-mastery is a state in which one does not readily yield to the sway of 
any arbitrary opinion or judgement (662Cst) that happens to occur. Impressions, intuitive 
judgement and appetites that easily persuade an individual are all regarded as dangerous. 
This condition, sometimes characterised as feminine, is opposed to self-mastery and 
thought to result largely from an improper upbringing.
34 Ipdvvios—816d-817a.
33 Lovibond (1994), p. 96.
33 The Athenian Stranger says that ‘if a native should stray to some other craft rather than the 
cultivation of arete then the city wardens will engage in chastising him with reproaches and dishonours 
until they restore him to his proper course’ (847a5-b2).
3’ (1994), p. 97.
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(Un)manliness in the Laws and Beyond
Courage (&v5peta) is a ‘good’ (<kya06£) that the Athenian Stranger claims can be 
generated in the human sphere by the proper application of ‘divinely inspired’ laws. 
There are ‘human’ goods and ‘divine’ ones and the former are perceived as being wholly 
dependent on the latter for their existence. Whoever has the greater or ‘divine’ goods 
likewise has the lesser or ‘human’ goods. Whoever is bereft of one of these must also 
lack both. ‘Wisdom (^p6VTdg)’, he says, ‘has the first place of those that are divine and 
rational, temperance of soul (ohx^pcov V'DCPg) comes second; from these two, yoked 
with courage (|lEc dtSpiac;) there issues justice (SlKOilOCrhvri) as the third, and the 
fourth is courage (T^tcapTOV 56 dtvSpia—631c6-dl). A similar arrangement may be 
seen in the five ‘cardinal virtues’ of the Republic and elsewhere.® The Athenian Stranger 
says much about what sort of behaviour he considers ‘manly’ or ‘courageous’ and we 
shall presently consider this. In order to understand the concept better, however, it is 
worthwhile first to examine its identified opposites. The word for unmanliness, the 
opposite of dcvdpeta, may be construed as dcvovSpia—or one of its cognates—which 
Liddell and Scott define as ‘want of manhood’, ‘unmanliness’ and, also, ‘cowardice’.®
There are two instances in the Laws where the Athenian Stranger mentions 
cowardice or unmanhness in passing and employs the term dcvotvSpiot. Both instances 
are revealing. At 659a, he urges the hypothetical Magnesian magistrates always to make 
fair judgements and never to render a careless judgement ‘through unmanhness and 
cowardice’ (§l dtvacvSpiav Kca'l SelAnav) thereby invahdating their sacred oaHis.® It 
seems right here to construe this passage in this way rather than, as the Loeb edition 
prefers, ‘cowardice and lack of spirit’.®1 Since SeiAna effectively conveys the sense of 
‘cowardice’, ‘unmanliness’ would seem better for dtvcwSpia. Both interpretations are 
acceptable renditions from the range of options available for Enghsh translation. Either 
way, the connotations of ‘unmanliness’ are implicitly present in the Greek. We may 
observe, then, that Plato’s narrator in the Laws considers the keeping of oaths and the 
dehvering of sound judgements to be ‘manly’.
88 Cf. Republic 352e sq, 401a, 444e; Protagoras 349b, 359a.
89 LSJ s.v. dvotaSpia.
90 Cf. Saunders (1990), pp. 65 sq.
91 England (1994), pp. 109-111.
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This is not the only occasion where unmanliness has been directly linked to 
cowardice. In Book IX, the Athenian Stranger condemns those who commit suicide 
without the compulsion of the state or some unfortunate circumstance such as illness or 
extreme decrepitude.92 The Magnesians will be told that anyone who should commit 
suicide for such reasons as ‘laziness and the cowardice of unmanliness’ 
(dcpyia KOt'l &VOtv8piotg SeiA/ux—873c7) is both a disgrace to his/her people and an 
effrontery to the gods.93 A purification ritual will be necessary to cleanse the state of the 
miasma produced by such an act. So not only is taking one’s own life without ‘legitimate’ 
cause deemed unmanly, but here unmanliness is linked again with cowardice and, in this 
instance, also with sloth.
The above two are the only instances of some derivation of dtVOtvSpiOt in the 
Laws. Yet there are a number of other significant examples to be found throughout the 
Platonic fiT/wx appropriate to this discussion. We can never assume with certainty that 
Plato ever held any of the beliefs posited by his narrators or that he did not change his 
view from time to time. However, there is some continuity to be found amongst the 
corpus and the case of unmanliness is no exception.94 In the Symposium, Apoilodoros says 
that a man would most fear the shame of seeming unmanly in the eyes of his beloved 
(178c-e).95 In the Krito, the eponymous narrator states that he and his friends might seem 
‘unmanly’ for not being more effective at saving Sokrates’ hfe both in and out of court 
(45c-46a). At Lheaetetus 176c, Sokrates indicates that all the affairs pertaining to one’s 
soul (including dtVOtvSp'lOt) are clearly visible to the all-seeing, all-knowing divinity. At 
I77b4, he suggests that those who do not stand, up to his dialectical interrogations are 
unmanly. At 203e7-8, Sokrates says that it is ‘unmanly’ to abandon a theory just because 
it is imposing or difficult.
Even more revealing passages may be found in the Phaedrus. The main instance 
occurs—not surprisingly—in the midst of a discussion on pleasure.96 Sokrates says that a
92 Sokrjies’ suicide, was, of course, dictated by judicial necessity and Plato has made this distinction.
He is said to have faced his demise with courage declaring that ‘those who practice philosophy in the 
right way are in training for dying and they fear death least of all’ (Phaedo 67e).
93 We are told in the Phaedo that most people, being subjects of the gods, have insufficient right to take 
their own lives (62b-62c). Similarly, Kebes states that no reasonable man would willingly seek to the 
leave the wise in*gtety of the gods (62d-62e).
91 See my chapter 1 for comparisons between the Laws and the Republic
95 While this may be a good argument for same-sex relationships in the military, it need not be taken as 
Plato’s own view nor, indeed, does it reveal much about what dtvavSpia may actually mean in context. 
As Cairns (1993), p. 378, says of this passage, ‘an entire city or army of lovers would be a powerful 
force, such vfou!ri be its determination to avoid disgrace and pursue honour’.
96 The only other instance of dcvavSpeia in Phaedrus occurs at 254c8, where the ‘dark’ horse of Strife 
is said to seem to pull away from its position in a manner that is ‘cowardly’ or ‘unmanly’.'
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man who compulsively pursues pleasure wiU seek out boys for sexual liaisons who are 
inclined toward a ‘soft (|l<aXatK6£), unmanly (&vov6po^) hfe instead of the toil and 
sweat of manly (dvSpslo^) exercise' (239dl). The ‘unmanly' boys in the Phaedrus are also 
described as putting on makeup and taking advantage of their ‘natural charms' in order to 
appear as attractive as possible (239d seq.). Here the contrast is readily visible. It is 
‘manly' to sweat a lot and do hard, bodily exercises in order to keep fit. It is ‘unmanly' to 
be ‘soft' from lack of exercise and to apply cosmetics similar to a woman. This is not 
only true in the physical sense. One should ideaUy seek to institute an orderly state on 
the body as weU as soul. The Sokratic formulation in the Republic, as Hobbs indicates, 
posits that physical, ‘sensible beauty...is the outer expression of inner harmony and 
grace, and beauty and moral goodness are thus “akin” (401 a8)'.®7
The physical state of ‘softness' is perceived to be a manifestation of the 
disorderly state of the boy's soul. The beloved in the Phaedrus is identified as soft and 
therefore not as physically weU ordered as his pleasure-seeking lover. Softness of body 
may be regarded as the by-product of a psychological condition inclined toward sloth 
(with which unmanhness has been connected in the Laws). This ‘unmanly' youth also 
uses cosmetics and is described possessing ‘feminine' characteristics both in terms of 
body and mind. Being physicaUy unfit—phiy^si^c^^^c^giic^a^Uy and psychologically feminine— 
means being unsuitable for battle or partaking of the vigorous affairs of the polis. If the 
pleasure-seeking lover is physicaUy fit, then he, at least, has an advantage in this capacity. 
The effeminate boy is characterised as being both physicaUy unfit as weU as 
psychologicaUy unprepared for the manly rigours of hfe. The leap from ‘softness', by way 
of effeminacy and unmanliness, to cowardliness seems to have spanned no great gulfs for 
Plato or his contemporaries.
A similar formulation of softaess=unmanliness is found within the Laws. As 
with the above example from the Phaedrus, those who engage in same-sex intercourse are 
also identified as losing virtue and becoming ‘soft'. The eromenos faUs the test of sophrosyne 
and both he and the consenting erastes acquire softness (malakid) in exchange for theit 
diminished virtue.97 8 The former is accused of intemperance, and of submitting to 
excessive desite for pleasures because he was too ‘soft' in character to be sufficiently
97 Hobbs (2000), p. 228.
98 Fisher (1992), p. 486; cf. Foucault (1984), p. 220 and Davidson (1997), p. 169.
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virtuous.® ‘Softness’ within the soul is seen as utterly inimical to arete. ‘Manly’
individuals, as Hobbs indicates, should ‘not falter through softness of the soul’.* 100 101 102
Not aU instances of unmanliness point to same-sex desires as the cause. Other 
passages throughout the Platonic corpus also bear brief mention. At Gorgias 485c-d, 
Sokrates criticises those grown men who Hsp and play hke children (and especially 
philosophers who do this) as unmanly. Softness of the soul is far more dangerous than 
that of the body; although, the sorts of habit that encourage physical softness are also 
perceived to incur its psychical counterpart within the soul. In the same dialogue, 
Kahikles (492b) condemns men who, because they are ‘slaves of pleasure’ and cannot 
attain ah that they desire, hypocritically praise justice and temperance in order to advance 
their lot. These men are considered to be unmanly (&vav§pi<O£). Only ‘manly’ men, 
Kahikles maintains, ‘are wise and andreioi in affairs of state: such men have the strength 
of character to carry out their plans to completion, and not falter through softness 
(malakid) of soul’.*®*
At Gorgias 522d-e, Sokrates indicates that the only ones who fear dying are those 
who are unreasonable and unmanly. In the Republic, Sokrates says that no one willingly 
condemns justice unless they are irrational or unmanly (&votv8pt<OQ—366d2). In 
discussing the origin of the timocratic youth, Sokrates suggests that a significant 
influence comes from the mother who repeatedly nags him and cahs the boy’s embattled 
father ‘unmanly’ (&vocv6p6<;—549d-550b). In his discussion of the rise, of the 
democratic state from oligarchy, Sokrates teUs his audience that, under such conditions, 
temperance is erroneously considered to be ‘unmanly’ or to indicate a ‘lack of 
manhood’.*® Finally, still discussing the evils of ‘democracy’, Sokrates states that this 
degenerate form of government suffers from a malady of discontent. This, we are told, 
is at least in part due to the fact that the few vigorous individuals in society come to rule 
over the ‘less manly’ (dcvavSpdxepov) who comprise the vast majority (564b*.103
® 836d7, d9-el, cf. 636c6-7.
100 (2000), p. 152.
101 Ibid. p. 140; Rep. 491o7-b4; cf. pseud. Plot. Alcibiades I.124e, where the young Alcibiodes wishes 
to excel in the ‘monly’ offoirs perceived os appropriate to o gentleman.
102 a-co<{)pcO2vn'V 6i &vov6piov xoXoimfeq—560d4
1031 hove octuolly left out o few possoge becouse they beor only minor relevonce here. However, I 
include the references in the event thot the reoder is interested. Cf. Menexenus 246e & 247b-c; Letters 
VII, 330d & 331o seq. This lost one condemns o crooked politicion, who gives bod constitutionol 
odvice, os being unmonly (&vav5p6q). It is quite similor to the Athenion Stronger’s condemnotion of 
judges who hove rendered folse judgements mentioned obove.
i-w
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All of these examples suggest a high degree of relative continuity between the 
early, middle and late dialogues (and amongst Plato’s private correspondences) on the 
subject of unmanliness. As a negative quality, it is generally associated with such things 
as disorder, a lack of control over the desire for pleasure, being submissive and a 
follower, and sometimes effeminacy. Whether refusing to engage Sokrates in a dialectical 
duel, declining to approach an imposing theory, being unready for battle, forswearing 
sacred oaths and rendering bad judgements, or fearing to face one’s inevitable demise— 
in all cases there is the implicit presence of a sense of cowardliness, lack of vigour, order, 
‘right’ reason and a deficit of manliness.
A Special Definition for Magnesia
The Magnesian definition of manliness is approached more directly in the context of a 
discussion on pleasure and pain. Groundwork for this line of thought has been laid in 
the Republic and elsewhere.104 As a prelude to his discussion of the educational uses of 
the symposion, the Athenian Stranger examines the connections between courage 
(ckvSpeta), self-control (eVKpotTEia) and pleasure (f|5ovY]). That which we might 
designate as moral courage is not to be defined merely as ‘a struggle through (SuX|ldt%T|V) 
fears and pains alone’ (633c9-dl). It must also be proof against ‘both yearnings 
(7e60O'U<;) and pleasures (fldovdg)’ that are ‘powerful cajoling flatterers’.105
Again, it becomes necessary to consider counter-examples in order to approach 
the Athenian Stranger’s definition. Unmanly, effeminate ‘softness’ that evidendy arises in 
an individual from the yielding to excessive pleasure must be avoided. Being ‘soft’ is an 
unacceptable state for Magnesian men and boys. The Athenian Stranger regards the 
submission to the desire for pleasures to be most unmanly. Perceived as inimical to arete, 
this sort of behaviour is thought to assimilate one into a slavish role unsuitable for the 
citizens of Magnesia to emulate. The Athenian Stranger indicates that no one will credit 
the act of giving in to excess as a means of achieving excellence:
On the contrary, shall all men not blame the softness (Tf|V jiaXoCKiav) 
of the man who yields to pleasure and is unable to endure, and shall they
104 Cf. esp. Phaedrus 237 sq.; Phil. 65c sq.; Prot. 353c sq; Rep. 505b sq., 561a, 580d sq.
105 ...Setvdq Ocorceiaq KoXaKtKdq—633dl-2.
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not find fault with him who imitates a woman when he turns out to be 
most like his model?106
An association between luxurious living, ‘softness’ and effeminacy already existed in the 
ancient Greek world and appears to have had some influence on Plato. This sort of 
association was, as indicated earlier, propagandistically aimed at the perceived barbarian 
enemies of Greece such as the Persians. The Athenian Stranger seems to have employed 
a fairly commonplace (if in some ways dubious) connection to build toward his greater 
discussion on pleasure. An ideal individual in Magnesia should be the opposite of ‘soft’ 
and effeminate. The ideal citizen should in no ways be a slave—except, that is, willingly 
subservient to Reason and the rule of law.107
This theory that one should become courageous, and therefore manly, through 
calculated exposure to pleasure is rather striking to the Athenian Stranger’s interlocutors. 
Megillus and Kleinias appear mystified by it. The concept of self-mastery, as integral to 
courage, would not have been alien to the Spartans, Kretans or Athenians.108 The 
Spartans in particular were known for seeking the improvement of arete through self- 
imposed hardship. What is unusual is the proposition that one should improve the 
resistance to pleasure through being exposed to it in a controlled manner. The Athenian 
Stranger regards pleasures as a dangerous and insidious threat to one who is striving to 
be virtuous. He sees it as analogous to the experience of being seized by an 
unconquerable fear in the midst of battle. Pleasures are perceived to have the power ‘to 
make the spirits (0D(1O1l)^) waxen’ in even those who consider themselves to be wise 
(633d2-3).
This is the basic flaw, as he describes it, in the education of citizens everywhere. 
In both Sparta and Krete, as well as in most Greek cities of the day, there were many and 
varied forms of exercise and military training (frequendy compulsory) that served to 
toughen the youths and build up their resistances to both naturally and artificially 
induced pains.109 But there seems to have existed no such system for building up their 
resistances to pleasures and yearnings of desire apart from the conventions of popular 
morality discussed above. ‘Base’ (KOCKdv) is the man who is defeated by or yields to pain,
106 ...gigTiaiv xoh OfiXeoq’idvxog xtjq e’lxdvog bgoi6Trp;a &p oh pknAgeiai—836d5-el-3
107 Cf. Hdt VII. 101-4, where Demaratus tells Xerxes that the Greeks ‘are free—yes—but not entirely 
free, for they have a master and that master is Law (nomos}, which they fear much more than your 
subjects fear you’. Cf. my chapter II.
108 Cf. my chapters I and VI on the ‘softness’ of Timarkhos for submitting to excessive pleasure.
109 Cf. my chapter III.
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says the Athenian Stranger, but he is also ‘base’ who yields to pleasures (t|5ovcSv).110 
Kleinias the Kretan, with the Athenian Stranger’s approval, adds the point that ‘the one 
ruled by pleasures’ has in fact been ‘shamefully (hTCOVeiS'iCTCCOg) conquered by himself 
(633e4-5). Magnesia wdl employ his plan (through supervised drinking parties and other 
means) in order to test and hone its citizens’ abilities in terms of the resistance to 
pleasure. This is perceived to encourage them in developing their individual andreia.
Pleasures, says the Athenian Stranger, are ‘one’s nearest (^YYTTOCTOC) and most 
dangerous (xaXeTttOOT'tCOV) enemies’ (634b5-6). He criticises the systems in Sparta and 
Krete that compel their citizens ‘to keep away from and not to taste of the greatest 
pleasures and entertainments’?** Failure to do so leaves them unprepared for 
temptations of pleasure and therefore subject to defeat. The Athenian Stranger hkens 
one who has no training in pleasures to one who has equally poor resistance to pain. 
Such a one is therefore easily defeated in a conflict by those who have been better 
equipped against the same adversities. The one untrained against pain is perceived as 
becoming the slave (SouXSTJOeiV) of those who are better equipped in this way (635c3). 
Being unschooled in withstanding pleasure results in a similar state of servitude for ‘they 
will be slaves, of a different and yet more shameful kind, to those who are able to endure 
manfully (KCapTepeiV) against pleasures and especially to those who have gained mastery 
over (K£KCpp£voc;) them’ (635d2-4). The insidiousness of succumbing to pleasure, of 
not having been adequately prepared against it, is said to result in an unhealthy and 
contradictory psycho-ethical state. Such people, he says, ‘wdl have a soul that is in one 
way slave and in another way free’ and this is a state deemed intolerable for citizens who 
are meant to be both ‘manly and free’ as completely as possible.* 2
The Athenian Stranger’s plan for testing his Magnesian subjects’ resistance to 
pleasure wdl, as we have seen in the previous chapter, incorporate supervised drinking 
parties. He divides the concept of courage into the standard type of fearlessness in the 
face of danger, etc. and into a category of self-control against indulgence in pleasures. 
The supervised symposion., hke mditary training, involves exposure to fear that, under 
controlled circumstances, is thought to strengthen one’s andreia. The symposiarch keenly 
observes their reactions and strives to promote the acceptable standards of self-mastery.
li0 633ei-2. His use of terminology here reflects that of Eur. (Her. Fur. 494-6) where Herakles is told 
that ‘to appear to your enemies even in a dream’, would be sufficient to defeat them, ‘for.. .they are 
kakos’. Cf. too Soph. Phil. 1306 sq. where cowardliness in facing a spear is described as kakos. 
ln ...peyiawv f|Sovmv xal roaiSucv—635b5-6.
*2 ...dv/Speioi Kai eAe'uGfefpoi—635d4-6.
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The subjects, weakened and reduced to a ‘child-hke’ state by drink, learn the appropriate 
responses whilst improving theit capacity to resist the pleasures that are heightened by 
the consumption of alcohol. As we have seen, the Athenian Stranger incorporates the 
element of modesty/shame as a psychological reinforcement. The anticipation of 
disgrace and shame resulting from potentially fading the test of self-control serves to 
indoctrinate a set of values through psychosocial manipulation. The fear of reprobation 
thus begets conformity—although the Magnesians should ideally be good rather than 
only seem to be so.113 114 *
To reinforce theit cooperation, the Athenian Stranger has linked drinking, 
through an association between the gods Dionysos and Apollo, with the /opos of 
education?14 This may represent another Spartan element, in the case of theit use of the 
deified Phobos, grafted onto Magnesi??1® Establishing a metaphysical link, with moral 
rectitude and correct behaviour provides considerable encouragement for citizens to 
display the proper responses to situations officially requiring self-control. The divine 
connection reinforces the perceived educational aspects of social wine drinking and 
brings into play both psychological and religious influences on the subjects of Magnesian 
symposia in terms of theit special relationship with andreia.
The Athenian Stranger maintains that his plan of utilising the controlled drinking 
party wUl produce stronger, more excellent and superior citizens. At least, we may 
surmise that they are to be well versed and rehearsed in all the appropriate social 
responses. These ‘proper’ responses consist of actively and successfully resisting the 
temptations of the flesh (especially same-sex indulgences which are considered to be 
quite excessive) and to remain orderly and polite in the company of the other drunken 
subjects whUst being obedient to the instructions of authority. The symposiarch, typically 
one of the Guardians of the Laws, is a representative of both divine and secular power. 
For those who faU to excel at the proper virtues, the symposion functions as an ‘acid-test’ 
(Pdt<OOCVO£) against wroogthiokiog and wrongfeehng—especially as regards the accepted 
values of manHness and courage.
The importance of testing these traits in the Magnesians is highhghted by a fear, 
as we have seen, that the unmanly psyche of someone who is dominated by sexual
113 Cf. Cairns (1993), p. 377, who discusses this issue of‘seeming’ vs. ‘being' good in the Laws.
114 On Apollo and education, cf. Aghion, Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 45-46; on Dionysos, pp. 
62-4.
n5 Mactoux (1993), p. 280 and Richer (1999), p. 96. Both describe a similar practice in Sparta with the 
deified principle of Phobos and its connection to the authority of the ephors. Cf. Laws 653d and 665a 
for Apollo’s connection to drinking parties and education and cf. my chapter III.
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pleasures (Tl<t)poS'ta'l<X) could make them unfit to be placed ‘in charge of one’s 
daughters and sons and wife, thus, exposing one’s loved ones to risk’ (650a2-4). The 
controlled drinking parties will provide the Magnesian government with a convenient 
index of psychological profiles (andreia quotient? arete score?) to help deal with the 
potential problems posed by idendfiably undesirable individuals. However fanciful such 
a proposition may seem, the Athenian Stranger means to go through with it. The 
ideological policing of Magnesia’s special definition of andrera, along with its other sexual 
values, will be comprehensive.
Conflating Sexualities
The Pythagorean Table of Opposites, or a comparable philosophical outlook, may have 
informed the Platonic concept that a virtuous soul should be ruled by reason and 
masterful self-control. The latter, integral to understanding dcpSpEica in the Laws, falls on 
the same side as Man, Order, Good etc. Indeterminacy, in part through the Unlimited as 
we have seen, is associated with Woman. It is an undesirable quality in a PlatonicjUy just 
soul and it falls on the same side as those categories in binary opposition to Order. 
Magnesian women are encouraged to adopt elements that are opposed to their perceived 
‘nature’ to overcome the indeterminacy associated with femininity. As we shall see in 
chapter VI, Magnesian women must adopt qualities otherwise considered masculine. 
Although the particulars of this plan are never fully explained, the Athenian Stranger’s 
particular definition of entails manly self-control being asserted over feminine
emotionality.
Ancient philosophy, as indicated above, had formulated a correspondence 
between sex and the perceived metaphysical attributes of arithmetical principles. 
However, defining such complex concepts as ‘the mascuhne’, ‘the feminine’ and ‘the 
effeminate’, in Plato’s era as today, is no easy thing. Modern philosophy, fohowing Hegel 
or Derrida, maintains that binary oppositions (such as masculine and feminine, self and 
other) integrally depend on their opposites for individual self-definition. The notion that 
the Same partakes of the Other is not new however.116
As we have seen, it is often revealing to consider the identified opposite of a 
thing since this tends to achieve a greater understanding of it. Perhaps Loraux’s theory 
of the Feminine Operator is applicable here to an extent. It is a curious psychological
116 Cf. Plato’s Parmenides 139 sq., 146d and 148a sq.; Sophist 254e sq., Theaetetus 186a; Timaeus 35a.
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feature that, according to her, functioned within the ancient Greek (especially male) psyche 
in order to actualise an accepted state of masculinity. She considers this to be a driving 
element within the psyche of a man that allowed him to take on certain culturally 
prescribed (albeit arbitrary) characteristics that were defined as manly. What makes it a 
‘feminine’ operator is that these traits, in turn, paradoxically contain certain implicitly 
feminine features or perform feminine functions. We shall presently consider some 
potential examples of this.
A specific vocabulary dealing with the ideological construct of the sexuality had 
already been developed in the pre-philosophical days of Homer. It seems to have 
functioned largely with reference to the behaviour of gods and heroes.117 118 119An ancient 
philosophical debate, as we have seen, later ensued concerning the importance of ‘nature’ 
(physis) and culture/tradition/law (noimos)f It progressed throughout the Classical era 
and beyond. In Classical discourse new, civic definitions began to characterise the sphere 
of sexuality. One ‘result’, according to Elshtain, ‘of the Greek division and classification 
of cultural phenomena was the polis, the concept and reality of a structured body politic 
set off in contrast to the oikos, or private household’.1^
Part of the expected duties of an Athenian citizen-male, being a representative 
member of the ‘vigorous ehte’, was to play an active role in the affairs of the polis. For 
some, this would have meant going to war. For others, it meant guiding the course of 
the ‘ship of state’, in the assembly, through the hazardous waters of international and 
domestic politics. Many citizen-men did both. Women were, as a rule, not afforded the 
opportunity to do either and were not expected to be actively involved in such matters at 
all outside of theit roles as mothers, wives and wedable heiresses. Given the 
circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the ideal traits of a citizen-male (as with 
masculinity in general) favoured activity, dominance, control and self-control.
Politics provides an instance involving men who, in order to be manly, potentially 
take on certain ‘feminine’ qualities or act in ‘feminine’ ways. This included participation 
in the business of the polis, debating and voting in the assembly and engaging in various 
power struggles with other men. There were internal conflicts, competitions for status 
and dominance-games. This represents at least one essential side of politics, even though 
politics in the form of stasis (sedition) is endlessly refused and rejected from the city even
117 This can also be seen in Hektor’s mode of behaviour as informed by his ‘Heroic Code’ of values 
that is opposed to Alexandras and Helen’s so-called ‘Pleasure Priincijple’.
118 Cf. my chapter I.
119 (1981), p. 12. The oikos became the sexually specific sphere of women, cf. my chapters V and VI.
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while it took place in its midst? 2° One cannot go far in politics in any era without making 
enemies and this fact tends to produce conflict. There are also the interests of diverse 
groups to consider and where their goals may be incompatible. In short, politics is 
wrought with strife, discord (mr), stasis and indeterminacy (the Unlimited) on a regular 
basis.
Democratic governments produce a venue that encourages such conflict. For an 
Athenian citizen-male to actualise his masculinity fully in the public sphere, he had to 
readily embrace chaos and discord almost on a daily basis. Plato has written a fair- 
amount about the defects of systems of government that entail inner turmoil, such as 
democratic Athens, and one recurring theme is that they are considered to be altogether 
too disorderly.120 21 122 *He preferred to influence politics indirectly either through advice (as in 
the case of Syracuse) or through his writings and teaching rather than by directly 
engaging in them/n However, despite Plato's possible support, the Feminine Operator is 
undermined by its own creator in terms of men and politics.
‘Ideally', as Loraux says, ‘the exemplary ane.r is the model of virility'.Virility is 
the ' male counterpart to fertility. While virility is implicit in all external expressions of 
manliness, a man exhibiting &v5peia outside the confines of the oikos may be seen as 
becoming somehow unsexed or sterile. When his mind and body serve only the 
purposes of the state, he seems like a sexless automaton. Athens produced exemplars of 
ideal behaviour, as Loraux indicates, such as ‘the disincarnated male model exalted by the 
Athenian funeral oration...a simple support for civic behaviour, the soma was the city's 
due, and the debt was paid with the combatant's death'.124 Achievmg ‘true' manliness 
might entail divesting oneself not only of all things seemingly feminine but also of basic 
humanity itself. Can a man's role in politics, be ‘unsexed' (as she suggests)' and, at the 
same time, reveal a Feminine Operator (as she also suggests)? This demonstrates the 
complexity of ancient sexuality and the dangers of attempting its explication with
120 Ibid. p. 11.
121 Republic 544c, 555b, 557b, 557e, 56\‘, Saatesman 392a, 302d sq.; Laws 710e etb. Unlike his father 
Ariston and stepfather Pyrilampes, he chose to avoid democratic politics as much as possible, cf. 
Davies (1971), pp. 332-5. Pyrilampes was a pi eminent 'supporter of Perikles and Plato was probably 
brought up largely _in his household. Kritias and Charmides, leaders among the extremists of the 
oligarchic insurgence of404, were, respectively, cousin and brother of Periktione; ' both were friends of 
Sokrates, and through them Plato may have known him from boyhood.
122 Cf ray chapter II.
m Loraux '(1995), p.' 10. Cf. Chodorow (1978), .p. 182, v/lio indicates that a key aspect of sex-role 
stereotyping formales is ‘that certain social activities are defined as masculine and ' supt^r^ior’.
124 (1995),'p. 10.
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theories that are problematic and too narrow in scope. But Loraux is definitely on to 
something.
There are other places where masculinity and femininity become conflated in 
interesting ways. C.ertain myths seem to value feminine elements embedded in a 
masculine form and vice versa. There is the curious birth of the goddess Athena, fully 
armed, from the ‘maternal’ head of her father, Zeus.125 Add to this the fact that Athena 
embodies the strategic and cunning qualities of warcraft as opposed to Ares’ brutal 
carnage. An ancient Greek male should ideally be clever, like Odysseus, in order to 
demonstrate true andreia. That is, he should paradoxically imitate the characteristics of 
the female goddess Athena. A parallel may also be drawn here between Athena’s 
virginity and the sterility of the public sphere of men.
The infant Dionysos being born from Zeus’ manly thigh connects with the myth 
of his sister’s birth.126 In both cases of these deities’ genesis, we have a male god (the 
quintessential male god) manifesting feminine qualities in order to advance his goals. 
Similarly, his father Kronos had held his children, in his belly before Zeus freed them 
with the aid of the hekatoncheires and kyklopes.‘‘J Thus the Olympian gods (except for 
Zeus) were born twice—once from their mother Rhea and again from the 
prison/‘womb’ of their father’s hoary flesh. This birth-imagery associated with males 
perhaps represents an insight into ancient male thinking.
Suffering through intense pains like those of childbirth may be seen as a sign of 
manliness. Perhaps the only thing that comes close to this experience, and therefore an 
approximate equivalent that a man might suffer, is the carnage of the battlefield— 
although it is by many accounts a pale substitute. ‘Andreia’, as Loraux says, ‘requires the 
heroic test of pain, and childbirth, not war is the cause of the most intense pain’.128 Birth 
and death, being mirror images, must have much in common. These two poles represent 
points of transcendence between the feminine and masculine, through paradox, by way 
of the, human imagination. Yet, again we run into a similar problem as with seeking a 
Feminine Operator in Athenian politics. The man who suffers pain or death, in war is 
not actually giving birth. This may be metaphorical fertility, but it is arguably closer to 
the ‘unseXed automaton’ image in terms of its sterility,
----------- ---------- ----------------------
125 Homer, Iliad V.875-880; Homeric Hymn 28.1.4-5, and Aghion, Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), 
pp. 471-3 and 192-4.
126-Cf. the Hbmenr fivmn to Dionysus, esp. 15-21, and Aghion, Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 
62-4.
'27 Hesiod, Theogdny 453-491, and Aghion, Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 260-2.
128 Loraux (1995), p. 12; cf. her chapters 1 and 2.
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Instances of masculine/feminine conflation, akin to the above conceptualisation, 
are to be found in the works of Plato. Variously he has appropriated the metaphor of 
pregnancy to signify the philosopher’s creative mental processes. At Symposium 206e, we 
are told that philosophical ‘conception’ instantiates itself, exchanging physical sexual 
union for sublime metaphor, within the philosopher’s soul. It is stUl a physically sterile 
experience, unlike actual childbirth, but this time the metaphorical process begets 
‘offspring’. Plato’s narrator expresses this condition that the soul experiences in terms of 
a ‘seed’ that grows in it until it is ready to be ‘born’ as if from a womb™ The word 
employed here is ti)5t£ and, while it can mean something so general as anguish, it also 
carries as its principal significance the ‘pains of childbirth’ or ‘the pangs and throes of 
labour’.77° Philosophical illumination requires a feminine modality. The philosopher’s 
psyche is like the woman mentioned in the ^Republic who, before finding a respite from the 
pains of childbirth, wanders about Hke lo made pregnant by Zeus and hounded by Hera’s 
gadflies?31
Similar sexually conflated material may be seen in the presentations of manliness 
in the Laws. In the first instance there is the preparation (against pain and pleasure) for 
all things martial. Empire is identified as incompatible with the pursuit of arete. 
However, the citizens of Magnesia will all be prepared to defend their homeland 
successfully against an invader. Women and men alike are trained from an early age in all 
manner of weapons and arts of fighting. The type of orderliness of body favoured by 
Plato’s narrators is that which is to be found in the toned muscles of an athlete or a 
warrior. Athletics may be considered as a type of preparation for war—even if war never 
comes. Being physically fit is perceived as healthy both for one’s self and for the polis 
(especially in terms of its defencc.-m A firm physique, as we have seen, is preferable to 
‘softness’ of body—especially in men—and therefore this becomes a key characteristic of 
the Athenian Stranger’s definition of manliness. If war is disorderly and chaotic, then it 
would seem to posses the quality of poikilia. Loraux suggests that it therefore must be 
somehow intrinsically feminine.™ Whether this is correct and whether Magnesia’s 
preparation for war counts in this way is liminal at best and open to debate. Again, 
perhaps andreia here requires a more unsexed mentality than a feminine one. 129 130 131 132 133
129 Cf. in particular Phaedrus 251d-c and my chapter III on preformationism and Plato.
130 LSJ s.v. cbSig.
131 Cf. Loraux (1995), p. 15; cf. Republic 490b.
132 Cf. my chapters I and II.
133 See above.
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The sort of manly agonistic interaction in which many Greeks engaged might be 
seen as embodying feminine qualities. That is, interpersonal conflict = lack of order = 
femininity. Emotionally agonistic interaction would especially qualify. The idiom of 
personal contest in Hellenic cities may have been a microcosmic manifestation of Hfe 
perpemally under the threat of war. It was present in the works of orators and 
dramatists and probably in everyday social interaction.?'. As Ober says, ‘the standard 
ethical code exemplified by the canon of Greek hterary culture may be roughly summed 
up as reciprocal and agonistic'.134 35 Tins ‘coloured' individual interactions as well as 
interactions between city-states. The ancient Athenians, according to Dover, ‘were, after 
all, fiercely and deliberately competitive, believing that the whole community gains if it 
makes a fuss of those who excel and spurs the mediocre into doing their best by the 
threat of humiliation'.136 137 138hhe verbally agonistic mode of ‘flyting' in particular, as Hesk 
suggests, was probably a prevalent theme in their daily lives??? It, as now, could be 
levelled against friend or foe depending on context and intent.
If the agon is somehow a feminine mode of expression, then one may apply 
Loraux's theory to it and observe the sexual paradox that this entails (e.g. masculinity is 
somehow actuahsed through participation in a feminine medium). However, in this 
respect at least, Plato has thrown something of an ideological ‘spanner' into the works as 
regards Magnesia. The Athenian Stranger recognises that verbal ‘flyting', on account of 
its disorderly nature, is counter-productive toward the pursuit of arete and thereby andreia. 
The only sort of agon allowed in Magnesia wiU be that which, in a controlled context, 
promotes official values and/or physical exercise. In the previous chapter, we saw that 
comedies are not to be permitted if they verbally ridicule Magnesian citizens?38 Those 
that do so with thymos are especially singled out for exclusion. This is to discourage 
citizens from imitating such disorderly activities in their daily lives. Far from admitting a 
Feminine Operator, the Athenian Stranger seems to have circumvented it.
In other respects, Platonic definitions of manliness in the laiws may be regarded 
as perhaps more self-subverting or, at least, sexually conflated. To observe this, one
134 Cf. Soph. Ajax 148-161, where the chorus discusses the verbal prowess of Odysseus, or 1250-63 
when Agamemnon verbally attacks Teucer’s pedigree, and 1290-1307 for Teucer’s rebuttal; cf. 
Demonsthenes LIV, contra Konon, 18-19, where he cites an example of verbal ‘flyting;’ cf. too 
Aristophanes, Frogs 756 sq., 849 sq. and Knights 1399-1400.
‘35 (2001), p. 181.
136 (1980), pp. 132-3.
137 Hesk (2002). Cf. Herzfeld (1985) p. 233, who, in ref. to modern Kretan practices derived from 
ancient ones, indicates that ‘men (and to some extent women as well) constantly challenge social 
tolerance because challenge itself is a social norm’.
138 Laws 934d-936b.
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must consider the experiment of Magnesia in its fuU capacity. The Magnesian state, 
along with all its institutions, laws and conventions, has been engineered by its creator 
for the primary purpose of instilling as much virtue/excellence/nce- in its human 
subjects as possible—each according to his/her abilities. The Athenian Stranger 
declares; ‘if a native should stray to some other craft rather than the cultivation of arete 
then the city wardens will engage in chastising him with reproaches and dishonours until 
they restore him to his proper course' (847a5-b2).
The Kallipolis of the Republic was meant to generate Justice in the soul of every 
citizen. The second-best state of Magnesia will not be so ambitious m its aim but 
nonetheless strives toward a similar goal. Not every citizen wdl become a philosopher 
king/queen—but some of them wdl. Magnesia's Guardians of the Laws are to be 
inducted into the ‘lesser mysteries' of Reason's rule more so than the ordinary citizen, 
but they wiU be deprived of the deeper metaphysics underpinning this.139 kt is the 
nukterinos council (or Vigilance Committee) that comes the closest to philosopher 
kings/queens. They are to have a broader education in which nothing of the ‘greater 
mysteries' of philosophy will be omitted.140 They, much as their Kallipolitan counterparts, 
are to be schooled in mathematics, geometry, astronomy, music, dialectics, philosophy 
etc.
Although it is never actually stated in such terms, there is every indication that 
these Magnesian luminaries will ultimately strive to experience the Form of the Good 
and thereby attain an enlightened state not different from that discussed in the Republic’s 
‘Parable of the Cave', or, perhaps more apt, that state referred to by Diotima in the 
Symposium as ‘Birth in Beauty'.141 142She maintained that aU eros is really a desire for the 
perpetual possession of the BeautiffU/Gooe (2(^<^tall-1^). She asserted that only through 
the illuminating effects of ‘Birth in Beauty' might this aim be attained (206b-c)?42
Knowing the Form of the Good amounts to a kind of psychic rebirth. The 
change is meant to be dramatic and profound. kt is significant that this process is 
described in terms of labour and birth. The philosopher, after fifty years or more of 
intense study, ‘gives birth' to a new and marvellous state of being that is characterised by 
Justice and Reason's rule (not to mention andreia). The laws and conventions of 
Magnesia are intended to yield a consistent supply of virtuous/excellent souls—and, we
139 On the selection and education of these Guardians of the Laws, cf. Laws 968c.
140 Laws 908a, 909a, 951d sq., 961a sq. and 968a
141 For the ‘Parable of the Cave', see Rep. 514 sq., 532b sq (and cf. 539e).
142 Cf. my chapter V11.
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may surmise, a regular if somewhat smaller number of ‘Births in Beauty’. The procreative 
act (physically or is one that requires both the masculine and the
feminine. The sexually creative act is the realm of woman alone. It may be considered 
that all the strictures of manliness constructed and enforced in Plato’s Magnesia 
paradoxically serve to realise a distinctly feminine goal: the gestation and generation of a 
new and ostensibly higher form of consciousness. This metaphysical formulation 
subverts manliness—one of its express goals—through its paradoxical recourse to a 
feminine metaphorical abstraction.
Conclusions
First, it should be evident from the material presented here that the Athenian Stranger is 
formulating (comstt^^x^c^ldin^) a mode of socially acceptable masculine behaviour for his 
citizens. It appears clear that many of his opinions (as perhaps with Plato’s) are derived 
out of a specific cultural context. His view of divdpetcx as the state of being proof not 
only against pains but pleasures is not new to philosophy. Its foundations are clearly 
present, in some form, in the ideological discourses available at the time. It is Hke these, 
in some ways, but subtly different in others. MegHus’ and Kleinias’ astonishment 
perhaps serves to represent how other Greeks of the time might have responded to the 
Athenian Stranger’s formulation that one must ‘train’ one’s resistance to pleasures, as 
with pains, by being exposed to them in a controlled manner.
His interpretation of bvSpetlX is clearly reminiscent of those in Athens that placed 
the other (barbarians, women, effeminate males) m stark opposition to manliness and 
freedom. It can be observed that ‘manly’ and ‘free’ Greeks derived their self-definition 
from this perception of the other. A comparable formulation is especially apparent in 
terms of the nationalistic propaganda of Plato’s era. The Athenian Stranger’s particular 
notions on dcvSpela, are intended to become a social imperative in Magnesia and will 
contribute to the accepted mode of discourse on the subject. He has borrowed from 
contemporary propagandistic methods in his attempt to engineer a particular cultural 
ethos on sex.
The Athenian Stranger’s particular formulation of dvSpeicx appears to be no 
less unique to Plato. The idea that a truly courageous (manly) individual must be
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equipped to cope with pains and pleasures alike is certainly interesting and influential.14? 
We can observe this notion arising, again and again, in history after Plato's era. It 
surfaces in the Stoic values of self-abnegation and moderation and again in later Christian 
ideas of mortification of the flesh. It may also be observed in many later manifestations 
of philosophical and religious asceticism that are, directly or indirectly, linked to Plato's 
Academy.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, however draconian the Athenian Stranger's 
programme of social regulation may seem to us in this age, its author had the noblest of 
goals in mind. The purpose of being proof against pleasure and pain (as with any of the 
prescribed modes of hfe laid out in the Laws) is ostensibly to prepare humankind for 
ascendance to a higher, transcendent level of philosophical being. ‘Birth in Beauty', 
despite paradoxically manifesting feminine characteristics amidst manly values, is 
portrayed as the height of human achievement. That end, as far as Plato's narrator is 
concerned, appears to justify fully the means required to achieve it.
i4j Self-mastery, defined along similar lines, dominates Aristotle’s Nikomachaean Ethics as well as
later Stoic doctrines.
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Chapter V
Sex and the Myth of the Family
‘The grouping of fellow tribesmen into kin of various categories, some of 
whom one can marry and some of whom one cannot, is central to the 
social organisation of most:.. .peoples’.
—Frederick Engels1
‘And, I ■ presume we should mention the.. .judge who is the best in regard 
to arete—if, indeed, there be such a one—who in dealing with a family in 
conflict will destroy none of them but reconcile them and succeed 
through enacting laws for them and securing amongst them for aU time a 
permanent state of friendliness’.
—The Athenian Strange^
Introduction
Every society, past and present, has sought to manage sex m one way or another through 
laws on marriage, divorce, inheritance, rape, ages of eligibility and many other matters 
relating to sexuality, society and the individual. As a social entity, the family actively 
imposes hmitatiqol on its members’ choice of sexual partners and binds them 
inextricably with the ownership and transference of property. In addition to its real- 
world manifestations, there are also other more subtle ideological means through which 
society exercises control over famihes and families do the same with their members. 
This is the ‘myth’ of the family. The conceptualisation of ‘family’ is constructed in the 
sphere of ideas through discourse, spin and mythos. As we have seen, Plato’s narrators are 
particularly concerned with the construction of such social structures.
The Athenian oikos represents a paradigm of family Hfe contemporary with Plato 
that largely, but not exclusively, informs his theoretical approach in the Laws. ‘The oikod, 
as Pomeroy says, ‘includes not only human beings, but property, and therefore, according 
to its size and to the context, it may be translated as “family,” “household,” or “estate.”’7 
The regulation of sex in relation to the oikos is a particular concern for Plato’s second- 
best polis. As we have seen, there are many factors that separate Magnesia from the 
Kallipolis of the Republic. Both take considerable interest in the sex-Hves of their subjects.*
*(1977), p. 25.
2 Plato, Laws 627e4-628a4.
3 (1997), p. 20. Cf. LSJ s.v. otKog.
4 Cf. my chapter I.
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One of the most striking differences may be seen in terms of the second-best state's 
special relationship with the oikos and the men and women that comprise it.
The patriarchal family is integral to achieving Magnesia's officially sanctioned 
civic goals. kt is a fundamental component of the overall structure of the city-state. This 
fact ultimately dictates that a significant portion of the Laws be devoted to coping with 
the sexual politics that families entail. There wUl be no communal breeding facilities as in 
the Kallipolis. Neither wiU Magnesian property be shared communally by all of its 
citizens. Offspring wiU be reared both by their parents, and by the polis, but not solely by 
state-appointed officials as in the more idealistic Republic} kn their stead is the semi­
private institution of the oikos. kt is rgwzz-^iiiv^te in the sense that much of its affairs are 
regulated directly or indirectly by agencies of the Magnesian government. This emended 
version wiU suffice for the second-best state to rear and induct new citizens into the 
community. kt requires a host of legal arrangements spanning the whole range of famUial 
affairs along with considerable state-sponsored scrutiny.
The style and manner of the Athenian Stranger's statutes strongly echo aspects of 
other systems, as we understand them, that had evolved in the ancient world. kt 
combines elements of Sparta, Krete and particularly his own Athens. Many other ideas 
recollect. themes developed in the Republic and elsewhere. The Athenian Stranger makes 
it clear that these laws have been prepared for a second-best state with a view toward the 
inculcation of specific philosophical tenets and modes of sexual behaviour! An ideal 
society, he says, is one where there is communal sharing of wives, children, properties, 
‘and aU that is called private is everywhere and by every means expunged from our lives’ 
(739c5-7). This ideal scenario is characterised as being ‘as unified as possible'. He 
indicates that no other wiU ever be laid down that is ‘truer or better' in overall 
exceUence! But the Athenian Stranger admits that the citizens of this state would have 
to be gods or children of gods for it to prosper. For a more realistic scenario of 
constitution building, a paler likeness of the best city-state has to suffice. This likeness 
‘would be as near to immortality as possible', and it would be next to immortality in
5 Republic 416d sq., 420a, 422d, 464b sq., 543b.
® The rules for a ‘best’ state would, quite naturally, differ. ‘For that state and constitution come first', 
he asserts, ‘and the laws are the best, where there is observed as much as possible throughout the whole 
of the city an old saying; as it is said: “friends have all things truly in common.’”
(be; 6vro) earl xoiva tdt (ir-iXcoiv—Laws 739b7-c2; a Pythagorean maxim often cited by Plato; cf. Rep. 
424a and cp. Eurip, Orest. 725.
7 jrtav bn jxdZtaxa Tr6Aviv-739d3 sq.
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regard to its honour.8 It is Magnesia. There, the system of human relationships second- 
best to total sexual communism (albeit tightly regulated) is that of the semi-private 
household unit (also highly regulated)—at once seemingly detached from the state, yet 
paramount to the continued functioning of this society: the Magnesian oikos will form an 
image of the state in microcosm.
The oikos and the polis
The Magnesian oikos serves as an integrally functioning unit of a greater whole. The 
Athenian Stranger’s revised version of the household has much in common with real- 
world analogues. The oikos at Sparta, as at Athens, preceded the polis, and perhaps served 
as a model for it.9 10Unlike these, however, the Magnesian oikoi artificiality makes it coeval 
with the (equally artificial) polis. They will be different from real social systems in terms 
of Magnesia’s ‘engineered’ creation as opposed to social evolution in the case of the 
others. The connection between the household and the state is observable in terms of 
the degree of social preparation that the former instils in its members in respect to the 
latter.
This connection is also observable in other familial relationships that mimic 
similar relationships between citizens and the state. In the Republic, Sokrates has 
indicated that a strong analogy can be drawn between the soul of an individual and the 
constitution of a polis.™ The one is analogous to the other. Both the citizens and the 
abstract civic entity of Magnesia are intended to possess arete. The primary goal of 
Magnesia’s government is to maintain a number of just souls sufficient to obtain a just 
state. The oikos in Magnesia is designed to maximise the ‘production’ of virtuous 
citizens.
In Book III, the Athenian Stranger posits theories on the history and 
development of civilisation that aid in his mythologizing. He says that the first advanced 
social unit to emerge was that of the family. Such ‘constitutions’ he calls ‘patriarchal 
laws’.11 He regards this as an essential step toward the more complicated constitutional 
systems of the Greeks that existed in Classical times. He also indicates that the 
‘patriarchal’ household now serves as a kind of universal criterion that a people must
8 739e3-7.
9 Cf. Pomeroy (1997), p. 62. Plato’s narrator agrees with this view, see below.
10 368e sq. This is the same reason given for composing the Republic as a quest to define Justice.
11 Jiarpioiq vdpoiq—680a8-9; see below on ancient ‘matriarchy’.
161
meet in order to advance.12 This, he feels, holds true for Greeks and barbarians alike.13 
Under such a system as the ‘patriarchal constitution’, the father (or rarely the mother) 
retains supreme authority over the family unit and directs its affairs. The household may 
then flourish, within limits dictated by the size of the family, and tends to be dynastic.14 
But subjects of such a ‘constitution’ as this can only grow so numerous or so powerful 
before they reach the next identified phase of development, that of kingship, and thence 
evolve more sophisticated governmental systems. The household, according to the 
Athenian Stranger’s views, may be regarded as fundamental to the development of all 
larger governmental entities and, since they are built on them, integral to their 
continuation.15
The importance of the oikos to the Magnesian state is reinforced through 
numerous laws that assert the primacy of parents and the honours due to them. In a 
speech composed for the benefit of his hypothetical populace, the Athenian Stranger lays 
down the Magnesian order of authorities and ranks them according to importance. In 
this hierarchy, ‘the better are superior to the worse, parents are superior to their 
offspring, men to women and children, rulers to the ruled’.16 According to the ‘hierarchy 
of betters’, the patriarchal rulership of the family is placed just below the position 
occupied by the authority of the state.
In an earlier discussion with Kleinias and Megillus, the Athenian Stranger 
asserted that the condition of ruling and being ruled extends into the private sphere as 
much as it does into the public. Expecting nothing but an affirmative response (which 
he gets), he asks ‘and on the whole, would the claim not be universally correct that 
parents rule over their offspring?’17 Within the Magnesian household, the father and 
mother retain authority subordinate to that of the laws, their guardians, magistrates and 
the nukterinos council. Here the Athenian Stranger seems to be exploiting a patriotic link, 
drawn from the real world, between patrios and pater that will support his version of 
family values. Attic orators had employed this as a useful rhetorical device.18 In pubhc 
discourse, as Strauss points out, ‘any connotation of “father”... is likely to have been
12 Engels (1977), p. 25, concurs.
13 680b sq. He quotes Homer {Odyssey IX. 112 sq.), in reference to this type of ‘constitution’ being in 
use amongst the Kyklopes.
14 AoKowi (ioi Ttdvxeg Tt)v ev toutco tc5 %p6vcp rcoXneiotv Suvaoielav KaXeiv-680b sq. Cp. 
Aristotle, Pol. 1252b 17 sq.
15 The Kallipolis in the Republic would seem to transcend this mundane limitation.
16 917a 1-7. Cp. 690a sq and see my chapter VI.
17 690a4-6; Kod 6Xa><; yov£ot<; feKy6vcov Apxeiv dt£ico|ioc opOdv 7Kxvtoc%ov dtv stri;
18 E.g. Dem. XXIII. 11; Ps. Dem. 11.21-22; Isok. IV.63; Isai. IV.4.
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strong and evocative’.19 The members of a Magnesian household must learn to respect 
parental authority and particularly the authority of the pater. They are then expected to 
extend this sense of respect, by means of something akin to psychological transference, 
to the authority represented by the polis. The oikos, Magnesian or otherwise, establishes 
patterns of obedience to authority along similar lines amongst its members and mandates 
an ethic of respect.
The Magnesian government and laws, their enforcers, instruments of 
propaganda, councils and courts, as we have seen, will strive to impress specific societal 
values on the populace as a whole. AU members of any Magnesian household are subject 
to the Athenian Stranger’s proposed social conditioning. First is the universal mandate 
for the pursuit of the positively identified values associated with artte. Those who stray 
from this path wiU be chastened and reprocched.2* This, in part, consists of carefuUy 
meted-out applications of public shame and official censure that have been 
psychologicaUy calculated to maintain order.21 The household in Magnesia will be the 
first agent of an individual’s induction into art'te. It wUl be expected to support aU tenets 
of the state’s official ideology. To ensure this, the oikoi are subject to an intense degree 
of scrutiny by the agents of the polis. If any citizens should be found to have faltered 
from the official course, they wiU have swift correction at the hands of the Guardians of 
the Laws and their subsidiaries.
The Magnesians at Home
The Magnesian oikos plays a role similar to that of its Athenian counterpart, but in several 
ways it is strikingly different. At Athens, the central oikos deity was Hestia, the goddess 
of the hearth.22 * Through the cult of Hestia, as Humphreys says, ‘the city was a 
macrocosm of the household—it too had its sacred hearth’^ Her presence focused 
inward and permeated the home. Hermes, god of thresholds, faced outward to the wide 
world. His image provided the clear demarcation of boundaries between the private 
sphere of the oikos and the public sphere of the polis. Neither Hermes nor Hestia will
*(1993), p. 60.
20 The Athenian Stranger, as we saw in the previous chapter, says that ‘if a native should stray to some 
other craft rather than the cultivation of virtue then the city wardens will engage in chastising him with 
reproaches and dishonours until they restore him to his proper course’ (847a5-b2); Cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 
VII. 1-3 sq. for a comparable Spartan practice.
21 Cf. my chapters III and IV for more on the uses of shame in the Laws.
22 Cf. Aghion, Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 299-300.
22 (1983), p. 15.
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defend their usual boundaries in Magnesia. The situation there significantly de- 
emphasises the separation of private and public.
The Magnesian polis encroaches on the oikos in a number of ways. It interweaves 
them together almost as a single entity. This inevitably necessitates some concessions 
from the ‘lesser partner' in this union. A Magnesian home wdl not be allowed to keep 
private shrines of any sort (909d-910b). Those familiar icons that would otherwise mark 
the symbolic division between the inside and the outside in Athens are altogether absent 
from Magnesia. It will be a polis in which the word ‘private' is to have as little 
significance as possible (739a-740a). All shrines are to be public. There wdl be temples 
of worship by the community as a whole rather than by individuals privately.24 * 26They wdl 
provide a convenient means of education and mass indoctrination. The exclusion of 
private religious ceremonies and icons of worship represents one of several radical 
revisions that appear to have littie or no parallel in realpoleis of Plato's era.
Private and public are further collapsed and conflated in regard to property and 
the famdy. The patriarchal household is the basic unit of the Magnesian state but, as 
Lacey points out, the arrangement of it leaves ‘the famdy far short of its position in 
Athens'.2" Remarkably, the Magnesian kleros, or household estate, is neither whody 
private nor public. It cannot be sold or given away but the state wdl not directly manage 
it.2" The citizen-holder (kyrios) of the kllros has the power, under the constraints of law 
and subject to the recommendations of officials, to designate its heir. A public list of 
A/mr-holders is to be kept so that everyone knows who has which property (741c). The 
polis keeps close contact with families to observe the manner in which they conduct their 
domestic affairs. This is to be accomplished in part through the offices of the Marriage 
Supervisors who wdl observe a married couple for the first ten years of their hfe together
" The Athenian Stranger mentions ‘private shrines of ancestral gods’ (lSpbjxxTX ISia rcatpx^cov Bedov) 
at which it is pious to worship ‘according to law’ {kata nomon) at 717b5. The proscription against 
private shrines at 909d6-7 is stated as ‘iEpcd joqSfc erg fev r^Si^iaig oiKaig fecrfaGco’. In the first 
instance, in Book IV, the Athenian Stranger may be referring to privately constructed shrines in public 
places. This, admittedly, seems incompatible with a state in which ‘private’ is meant to be expunged as 
much as possible—but it is certainly not out of the question. It could also be that Plato had changed his 
mind by the time he wrote the proscription in Book IX. However, whether Magnesian citizens are 
allowed to construct ‘private’ shrines in public or not, it seems quite clear that neitheriSppb-Ot'xa 
\6ia rcarp^cov Gecov nor ‘iepd, are to be permitted within the private space of the oikos.
"(1968), p. 178.
26 It also seems unlikely that he is borrowing this idea from Sparta since, as Patterson (1998), p. 250, n. 
12, says ‘Plato’s silence on any such Spartan system of indivisibility and inalienability of kleros while 
setting up just such a system in the Laws (in the presence of x Spartan) is strong evidence that there 
was none’.
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in order to ensure that they produce the appropriate number of offspring and rear them 
in a suitable way (783b-784b).27
The Magnesian oikos necessitates a division of labour along sexual lines. If a 
woman has just wedded the heir of one of the 5040 kleroi, then she and her husband will 
move into the other of the two parts of the estate, where the heir’s father and mother do 
not live, and begin producing offspring (776a-b). One reason given for this is that close 
proximity to their parents might provoke undue conflict (776a).28 While still part of the 
paternal estate, both lots of land with houses are to be located in separate parts of the 
city. The second house is used as a sort of nursery for the rearing of children along with 
being the venue of a type of test for the newlywed couple’s parenting skills. Other 
children may continue to live at home but also may be subject to forced emigration. 
Women play a much more significant role in the domestic tasks of childcare than do 
men—although, it would appear that their (female) slaves and servants will undertake 
much of the actual work.29
In time, the legitimate heirs will ascend to the status of kyrioi of the double estate. 
They will take up residency in the main house and manage its affairs. This process will 
replicate itself when their heirs marry. The notion of a double property may seem novel 
but there is some indication that this may not have been uncommon amongst upper class 
Athenians.30 As Snodgrass indicates, we should not ‘exclude the possibility of second 
homes, expressly recommended by Plato in the Laws (745e4-5) and later disparaged by 
Aristode in the Politics (1265b25-6) on the grounds that they made life awkward’.31 Both 
passages date from the same general period and each, in different ways, perhaps suggests 
that its author was familiar with the idea of keeping a double residence as a practice 
amongst certain classes.
Aside from the rearing of their children (which turns out to be both a private and 
pubhc business), what will Magnesian citizen-women do with their time on the double 
klerosi The possibility that they might spin or weave is discussed at 805e-806a. The
27 feft'iCTKonoi S’ fecrxcocrav xobtcov <5fcq e'lXopeOa yuvaiKeg; these are discussed in greater detail later in 
the next chapter.
28 There is some evidence of a similar practice in ancient Krete (Code of Gortyn IV.32sq.); cf. too 
Aristotle, Pol. II. 2, 5, (1263a) and Plut. Moralia 238e-f.
29 In Xenophon’s Oikonomikos (VII.24), Ischomachus expresses the notion that women ‘naturally’ 
have more affection for newborn and young children than do men.
30 Plato experienced at least two households in his youth between the time that his father, Ariston, died 
and his mother remarried her uncle, Pyrilampes. The main one would have been Pyrilampes’, the other 
Ariston’s and/or possibly Periktione’s father’s (or her own, which had been Ariston’s?). Cf. Davies 
(1971), pp. 332-5.
31 (1990), p. 127.
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Athenian Stranger does not make it expressly clear if they will do this or whether all such 
menial tasks are to be undertaken by servants and slaves. He may be taking it for granted 
that all women must know something of these arts. The recommended dedication of 
‘something woven that does not constitute more than a month’s work for one woman’ to 
the city’s temples suggests that citizen-women might engage in weaving and spinning for 
ritualistic purposes (956a).
Weaving was a ‘rite of femininity’, associated with religious duties, undertaken by 
Athenian girls of the aristocratic classes. They wove the sacred robes that were 
presented to Athena annually at the Panathenaia. A similar practice was performed 
involving the robes offered to Artemis at Brauron.3/ These ‘samples of clothing’, as Cole 
says, ‘dedicated by the women are described as poluitltstata, “expensive”, or “completely 
finished”'.32 3 34 * * 37Women in the Panathenaic procession, as depicted on the Eastern section 
of the Parthenon frieze, attend the priest and priestess carrying the sacred ptplos as a gift 
to the goddess.3" ‘As arrhtphoroi or trgastinaS, according to Blundell, ‘they would have 
been initiated into the art of wool-working, seen by Greek men as the quintessential 
activity of the married woman in the home’?5 A few citizen-women may only have 
woven fine garments for ritual or special occasions whereas many more will have 
engaged in the everyday tasks of making and mending clothes for common usage. 
Nonetheless, aU Athenian citizen-women were expected to know this art at an expert 
levd/dd Other Greek societies seem to have held similar views—with the possible 
exception of Sparta?/
The symbolic and ritualistic associations between women and weaving in 
Classical Athens seem to clarify the Athenian Stranger’s statements about his
32 Cf. Loraux (1984) p. 23 and Blundell (1995), p. 135, for Athena’s robes and Sealey (1990), p. 37, for 
those of Artemis.
33 (1998), pp. 36-7; cf. Ath. Pol. LIV.7, for the po/k ' organisation and supervision of these affairs.
34 Cf. Slabs V and VIII in particular. Whilst the male figures in the procession are represented as 
manly warriors, the women are characteristically associated with symbols of domesticity. Hephaistos 
sits on Athena’s left hand side and highlights the association between technology and the crafts along 
with these two deities’ pseudo-sexual relationship. Hephaistos had once tried to rape her and, as she 
rejected him, he ejaculated onto her leg. She wiped it off with a piece of wool and cast it to the ground 
from which sprang Erichthonios. Cf. Blundell (1998), p. 65 for a discussion of this myth and Kearns 
(1998) pp. 100-101 for the association between the ritual of the Panathenaia and the legendary 
daughters of Kekrops who, as the originators of the craft, first presented the peplos to Athena.
33 (1998), pp. 63-4.
3 Cf. Cf. Aristophanes, Lys. 575sq for her analogy between statecraft and women’s customary labour 
of carding and weaving wool; cf. 712 sq.
37 Unlike Athens and elsewhere, we are told that domestic pursuits such as weaving and carding were 
not considered appropriate occupations for citizens (Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.3-4), But this seems an odd 
proposition and may refer to idealised or imagined customs rather than actual law. Cf. Laws 806a5-cl, 
for the Athenian Stranger’s view that they did engage in spinning and weaving.
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hypothetical subjects. The designation ‘a month's work for one woman’ could be 
regarded as a unit of value. It need not necessarily imply that Magnesian citizen-women 
of any class would have to undertake such work themselves on a regular basis. However, 
if aristocratic women in Athens made fine articles of clothing for religious duties, then 
this lends support to the proposition that the Magnesians will do the same. The act of 
producing clothing for general use might be considered too banausic for citizens as it 
could limit their pursuit of arete. Magnesia’s slaves and metics will most likely undertake 
most spinning and weaving for practical purposes. But liberation has its boundaries. 
Female citizens will still be initiated into these traditionally feminine mysteries even if 
only for the sake of ritual and public ceremony. This should be regarded as a feature of 
their particular arete.
The Athenian Stranger discusses some of the duties that a citizen-woman will 
perform in the home.38 These include the necessary care of children and, as indicated 
above, weaving. Another domestic role that she will be expected to perform is that of 
acting as steward (Tapietoc) of the household. In this capacity, she will oversee and 
assign the work of domestic slaves and servants and, presumably, manage many of the 
economic aspects of the kllros. The Athenian Stranger is not especially specific in regard 
to aU aspects of her ‘stewardship’, but there is reason to believe that she might exert 
considerable authority.
There is evidence for domestic management by women in ancient Athens and 
elsewhere. Xenophon’s fictional husband Ischomachos, for example, makes the 
interesting anthropological statement that women—being softer, more tender and 
anxious than men—are better suited to indoor tasks. A good wife, he reasons, should be 
like a queen bee managing her hive. Ischomachos’ model wife dispatches the servants 
and slaves to do their jobs and supervises aU those who work inside. Her tasks are meant 
to include storing, administermg and distributing the goods brought into the house along 
with the finances that affect them.39 The comedic character Lysistrata similarly contends, 
in a scene of some dramatic conceit, that women are quite capable of controlling the 
Athenian treasury since they have been in charge of housekeeping budgets for years.40 
The comedic context does not undercut the value entailed in such an observation.
38 805e-806c.
" Oikonomikos VII. 10 sq. Clearly, Ischomachus ‘model’ wife represents an idealised (and particularly 
masculine) view of how women citizens of a certain class ought to behave once married. But this view 
may have been quite popular amongst upper-class males.
40 Lysistrata, 492-7. Aristophanes’ attitudes toward women, like Xenophon’s, should be read in terms 
of the context of his class and sex.
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We hear of other instances where Athenian women display competence in 
managing household economics through oratorical evidence. It is anecdotal and perhaps 
should not be considered indicative of the norm, but it is no less revealing. In one such 
example from Lysias, a famdy meeting is described where a mother challenged that her 
son's guardian (her father) had mismanaged the household finances.41 This implies that 
she had some understanding of these matters. Athenian women, consequently, could be 
present in legal discussions about a household member's will and could sometimes 
represent their husbands on these occasions (with the aid of a male relative as 
intermediary).42 Aiskhines refers to wealthy young men whose fathers were deceased and 
whose mothers administered their property.43 44 45 46 47
Many or all of these may represent exceptions rather than the norm. Xenophon's 
Oikonomikos should be regarded as an idealised vision in much the same way as Plato's 
Laws. But there is also the indication that Spartan women had a comparable (if greater) 
control over their domestic affairs, in part, as Mihender says, because ‘the average 
Spartiate husband spent less time at home than other Greek males'.** Magnesian women, 
perhaps more hke their Lakonian counterparts, wiU have greater access to the pubhc 
sphere than any citizen-woman of Classical Athens" Is there reason to think that they 
would have less authority in the Magnesian private sphere (especially as ‘stewards' of the 
household) than they presumably did in real hfe? The Athenian Stranger has not told us. 
One is inchned to suspect that they would have at least as much authority in their 
‘stewardship' of the oikos as their Athenian counterparts.
In other domestic/economic respects, they are somewhat more limited and these 
same limitations are, at least, extended to both sexes. The Magnesians will not be 
ahowed to engage in retail trading of any kind or to use the oikos as a means for acquiring 
profit. The Athenian Stranger discusses some of the iniquities of the retail trade and the 
manner in which innkeepers treat their guests as ‘prisoners' to be ransomed at a high 
piice.ii He also says that such a situation need not be the case if the ‘best possible' 
people were in charge of these exchangss" In this hypothetical digression, he indicates
41 XXXII. 10, 12-18
42 Demosthenes XLI.17-19
"1.170
44 (1999), p. 372. Cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.5; Plut. Lyk. XV.7-10.
45 Cf. Millender (1999), pp. 370-3 and below.
46 918d-919b, perhaps recollecting Plato’s experiences in Sicily.
47 ‘Yet if someone—which should never happen nor ever will—were to compel (it is laughable to say 
but nonetheless it will be said) the best men everywhere to be innkeepers for a period of time, or to 
engage in retail trade or to practice one of such like things, or likewise if one were to compel [the best] 
women, out of some necessity of fate, to partake of such a way of life, we would know how friendly
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that the ‘best possible’ women who might engage in it would be like ‘mothers and 
nurses’.
The banausic retail trade is exclusively Hmted in Magnesia to a separate sphere of 
the polis encapsulating resident-aliens and foreign visitors (920a3-4). Citizens must not 
engage in mercantile ventures.4" Those who defy this rule stand to suffer public shame 
and potential imprisonment. A citizen-man or woman might entertain guests at home. 
Perhaps the guests might offer to return the favour of hospitality to their hosts someday 
in kind, but neither of them would be permitted to charge any type of fee or to earn 
profit for these services. The matriarch of the household would act as ‘mother and 
nurse’ to the visitors as to her own family. Her role in this context indicates the sort of 
sexual typecasting to which Magnesian women are subject.
It is forbidden for a Magnesian woman to carry on any kind of trade in woven 
goods produced in the home. It would seem that this restriction also applies to goods 
produced by slaves or servants. The economic regulations of Magnesia are designed to 
prevent any harsh necessity that might compel citizens of any class to engage in trading 
to maintain themselves. Perhaps Plato recalled the time in his youth when hardship 
affected Athenian citizen-women in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. Many 
citizen-women became nurses, wool-workers and grape-pickers as a consequence of the 
general economic misfortunes. This is attested to in a speech of Demosthenes where the 
citizen-speaker remarks that, under such circumstances, ‘we confess that we sell ribbons 
and do not live in the way we would hke. This was regarded pejoratively by the upper 
classes who eschewed such banausic activities. It was not forbidden for citizen-women 
to engage in trade but it seems to have been preferred that they should not do so. The 
fact that Euxitheos, in the above speech by Demosthenes, could have his citizenship 
questioned on account of his mother working as a nurse and seUing her ‘homespun’ lace 
ribbons underscores this status-oriented prejudice.
The Athenian Stranger prefers that none of his citizens (male or female) should 
have to engage in base commerce of any kind. The nurses who look after citizen- 
children must come from somewhere other than Magnesia. They are meant to be slaves * * *
and dear each of these things is, and if it should happen according to an uncorrupted principle, all such 
innkeepers would be honoured as in the guise of a mother or a nurse’ (918d8-e7).
48 The Athenian Stranger says that none of the citizens who hold a share of land amongst the 5040 
hearths ‘is to be a retail trader, either voluntarily or involuntarily, or a merchant or a waiting-servant or 
to render services whatsoever to private individuals who do not return to him equal services—except 
for a father and mother and to those household members of a younger generation and to all those elder 
than himself [or herself], as many as are free and freely served’ (919d3-e2).
33LVII.31
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or foreign women, hired in this capacity, under the strictest supervision and are required 
to be physically fit to promote healthy activities for citizen-youths (789e-a). It is typical 
of Magnesian policy that children’s nurses are to be supervised by specially appointed 
citizen-women whenever they undertake their duties outside the oikos (794b). While 
citizens are subject to considerable scrutiny in public and private Hfe, non-citizens are 
highly suspect and thus bear even more intense supervision by the polis.
Betrothals and Inheritance
Derrida has asserted that Plato’s works are logocentric. That is, they focus on ‘presence 
as opposed to absence’, the ‘Hving voice’ as opposed to the written word, Hfe opposed to 
death and soul to body. " He also calls them phaUocentric saying that the principal goal 
of Platonic writing is the philosophically symboHc ‘production of the son after the 
father’s death’.51 52 53Dubois has criticised Derrida’s argument on the grounds that it too is 
overly phaUocentric, saying that ‘it fails to acknowledge Plato’s desire to appropriate 
maternity to the male philosopher’.5" It is not within the scope of this chapter to confirm 
or deny such claims;5" however, Magnesia’s hypothetical constitution and its particular 
interest in the continuance of patriarchy seem to support them to some extent.
The second-best state regulates its citizens’ sexual congress to a high degree. 
Marriage is the foundation of the oikos and one of marriage’s express purposes is 
reproduction.54 55Once Magnesian youths have attained the appropriate age, the laws 
outHne a process by which potential mates are to become engaged. There is no question 
that designated heirs wUl be expected to marry and assume the roles of mother and 
father to a new generation. Sex-roles, as we have seen, are inculcated from an early age 
and girls wiU be especiaUy encouraged to imitate their mothers’ model as much as sons 
are encouraged to idoHse and imitate their fathers.”
" (1998), pp. 6-13.
" (1981), p. 168.
52 (1988), p. 170. She and Derrida are specifically discussing the Phaedrus but these arguments apply 
to Plato’s works in general. Cf. my chapters III and IV. For other objections to Derrida here, cf.
Ferrari (1987).
53 But cf. my chapters IV and VII for ‘birth in beauty’ and the myth of ‘the two horses’.
" Pomeroy (1997), p. 33. New Comedy (Men. PAH) 12-15) offers a brief formula for marriage that 
probably applied in the Hellenic age as well as the Hellenistic: FATHER: I give you my daughter to 
sow for the purpose of producing legitimate children. GROOM: I take her. FATHER: I also give you 
a dowry of three talents. GROOM: I take it, too, gladly. Cf. also Sam. 897-900, DjA^Z^.
55 Chodorow (1978), p. 194, points out that, in a patriarchal society, a girl is often encouraged to 
identify with her mother’s role from an early age so, when married, ‘she becomes the mother 
(phylogenetically the all-embracing sea, ontogenetically the womb)’.
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The Athenian Stranger’s law says that the marriage pledge (engyeses) is to be ‘under 
the authority of the father first, in the second instance of the (paternal] grandfather, in 
the third instance of the brothers by the same father, and after this it is under the 
authority of those on the mother’s side in Hke manner’ (774e4-6). This is similar to 
Athenian law in which, as Pomeroy says, the ‘hierarchy of those who may inherit mimics 
the hierarchy of family relationships, with priority accorded to males within the same 
degree of relationship and to coUaterals on the father’s side (i.e. agnates), starting with 
brothers’." There are at least two significant points in which Magnesian law differs from 
that given by pseudo-Demosthenes: first, that it characteristicaUy admits relatives on the 
female side and, secondly, that it posits the grandfather, in keeping with Magnesia’s 
gerontocratie character, as having precedence over brother...
This system would seem to Hmit the choice of one’s future marriage partner but, 
on the whole, such limitations appear to have been common across a range of Greek 
poleis. The ‘rights’ of a woman in marriage were, at best, secondary. ‘In wedding 
procession scenes on pottery’, as Stears says, ‘the groom grasps the bride by the wrist, a 
symbol of his dominance and of the inequa^Hty of the relationship; a ritual rape’.56 57 8 * *While 
symbolic in character, such scenes imply the fact that the marriage might not necessarily 
be of the bride’s own choosing. Herodotos indicates that freedom of choice by women 
of their perspective partners was unusual.5" It was not altogether unknown. An amazed 
Plutarch reported that Kimon’s sister, Elpinike, chose her husband freely and, likewise, 
he indicates that Peisistratos’ daughter also married for love." Xenophon’s account of 
the Spartans suggests that their system allowed more freedom of choice for both 
parmers (with Hmited contact after marriage) and, in some particular circumstances, 
allowed husbands to share their wives with other men.61 *There is also some evidence for 
women’s limited influence over their betrothals at ancient Gortyn (whose legal codes
56 (1997), p. 20. Plato’s mother, Periktione, remarried her paternal uncle, Pyrilampes, after the death of 
Ariston; on this cf. Davies (1971), pp. 332-5.
57 Pseud. Dem. XLIV.18, indicates that ‘whatever woman is pledged on just terms to be a wife by her 
father, or by her brother who has the same father, or by her paternal grandfather, the children bom of 
her shall be legitimate’.
58 (1995), p. 126. This is in contrast to funerary representations where ‘the handshake is a symbol not 
only of unity and of farewell or greeting but also. ..of the equality of those involved’.
" Hdt. VI. 122. .
" Plut. Kimon IV.7; also cf. ibid 9 for Kimon himself, and Dem. XL. 27 for an account of a man said to 
be in love with his wife; for Peisistratos’ daughter see Plut. Moralia 189c.
61 Cf. Lak. Pol. IX.5 on the alleged degrees of freedom allowed Spartan women and 1.5-10 on wife­
sharing. But, as Cartledge (2001), p. 121, says, ‘we cannot automatically infer that ownership of 
property conferred on Spartan women personal independence, let alone political power’. A Spartan
kurios may have acted in the same or similar capacity in making betrothals as his Athenian counterpart. 
Cf. Millender (1999), p. 360 sq. on Spartan women’s perceived ‘liberation’.
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appear to have interested Plato) where, as Sealey says, ‘by the time the laws were written 
down...[i.e. mid 5th century b.c.e.] the woman had acquired some voice in choosing her 
husband’.62 At Athens, it was the bride's kyrios who generally had the authority to make a 
vaHd betrothal.6" .
The legitimacy of the offspring depended on the efficacy of this. In contrast to 
Athens, Magnesian pohcy seems to be less concerned with legitimacy than stability. The 
kyrioi are recommended (but not compelled) by law to make their choices of betrothal 
based on the precept that ‘the natural tropism of hke to mate with like should be 
avoided'.6" Members of the highest of the four property classes should therefore be 
matched with members of lower classes, and so on, in order for the state to remam 
vigorous and avoid decyy.42 This represents a significant change from the eugenic 
policies found in the Republic that placed little value on the family as an institution. In 
Kallipolis the different ‘metals' of the three classes were not to intermingle; rather, the 
‘best’ only bred with the ‘best’ etc., according to a calculated scheme, in temporary 
marriages mechanistically designed to produce offspring with consistency.'* 64 * 66 Balance is to 
be maintained in Magnesia through permanent marriages with an economic basis in land-
4 (1990), p. 155 sq. Cf. Lefkowitz and Fant (1982), pp. 33-4 on these Kretan laws.
4 Cf. Dem. LIX.122 where it is said that ‘marriage consists in this, that one has children and one 
introduces sons to one’s phrateres and to one’s fellow demesmen. But one gives daughters as one’s 
own in marriage to men’. The supposed Spartan custom of youths ‘capturing’ their brides is not based 
upon any Classical evidence although, as Hodkinson (2000), p. 98, says ‘matrimonial rites may have 
included a symbolic marriage by capture (Plut. Lyk. XV.3)’; cf. Hdt. VI.65 on King Demaratos who 
carried off the woman betrothed to his kinsman Leotychidas. Herodotos and Aristotle regard this 
anecdote as indicative that, as Hodkinson {ibid.) says, ‘it was Leotychidas’ method of acquiring a wife 
which was the norm and that marriages were typically preceded by a betrothal arranged by the brides 
parents or next-of-kin’.
64 Rankin (1964), p. 85. Contrast Hdt. 1.196-99 for the alleged Babylonian ‘wife market’ and women’s 
participation in temple-bound concubinage as examples of Platonic-style theorizing on curious ways of 
organising society and marriage projected onto an ethnographic example (see also IV. 19 on the 
Issedonian women). But, as Pembroke (1967), pp. 4-5, says ‘marriage in Babylon, as Herodotos 
describes it, does seem to require the market-place.. .even so, he cannot bring himself to set the scene 
in one; he has the girls rather vaguely “collected together in one place” instead’. Babylonian temple 
prostitution, as Harrison (2000), p. 217, says ‘is described by Herodotus as “the most shameful of 
customs” (6 Sk 8f| aicxiicyro? xcov vdpcov, 1.199)’. Cf. Burkert (1990), p. 24 on the distinctions 
between ethnography and moral relativism in Hdt.
4 (772e7-e4) If the wealthy only marry the wealthy and the poor marry only the poor, in time the 
division between the classes will be so great as to cause tensions and possibly class conflicts that 
Plato’s narrator seeks to avoid (cf. 744a8-745bl).
66 Rep. 459d-460b. Cf. Republic 546al-547a6 for the infamous ‘Nuptial Number;’ there are numerous 
works dealing with this complex passage among which include, but are not limited to, Aristotle, Pol. E 
12. 1316a4 sq.; Macrobius Somn. Scip. II11. 10 on the so called ‘Great Year’ or ‘Cycle’; Proclus In. 
Remp. II p. 38; cf. Adam (1891), p. 79. Cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 152-4, 159-62 on the Platonic ‘Myth of 
Metals’ as propagandistic deception and persuasive rhetoric.
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division.67 68No citizen may have more land than any other and, as we have seen, a single, 
patriarchal household occupies and tends to the allocated kleros.™
Magnesian betrothals bear a striking resemblance to those in ancient Athens. This 
is especially so, as Rankin indicates, in terms of ‘a customary limitation of erotic 
“choice”’ such that the particular feelings of the betrothed would seem not to figure as 
prominently into the equation as other more material concerns.69 Magnesia’s methods 
reflect Spartan elements as well. Plato’s narrator has provided some speciahsed social 
programmes to encourage young people in the choosing of an ‘appropriate’ mate. He 
outlines a scheme whereby they might become better acquainted with one another before 
marriage. Potential mates must know as much as possible about each other’s respective 
family and background (771el-5). As we saw in an earlier chapter, they will dance 
together naked, observing some degree of propriety, so that they get a good look at one 
another.70 This represents an institutionalised form of sex-role stereotyping from an 
early age. However, this pre-betrothal mingling envisaged by the Athenian Stranger for 
his model society suggests that, even with the betrothals being arranged by the bride and 
bridegroom’s kyrioi, there would be some element of choice on the part of the 
participants. It is a directed ‘freedom’. The degree to which women might influence 
their betrothals, through expressing favour for one individual over another, should not 
be discounted.71 Perhaps even marriages of love, in the modern sense of the word, could 
come to pass in Plato’s second-best state.
The reality of 5li'-4tl‘ century Athens appears to have been somewhat less than 
sympathetic to those who might have wanted to marry for the sake of eros alone as
67 Cf. Laws 684d for the difficulty of land distribution; there are 5040 (a number divisible by 1, 2, 3,4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 etc. without remainder) administrative units for land-holdings by the citizens of the 
city (737e); each lot supports one family, the number of families is meant to remain at more or less a 
constant of 5040 (740b-c): one of the male children will inherit the holding and the females are given 
in marriage where appropriate; excess offspring will be obliged to emigrate (740d-e, 741). As Purcell 
(1990), p. 45, points out, ‘instances of “overpopulation” [in the ancient world] causing emigration are 
more plausibly to be attributed to resource fluctuations or to increase in community size through 
immigration than to demographic increase (and that is all the famous passage of advice about apoikiai 
in Plato’s Laws 4.707d-708d means)’. As we saw in my chapters II and III, the Athenian Stranger has 
provided safeguards against immigration being a problem.
68 This appears to correspond, at least in some respects, with Xenophon’s account of Spartan principles 
on land distribution, cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.9 and VII.3-6. Polybios (c.205-c.l20b.c.e) also indicates that 
Spartan land laws were such that ‘no citizen may own more than another, but all possess an equal 
share’ {Hist. VI.45, 3-5). However, such equality was not always the case; cf. Cartledge (2001), pp. 
121 sq. Polybios drew upon Xenophon’s account of the Spartan laws for his histories and so, like 
much of Xenophon’s ethnographic data on Sparta, one must take it with a grain of salt.
69 (1964), p. 90.
70 771e5-772a3; cp. 672e5, 656c2, and for the role assigned to pleasure and festivals in the theory of 
education see 653c sq.
71 Cf. GT/pp 171 sq., for a discussion of‘heterosexual’ eros and marriage, cf. pp. 163, 167, on this in 
regard to Plato’s philosophy.
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opposed to civic duty or familial obligations. Relationships of passion could be regarded 
as potentially quite dangerous.72 Athenian society required of its free male citizens that 
they arrange marriages for their daughters and sometimes sisters and more distant female 
relations. This duty to the oikos and the polis was taken very seriously.73 As mentioned 
above, the kyrios was responsible for making the match and we have already seen that 
Plato's narrator, in dealing with the matter of authority over betrothals (774e4-6), has 
favoured a similar procedure for Magnesia. There, a male child may be designated as heir 
(KXl|pov6|lO£). The chosen heir is recorded in a written will and he then inherits the title 
to the estate on the death of the testator.
Any excess children may be married off, adopted (posthumously or otherwise) 
into another household or, alternatively, dispatched to an allied city or colony.74 75The 
Athenian Stranger provides a provision that allows a testator to leave any quantity of 
property deemed fit (excepting the actual, immovable Magnesian estate and its associated 
equipment) to children other than the heir unless they already have their own household 
(923d6-7). He indicates that daughters should be treated in like manner as sons, in terms 
of inheritance, inasmuch as they too may inherit movable property—providing they are 
not married or engaged to be married (9i23cl8-<el). It follows, therefore, that the only 
children to inherit any movable property or money would be either any who remain in 
Magnesia but never gain their own household or those who have been dispatched to a 
colony (assuming they are eligible). The law here allows for unmarried individuals to 
inherit movable property but the system that the Athenian Stranger envisages does not 
strongly favour anyone being unmarried for very long.
A Magnesian man who has no sons will ‘adopt' an heir to marry a chosen 
daughter. The adopted heir thereby becomes his ‘son' in law. In the event that ‘the 
testator should leave no male offspring, but only daughters', says the Athenian Stranger, 
‘let him bequeath for whichever of his daughters he may wish a husband, a son for 
himself, recorded as his legal heir'T The posthumously appointed heir would then marry 
the designated heiress, when she comes of age, and become legal master of the estate and 
wdl be responsible for providing it with an heir and the city with future citizens. The fact 
that a brotherless heiress must be wed to an heir for the estate to pass on to the next
72 See below on seduction and incitement to passion. Cf. too pp. 171 sq. for more on this.
73 Isaios 1.39 concerning the obligation to arrange marriages for orphaned cousins; cf. Lysias (bom c. 
445b.c.e.) XIII.45 and XII.21 for views on the wrongful deprivation of marriage.
74 Cf. 707d-708d and 740c4 and e6.
75 923e4-6. This compares well with ancient Hebrew law where, ‘If a man die, and have no sons, then 
ye shall cause his inheritance to pass unto his daughter' {Numbers 27.8), she then passes the inheritance 
on to her offspring via her husband (whether of the same clan or not—ibid. 36.3, 36.8).
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generation, although indicative of patriarchal control, emphasises a woman's social and 
legal importance in Magnesia.
There is a comparable legal emphasis on the female side of the family for 
purposes of inheritance present in Athenian law, in terms of the anchisteia? This 
phenomenon has been considered a Classical ‘shadow’ of more ancient customs of 
matrUineal descent.76 7 * * 80 81 * 83The Greeks do not appear to confirm this. Herodotos and others 
wrote about barbarian cultures that allegedly practised such a tradition.'® The purpose of 
the prehistoric ‘goddess' figurines dating from around or before 2,600 b.c.e., speculation 
about which had been used in support of the earlier conclusions on ancient matriarchy, 
currently remains a subject of lively debate.'® As Pembroke states, ‘it is no longer believed 
that the tracing of descent through women was ever universal, or that it is essentially an 
older phenomenon than that which is traced through males’.®0 Outside the JLmr, some 
of Plato’s characters have regarded autochthony as a matriarchal phenomenon. As 
Loraux says, in this respect ‘Plato resolutely places the emphasis on the mother'^ 
Autochthony, rooted in myth, is by no means an indication about the structure of early 
human societies. Neither, as we have seen, is Plato bound to be consistent on every 
point between dialogues. The Athenian Stranger shows no sign of belief in an ancient 
mutterrecht when he discusses the patriarchal family as the foundation of civilisation^ 
The fact that certain nineteenth-century German scholars imagined such a thing probably 
reveals more about them than the ancient Greeks^
Nonetheless, property and inheritance are intrinsically connected with 
Magnesian women in comparable ways to their real-world analogues. Legally providing
76 Stears (1998), p. 116, the anchisteia is a bilateral kinship grouping centred on an individual and 
extending to the children of cousins. Cf. my chapter VI for more on this.
77 ‘The fact that, even in Classical times when succession was through males, the claim of a woman, 
who had no brothers, to the family land remains paramount points directly to a time when all property 
descended through women’, writes Willetts (1967), p. 24,
’® Such as the Lykians of Asia Minor who allegedly named themselves after their mothers, I.173sq. On 
the Amazons, cf my chapter VI.
’® Channel 4 (2002a). Varying theories suggest that they were women’s teaching tools for sex- 
education, that they were a type of pornography for men or, possibly, cultic artifacts. As with the so- 
called mutterrecht, one should be careful about ‘xeroxing’ modern views onto the past. According to 
this programme on Channel 4, prehistoric societies were probably more sexually ‘equal’ than one­
sided. The subjugation of women’s labour of childbirth seems to have begun with the formation of 
cities and the advent of the large-scale ownership of private property (e.g. the house).
80 (1967), p. 1.
81 (1993), p. 240. Cf. Menex. 237e4 and 239al-2. Attic soil is ‘both their earth and their mother’, so 
Athenian andres are all ‘brothers, children of the same mother’. As Loraux p. 121, indicates ‘the Attic 
earth is never only “mother” in the funeral orations, but, through a return in full force of the paternal 
signifier, it is always both “mother and father” {meter kaipatris: mother and earth of fathers)’.
86 680a8-9. He says that some of the ‘patriarchal constitutions’ would occasionally have mothers in 
charge but he does not seem to regard this as having been the norm.
83 Cf. von Bachofen (1897) for the theory of matrilineal descent..
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for a ‘son’ and heir to marry the heiress and inherit the immovable estate underscores 
thiis.84 * * * 88The policy of supplying heirs to sonless patriarchs echoes similar Athenian 
litigation where, under these same circumstances, the ‘nearest male relative succeeded to 
the estate’ having been appointed by the polis through the process of epidikasiaf* In 
Magnesia, the eldest relatives take precedence and preference is given to the eligible heirs 
who are in the household of male relatives more than female one®.®6 Anyone may be 
excluded from inheriting the estate and from marrying the heiress should he akeady have 
inherited an estate and married an heiress, or should he be otherwise unavailable.
The ‘rorl•ecmeis’ of the heir and heiress’ respective ages is to be discerned by 
state marriage inspectors who will. make a determination, in part, by viewing the males 
naked and the females stripped down to the navel.®7 Judging by the list of heirs, the 
chosen bridegroom’s age could be significantly greater than that of his bride (924e6). He 
could also conceivably be much younger. If there happened to be several orphaned 
daughters, then it follows that only one, most likely the oldest, would be the designated 
heiress since there is only one immovable estate. The other daughters should 
theoretically be married to the heirs of other families if possible. Their betrothals would 
appear to fall under the authority of their eldest sister’s husband since he would be the 
new de facto master of the household and Ayos of the estate.
The Magnesian system of selecting heirs and betrothals for both men and women 
may be seen as having a rather perfunctory or mechanical character. This would appear 
to accentuate the primacy of the needs of the polis over those of the individual as regards 
the generation of offspring and the population of the immovable estates. However, 
there is some indication that an heiress might possess some limited control over her 
eventual betrothal. Having described the order of succession at length, Plato’s narrator 
grants an heiress an interesting degree of freedom. He proposes that, when a man dies 
both intestate and leaving only daughters, and if the family lacks aU of the relatives
84 The list of heirs and their order of succession is as follows: 1.) A brother of the deceased by the
same father (but not necessarily by the same mother); 2.) A brother of the deceased by the same 
mother (but not necessarily by the same father); 3.) A son of the deceased’s brother (providing that he 
and the heiress are of the appropriate ages); 4.) A son of the deceased’s sister (same guidelines as #3
above); 5.) A brother of the deceased’s father; 6.) A son of #5 above; 6.) A son of the sister of the 
deceased’s father; Pomeroy (1975), pp. 168-9, says that ‘such endogamous arrangements were
common among propertied Athenians’. The inclusion of the maternal brother is contrary to Attic law. 
The Code of Gortyn offers a very similar line of succession excluding the maternal relatives'(Col, VII, 
15-27). On the marriage of ancient heiresses to cousins cf. Davies (1971), p. 3716b. Also see 
Thompson (1967), pp. 273-82.
88 Sealey (1990), p. 29. Cf. Lefkowitz and Pant (1982), p. 34.
88 Cf. Laws 924e2-925al, where ‘the males come before the females in any single generation’.
®7 925a2-5. Herm. {Juris Dom. 27), reckoning this situation to be the same as is that referred to at 
Aristophanes’ Vesp, 578, deems Plato’s legislation to be in keeping with Attic precedent.
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described in the list, then ‘the giri, along with her guardians, may freely choose a willing 
man from the city' who will become ‘the legal heir of the deceased and husband of the 
daughter' (925a5-b2). It appears to be only a shght liberty but, as England said of this 
statute, ‘the amount of choice allowed by Plato to the bride was probably much in 
advance of Attic custom'.®
The Athenian Stranger allows a further degree, of freedom of choice for women 
in marriage. He offers another potential situation in which an heiress might exert some 
control over her future bridegroom. If the city is suffering from a lack of heirs, the 
heiress (who has no brothers and whose father has left no wdl) may then recall someone 
who has been dispatched to a colony. If he is a family member, however distant, he then 
automatically becomes heir and ‘son' to the deceased and betrothed to the heiress 
(925b7). In this case, no permission would be required from the heitess' guardians since 
die heir is the nearest eligible relative. However, if the man chosen is from outside the 
heiress' housdol®® then he may only marry her on the condition that her guardians give 
permission (925b6-c3).
It is uncertain how often such circumstances might arise under which an heiress 
could exercise direct control over her future husband. She would only be able to make a 
fairly resolute, binding and unchallenged choice when there happens to be nobody within 
the state who qualifies as the legal heir, a relative has been dispatched to a colony and the 
heiress happens to choose him. There is a difference between a selection subject to 
many rules and scrutiny and a completely free one. Even as an exception, these 
situations do not grant the sort of freedom of choice to a woman that a Magnesian father 
or guardian may exercise (although they too are limited to endogamous betrodials with 
citizens and colonials—as well as being bound by the state's policies and supervision). 
The daughter always has the option to agree with whomever the law, her father or her 
guardians say she must marry.
Marriage and teknopoiia
The duties expected of ancient women, whether by law or custom, generally yoked them 
to the oikos. It is impossible to indicate with certainty the precise extent to which sexual
®((921), p. 527.
® I.e. not part of her anchisteia.
177
segregation actually took place amongst aU classes of women.® However, as Schaps says, 
‘large areas of male culture were in fact entirely closed to women: the assembly, the 
lawcourts and the gymnasia, and even the normal daily social encounters with Athenian 
men'.®* When Lysistrata complains of the women's lateness to her meeting, Kleoetee 
says ‘dearie, they’ll come; it’s difficult for women to leave the house, they’re always 
rushing about after their men, or waking up the servants, putting the baby to bed, 
washing or feeding it'.* 92 * *While this is clearly a comedic description, it would appear to 
denote an underlying truth about real women's hves. Perhaps an Athenian marriage was 
not as bleak as Hooper suggests when he describes it as ‘a matter of good family, good 
dowry, and good health.. .bearing children and managing a household were all that would 
ordinarily have been asked of a wife’.®®
Magnesian women, as we have seen, reflect their Athenian counterparts in many 
ways. This seems particularly true in regard to women’s role in the patriarchal family. As 
Cartledge, says, the ‘making of children... \teknopoiic\ could be accounted a form of state 
liturgy or public service elsewhere in ancient Greece too'.®4 Marriage and childbearing 
are identified (and will be culturally enforced) as essential parts of a woman’s life in 
Magnesia. The one is the intended product of the other, in the Athenian Stranger’s 
reckoning, and so they are tetrte.sically teterconneeeed.95 The relationship between a 
child and its household wUl impress a pattern for imitation from the earliest age.®6
The stability of Magnesia’s population must be assured by offspring in the 
appropriate numbers. Perhaps more urgent is the perceived necessity that the 
appropriate psychological conditions be encouraged amongst citizen families. The polis 
exerts strict supervision over marital affairs at most every level involving oikos, phratry and 
phyU. This may be read as a particularly prevalent type of an iestituttonaltsee sexual 
subjugation of women, based on the act of reproduction, cited by modern feminises.07 
But Magnesia would not be alone in this respect. The practice of regulating the 
institution of matrimony has not been exclusively limited to Plato’s hypothetical cities.
90 Cf. my chapters I and esp. VI .
6* (1977), p. 323.
92 16-19. Some, like the character of Theagnes wife (64), might consult Hekate before leaving the 
house.
68 (1978), p. 254.
6' (2001), p. 116; see below on the Spartans.
68 Cf. Laws 772a7-774al, 783b2-c4
® Cf. Chodorow (1978), p. 79 sq., for her discussion of some of the self-replicating features,
specifically in terms of sex-roles, of the patriarchal family. 
92 Cf. McKinnon (1982), p. 543 and my chapter I.
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Significant portions of extant legal codes and recorded customs survive from the 
Classical world and especially from Sparta, Krete and Athens.
Magnesian law specifies that ‘the age limit of marriage for a young woman is to 
be from her sixteenth to her twentieth year', and for men, around the ages of thirty to 
thirty-five (752b2-9). These are not merely suggested guidelines but prescriptive 
legislation to be obeyed by all. The statutes provide pecuniary fines and psychological 
penalties, through a sort of automatic social stigmatisation, for those who would choose 
to remain single.® This differs somewhat from our understanding of Athenian customs 
in the 5th-4th century b.c.e. and may have more in common with Spartan practices. 
Magnesia, as we have seen, incorporates many aspects of both. Even so, the potential 
gap between the marriage ages of the respective sexes in Magnesia shares some similarity 
with practices in Athens.
Many Athenian males over thirty appear to have preferred to wed significantly 
younger brides.® This practice seems to have been structured around the age at which an 
heir might be expected to take on greater responsibility in the affairs of the kllros. 
Married at the age of thirty, he would be about sixty when his son (assuming he had one) 
might wed. On his retirement, his heir could take over the affairs of the property.1®0 
During the thirty or more years in which a man would most actively partake of public life 
appropriate to his class, perhaps liis wife could better serve her husband in a domestic 
capacity (thanks, in part, to the vigorous and impressionable qualities of youth) were she
98 774a3-c2, Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom, ii. 423a, concerning this law, who calls the monetary penalty 
Tpo(jf)V and suggests that there would be magistrates’ fees to be paid in addition; Strabo
(c.67b.c.e.-19c.e.) 10.482, citing Ephorus of Cyme (early 4® century b.c.e.), says that Kretan youths 
were customarily obliged to marry at the same time upon graduation from the agela of childhood. 
Persistent bachelorhood could conceivably incur psychological penalties from one’s age-mates or 
society in general. The Code of Gortyn (VII29-47) decrees that a judge must compel a male heir, who 
is of age and unwilling to marry, to wed his legally betrothed Tcarpo'tOKoq within a two month time 
span. Nonetheless, since it is left to the family of the heiress to pursue the matter in the courts, 
presumably, under some circumstances, a would-be bachelor might escape any restrictions.
9 The subject of when to marry can be observed as part of a broader cultural discourse represented in 
surviving texts. In the Republic, Sokrates had favoured twenty-five and older for males and Aristotle 
seems to have supported thirty-seven or a little bit younger for males and eighteen for females; 
Aristotle, Pol. VII. 14, 6 (1335a). Cf. also 721b, 785b; Republic 460e. Hesiod (c. 700 b.c.e.— Works 
and Days 695 sq.) recommended that women many about the age of eighteen or nineteen.
*°9 At age fifty-nine, an Athenian’s military service ended and he was therefore considered an ‘old 
man’ indicates Lacey (1968), p. 107. Retirees were considered ££co ton xaTaXdyou and they became 
arbitrators for a year (Ath. Pol. LIII. 4), but did not simply vanish thereafter—e.g. Sokrates served as 
president of the Assembly in 405 at about age sixty-four (Xen. Mem. I.l, 18 and Plato Apology 32b-c).
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ten to fifteen years his junior. This may have been a popular ideal, but it did not always 
occur in reality.10*
As wiU be the case in Magnesia, an Athenian father, or the legal guardian of the 
epikleros, made the marriage pledge. The physical union of man and wife followed quite 
possibly in rapid succesiion® Although such a marriage would be accompanied by 
private celebrations, as Lambert indicates, ‘it was not marked by any legal ceremony'.*® 
The legal aspects appear to have been handled by the father (through engyesis and engye) 
and by the husband through his phratry. 104 The new brides' names were presented to 
these civic kinship-groups on the third day of the apatouria, when their husbands made a 
ritual sacrifice at a ceremony called die gamelia}*
Whether this was done solely for epikleroi or for everybody remains uncertain. 
Since this ceremony took place when the bride-to-be reached puberty, we may infer that 
a typical age at which citizen-females might undertake their first marriage would not 
likely be much beyond that of sixteen and, given the ancient Athenian disposition toward 
virginity, it was possibly younger.* 1 * * * *®6 The laws of Gortyn are more straightforward on the 
subject of her age. They indicate that, prior to twelve, a Kretanpatroiokos was considered 
a ‘minor' (&vopo£ or &v£po^). Thirteen appears to have been quite acceptable. She 
would have come ‘of age' (pptOVGa or 6pi|ta) and was therefore considered ready for 
marringe.I07
Cf. my chapter VI and below.
102 But cf. Dem. XXVIII. 15-16 and XXIX.43 for some exceptions.
*(( (1993), p. 182. Cf. Isaios VIII. 18-20, on the character of private marriage celebrations.
’c The importance of such a civic kinship-group which is not necessarily indicative of actual kinship, 
whether in Magnesia or Athens, connects well with Engels (1977), p. 176, who indicates that the 
evolving social institutions within the city-state had ‘created a public force which was now no longer 
simply identical with the whole body of armed people... it divided the people for public purposes, not 
by groups of kinship, but by common place of residence'.
l°( The Apatouria ■ was associated with the boy’s sacrifice, on the same day, when they cut their hair
signifying the end of childhood (cp.. Isae. VI. 64, VIII. 19); some Byzantine sources suggest that boys 
and girls may have been introduced into the phratries during the Hellenistic period or in cities other 
than Athens in the Classical (Julius Polydeuces Pollux of Naucratis [end of the 2nd century c.e. ] VIII,
107, and the Suda pp. 265-6). For more on phratries, cf. Lambert (1993), 143-61; Wade-Gery (1931), 
pp. 129-143; also, Sadao Ito (1981), pp, 35-60, rejects Pollux’s statement that the the gamelia was 
sacrificed by members of phratries when girls reached puberty. Plato (Laws 785a) mentions that 
Magnesian women will be inducted into phratries. The Byzantine scholars may have misinterpreted 
Isaios III. 73, where there is some indication that, under certain circumstances, women could be
‘introduced’ to a phratry. This discussion is taken up and expanded upon in my next chapter.
’((Cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 26.4 for Perikles’ famous marriage law that insisted upon a form of pedigree 
for Athenian citizenship.
1® VIII, 39 and XII, 17-19.
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The Spartan customs on the legal age of a patroukhos, as we have them, ate 
somewhat uncleat and few in number. However, they make an interesting point of 
contrast with what we undetstand of those in Athens and Krete.108 Xenophon’s idealised 
account of the Spartan constitution indicates that Spartan men often wedded ‘older’ 
women. Lykoutgos allegedly fotbade men to many until they wete ‘in the period of 
physical prime’,W9but some older men still pt-fened younger bridee* 1® Xenophon does 
not say precisely what age ‘period of physical prime’ entailed. Plutarch gives evidence fot 
a compatable ‘minimum age’ but also does not specify what it might be.** As Cattiedge 
suggests, however, these laws ‘almost certainly applied only to men’.**2 That preferred by 
the Spartans for females could easily be the ages of sixteen to twenty. It could just as 
easily have been ages twelve to sixteen as was typically the case in many Greekpokis. The 
allegedly superior Spartan diet may have helped their girls mature faster and wed earlier 
or, alternatively, the rigorous athletics might have delayed the onset of menstruation and, 
thereby, their weddinge*®
108 Cf. Cartledge (2001), pp. 119, 120. Spartan marriages, as will be discussed later in this chapter in 
the context of adultery, by their very nature do not form typical family structures as one would expect 
to find in ancient Athens or Gortyn.
®o fev dKgaig acogdwv... Lak. Pol. 1.6-8; cf. Plut. Lys. XXX.7.
* ^Xenophon’s reports on the Spartans may or may not represent the customs and practices established 
by the reformer Lykourgos, However, by the time that Xenophon wrote his account (and certainly by 
the time Plato was writing the Lows) many things had changed. Tf anyone should ask me’, he writes 
Xenophon {Lak. Pol. XIV. 1-2), ‘whether now the laws of Lykourgos seem to me still to remain 
unchanged, by Zeus, I could not say that with confidence’. Many of the Athenian Stranger’s 
borrowings may actually be from a Sparta that no longer existed except in memory or possibly in 
imagination only.
1H Lyk. XV.3, Kleom. I
*O (^^(^)0i), p. 116.
in Ibid.
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It is possible to hypothesise that having younger wives to look after their 
domestic affairs must have been rather convenient for retired husbands. But a woman 
who remarried after her initial husband's demise (e.g. for purposes of inheritance) might 
be much older than the new husband. This does not discount the fact that both in the 
Lam of Plato and in the reality of his time, at some point in her marriage a wife could be 
half her husband's age. The legal and traditional institutions that supported such a 
system were concerned with the survival and continuance of generation in a world 
without the benefits of modern medicine. The numerous laws and traditions governing 
matrimony suggest that ancient societies were actively interested in casting individuals in 
sex-roles from an early age with the express purpose of encouraging reproduction. 
These, however, seem amateurish compared to the Athenian Stranger and his arsenal of 
social engineering.
Plato's Stepchildren
In framing his constitution as he has done, the Athenian Stranger has had to structure 
inheritance laws under the constraints imposed by his indivisible properties. The law 
must encourage families to produce sufficient heirs to inherit estates lest the number of 
households change from a stable 5040. Aristotle, in the Politics, criticised Plato for 
suggesting such a large number of citizens, saying that ‘we cannot overlook the fact that 
such a number would require the territory of Babylon or some other huge country'.11* As 
Nixon and Price suggest, perhaps Aristotle felt that a population centre of this size could 
‘hardly be counted as a real poliiP3
The scope of Magnesia is impressive by ancient standards. The system of 
employing the controlled allocation of land units, necessitated by the population 
constraints, appears to have very little precedent in the known constitutions of Plato's 
era. ‘Moreover', as Hodkinson says, ‘Magnesia's system of “single heir” inheritance 
(745b; 923c) never existed in Classical Sparta outside the retrospective fictional account 
of Plutarch, Agis 5’.ns This particular notion appears to have been uniquely Plato's own. 
The plan of controlled inheritance and the indivisibility of the land units are designed to 
eHm^iiate any threat of under- or overpopulation that might hinder Magnesia's stability
1,4 1265al3. At 1276a29, Babylon ‘it is said, had been captured for two whole days before some of the 
inhabitants knew of the fact’.
H591990), p. 163.
’I® Hodkinson (1994), p. 204; Plutarch’s account being largely influenced by Xenophon’s idealised 
Spartan texts and probably Plato’s dramatic dialogues as well. Cf. Hodkinson (2000), pp. 44-5 on this 
and for Plato’s alleged influence on third-century Spartan revolutionaries.
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(cf. 740b-c). This necessitates a proactive stance toward sustaining the family unit as 
.intact.
If a Magnesian man should die intestate, leaving no heirs whatsoever, a couple 
will be chosen from surviving, estate-less relatives of appropriate age in order to assume 
the roles of heir and heiress on the vacant estate. The heiress will be selected from a list 
of relations including the deceased’s sister, his brother’s daughter, his sister’s son, the 
sister of the deceased’s father, the daughter of the father’s brother and the daughter of 
the father’s sister (925c3-d5). The heir is then chosen from the same list of relations as 
at 924e2-925a2 (discussed above). The Athenian Stranger does not say whether this new 
couple, designated to people the barren estate, are to have any control over the matter of 
their subsequent marriage. Their respective kinship-groups, presumably, would give 
considerable attention to the choices allowed them by law with a view toward the future 
couple’s happiness. There is every reason to think that any such potential couple will 
possess an embedded ethic toward marriage that is likely to cast the prospects afforded 
them in a desirable light:.
However agreeable the notion of matrimony may be to the Magnesians, if the 
actual marriage should prove too disagreeable, the couple wil have a legal recourse 
readily at hand. In the event that married partners should want a divorce, says the
Athenian Stranger:
...because they are beset by a mishap of temperaments, the case must 
come under the care of ten men of the Guardians of the Laws who are 
middle-aged, and ten women of the Marriage Guardians in like 
manner... [and] if they are able to reconcie the couple, then let those 
arrangements stand; but if emotions seethe to a greater degree than this, 
then they wil strive to find someone for each divorcee?*7
These Guardians wil act first as marriage counselors and then, fading that, as 
matchmakers. Note that he appoints male Guardians, presumably, to counsel the 
husband and female Guardians, again presumably, for the wife. It seems correct to think 
that some members of an ancient Greek famiy or kinship-group would, in reaHty, have 
acted as marriage counsellors as needed—Just as they do in the modern world. The
H7 Laws 929e9-930a5. They are to be matched with mates who have more complementary 
temperaments.
■ii.
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Athenian Stranger seems to be devaluing a pre-existing custom and replacing it with state 
agencies. He has suggested the establishment of marriage counselling, in an official 
capacity, in order to help maintain the state's stability. This represents a significant 
innovation and it appears to be out of character with ancient Greek customs.
Another innovation is a special ‘divorce clause' reserved by the state. According 
to this clause, a Magnesian divorce may happen automatically when a couple has faded to 
produce children after ten years of marriage (784c2-4). This and other such rules of 
divorce and remarriage emphasise the Athenian Stranger's concern that his populace 
should be busy ‘getting children to set up new households' (930a8-bl). England 
suggested that the method proposed in the Iutms would not only make the process of 
divorce more elaborate and complex than in Attic law, but that the additional deterrent 
of a forced union with a potentially unsympathetic partner would seem to discourage the 
Magnesians from ‘swamping' the courts with divorce casss?® The psychological threat 
of remarriage, as well as the ministrations of the marriage counsellors, might deter many 
from making a hasty decision about separation. The passages on divorce provide much 
room for speculation and there is no real indication as to how much freedom of choice 
might be granted to potential partners for remarriage.
Magnesia places a high value on the sanctity of marriage as integral to the state's 
stability and prosperity. There is every sign that the ancient Athenians felt similarly but 
their divorce laws provide a point of contrast to Magnesia's. In Athens, a man could 
dissolve his marriage merely by sending his wife from the house and restoring her dowry. 
Few if any legal proceedings were required*® Ao Athenian woman could initiate a 
divorce by returning to the home of her kyr/os. This had to be officially finalised by 
registration with the appropriate archon, as Sealey says, ‘with the help of her nearest male 
relative'.*® It was not unusual for Athenian husbands to betroth their wives to wed 
someone else after getting a divorce.*1 Perikles, for example, made arrangements for his 
divorced wife's remarriage and we are told that Pasio -likewise betrothed his soon-to-be 
ex-wife to Phormio, his manager.* 119 120 * 122 Magnesian procedures veer away from this tradition
1* England (1921), p. 547, note on 930a6; cp. also Laws 773c5.
119 MacDowell (1978), p. 88.
120 (1990), p. 36. For divorces initiated by women cf. e.g. Dem. XXX. 15,17,26, 31; Isaios III.8.7.
*1 The elder Demosthenes, displaying a marked difference between his city and the Athenian 
Stranger’s, had betrothed both his wife to his sister’s son and his 5-year-old daughterto his brother’s 
son while he still lived, Dem. XXVII.5, XXVIII. 15, XXIX.43. It was not uncommon for an Athenian 
husband to make arrangements for his wife’s subsequent remarriage. On this cf. Dem. XXX.7,
LVII.41 and Isae. II.7-9. For other examples of the remarriage of widows cf. Thompson (1972), pp. 
211-25. .
122 Dem. XXXVI.8.
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and grant somewhat more freedom to women seeking divorces than the laws of 
Athens—although, it should be noted diat the city-state will have the final say in any 
given divorce above and beyond the wishes of the individual litigants.
Kretan divorce laws, again by contrast, appear to have allowed much more 
latitude to women than at Athens. If a married couple should become divorced, then the 
wife was ‘to have her own property which she came with to her husband and half of the 
produce, if there be any from her property, and half of whatever she has woven within, 
plus five staters if the husband is the cause of the divorce’.123 124 125If a divorced Kretan 
woman had borne any children, she was to receive a share of the household property and 
could then be remarried, with considerable say in the matter, to another man of her 
phyle™ Plato seems to have employed aspects of Athenian and Kretan legal codes in 
composing his Magnesian divorce laws but, again, with a greater emphasis on state 
controls and a view toward artificially maintaining a stable population. We are not told if 
there will be any type of movable property settlement for Magnesian divorcees. It seems 
unlikely. There will be no dowry to return and the kllros is indivisible so there might be 
little property to depart with an ex-wife other than her clothes and personal effects.
The Magnesian constitution provides many regulations that govern household 
affairs to a very precise degree with the promotion of harmony as a primary goal. 
Another example of this may be observed in the legality surrounding remarriage in the 
event that a spouse should die. The Athenian Stranger says that ‘if a wife in death leaves 
behind both male and female offspring, the law we are establishing would encourage, but 
not compel, the widower to rear the children without bringing in a stepmother’! It is 
worth noting here that this statement of the Athenian Stranger’s appears to reflect certain 
observable Athenian attitudes on this matter. The sentiment appears to have been that, 
since a stepmother’s adopted children are not her own, she would be inclined to regard 
them in a lesser capacity.126 Ancient orators, playwrights and philosophers seem to 
concur. A client of Isaios once claimed that conflicts were especially common between a 
stepmother and her stepdaughter.^7 In a speech of Lysias, Diogeiton’s daughter has
123 Code of Gortyn.. 11.45-53.
124 Sealey (1990), pp. 64-65.
125 jxfi giyTphav fercaa/6pevov-—930b3-6; England (1921), p. 548, says of this passage that ‘the 
participial clause here contains the more important verb; “spare the children a stepmother!”’
23 Golden (1990), p. 143; cf. Hesiod, Works and Days 825 and, Menander, Monos. 127, for the 
proverb that good days are ‘mothers’ and bad days ‘stepmothers’, and the negative qualities associated 
with a ‘stepmother of ships’.
*27XII.5.
185
charged that her father has been more generous with the children of his new whe?® In 
Euripides’ .Alkestis, the dying heroine begs her husband Admetos not to bring in a 
stepmother for their children lest she beat them?® Herodotos and Euripides both 
recount stories in which a second wife proves to be ‘a real stepmother’ by plotting 
against her husband’s children—and especially against his daughters by previous wivee.1® 
We also have Aristotle’s compelling assertion that all creatures with offspring are chiefly 
concerned for those that they consider their own.®1 The Athenian Stranger’s preference 
that a father should rear his own children as a single parent rather than introduce die 
potentially destabilising element of a stepmother seems rather charitable, given popular 
views, and ultimately geared toward the children’s overall well being. But it would also 
appear that he is indifferent as to whether one or two parents should rear the children. 
That there be sufficient children to inherit the klems and assume the duties of citizens 
seems to be the more pressing concern.
Assurance of consistent and controlled reproduction is a central issue in the 
Athenian Stranger’s approach to family law. The minimum legally accepted number of 
children to be produced by marriage is one of each sex per Magnesian household (930c8- 
dl). The rules governing remarriage hinge largely on whether or not this quota of 
offspring has been filled. If there are no children, then the widower must remarry so 
that ‘he beget sufficient children for both his household and the city-state’.®2 In the 
event that a husband dies leaving a widow with sufficient children, then she may rear 
them alone—providing she’s old enough. Otherwise, her relatives are to report the 
matter to the ‘women in charge of marriages’ (the Marriage Supervisore?.1® Both they 
and the relatives together, having considered the details of the case, render a decision on 
the issue of remarriage (930cl-7). It is unclear whether or not a young widow might 
have any say in her remarriage. The fact that her relatives (Tp00‘fjKOV'T££) are involved at 
least suggests that her wishes might be taken into account. But this is by no means 
certain since diey too are interested parties.
Some kind of synthesis between Athenian and Kretan marriage customs appears 
to be taking place in the Laws. The Athenian Straigrr7s statutes on the death of a spouse
128 XXXII. 17.
129 302-309. It is probably this passage from Euripides to which the Athenian Stranger is making 
reference at 930b3-6.
®9 Hdt. IV.154.2; cf. Eur. Aik. 313-319.
®i De Gen. Anim. III.759a36.
®9 Tm te oiKcp Kal vp k6Aei—930b6-cl.
®9 ywcxikeg fcm.iiEXoHgivEg taw Y<d|ia)V--930cl.
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are, in fact, nearly identical to those in the Code of Gotrynn3* They differ primarily in terms 
of the rules that he provides for remarriage being characteristically stricter. A significant 
point of departure from both Athenian and R^tan tradition involves the diminished 
importance of legitimate offspring. In Athens, as Pomeroy states, ‘an unattached widow 
had the potential to dishonour her family, and even inspire doubts about the parentage 
of her children'?® In contrast to this, the position taken by Plato's narrator on the 
remarriage of widows and widowers in the Laws is not particularly concerned with 
legitimacy of offspring—or, rather, a child's ‘legitimacy' is less dependent on who its 
biological parents happened to be as opposed to its position in relation to law.®® Legal 
status, then, takes precedence over the circumstances of birth. Marriage and remarriage 
in Magnesia are meant to be smooth, almost mechanical processes whereby a rooteulled 
number of children will be produced in order to inherit a controlled number of 
properties and thus preserve the unity, harmony and functions of Magnesia.
Dowries
Any inquiry into the Athenian Stranger's conception of the family in the hypothetical 
city-state of Magnesia, or the role of its women, must iocls^de the subject of dowries. In 
addition to the sort of restrictions of romantic choice discussed above, constraints are 
also to be placed on the amount of wealth expended when a woman weds. At 742c2-5, 
the Athenian Stranger says that ‘when a man marries or gives someone in marriage, he 
must neither impart nor obtain any dowry (Tpotll) whatsoever'. It turns out that a 
minimal amount of money may be given as something Hke a dowry but the figures are 
rather small by comparison to known Athenian dowries.
There, a girl's future might depend heavily on her dowry. Without one, she could 
end up an ‘old maid' as early as the age of fifteen.®' The removal of dowries from 
Magnesia is striking. Since, at Athens, the father of the family had ‘legal control of.. .his 
wife's dowry even after his son's majority', there may be something ‘liberating' about
1® Code of Gortyn VIII.42-IX.17.
135 (1997), p. 169.
136 Cf. Ogden (1996) did Laws 930dl-e2 for an account, albeit brief, of how rulings on the status of 
children are to be decided ‘when there is no dispute about the parentage of offspring’. The Athenian 
Stranger appears to be not particularly fearful, as one might expect from a typical Athenian of his day, 
about an infestation of illegitimate offspring, against all propriety, ravaging innocent households. of 
course, the author of the Laws was not typical in many respects and he either did not anticipate this to 
be a problem in his hypothetical state or he thought that existing institutions (like the Marriage 
Guardians) could easily cope with it.
*® Pomeroy (1997), p. 178.
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thek exciiion®3® This restriction, amongst others, appears to fall under the state’s fiscal 
policies designed to assert a kind of stratified equality within the Magnesian economy. It 
is part of the Athenian Stranger’s plan to eliminate gaps between property classes (as is 
the policy of citizens being encouraged to wed outside thek property class) and so help 
Magnesia to achieve its goal of being a ‘friend unto itself (701 d). Perhaps having no 
dowry to provoke a domestic dispute would work to the benefit of the oikos.
This economic policy, of which these limitations are a part, influences many 
aspects of Magnesian Hfe. The Athenian Stranger has forbidden such things as the 
loaning of money and charging of interest (742c sq.). These are deemed harmful to the 
city’s concord. Magnesians are prohibited from possessing gold or silver (except on 
foreign expeditions) and, for thek day-to-day purposes, they are meant to use a currency 
that is ‘honoured amongst themselves but valueless to other people’ (742a6). He favours 
what he perceives to be a Spartan custom on the matter13®
This is the policy outlined in Xenophon’s account of Spartan currency after 
Lykourgos’ reforms ‘such that even ten minae could not be brought into the house 
without the master and servants knowing as it would take up a lot of space and requke a 
wagon to move it; there were also searches for gold and skver, and if any was found, the 
possessor was punished’.* 4® However, as Hodkinson says, ‘contrary to the programmatic 
statements in literary sources, a range of evidence indicates official possession and use of 
precious metal currency before 404’?2i It appears that some kind of kon-ingot currency 
was actually in ckculation in ancient Sparta even if it was not the only kind avakabee.ni
The Magnesian prohibition against dowries appears to be consistent with the 
spkit of Lakonian ideals if not actual practice. The third-century claim that this was also
I3® Strauss (1993), p. 65.
*3 Cf. Rep. 547b-548b on the perceived overthrow of these values that characterised Spartan decline. 
Burnett (1976), p. 3 and plate I.l, discusses the use of weighted metal ingots as a means of exchange 
amongst cultures of the ancient near East and Early Roman transactions that were conducted through 
the use of uncast bronze lumps (the so-called aes rude) or bronze bars with a large component of iron 
(the aes 5/gnatum).
*4® Lak. Pol. VI. 5-6; Polybios {Hist. IV, 45, 4-6) also says that money was esteemed of no value 
among the Spartans. Yet the apparently diminished significance of wealth amongst the Spartans 
probably represents an ethos from an idealised past that either never happened or was no longer in 
practice by the time of Plato’s Laws. As even Xenophon {Lak:. Pol. XIV.3-4) reports, ‘in former days 
they were afraid to be discovered possessing gold; but nowadays there are some who boastfully display 
their property’.
141 (2000), p. 167. Sparta minted no coinage of her own until the 260s or 250s. As he says, ‘several 
sources from the fourth century onwards claim that gold and silver coinage issued by other states was 
excluded by Lykourgos and that this prohibition remained in force until 404 when the booty sent to 
Sparta by Lysander was admitted for public use’.
* Svoronos (1906), pp. 192-202 suggests that they might have taken the form of a roasting spit, or 
obelos—hence the subsequent use of the related term obolos in Southern Greek coinage systems. Cf. 
Hodkinson (2000), pp. 162-4.
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the ancient Spartan ttadition is probably a later ‘invention of revolutionary 
propaganda’.??® The reasons given by Plutarch for the alleged removal of dowries from 
Sparta were, in characteristically egalitarian tones, ‘so that none may be left unmarried 
because of poverty or sought eagerly because of affluence’?*? This bears similarity to 
Magnesian ideology and again one is inclined to wonder, as with the ephebeia (discussed in 
my chapter III), if Plato’s writings did not exert some influence on the later nobo**45 
His version, however, is designed to correct the errors that he perceived in realty. 
Property is specifically targeted. A transfer of material goods seems to have 
accompanied Spartan brides from the 6* and 5* centuries onwards and Aristotle’s 
reference to this as a proix may be a ‘loose’ way of describing the practice as analogous to 
the Athenian one?® He says that Spartan women had ‘large dowries’, loaned money at 
interest and were able to own and inherit property? These particular Lakonian 
elements, if true, have been carefully excluded from the second-best polis.
Also in keeping with later lyykourgan sentiments, the Athenian Stranger indicates 
that ‘to be exceedingly wealthy and at the same time to be good is impossible’ (742e6-7). 
To this end, the Magnesian constitution is geared toward encouraging a state of 
socialised moderation amongst the populace. The prohibition against dowries is 
expounded on in more detail at 774c-e. In theory, members of the poorest property 
class have an equal opportunity to make a good marriage since no dowry wiU necessarily 
liimit either their choice of potential partners or their future economic or social prospects. 
The Athenian Stranger adds that this problem will be eliminated since ‘the necessities of 
life are to be available to aU of the citizens within the polls' (774c5-6).
Another reason given for the exclusion of dowries in Magnesia is that it wUl 
make women less hybristic and encourage their husbands to avoid humiliating servility
*4® Hodkinson (2000), p. 98; cf. Patterson (1998), p. 250.
144Afor. 227 sq., Hermippos fr. 87 apud Athenaios 555c. According to Plut. Mor. 242b, ‘c poor 
[Spartan] girl, being asked what dowry she brought to the man who married her, replied, “the family 
sOphrosynS".
ii Hodkinson (2000), p. 44-5, 72 end 93-4 for third-century Spartan revolutionary connections with 
Plato (and esp. the Laws). Cf. Cartledge (2001), pp. 119-120 on Aristotle’s criticism of Kretan and 
Spartan dowries end inheritance lews
I® Hodkinson (2000), p. 99. The Code of Gortyn (VI.9-12) also refers to the transfer of property to e 
bride by her father end indicates that, as in Sparta, it remained under her control. 
l4’ Cartledge (1981), p. 98, argues that ‘what Aristotle calls “large dowries” were really... marriage- 
settlements consisting of landed property together with any movables that a rich father (or mother) sew 
fit to bestow on e daughter’. Cf. Pomeroy (1997), p. 55; for Hellenistic end Romen sources on Spartan 
‘dowries’ cf. Plut, Mor. 227f-228e, Lys. XXX.5-6; Ael. VH VI.6; Ath. XIII.555c end Justin 111.3.8.
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(SouXeia) on account of money (77/T7)74.i® As Saundets has said, ‘a wife with a large 
dowry enjoyed a certain edge in domestic arguments'.**® There is some indication that 
this may have presented a point of concern for some ancient Greek husbands. ‘When 
talking about the corrgrtoess of the decision not to have dowries', says Fisher, ‘he seems 
to speak the traditional language of Greek males'.*®
There was the possibiE-ty that a wife might ‘lord' their dowry over her husband as 
leverage for a position of power. As Gardner says, ‘marriage to a woman of greater 
wealth could be viewed as a loss of freedom'.*®* One way that a woman could possess 
and control wealth (and therefore freedom), to an extent, was through her dowry. It is 
possible that the Athenian Stranger, in making his rules on this subject, is rrniog to 
prevent Magnesian women from having such an option. Only a limited amount of 
money may be committed to a Magnesian bride's apparel without incurring a fine equal 
in value to the sum illegally spent. The legal amounts are up to 50 drachmae (1/2 minae) 
for the lowest property class, up to 100 (one mind) for the third, up to 150 (one and Vz 
minae) for the second and up to 200 (two minae) for the first class (77^<dl^5).
These figures can be better understood when compared to actual dowries of 
which we .have some knowledge. Isaios says that twenty minae would be insufficient if 
offered by a man of property and he asks if ten minae are suitable for the dowry of a 
freeborn girl given in marriage to a bridegroom worth three talent*.1® Demosthenes 
mentions a dowry of two talents and eighty minae put forth by a wealthy citizen when his 
daughter wed.1® Plato himself reported a planned expenditure of thirty minae for his 
niece's marriage to Sp^esliipuor054 Ancient Kretan dowries seem to have been limited to 
about one hundred staters, but this is not clearly expressed and there were probably ways 
around it15® Moreover, both in Classical Athens and on Krete, the dowry remained the 
property of the bride for her upkeep but under a kind of administration by her husband. 
It had to be returned to her in the event of seppa-nmon.1® It follows, therefore, that a wife
148 hpptg 5k fjvtov Yvvai£i; Justinian (iii. 3) seems to. have adopted Plato’s attitude and speaks of 
dowries as ‘frena’.
149 Saunders (1970), p. 254, n. 14.
150 (1992), p. 480; cf. too ibidF. n. 119.
‘9' (1987), p. 14.
1® XI.40; III.49.
‘99 XXVII, 42-5; cf. Archippe’s huge dowry, Dem. XLV. 28. It consisted of ‘a talent from Peparethos, 
a talent from here, a lodging house worth 100 minai, female slaves, the gold jewellery and other things 
of hers’.
154 Letter XIII, 361d-e.
*® Code of Gortyn Col. X. 14-20
*99 ibid. Col. Ill, 40-44; also for Athenian regulations on women, regardless of their social class, who 
reclaimed their dowries cf. Isae. III.8 and III.78. For examples of widows’ dowries, cf. Dem. XXVII.
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with a large dowry could potentially have used it to influence her husband. She could 
conceivably employ the threat of divorce that, if undertaken, might then result in his 
having to render the appointed sum almost immediately. No text exphcitly states that the 
dowry had to be returned on divorce, but, as Sealey indicates, ‘the coherence of 
principles in the Athenian law of marriage suggests that it did have to be refunded in that 
event’.*®’ If she had a very large dowry, a divorce could be rather costly for an ex­
husband. It was, as Lacey says, ‘deemed to be her share of her paternal estate, a share set 
apart for her maintenance’.*5®
There is some indication that there was a type of inheritance similar to dowries 
whereby a Spartan daughter might receive part or all of her household estate when she 
mame*,1®9 Although their constitution supposedly forbade the buying and selling of 
estates (as with Magnesia), it permitted anyone who wished to transfer land through gifts 
and bequests (unhke Magnesia). As a result, according to Aristotle, nearly two-fifths of 
Spartan land seems to have come into the possession of citizen-women up to the time of 
the Battle of Leuktm.* 160 Aristotle criticised this poHcy suggesting that a firmer regulation 
of dowries would have been a better answen161
The Athenian Stranger seems to be seeking to prevent any instability amongst his 
5040 land allotments and evidently was well aware of the ‘flaws’ in constitutions of his 
day regarding such matters. By prohibiting dowries and strictly limiting a bride’s 
trousseaux, he has excluded from Magnesian women a measure of power that many 
other ancient Greek women apparently enjoyed. This is ostensibly done with the intent 
of preserving concord and encouraging economic stability. In the next chapter, we shall 
see what kind of exchange they obtain for the loss of such hberties.
5, 13-14, 13 with id. XLV, 28; Isae. VIII.8; Lysias XXXII.6; and see Hypereides (390-322b.c.e.), 
Lykophron, 1.5 where a widow’s kurios (her brother) arranged her marriage, but her child’s guardian, 
who was administrating her first dowry, provided her with the dowry.
,3’(1990), p. 29.
‘3 (1968), p. 109.
i5® According to Plutarch {Moralia 227 sq), the Spartan lawgiver had forbidden dowries by legislation 
believing, much as the Athenian Stranger, that character rather than wealth should determine the choice 
of a bride.
160 ££ pomeroy (1997), p. 43. Hodkinson (2000), pp. 98-103, on this complex passage from the 
Politics of Aristotle. He indicates, p. 103, that ‘Even if one rejects my hypothesis of universal female 
inheritance and prefers to view landed dowries as voluntary gifts, it is apparent that by the fourth 
century marriage-settlements were often quite large’. See next note.
16* Politics 1269bl2-1270a6. Aristotle, in his statement about ‘heiresses’ and ‘dowries’, could have 
been referring, says Blundell, ‘somewhat inaccurately, to two types of female inheritance, one where 
the daughter inherited the entire estate, and one where she received a share of it on marriage’ (1995), p. 
156.
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Cottect Ptocteetion
A major telos of Magnesia’s policies is the maximum degree of happiness for all citizens 
of the state as a whole. The oikos is crucial for the achievement of this goal. In addition 
to being semi-independent ‘engines’ of socialisation (‘indoctrination’) into Magnesian 
ethics such as andreia and arete, the family must also serve the obvious function of 
producing new citizens to populate the city. The people will be told that the generation 
of offspring is Hke the divine act of creation. The Athenian Stranger has prepared a 
speech for his hypothetical colonists that is calculated to drive home the notion that 
every Y^VEGIQ fashions an instrument for helping to secure the happiness of the 
universe as a whole (903c). They are encouraged, in a manner of speaking, to ‘be fruitful 
and multiply’, but their population must not exceed 5040 household urnis.162 The state 
wih take measures to ensure a stable population according to the Athenian Stranger’s 
prescriptions. These include, but are not limited to methods of contraception and 
abortion, along with fertHty treatments as necessar*.* 1 *®3 * Excess offspring, as we have 
seen, may be dispatched to a cdon*.®*
The Athenian Stranger’s proposed speech contains the exhortation, appealing to 
basic human nature, that they ‘must naturally hold onto the Everlasting by always leaving 
behind children and grandchildren that they may render service unto the God’.*® The 
subject of the procreative act itself is primary factor in the Athenian Stranger’s 
comprehensive approach to the Magnesian household. He has provided some 
constitutional guidelines on correct procreation for married couples that have the force 
of law. Both marital partners are exhorted to engage in the act of procreation with a full 
sense of responsibHty and propriety ‘especially when no children have been born to 
them’ (783d8-784al). He urges that no procreation should take place when either parent
’92 5040 is the smallest number that may be divided by the numbers 12, 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 
without a remainder. This ar^^^i^^^^ical peculiarity makes an easy division for administrative purposes. 
But the number of citizens is huge for an ancient polis', as Nixon and Price (1990), pp. 162-3 say, ‘Plato 
in certain parts of the Laws takes over current practices from Athens or other states; with the number of 
citizens he is led by theoretical principles to offer e number much larger then that possible for the 
majority of tribute payers’. This was a concern for Aristotle in the Politics (see above). But 
Magnesia’s monetary policies are designed to function without the need for tribute payers.
l®3 Laws 740d; the ‘highest and most distinguished’ official is to be appointed to oversee population
control. Cf. also 818d8, Protagoras 345d, and Simonides Fr. 5. Cf. Hippokretes (4’ b.c.e.) Nature of
Women 98, for herbal methods of contraception available end, also, Lefkowitz and Fant (1982), pp. 88­
9.
164 740c4-e6.
l®5 ...dScov Ke/taLeuTCovTCC del tcp 0ec5 bTcpetac; dv0 cbrco TaeaCSbbvai.—773e5-774al.
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is intoxicated in order to prevent damage to the foetus (775b4-e3). Sexual congress -in 
Magnesia is to be a sober affair.
To ensure that the correct pruceeuees are followed by married couples, several 
Magnesian women wil be chosen as Marriage Supervisors to observe couples for up to 
ten years—providing that rhUdego come in suitable numbers (784a sq.). If a couple does 
not produce their quota of offspring, then they have two options. Either they may 
divorce or receive counselling at the hands of government officials. If, having been duly 
rounse^ed, they stil are unable to fulfil theic marital duties regarding teknopoiia, then ‘the 
female officials will go into the home of the young people and admonish and threaten 
them to cease theic error and ignorance' (784c2-4). Faiure to comply may result in 
deprivation of the priviege of attending weddings and parties celebrating births (with 
stringent penalties for defying the ban—784dl-5). The Magnesian state officials use the 
fear of shame as a preventative measure to ensure obedience. If some citizens should 
disobey, more public forms of shame may be deployed against them.1®6
Drawing an analogy from the behaviour of animals, tlie Athenian Stranger 
suggests an ideal mode of behaviour for his hypothetical populace in terms of marital 
fidelity. He asserts that the citizens' standards should not be lower than those of the 
beasts and birds.®' Whether this analogy reflects true cooeltloos in nature, or even 
common beliefs on the matter, is not really the OliCnr.1®® It is a ‘pharmacological' model 
propagandisticaUy embraced by Magnesia's authorisier.1®9 Citizens are expected to engage 
in proper sexual relations only within state-approved marriages between members of the 
opposite sex. ‘Idea^y no man', says the Athenian Stranger, ‘would dare to have sexual 
relations with a respectable free-woman other than his wedded wife, nor would he dare
‘®9 Cf. my chapters IV and VII.
‘o’ ..when they arrive at the appropriate age, a husband is wedded to a wife, as a matter of personal 
preference (Kara %&piv), and a wife to a husband, and for their remaining time they live piously and 
justly, being staunchly true to their first love-contracts’ (840d6-el). Cf. Eur. Hel. 190.
‘®9 Cp. Hdt. 11.64 and IV. 180 for a contrasting animalistic analogy. At 11.64, he indicates that ‘only the 
Egyptians and the Greeks’ do not behave like animals since they forbade sexual intercourse in temples 
(e.g. unlike the Babylonians and other barbarians). At IV. 180, he discusses the savage Machyles and 
Auses (tribes near Libya) who share their women in common ‘like animals’. Cf. Rosellini and Said 
(1978), p. 965 on Herodotos’ slanted ethnography of‘savage’ promiscuity amongst foreign peoples and 
cf. my chapter VII for more on this analogy in Plato. Egyptian suggests that they placed
less emphasis on virginity and same-sex intercourse than the Athenians of Plato’s era (Channel 4, 
2002b).
‘69 Cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 153-6, 159-62 on Platonic pharmaka. In contrast to Plato, Diogenes the Cynic, 
in his hypothetical constitution, considered promiscuity with mutual consent to be the most satisfactory 
sexual arrangement and he regarded the sexual act as not especially private (Diogenes Laertes VI.72, 
97). On comparable modes of sexual propaganda cf. Xen. Lak. Pol. 1.7-9 for alleged Spartan wife 
swapping and Herodotos who portrayed barbarian cultures as being sexually promiscuous, cf. 1.203,
III. 101, IV. 180 and also Rosellini and Said (1978), pp. 955-66.
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to sow unacceptable and bastard seed among concubines, nor sterile seed in males 
contrary to nature’ (841 dl^).* ’®
This may, in part, reflect Plato’s disapproval of Athenian customs, especially after 
414, that permitted men to entertain ‘legitimate’ relations with concubines.*’* The 
Magnesians are clearly intended to follow a higher standard of marital behaviour. Yet 
there is some indication that they might not always live up to the ideal. Plato’s narrator 
speculates on making a law in the event that some citizen’s virtue falls short. He says;
If a man should have sexual intercourse with anyone, whether she be 
hired or procured by some other means, other than the woman he led 
into his household before die gods in sacred matrimony, except he keep it 
secret: from all other men and women, I think we would do rightiy in passing a 
law excluding him from state honours since he is in fact no better dian a 
foreigner [emphasis mine].*’2
Magnesia’s policies on legal intercourse, while similar to those at Athens, promote a 
different emphasis and, perhaps to some extent, reflect more Lakonian ideals. No 
penalty is mentioned for Magnesian women caught in adultery but a comparable sort of 
limited social disenfranchisement would seem to apply to them as well. The 
punishments that breaking this law would incur appear to act largely as psychological 
deterrents. Anyone actually caught and penalised (i.e. for not having the propriety to 
keep an affair secret) would serve as a powerful, shame-based warning to others. Given 
the scrutiny under which aU Magnesians live, one is inclined to wonder when or if they 
would ever have die opportunity to undertake such activities. Even so, there seems to be 
some uncertainty on Plato’s narrator’s part as to how far the state may infringe on the 
bedroom.
i” Cf. my chapter VII on the issue of same-sex liaisons.
I’* Rhodes (1981), p. 331, MacDowell (1978), p. 89-90 and Harrison (1971), pp. 13-17; cf. Dem. 
XXIII, Aristotle, Ath.. Pol. LIII, Gell. XV.30.vi and Ath. XIII. Before Perikles’ law, the male offspring 
of such unions could become citizens; afterward, with emphasis squarely focused on the mother’s 
legitimacy, they were regarded as bastards (nothoi). Cf. Harrison (1971), pp. 24-8, 61-8 for an 
assemblage of the evidence on mixed marriages and bastards. The law on citizenship was relaxed, 
whether officially or otherwise, in the closing years of the Peloponnesian wars (see below).
*72 841 d6-e4... dot; 6vxco; 6vxa ^evixdv. Some question remains as to whether or not this law has 
actually been (or will be) passed. The laws on sexual conduct present considerable difficulties in 
interpretation. For more on this subject, cf. my chapters VI and VII. ... chc; bvxco; 6vxa £eviK6v 
compares well with Matthew xviii.15-17, where ‘if your brother [or sister] does something wrong’ the 
prescribed remedy is to make it known to the public (the church) and thereby, one may interpret, 
discourage them from further wrongdoing through shame and public censure.
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Adultery is one thing but rape is quite another. The latter is to show no quarter 
in the second-best polis. If a Magnesian man should use force in a sexual manner against 
either a free woman or a youth, says the Aflienian Stranger, then he will be slain with 
impunity by the individual who has been forcefully ‘outraged’ or by members of that 
one’s immediate, male kinship-group*’® As Fisher observes, this law is very similar to 
that at Athens in terms of the punishment of the rapist*’4 It is not known how often 
rapists were actually put to death and Lysias I may not be paradigmatic*’® The 
Magnesian penalty, however, will apply in almost every case and seems harsher as a 
result. If a male citizen of the second-best state should commit tape, then he would have 
proven himself lacking in sophrosyne, not to mention arete and andreia. Such an individual 
would be regarded as an enemy to Magnesia, her laws and citizens. Rapists are to be 
treated with contempt equal to parricides.
The harshness of Magnesia’s penalty for rape and the somewhat lessened 
emphasis on adultery are both a notable shift in values from those of Athens—if not 
necessarily in legality. In the case of the latter, an ideological distinction existed between 
rape and adultery that especially reflected the concerns of men. Adultery implied 
seduction and possibly some consent on the part of the woman while tape denoted 
neither*’® Both Dover and Pomeroy see the speaker in Lysias I {against Eratosthenes) as 
responding to the fact that adultery was more of a potential threat to the husband’s status 
than was rape.*77 It is another matter whether or not such sentiments wete reflected in 
law. As Harrison says, ‘the speaker in this case may be disingenuous, and his 
“sociological justification” may reflect the fact that he knows that he is being 
disingenuous’*’® The idea that adultery deserved greater emphasis may have appealed to 
the men that comprised Lysias’ audience. Seduction and passion were perceived to play 
greater roles in luring a woman into adultery than free will. Herodotos does not utilise 
such terms as ‘force’ or ‘consent’ in reference to Alexandros’ sexual liaisons with Helen. 
Instead, the character Proteos condemns him for having seduced her, for ‘exciting her
i’3 874c2-5.
i’4 (1992), p. 482; cf. Dem. XXIII.53; and cf. too Morrow (1960), p. 465 sq. and MacDowell (1978), 
pp. 89, 124 for Athenian parallels.
175 Cf. my chapter VII and below. 
i’® Cf. Omitowoju (2002), pp. 113-114
Cf. Dover (1974), p. 147 and Pomeroy (1975), p. 87. Cohen (1990), p. 148, indicates, ‘whereas 
modern law focuses on coercive, non-consensuel sexual transactions, making rape the pre-eminent 
sexual delict, Athenian law accords this place of honour to adultery, which is clearly the paradigmatic 
sexual offence’. But see below.
i’® (1997), p. 191. Cf. Harris (1990) for this view of Lysias I,
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passion’ and then violating the hospitality of his host.1’® As Harrison suggests, ‘it appears 
that arousing passion or excitement in a woman is actually a worse crime than mere rape. 
(The fact that he arouses her passion only after the initial seduction might suggest that 
their initial meeting was non-consensual.)’1®®
The Athenian concept of moicheia applied to both the woman seduced and the 
man who was seducing her. A woman taken in adultery, as Sealey says, ‘was not treated 
as criminally guilty or legally liable; for she was not tried...she was a passive object in 
adultery, as in the conclusion of marriage’.* ®* Her reputation, however, accrued public 
shame.1 ®2 she would experience, as Todd aptly calls it, ‘the female equivalent to atimid™ 
The woman’s perceived passivity connects, in some ways, with the Dover/Foucault 
construction of ancient Greek sexuality along penetrator/penetrated lines; but, it is 
perhaps more revealing about the way that men viewed women in regard to sex rather 
than how women viewed sex or themtelve4.184 This active/passive dichotomy is 
highlighted in the sophist Corgias’ Enccomium of Helen. He argues that, if she was in fact 
seduced by Paris, then ‘the persuader, because he compelled, is gutity; but the persuaded, 
because she was compelled by his speech, is wrongly reproached’.*®® In Euripides 'Tryan 
Women, however, she is not so easily acquitted despite her clever use of Gorgias’ 
suggested argyiments.1®6 Hekuba relendessly presses her case against Helen. This, as 
Croally says, is ‘an extreme rhetorical move of generalizing her attack into one of 
irrationality, sexuality, desire and woman (Helen and Aphrodite are taken as 
representative of these disturbing factors)’.1®’
i’® Hdt. II. 115.4-5.
180 (i997), p. 191. These sentiments are echoed in Lysias I (32 sq.) where the object of violent assault 
is said to hate her attacker, but the psyche of a woman seduced was seen to be damaged. 
m Sealey (1990), p. 29.
182 Ibid. p. 194. As Omitowoju (2002), p. 114 indicates, ‘in this punishment we have the social aspect 
of the offence spelled out to us because the punishment is designed to demonstrate before the whole 
city, defined in its religious configuration... who possesses respectability and who does not’.
’2® (1993), p. 279.
1®4 Cf. my chapters I and VII.
*2® Note the use of active and passive language construction—whether in Greek or English;
6 p£v obv Teiciai; cb; dvayKdaa; dtSiKei, t 5fc TtetaOetaa 6; dvayKaaOeiCTa tcp X6yco (idcrqv 
b,Koo>er KaKCoi; (12-13).
’2® Croally (1994), p. 155, indicates that Helen ‘uses the first, second and last of Gorgias’ arguments (as 
well as some of her own). It was Aphrodite who offered her to Paris (929-31), thus making her 
abduction a decision of the gods (Gorg. Hel. 6.); Paris married her by force (962/ Hel. 7); and 
Aphrodite, the goddess of love, is a powerful divinity who cannot be resisted (940, 945-50/ Hel. 19)’. 
But Menelaos condemns her claiming (1037) that she went willingly.
1®’ (1994), p. 157. and even Helen, as Croally pp. 156-7 says, ‘explicitly admits that she is talking 
about the irrational’; Euripides’ Hekuba ‘ridicules Helen’s story of Aphrodite’s presence’ and ‘from the 
substance of the arguments themselves, it would have been difficult for the audience to decide whom to 
favour as a winner of the debate (something they may have been able to do with Medea, or 
Andromache, or Hecuba)’.
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Matching perhaps the Athenian perception of the crime, there were severe social 
and psychological penalties for women found guilty of being seduced. It was 
compulsory for her to be swiftly eivorcer.1® Thereafter she could be kept permanently in 
an unwed stae*,1®9 with an additional psychological penalty (as in Magnesia) of being 
deprived of the right to attend public festivalr.19o ‘The ban on marriage', as Ogden says, 
‘(a thing regarded as a woman's due and raison d'etre) and the ban on religious 
participation (the basis of a woman's social Hfe) would have been devastating'.*®* This 
seems quite harsh but many would have considered her corrupted through seduction.®2 
Aiskhines supports the idea of seduced women being banned from pubHc sacrifices on 
the grounds that they might corrupt other women present. He adds that, as part of their 
penalty, it was forbidden for them to be adorned with jewellery or fine clothes. If she 
defied this, then her garments could be pubHcly stripped from her on condition that, in 
doing so, no one cause her bodily harm. Not only might she not be allowed to remarry 
but she would also have to bear the pubHc shame of her crime for the remainder of her 
Hfe.®®
The law in Athens urged the shunning of such women along with proactive ‘self­
help' on the part of their husbands. It could impose a loss of civic rights (attimid) on a 
man who failed to divorce his wife after winning the case against her adulserer.®4 
Demosthenes and Aristotle teU us that a male citizen could kil with impunity an 
adulterer (or seducer) caught in fkigrante with his mother, sister, daughter or wie*.®5 This 
practice seems to have been seldom employed in the Classical era but was not altogether 
unheard of. The Athenians appear to have preferred a type of pubHc humiiation 
inflicted on a male adulterer by the husband rather than the more barbarous act of 
mudde*.®6 This shaming might take the form of a pubHc beating by the cuckolded 
husband and his mates or the offending party could, as Ogden says, ‘also be subjected to 
rapbanidosis, which involved the singeing off of their pubic hair with hot ash, and tlie
*99 Dem. LIX.86-7.
199 Hypereides, Lykophron 1.12-13
®9 Aiskhines (1.182-3) indicates that, for an Athenian woman, not being able to dress up for the 
festivals ‘made life not worth living’. Cf. Sealey (1990), pp. 28-9.
*91 (1997), p. 29; cf. Aiskhines’ 1.183 for the observation that Solon wanted to make the life of an 
adulterous woman ‘unlivable’. Cf. Plut. Sol. 23, where Solon stops a man from having the righ to sell 
his daughter or sister into slavery ‘unless he should find her in [unsanctioned] intercourse with a man’. 
®9l183 sq.
®9 Lysias 1.33. Plutarch {Solon XXIII.2) says that Solon’s law decreed that an Athenian girl seduced 
into adultery be sold into slavery.
®4 Sealey (1990), p. 29.
®>9 Cf. Dem. XXIiI.53-6; cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. LVII.3, for lawful killings associated with adultery.
®9 Lysias 1.49, Ar. Clouds 1083, Wealth 168,
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insertion of a radish or fish (a skorpios or a mullet) into their anus’.*®’ It is possibly 
indicative of then androcentric character that neither Magnesia nor Athens seems to be 
quite so concerned about seductresses—unless perhaps they were foreigner*.1®
The Athenian Stranger’s proposed law on adultery, as with many of his laws, 
necessitates state intervention in areas where Athens preferred self-help. This is one 
significant aspect in which Magnesia’s mores might be seen as rather alien to those of 
Athens. However, not unhke Athens, the laws appear to place more importance on 
penalising the male seducer than the female. Nussbaum has suggested that Plato had a 
‘special worry about the loss of male bodily fluids that are important for reproduction, in 
connection with his persistent worries about population’.*® Whether this is an accurate 
statement of Plato’s thinking or not is impossible to say. His narrator does appear 
somewhat less concerned over the chastity of women and legitimacy of offspring than 
was apparently the case amongst the ancient Athinians.2®
The Magnesian government is designed to take an active interest in maintaining 
the stable populace of 5040. Marital sex would appear to have less moral significance 
than it has practical necessity. This is demonstrated by the Athenian Stranger’s support 
for methods of contraception, abortion and fertility treatments. As we have seen, a 
loophole has been provided by which some men might engage in adultery with women 
who are other than citizens—in spite of being strongly discouraged from doing so. In 
the Laws, as Field says, ‘strict monogamy is the rule, and Plato expresses strong 
disapproval of aU extra-marital intercourse, though he does not think it practicable to 
forbid it by law’.20* The strictness of the rule of monogamy in Magnesia is upheld less by 
the legal code and more through psychological influences involving shame and fear.2®
'9’ (1997), p. 28.
i® Cf. my chapter III on Aspasia.
199 (1994), p. 1579. Nussbaum cites Dover who ‘suggests that loss of semen plays such c large role in 
folklore end psychopathology that one may wonder whether Plato thought that semen was a 
nonrenewable resource’. She attests that she received c letter from Sir Kenneth Dover highlighting this 
phenomenon but does not include it in her article.
200 Dem. XLVII.53. Diogenes Laertius (11.26) alleged that the Athenians temporarily loosened some of 
their stringent policies on legitimacy and marital sanctity after the Sicilian disaster end plague of 413, 
when they were faced with an immediate need to repopulete their state (he says that Sokrates had two 
wives). Rhodes (1981), p. 331, says that ‘the lew was still in force in 414 (Ar. Av. 1649-52), but in the 
lest years of the Peloponnesian War it was either annulled or ignored’. The Athenian concern had been 
and, later, continued to be over legitimacy lest en adulterer impregnate a men’s wife end the issuing 
offspring being reared as if it were e ‘proper’ heir; cf. Lysias 1.33. Cf. MacDowell (1978), p. 91, where 
he indicates that ‘the decree making a concubine’s children legitimate, if it did exist, must have been 
annulled by the end of the fifth century; in the fourth-century, it is clear that only the children of c duly 
married wife were legitimate’.
29’ (1969), p. 123. On the subject of matrimony in Plato’s Laws, Field says that ‘his attitude is in many 
respects the same as that expressed in the words of our English Prayer Book, so distressingly 
unromantic to modern taste. The institution of marriage, we read there, is ordained first for the
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Despite a lessened significance on legitimacy, the Athenian Stranger does not 
propose the sort of sexual license that Xenophon and Plutarch suggest was the case 
amongst the Spartans. Plutarch ioetcares that they regarded adultery and rape as hardly a 
crime at ah.20® Xenophon does not mention adultery and Plutarch goes out of his way to 
deny that it existed. ‘Plutarch seems to have been technically correct', as Partleege says, 
‘and this is a remarkable comment on the emphasis laid on the extra-marital maintenance 
of the male citizen population at Sparta'.* 204 * * * 208 *It may have been the case that there was no 
law on adultery in Sparta except amongst the royal famige2.555 Our lack of knowledge 
about rape and adultery in the lower classes may be due to the small number of non- 
Spartans that had the chance to hear about them.®® Polybius and Strabo both suggest 
that the Eohors had encouraged sexual license amongst citizens and helots as a means of 
survival in times of conflict when legitimate fathers were few and this precedent may 
have discouraged the rrhoioalisatioo of extra-marital iotercouyse.207 The Athenian 
Stranger does not borrow the Spartans' allegedly lax sexual mores for Magnesia, but his 
greater interest in population stability over legitimacy of offspring appears to favour their 
values more than Athenian ones.
The ancient Kretans, in contrast, appear to have preferred an elaborate system of 
fines for various degrees of adultery according to the economic and social status of tlie 
participants (nominal fines were stipulated for adultery with slaves and the like.-20® 
Kretan law, like Athenian, refers to the ‘seduction' of the woman in cases of adultery. It 
was sometimes called the ‘sins of a wife'.®® The Athenian Stranger does not seem to be 
particularly concerned with women being seduced. It goes without saying that a female 
citizen of the second-best polis ought to have better self control. But he does not 
penalise them in the same way as the Athenians.
procreation of children, and secondly, as ‘a remedy against sin’ (p. 124)’. Extra-marital liaisons are not 
forbidden in Magnesia, although, as we have seen, they are strongly discouraged.
®2 Cf. my chapters III and IV.
244 Lyk,. 49c sq. and Xen. Lak,. Pol. 1.6-10.
204 (2001), p. 125.
224 The only adultery that we know of in ancient Sparta, aside from the literary case Helen and 
Alexandras, was the reported instance of Queen Timaea who bore a son fathered by Alkibiades (Plut, 
Aik,. XXIII.7-8; Ages. III. 1-2). Anaxandridas allegedly resorted to bigamy rather than adultery because 
he had no children by his first wife (Hdt. V.39-41). It is precisely because they were about nobles that 
these stories bore significance enough to be recorded.
2* Pomeroy (1997), p. 56.
707 Polyb. XII.6b5; Strabo VI.3.3 {279-80}; but as Pomeroy (1997), p. 56., indicates, this may be an 
aetiological myth to account for the pre-existing phenomenon of sexual license.
208 Code of Gortyn, 11.10-27.
220 27W. II, 10-15;Lacey (1968) p. 113.
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The Magnesian regulations impose no fines, trifling or otherwise, for adultery and 
against it stands the psychological threat of public shame along with partial (and 
presumably temporary) disenfranchisement—only if caught. Rape earns the discouraging 
penalty of a violent death. Magnesia’s moral imperative of arete would ideally preclude 
engaging in such sexual acts that are deemed shameful, immoderate and/or criminal. 
Lacey theorises that Plato’s narrator is reacting against Athenian attitudes that permitted 
men extra-marital relations providing that they were not with women of some other 
citizen’s immediate famity.212 But is he? Theoretically, the Magnesian citizens should not 
partake of extra-marital affairs but, in practice, they could do so with relative impunity. 
The laws do not forbid such things but societal values strongly discourage them. The 
rule of moderation is intended to control the passions of Magnesia’s citizen-elite in order 
to facilitate tlieir pursuit of arete.
Child/Parent Relations
The Magnesian family hierarchy is primarily patriarchal. Men play an active role in terms 
of their authority within the household. The Athenian Stranger’s ‘hierarchy of betters’ 
posits that ‘parents are the superiors of children, and men (<dv5pE£) of both women and 
children, since rulers are superior to the ruled’.210 11 212We may deduce from this, that the 
father is meant to hold the highest position of authority within the household. 
Magnesian mothers likewise appear to have some authority (second to fathers) but their 
principal role remains that of bearing offspring. As Chodorow indicates, women have 
been traditionally ‘defined as wives and mothers, thus in particularistic relation to 
someone else, whereas men are defined primarily in univErsaHstir occupational tErms’.222 
The father is kyrios of the Magnesian estate and his male heir (by blood or adoption) then 
becomes the next kyrios. It is the Magnesian father who makes out the will and it is to his 
line of relatives that primacy is accorded (for the purpose of designating the new male 
heir to be kyno^ in the event that he should die intestate (924e2-925al).
Very little is said about the actual relationship between Magnesian fathers and 
their offspring. The role of the father will be to direct the household. It is fair to say 
that the model of masculinity that he is exhorted to follow is ‘idealised or accorded
210 (1968), p. 114.
2,1 917a4-6, cf. my chapter VI.
212 (1978), p. 178.
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superiority’ and this makes it desirable for male youths to imitate by example.2’3 Yet 
there are limits to the powers that a father may exercise over others in his household. All 
the members of the oikos, it should be recalled, are first and foremost subjects of 
Magnesia and ‘belong more to the state than to those who begat them’ (804d4-6).
In order to assure a peaceful concord, the Athenian Stranger has established legal 
protocols to cope with potential problems that might arise between parents and their 
offspring. These rules are not comprehensive in their coverage but, presumably, the 
nukterinos council and the Magnesian magistrates will provide more detailed guidelines 
later. The Athenian Stranger’s outlines whl be paradigmatic for dealing with a broad 
range of familial problems. He indicates that the sort of difficulties that his laws 
encompass should be quite uncommon in a virtuous city like Magnesia. They are more 
likely, he says, ‘to occur amongst men who are wholly evd’/n Even so, as if anticipating 
that there might be some exceptions to the rule, he provides statutes to regulate 
disinheritance of sons by fathers and indictments of semhty against fathers by sons.
If a Magnesian father wishes to disinherit a son (and presumably a daughter as 
well), he may not do so without due pn^^ce^^^s The Athenian Stranger’s language here 
suggests that sons might be the primary ones to suffer disinheritance. The state of being 
legally ‘fatherless’ is regarded as a weighty matter in Magnesia. It is a condition that 
carries with it an implicit sentence of eventual exde (928e7-929al). An estranged father 
must call together an assembly ‘of his own kinfolk as far as cousins and likewise his 
child’s kinsfolk on the mother’s side’2*. The word that I have rendered as ‘child’ is n'l6^ 
which literally means ‘son’, but can also convey the more general sense of ‘child’ much as 
d,V0pCDTCO£ can indicate aU of humanity.213 214 215 216 17
There is no reason to assume that daughters might not also be subject to the 
same law. The crucial point appears to be whether or not the offspring in question is 
due to inherit the indivisible estate. The parent and child are both given equal 
opportunity to present their respective cases before a family gathering. If the assembled 
members vote (excluding the father, mother and child in question) in favour of the father 
by more than half, then the child is disinherited (929b7-c3). He/she is not without 
recourse, however, since any citizen of Magnesia may adopt the outcast within a ten-year
213 This is c key feature of sex-role stereotyping according to Chodorow (1978), p. 181.
214 Laws 928e3-4; kv TayKdKcov f|0eaiv dvOpriTcov yl/yve<T0oci.
215 We are not told whether e mother can do this as well.
216 923b2-0, her anchisteia.
217 LSJ s.v. di6g and
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grace period specified by law (929c3-d3). Otherwise, the disinherited will be compelled
to emigrate.
Certain legal procedures apply if a Magnesian child (again, the word used is til6^) 
should wish to have a parent indicted for senility. The situation discussed by die 
Athenian Stranger is one in which a kyrios has become seriously demented and is no 
longer capable of his managerial role over the kllros. This legislation. may not apply in die 
same manner to a senile mother unless she happens also to be the head of the 
household. Such a situation seems likely to be a rare occurrence given both die 
‘hierarchy of betters’ and the strong social convention that all Magnesian citizens of the 
appropriate ages should be married with the man in a dominant role—but it is not 
beyond the realm of possibility. A son who seeks to have his father declared senile ‘must 
first go before the eldest of the Guardians of die Laws and report to them his father’s 
condition and they, after a fuU enquiry, whl advise whether or not he should bring an 
indictment’ (929d9-e4). If they, after their investigations, advise in favour of an 
indictment, then these same Guardians act as advocate and witness for the son’s case 
before a magistrate (929e4-6). If the father in question is deemed senile by the court, 
then ‘thereafter he will have no power to administer even the sloalleit tide of liis 
property and he will be considered as a child in the household for the remainder of his 
life’ (929e6-9).
These procedures for dealing widi disinheritance and indictments of senility also 
have their analogues in ancient Athens. It is, however, fair to say that the Athenian 
Stranger’s system represents a significant revision of any ideas borrowed from there. We 
are told that an Athenian father could legally disown his son, even after paternity had 
been acknowledged, by a formal rejection (apokeryxis) if evidence was brought to light 
proving the child was not his own?® ‘Some scholars’, says MacDowell, ‘have taken 
apokeryxis to mean “disinherision;” but the Athenian evidence is against the view that it 
was legally permitted for a father to disinherit one who was actually his son, except by 
having him adopted by someone else’.222 * *
218 Demosthenes XXXIX.39.
219 (1978), p. 91. The Code ofGortyn (XI. 10-15) reveals that a Kretan procedure existed for 
disinheriting an adopted son but says nothing about disinheriting a natural one. If a Kretan father 
should wish to disinherit an adopted son, then he must bring his case before an assembly of the people 
and would be liable to pay ten staters to the disowned in the event that he is successful in his case. The 
general assembly in Krete would have consisted of many adopted ‘relatives’ of the would-be orphan 
whose testimony might be taken as primary evidence. There is no indication in the Code of Gortyn that 
a disowned son would be required to emigrate—but this might be necessary without a citizen-father.
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More is known about indictments of senility brought against their fathers by 
Athenian sons. There were a significant number of such cases. Golden suggests that 
this might have been due to mounting tensions between fathers and sons over 
inheritance plus having recourse to a ready means of addressing the problem through 
established legal tradition.2® An Athenian son might indict his father with a graphe 
paranoias, ‘a lawsuit asserting that his father was no longer competent to manage his 
affairs’.220 21 222 223Attesting perhaps to the unfairness of some of these proceedings, there is the 
famous (but dubious) case of the playwright Sophokles who successfully defended 
himself against an indictment of senility by reputedly reciting aloud passages from his 
Oedipus at Kolonoo?! The Athenian Stranger clearly expects fewer such conflicts to occur 
between Magnesian fathers and sons.
Required Respect
Firstborn offspring of Magnesian families wdl remain within their respective households 
until they become married, ideahy inheriting a title to a land unit, and begin a household 
of their own. Most will remain in Magnesia and be throughout their Hves, in some form 
or another, subject to their parens..^3 The interplay between the integrity of the 
household unit and the stability of the polis is a special aspect of the myth of the family. 
A process of transference directs the mandated respect for elders into a sublimated 
respect for the state. He says that ‘the view which should be held by everyone, both 
amongst gods and men, is that the older is considerably more revered than the younger’ 
(879b7-cl). The citizens will be told that ‘injurious treatment (ot’lKia) of an older person 
by a younger one is a shameful thing (a’icxpdv) to see occurring within the state and is 
hateful to the god’ (979cl-3).
The religious sentiments that he is associating with proper behaviour toward 
one’s parents are not unique to Plato but partake of a broader cultural ethos. The ancient 
Athenians appear to have maintained similar views. In Athens, as in Magnesia, ‘anyone, 
and not merely a wronged father’, as Strauss indicates, ‘could file a special lawsuit against
220 Golden (1990), p. 110.
221 Ibid. Cf. also Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 56.6, Ar. Nub. 844-846, Xen. Mem. 1.2.49, Aiskhines III.251. 
Aristotle recognised the dangers posed by senile kurioi and so he recommended retirement around age 
seventy ‘when a man begins to lose his vigour’ {Pol. V1I.1335a36). Note that Magnesia’s version of 
this legality requires an official consultation with the Guardians of the Laws before the case can be 
brought before a magistrate.
222 Apul. Apol. XXXVII. 1.2, Luc. Macr. 24, Plut. Mor. 785a, Cic. Sen. VII.22.
223 717b sq., 917a, 927b 1 sq.; cp. 680e sq, 690a and 714e.
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a son for alleged mistreatment of parents {graphe goneon kaksdseos), including neglect or 
physical violence’?24 The religious implications of parental respect may also be seen, as 
Golden says, by virtue of ‘the interest in the subject they [the Athenians] attributed to the 
gods’?.. The gods themselves were thought to take an active interest in the treatment of 
parents by their offspring and this was an influential factor in the ever-present 
background of traditionally perceived norms that dictated Athenian custom. Whether 
they adhered to this virtue in real life or not, it affected their moral outlook. Lykourgos 
the orator, in his attempt to prosecute Leokrates on a charge of treason, indicates that 
the gods preside most of all over the duties to ‘parents, the dead and themselves’?.* 
There is every indication that, at least ideally, disrespect for one’s parents could be 
viewed as an effrontery to the gods and therefore tantamount to impiety.224 * 226 27 228 * 230
The official virtue of respecting one’s elders in Magnesia also displays certain 
Spartan leanings but should not be considered as ‘wholesale’ borrowing from their 
culture. ‘Honours given to the old at Sparta’, as Powell states, ‘represented the 
culmination of an elaborate hierarchy based on age and beginning in early schooldays’?.” 
Magnesia, as we have seen, wiU be a sort of gerontocracy Hke Sparta—with its Guardians 
of the Laws over the age of fifty and the Vigilance Committee made up of the eldest of 
these?.. The Athenian Stranger’s preference for ‘Spartan-style’ institutionalised 
reverence for elders may be taken as a criticism of Athenian society in terms of practice if 
not theory. According to Xenophon, in contrast to his idealised Spartans, the Athenians 
tended to show their- elders considerable disrespect?30
The ethic of revering one’s parents was as deeply rooted in myth and religion as 
in culture. Its social function in Magnesia, as elsewhere, may be seen as serving to 
maintain a kind of harmony amongst families and the state at large. The Athenian 
Stranger’s particular approach to the problem of encouraging all of his citizens to respect 
their elders is at least threefold in nature. First, there is the all-encompassing Magnesian
224 1^^S^3), p. 65.
Golden (1990), p. 101.
226 Contra Leokrates, 94. Cf. Aiskhines III.252.
227 E.g. Aiskhines. Supp. 707-709; Xen. Mem. IV.4.20; Dem. XXIV.60; XXV.66; Aiskhines. 1.28; 
Antiphanes fr. 262E; Men. Fr. 715E; Aristotle, Nic. Eth. IX. l 164b5, 1165a24. This subject of the 
importance of parental respect is also a primary theme of Aristophanes’ Clouds end Wasps.
228 Powell (1994), p. 276. Cf. 11.39 for customs of similar respect ethnogrephicelly projected onto 
Egyptians, Skythians end Hdt. 1131 for the Persians to e lesser extent.
2^ Cf. 755a, 951d-e, 952a and 961a on the requisite ages of these. Magnesia’s gerontocratie leanings 
may have something to do with Plato’s own advanced age at the time he composed the Law,
230 Mem. III.5.15. Cf. Hdt. 1.30 sq. on Solon’s myths of Tellus and his children, along with Kleobis and 
Biton, as exemplars of ideal parent-child behaviour; cp. II.35-6 for a contrast with alleged Egyptian 
disrespect for parents.
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moral imperative for the pursuit of arete. The educational system of Magnesia (not unlike 
that of Sparta) indoctrinates this ideology into its subjects. But, since this is to be a 
second-best state, something more is perceived as necessary to ensure the maximum net 
result of proper behaviour for all. Another method of the Athenian Stranger’s involves 
propaganda. This includes such axioms as those mentioned above, the use of ‘noble hes’ 
or ‘fables’ to convince the masses as well as other examples of this information-baiEd 
tactic.231 232 233 234The third and, perhaps, the most powerful weapon in his arsenal is the law 
itself, which works in concert with moral imperatives and elements of propaganda. Such 
a law is introduced in book IX, It mandates that Magnesian youths must regard all 
citizens over a certain age as parental figures with the incipient authority that such status 
entente???
His method is designed to promote stability of the polis, phyle and otkos by 
reinforcing the ‘hierarchy of betters’??? Most people in positions of authority will be 
over the age of fifty and will thus be able to demand a high degree of socially conditioned 
and legally mandated respect from younger citizens. The latter are recognised as perhaps 
the most likely ones to resist authority. Magnesian law will provide a number of 
discouragements for any potentially irreverent youths. In most circumstances, a youth 
win. have no choice but to submit to virtually any type of treatment by an elder. ‘When a 
young man is beaten by an old man’, says the Athenian Stranger, ‘it is appropriate that, in 
every case, he should quietiy endure his anger, and thus store up honour for his own old 
age’ (when, presumably, he may then beat younger men—879c3-5). Alternatively, if a 
young person should beat their parents (and presumably, but not necessarily, this would 
include all metaphorical ‘parents’ as well), and the assailant is not afflicted with madness, 
then they will be cast out on pain of death should they attempt to return?3'1 Perhaps out 
of a concern for fairness, those Magnesian magistrates who judge children that have
231 Hesk (2000), p. 145 sees this tactic in Plato’s writing as representative of 4-t,‘ century ‘political and 
legal debate as a discourse transformed by a new technology of rhetoric into an “efficacious discourse” 
of persuasion—a discourse that always threatened to persuade through deceptive communication rather 
than truth’. Cf. my chapter II.
232 ‘Let it thus be established: everyone shall revere his elder both by deed and word; whosoever, man 
or woman, exceeds him in age by twenty years he shall regard as a father or a mother, and he shall keep 
his hands off that person, and he shall ever refrain himself, for the sake of the gods of birth, from ail 
reproductive acts with those who might be his own bearers and begetters’ 879c5-d2; cf. Rep. 461d-e for 
a similar law in the Kallipolis.
233 Cf. 917al-7 for this hierarchy and above,
234 880e9-881d7. The Athenian Stranger states at 880e8-9 that ideally this situation should never arise 
in Magnesia. Fear of the penalties that such offenders earn in Hades should keep them in line (881a3- 
5)—but the length and elaborateness of his legal formula for dealing with potential parent-beaters 
suggests some fear that it might. Interestingly, perhaps out of a concern for fairness, those Magnesian 
magistrates who judge children that have committed crimes against their parents must themselves have 
children that are not adopted (878e).
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committed crimes against there parents must themselves have children who are not 
adopted (878e).
One of the worst crimes that a Magnesian citizen might conceivably commit is 
that of parricide. This sort of outrage is considered to be on par with temple robbery 
and rape.235 It is seen to deserve the heaviest of penalties. There might be some small 
consideration for the perpetrator if they ‘should date to slay a parent in the madness of 
rage’ and if the dying parent should happen, perhaps as their final act, to acquit the 
offender (869a4-b2).535 They would be permitted to undergo rites of purification lilce 
those who commit involuntary homicide. However, if there are no such mitigating 
circumstances, then the law will be most severe. The Athenian Stranger says that if it 
were possible for the parricide ‘to die many deaths’, then this would be an appropriate 
punishment to fit the magnitude of the crime (869b5-8). The penalties for a parent who 
slays a child in anger (868c7 sq.), along with husbands and wives who kiU each other in 
rage (868d7 sq.) and siblings who kill each other under the same circumstances are 
considerably less severe and usually involve ritual purifications and sometimes 
suspension of certain privileges (869c8 sq.). Underscoring its significance, even in the 
‘madness of rage’, to slay a parent in Magnesia can incur the ultimate penalty of death by 
execution (869c5-7). Only under extreme circumstances might a child prevail over the 
win of his or her parent^7
However, as we have seen, parents are not given total supremacy over their own 
affairs or their children’s. They are all subject to a higher authority that is intent on its 
own goals and its self-preservation. The state casts parents and children in specific roles 
within a hierarchy designed to promote respect and obedience. The connection between 
respect for parents/elders and the sanctity of the state is made clear in Book III. There, 
the Athenian Stranger indicates that a lack of the proper reverence for parents is like the 
condition of anarchy. He and Megillus have been discussing how ‘excesses’ and 
‘liberties’ (manifested in such things as poetry, music, drama and democracy) lead to the 
deterioration of a state. Music and the theatre have die potential, it appears, to make 
men ‘without fear’ such that their ‘audacity begets effrontery’.238 After this condition has 
festered for a while, the audacious subjects then refuse to obey their rulers. The next
235 Temple robbers and parricides are to be denied interment within tombs in Magnesia (960b). A 
similar statute existed in ancient Athens whereby temple robbers were said to have been denied burial 
in all of Attica (Xen. Hellenika 1.7.22).
236 Not unlike the case of the noble Hippolytos in Euripides’ play by the same name (1401-1446)— 
except that the roles of parent and child are reversed in comparison to the Athenian Stranger’s law.
237 E.g., if they were suffering from senility or other mental debilities, as discussed above—928d sq.
238 ...tl 8k dSera dvaurxwXuxv bvfereKe—701a9. Cf. my chapter III.
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phase of deterioration, closest to pure anarchy, is arrived at when children ‘flee 
submission to theit parents and elders and their admonitions’.2.. The final phase of 
decadence comes when people lose all respect for the gods and thereby revert to a pitiful 
state.239 40
In order to avoid this spiral of decay and promote civic stability on the whole, the 
Athenian Stranger indicates that respect for parents and other elders is compulsory. 
People’s attitudes toward their superiors are regarded as a sort of barometer for 
indicating a society’s overall health. The microcosmic authority represented by parents 
and elders symbolises the greater authority of the macrocosmic polis. .
Honouring the Deceased, Glorifying Magnesia
A significant way in which this hypothetical society wiU support the myth of the family 
(and thereby the solvency of the state) may be observed in the honours extended to the 
dead. These rituals strengthen family unity and reaffirm the sexed hierarchy of the oikos. 
Parents are to be buried by their families in a manner that preserves the general rules of 
moderation and arete. There whl be yearly ceremonies to honour theit deceased 
rerationl.i41 242Teese, much hke similar honours later paid to the Roman dead, will 
encourage shame/modesty and respect (aid-os')^ As Flower indicates, ‘Shame is often an 
important ingredient in cultures which are small-scale hke city-stntes...[these] societies 
depend on personal rather than on abstract obhgatlois, as citizens regularly came face- 
to-face with one another’.243 244The Athenian Stranger, in one of his prepared speeches to 
his subjects, says that if these rites associated with the dead are followed properly, then 
‘we shah win rewards from the gods and from ah that are mightier than ourselves and we 
shah pass the greatest part of our hves enjoying hopes of happiness’?44
These rehgious sentiments bind the Magnesian oikos to the polis, much as in the 
real world of Plato’s era, through a process of transferring reverence from a deceased 
relative to the state as a whole. This is consistent with contemporary modes of ‘death 
and memoriahsation’ in the Classical world that, as Stears says, ‘appear to have provided
239 701b7-8; cf. Rep. 424e.
240 701bl 1-14; he indicates that something similar happened to the Titans.
241 71748-7^3. Cf. my chapter VI.
242 Cf. Polyb. VI.53.6 on the Roman imagines and their propagandistic use in funerals; cf. my chapters 
III and IV for more on the uses of aidos in Magnesia.
243 (1996), p. 14.
244 71^4-^.
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an avenue for the expression of a number of social norms and ideologies’.2?? In 
Magnesia, as in the real world, there wiU be the added incentive that, if one performs the 
correct honours to the dead, then the gods wiU favour the individual doing so, his/her 
family and Magnesia. It is also impHed, but not actually stated in the Lams, that the 
neglect of these honours due to the dead could cause severe damage to the state and 
thereby any negligent families.
This theme of persuasion, as with other elements of propaganda, recollects 
Perikles’ famous ‘Funeral Oration’.246 But Magnesia’s ideological foundations are 
profoundly different from those of imperial Athens.24? Similar rhetorical techniques to 
those of Perikles will be employed. They too will urge the Magnesians that ‘the 
degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous to a man of sphit than 
the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism’ (43). The 
quality of andreia (39-40) will be extolled in Magnesia. These and other notions indicate 
an extent of similar sentiments in both Plato and Perktnr.248 Andreia, as discussed, has a 
different meaning for the Athenian Stranger and Magnesia wdl not be a polis that praises 
imperial values—in death or otherwise.?49 Different ‘virtues’ take their stead.
Magnesian funerals wdl be expressions of familial and societal reverence. They 
are subject to many restrictions and, as with everything else, scrutiny. It was not unusual 
for the ancient polis to dictate the parameters of funerals conducted by private families,?50 
Magnesia is more comprehensive in this capacity than any real polis. The appropriate 
religious interpreters will expand the Athenian Stranger’s outline of the particular 
customs of burial, ‘whether the deceased be either a man or a woman’ (958d3-6). It 
seems Hkely that different sorts of ceremonies will be fashioned according to their sex.?51 
The Athenian Stranger does not say, but he is wkEng to provide some guidelines for 
Magnesia^ future theologians to follow in making thek individual interpretations.
245 (1995), p. 128.
Thuc. H.^^^-47.
247 Cf. my chapter II on persuasive rhetoric and paramyth in the Laws.
248 Although not always. Plato’s Sokrates, at Menex. 236b, is perhaps as Stadter (1978a), p. 119 says, 
being ‘especially ironic’ in suggesting that Aspasia composed the ‘Funeral Oration’.
249 Plato took exception, as Stadter (1978a), p. 120, indicates, ‘to the contemporary interpretation of a 
view of empire and democracy’. Cf. my chapters IV and II. In response to Toynbee’s assertion (1972), 
pp. 90-2, that Laws 704a-707c (where he indicates that Magnesia will not organise its economy on 
naval strength or empire) is a direct criticism of the ‘Funeral Oration’, Macdonald (1959), p. 108 
indicates that a ‘comparison of the points made by the Athenian Stranger with passages from the “Old 
Oligarch” makes it clear enough that Plato is merely airing longstanding conservative prejudices’.
250 Cf. Pomeroy (1995), p. 111.
251 That is, if men and women sing separate religious songs, then this seems logical; cf. my chapters III 
and IV on Magnesian music.
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Graves are to be situated, pragmatically, in ground that has no use for cultivation 
so that the dead do not deprive the living of the necessities of Ufe. The burial mound 
can be no larger than that which can be completed by the work of five men in five days. 
The grave markers, on the whole, must be kept simple in design.”. For most citizens, 
the undertaker ‘wiU make the stone grave-markers not larger than as much as will contain 
no more than four heroic lines of encomia on the life of the deceased’... The simplicity of 
these grave-markers highlights a degree of equality between men and women—just as the 
limitations on expenditure for funerals and tombs serve to equalise most Magnesians—in 
death.
The family of the deceased is admonished only ‘to spend a measured amount as 
is appropriate for a soul-less altar of the ones beneath the earth’.54 The Athenian 
Stranger says that it would not be unseemly for the legislator to define the ‘measured’ 
expenditure as five minae for the funeral of one of the highest property class, three for 
the second class, two the third and one mina for an individual of the lowest property 
class.”” There are to be no elaborate funerary devices (none of the archaic kouroi or 
korai, nor any of the famkial sculpture—even plain, democratic ornamentation— 
associated with Athenian tombstones from c.500 b.c.e. onwards) as this de-emphasises 
the importance of personal expression in terms of wealth and class.”. The Athenian 
Stranger’s restrictions on funeral expenditures appear to reflect a similar desire for a kind 
of equality (or near-equality) in death as those allegedly introduced by the democratic 
reforms of Solon at Athens.”’ Unlike Athens, however. Magnesia wfll ensure that its 
funerary practices are scrutinised by one of the Guardians of the Laws to ensure that the 
rule of moderation is strictly upheld (959e3-5).
Like Solon, the Athenian Stranger seeks to avoid excessive emotionality at 
funerals. As will be discussed more in the next chapter, it must be checked with ‘manly’
252 The Priests and Priestesses of Apollo and the Sun are an exception to this rule cf. my chapter VI for 
more on these.
253 958e8-959al. The upright stone slab or stele and its variations was also in use in Classical Athens 
but comprised only one of many possible styles available, cf. Stears (1995), p. 113.
254 ...do; e’tQ dnjnucov %0ov'twv pco|i6v—959dl.
255 959d3-6. These restrictions of expenditure follow-up the comments which the Athenian Stranger 
made at 719d-e where he indicated that a poet might praise a costly funeral for a wealthy woman as 
well as a skimpy funeral for a poor man as both being well-measured ‘but one must tell what and how 
much is a "measured" amount’ before it can become law. It is perhaps worth noting that Plato (Letter 
XIII, 36 le) reported a planned expenditure of ten minae for the tomb of his mother, Periktione.
256 On representations of families (and especially of women) in ancient Athenian funerary practices, cf. 
Osborne (1997), 3-33 and Stears (1995), pp. 113 sq. Cf. Rubinstein (1989), pp. 411-20, for a survey of 
Athenian funerary monuments in relation to economic class.
257 Cf. Dem. XLIII.62 and Plut. Solon 21. Pomeroy (1995), p. 112, discusses these Solonian funerary 
laws, which bear a striking resemblance to Magnesia’s, in greater detail. Cf. my chapter VI for more 
on this and below.
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austerity and women have been particularly singled out by this injunction. In part, such a 
position is predicated by the rule of moderation. It may also reflect the Athenian 
Stranger’s views (and possibly Plato’s) on the nature of the soul, its immortality and its 
importance above and beyond that of the flesh.58 As time passes in Magnesia, its 
cemeteries wiU fill with the virtuous dead whose souls have gone beyond. The plain 
memorials left to them seem to be a psychological mechanism for the transference of 
adoration poured on them by individuals and families. They become a monument to the 
arete of the city-state as a whole.
Magnesian funerals are events of importance for the family but the glorification 
of the polis clearly overshadows the individual’s significance. The yearly ceremonies to be 
held by family members to honour their deceased relatives serve both to unify the 
citizens of the state through the common practice of mourning as well as to strengthen 
the bonds of respect for theit ancestors. These reinforce societal roles along sexual Hnes. 
They honour Magnesia’s collective dead and bind the community through the 
participation of families evincing a common reverence for their ancestors and, as with 
Periklean funerary rhetoric, they propagandistically advertise the civic virtues that these 
are seen to represent. The oikos meets the polis at a Magnesian funeral and at die yearly 
memorial ceremonies. The one draws on the other for strength, comfort and exaltation. 
The ideals of the polis and the role of the oikos within it are mutually forwarded in these 
celebrations of death and remembrance.
Conclusions
There are many and subtle ways in which the Athenian Stranger is constructing the myth 
of the family for Magnesia. These include, but are not limited to law, calculated rhetoric, 
imposed custom, educational indoctrination, censorship and mythologizing. It is fait to 
say that the Magnesian household is significantly different from its analogues in ancient 
Athens, Krete, Sparta or anywhere else. This difference is underlined by such 
distinguishing characteristics as the participation of Magnesian women in and outside the 
oikos, frequent supervision by the state and the rules governing marriage and the
258 Tn life itself, what constitutes each of us is nothing other than the soul, but the body following each 
of us is a semblance; and it is noble to say that the bodies of the deceased are images of the dead, while 
the being that is really each of us, named the immortal soul, goes off to other gods to give en account, 
just as the ancestral lew says' (959a6-b5). The word he uses here for ‘image’ (eiScoXov) was frequently 
applied by Homer to the souls of the deceased. The underworld deities are sometimes referred to as the 
‘other’ gods as at Phaedo 63b end in Aeschylus, Supplices 230-31.
210
inheritance of property. The indivisible 5040 land units may be seen, at least in part, as 
limiting upward (and downward) social mobility but also functioning to stabilise the 
socio-economic foundations of the polis. As with the level of supervision, this recollects 
ideahsed representations of Sparta. The Magnesian state is an active agent that regulates 
many more activities in the private sphere of the populace, policing theit ideas, than most 
real governments at the time would have considered possible.
The structure of the Magnesian family, as Plato’s narrator has outlined it, is 
patriarchal and appears fairly traditional—especially by Athenian norms. The ‘hierarchy 
of betters’ and other such passages suggest that greater authority is to be granted to 
fathers than to mothers. More emphasis also seems be placed on the importance of sons 
as heirs and future kyrioi than on daughters. Their role in inheritance, while no less 
significant, is perceived as somewhat less than that of males. Sometimes it seems that the 
Athenian Stranger wants Magnesian women to be independent and active citizens in the 
same way as their male counterparts. He has granted them no small role in both the oikos 
and the state. The Athenian Stranger’s statements to the effect that women are 
somehow naturally ‘inferior toward the pursuit of aret? seem to devalue and relegate 
mothers and daughters to subordinate and secondary position compared to those of 
Magnesian fathers and sons. More on the issue of Magnesian women’s ‘liberation’, and 
file costs thereof, wiU be explored in the next chapter.
Plato’s decision to utilise the institution of the patriarchal household in liis 
hypothetical Magnesia seems ultimately based on utilitarian efficiency in fulfilling the 
perceived needs of the second-best polis. In the Kallipolis, aU property is held in rcmmcn 
and the state-sponsored breeding facilities perfunctorily perform then tasks with the 
sureness of well-oiled machines. These were designed for an ideal society. Magnesia 
employs a more de-centralised approach with the semi-private household conscripted to 
perform the work of a breeding facility with less expense and supervision. It may 
represent a practice not unlike like the modern. Western approach to socialism in which 
the state provides the means for independent, corporate entities to thrive so long as they 
perform a specified socio-economic role. One may construe the Magnesian oikos as a 
semi-independent, corporate entity that indicectly exercises the will of a centralised 
authority. Its main purposes are to ensure the continuation of the populace and to 
prepare citizens for then future place in society. This includes carefully moulding their 
modes of thought and promoting theit ideal sex roles from an early age. The myth of 
the family works with the greater myth of the polis to achieve these ends.
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Chapter VI
A Brave New Femininity
‘Go into the house and see to your tasks, the loom and the distaff, and bid 
your handmaidens go about their tasks. War will concern men, all those 
born at Troy and me especially’.
—Hektor1
‘To allow the female to live in luxury, spend money, and follow disorderly 
pursuits, while supervising the male, is to grant only half of a totally happy 
life—instead of double that for the city’.
—The Athenian Stranger2 *
‘Then card wool and work it delicately whilst munching beans. War wiU be 
women’s business’.
—Lysistratai
Introduction
As discussed in earlier chapters, Magnesian women have an unparalleled status in their 
society. Yet they are constrained in particular ways. Thek status stands in contrast to tlie 
state-mandated necessity of teknopoiia. In addition to this, they wiU be encouraged to modify 
thek femininity by subordinating certain perceived negative aspects of it to the rule of 
orderly, manly Reason. How is this ‘new femininity’ defined for Magnesian women? This 
chapter proceeds from the assumption of contemporary philosophical thought to the effect 
that ‘male, like female, is an idea about sex...to say that male-ness is “absence of female­
ness,” or vice versa, is a matter of definition and metaphysically arbitrary’.4 Plato’s narrator 
is no stranger to metaphysical arbitration in the sphere of sexual ideas.
The second-best society significantly revises the traditional dichotomy between oikos 
and polis by allowing women unprecedented access to participation in the affaks of the latter 
(along with the state’s encroachment on the former). This freedom comes at the cost of 
some characteristics here expressly associated with women. The Athenian Stranger seeks to
1 Homer, Iliad VI.49Q-493. Cf. Aristophanes, Lys. 714, where, when she, like Andromache, tried to broach 
public policy with her husband and he similarly declared, ‘war will be the concern of men’.
2 Laws 806c4-7
2 Aristophanes, Lys. 536-8.
4 Principia Discordia, qtd. in Formosa (2002)
ht^^p//j^.U^^^l.^^^t^n^t^.<ccrmh^J^€^l^c^i^c^<^^cH^/J^^2^c^^<cmetap]^rysics.html
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obtain part of bis ‘mascuhnisation’ of Magnesian women through a Lakonisation and/or 
Kretanisation (it could likewise be termed ‘Sauromatianisation’, or maybe <Amazoilsatioi’) 
of essentially Athenian feminine norms.* 5 Members of either sex in Magnesia wiU be 
thoroughly supervised throughout their entire hves and both the state and the family whl 
inculcate their accepted sex-roles from an early age. The ideal role for a Magnesian woman 
emerges as a synthesis of traditionally ‘manly’ qualities (such as warcraft and pohties) 
together with traditionally feminine quahties (e.g. housewife and mother), both norms of 
ancient Greek Hfe, to bridge the gap between pubhc and private spheres. The result is 
revolutionary.
Public Life
There are a number of ways in which Magnesian women directly participate in the polis. 
They must necessarily devote a significant amount of time and effort to the bearing and 
rearing of children. In this capacity, Magnesians enjoy a freely available system of nurses, 
teachers and state-subsidised slaves to take many of the responsibilities entailed in their 
ehildrei’s upbringing. Apart from the necessity of generating offspring to populate the city- 
state, a Magnesian woman wih be groomed from youth to participate in the pubhc realm 
alongside men—if not entirely on an equal footing with them.
Institutions such as phratries and the mixed-sex communal dining tables take women 
outside the household and place them squarely in the sphere of the polis. The system of 
education outhird for both sexes allows for the sort of preparation needed not only for the 
pursuit of arete but also for this participation in pubhc hfe/ Magnesian women’s militery 
involvement heightens their capacity to interact on a similar standing as men. There is to be 
some sexual segregation in r^g-feus ceremonies but even this places women together in a 
civic capacity. The situation of Magnesian women in the pubhc sphere seems to be derived 
more out of a utihtarian urge for efficiency than any modern ethic of sexual egahtarianism.
The potential range of ‘civil hbrrtirs’ allowed to female Magnesian citizens remains 
unclear in many respects but future Magnesian legislators wih work out the fine details. The
5 As Cartledge (1981), p. 86, indicates, there was a sort of ‘“Lakonomania” which infected certain upper- 
class circles in democratic Athens’, and Plato was as much effected by this as Xenophon (but not Aristotle).
5 Cf. my chapter III on education.
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Athenian Stranger’s account, as with aU of his other laws, provides a fundamental framework 
that leaves many of the particulars for others to contend. He has, however, provided a great 
deal of information on the lives of women in tht public sphere. He constructs their place in 
society with ideological recourse oo some of the cl.t;ftEir^^ett parts thi^it women in other cultures 
of his day are perceived to have played and then formulates a role, based on these, for his 
ierond-bEit state. He intends a sort of merging of traditional feminine attributes with 
specifically idtntifiEd masculine ones.
Art Magnesian citizzn-women going to work on a farm, herd sheep and cattle and 
serve tht household like slaves? Or wdl they bt completely shut off from the outside world 
and tend Exclusively to household matters such as weaving, rockieg and cleaning (805d-t)? 
Wdl they follow a Spartan example (however idealised) and partake of gymnastics and 
music/ weave and spin little,” and exist in a sort of middle ground between taking cart of 
others, acting as stewards of the household and rearing children? If Magnesian women lived 
in a manner such as Lakceiae women (or tht way that the Athenian Stranger seems to think 
they lived), he says that they could learn both gymnastics and wool-working but:
They would not partake of warlike things, so they would not bt able, if at 
some point fatt should compel them, to fight for the sake of their city and 
thtir children; nor would they bt able to shoot arrows, like certain Amazons, 
nor could they bt acquainted with tht skdl of any other misshe, or to take up 
sptar and shield in imitation of the goddess, so as to nobly oppose tht 
ravaging of their fatherland9—nor indttd could they produce fear in the 
tntmy, if nothing mort, by being seen arrayed in martial order. Living in
7 Plutarch, following Xenophon, reports that Spartan women, in addition to gymnastics, also took up the 
arts of running, wrestling and throwing the discus (Lyk. XIV.2). Cf. Aristophanes, Lys, 81 sq. on the 
Spartan Lampito's comedic characterisation as a ‘manly' woman.
8 Much as with Magnesia, slaves and servants relieved Spartan citizen women of many household duties. 
Unlike Athens and elsewhere, we are told that domestic pursuits such as weaving and carding were not 
considered appropriate occupations for citizens (Xen. Lak. Pol. 13-4). Whether this is true or not is 
debatable. Xenophon may be referring to men only, cf. my chapter V.
9 Aristotle, PoL 1270 sq. Indicates that the Spartan women's ‘license' was due, in part, to the male army 
being away for so long at a time and that Lykourgos ‘gave up' trying to bring them under control when 
they resisted his reforms. This would seem to point to their role in homeland defence out of necessity in 
the absence of the men.
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such a way, they would not dare to imitate the Sauromatians, whose women 
would seem like men compared to these.10 11
Magnesian women, as we shall shortly see, wU have the opportunity to become well versed 
in the arts of war and fighting. The Athenian Stranger has decided not to imitate precisely 
any of the customs, mentioned in the above passage, in formulating a role for Magnesian 
women. Rather, he borrows something from each of them in order to achieve a synthesis of 
sexual characteristics that he deems desirable for women'of the second-best polis.
Amazons, Sautomatians and Magnesians
Ancient Greek women’s participation in the public sphere of the polis, as we have seen, could 
be described as lnuited at bes.." Plato’s utopia, however tttccnd-best’, demands a greater 
degree of equality and this entails some socio-sexual re-programming. The matcuhnisaticn 
of women in Magnesia is perhaps most evident in terms of their involvement in the military. 
It may also be observed in their apparently more limited role in city politics. Some of the 
‘manly’ ideals that the Athenian Stranger prefers his female subjects to adopt are indicated in 
the selection from the text above and elsewhere. Repeated recourse is made to the model of 
the Amazons, Spartan and Sauromatian women. His particular choice of images reveals a 
complex network of ideological relationships.
The concept of Sauromatian women, one of the examples cited in support of 
military training for female Magnesians, would have evoked an immediate association with 
the other., less ‘civilised’ peoples of the world and their apparently ‘topsy-turvy’ modes of 
existence. Sauromatia, the Athenian Stranger says, represents a culture in which women are
10 806a5-cl. As Cartledge (2001), p. 113, says, a ‘Spartan girl—like her counterparts in other Greek states 
(of. Hesiod, Op. 520)—resided with her parents until marriage. Specifically, she continued to reside with 
her mother, for the matricentral character of a Spartan girls’ home-life was heavily accentuated by the fact 
that her father was expected to spend most of his time living communally and in public with his male 
peers’. See below on the Sauromatians and Amazons.
11 Herodotos’ Histories, as Harrison (1997), p. 191, indicates, ‘suggest the belief in women as “legal 
minors’” permanently in need of restraint But compare this with their capacity for responsibility enshrined 
in Athenian law as described by Gould (1980), pp. 44-5. Harrison ' goes on to say that ‘when Athenian 
women (in the dim, distant past) stab to death with their brooches the bearer of the news of the deaths of 
their husbands... the Athenian response is only to change their style of dress from Dorian to Ionian, so that 
they would no longer wear brooches (V.87.2-3); they could not be trusted to hold back from similar 
hysterical outbursts (equally perhaps any punishment would have been pointless?)’.
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instructed to handle horses, the bow and other weapons on equal terms with men,12 
According to Herodotos, the Sauromatiais were a people who lived East of the Skythians.1. 
They were allegedly descended from an intermingling of Skythian men with a band of 
marauding Amazons who were generaEy ‘misbehaving’ in that region. The Greeks had 
defeated these in Themii.sklya and, whilst captives aboard ship, they successfully overtook 
and slew their male captors. Knowing nothing of the art of sailing (since they were women), 
they roamed aimlessly until they reached Lake Maoetis (Sea of Azov) where they 
encountered the Skythians. Herodotos’ audience had long been fascinated with these 
warrior women. Characteristic of the relationship between the Greeks and Asians (real or 
imagined), there was intense interest in Amazons—this, mingled with the usual degree of 
scorn reserved for foreigners and their way.?.
Herodotos’ account of the Amazons reveals, as Gould says, ‘his open-eyed 
acknowledgement that human experience is multiform and that the role of women is 
culturally determined’?. This would seem to be true inasmuch as Herodotos can imagine 
that foreign cultures differed in remarkable ways?. Amazons are barbarians by Athenian 
standards but diey are still considered European, although they are situated at the 
peiphey.?. As Romm says, they ‘dressed, according to the usual Greek depictions of them, 
in leather clothing that gave them a distinctly Asian appearance’?” These women who ' take 
up arms like men, imagined or otherwise, stand in stark contrast to the vast majority of their 
Greek counterparts.’.
AU versions of the myth contain curious distortions of normal Greek customs. In 
response to the Amazonian invasion, Herodotos teUs us that the Skythians decided to send
12 804e. Cf. Hartog (1988), pp. 31-2 and 39.
13 The Skythians reportedly celled the Amazons oiorpata which means ‘killers of men’ (Hdt. IV.27). This 
perhaps recalls Homer’s term for them at Iliad III. 171 sq. end VI. 186, which is antianeirai and, as Hartog 
ibid. p. 240, indicates, is ‘playing on the prefix anti, both the “equals” and the “enemes” of males’. Cf. 
ibid. pp. 3 sq. on the ‘imaginary Skythians’.
14 Cf. my chapter IV for more on Graeco-Asian relations.
15 (1989), p. 132. Cf. Thomas (2000), pp. 61-2 on Herodotos’ ethnography of the Skythians and Amazons 
in terms of ancient medical beliefs about the effects of herbs and types of edible game in relation to the 
‘humours’ and ‘bile’. Such regional influences are considered to have affected the particular development 
of the Amazons. The grass in Skythie was thought to produce more ‘bile’ than all other ‘grasses that we 
know’ (Hdt. IV.58).
16 Cf. Harrison (1997), p. 187.
17 Hippokrates, dirs; Waters, Places XVII. Cf. Thomas (2000), p. 88.
18 (1998), p. 171. Cf. Bovon (1963), pp. 580 sq. on modes of‘barbarian’ attire and, p. 598 sq. on its 
reception in Greece as ‘decadent’ end ‘soft’.
19 Except, perhaps to some degree the Spartans. Cf. Hardwick (1996), pp. 173-4 who also discusses the 
Amazonian/Lakonian female Guardians of Republic V.
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thek youngest men, of ephebic age, to live amongst the Amazons, to live like them and, 
ideally, to seduce them into marriage. The Amazons eventually agree to take the young men 
as husbands—but only on condition that they go and fetch whatever movable property they 
would inherit from theif fathers. This represents one level of an inversion of the ‘normal’ 
that tends to be present in the myth at large. ‘So here’, as Hartog indicates, ‘it is the 
husband—not, as is customary, the bride—who brings the dowry’.. In this way, according 
to Htrodctot, was the wild Sauromatian race born.
Amazons were a popular topos for Athenian art and literature from the 6th century 
b.c.e. onwards.1 2Representations of them had been present in ancient Greek culture at least 
since the time of Homer and Hesiod and probably earlier. Portrayed from the outset as 
barbarians, they are abstractly localised in a realm that belies the societal norms of Greek 
society.. Thek images on the Parthenon, as Blundell says, ‘like the other mythical 
opponents on the metopes, can be seen on one level as an example of the “defeated 
barbarian” type’.3 Thek ‘barbarous’ reversal of norms also made them attractive objects of 
erotic curiosity.4 They reverse a polarity whose paragon is the adult male hopUte-cum-father 
and kyrios. The psychological implications that they appear to have signified to Greek men 
are complex. It is possible that, as counter-examples, they represent subversive elements 
present in the Classical mindset toward women.”
The Amazons provide revealing insights into the modes of thought on sex at the 
time. They upset the boundaries that were clearly defined for the public and private spheres 
in many Greek poleis and especially Athens... Amazons attained a peculiar status through the
2° (1988), p. 222.
21 The earliest Athenian literary reference is probably that at Euripides’ Herakles 408-419. They also 
appear on vase paintings from 575 onwards and frequently portray the Amazons in Herakles 9* labour and 
Theseus’ famous rape of Hippolyte. Cf. Tyrrell (1984), pp. 2-3.
22 Aristotle (Pol. 1327bl8-34) condemns Asiatics as inferior, as does Heroddos (IX. 122.3), largely by 
virtue of their local climate and where they live (e.g. not Greece). Ephorus (Steph. Byz., s.v. Amazones) 
applied similar ‘geographical predestination’ to the Amazons. Cf. my chapter IV for more on Greeks and 
barbarians. Cf. Thomas (2000), p. 56. Hardwick (1996), pp. 158, 161 discusses this along with some of 
the modern associations between Amazons, lesbians and feminists as altogether ‘manly’ women.
23 (1998), p. 55.
24 Tyrrell (1984), p. 66, says that Amazons ‘are beautiful women who arouse men sexually, but their erotic 
appeal cannot be civilised in marriage, its proper sphere, and so is loose, socially unproductive, and 
dangerous’. But they are ‘civilised’ through conquest and marriage in popular art and myth, see below.
25 Perhaps, as Harrison (1997), pp. 186-7, says, ‘we identity a handful of heroines [in Herodotos], Medea, 
Artemesia, Antigone, and see them as evidence that Greek women envisaged the possibility of their own 
emancipation; male stereotypes of women show their fear of the opposite sex, their (unconscious) 
acknowledgement that the oppression of women was wrong, that it could not ultimately be sustained’.
26 Cf. Homer, Iliad VI.490-493 (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) and cf. my chapters I and V.
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negation of these traditional norms.2’ ‘Imagining an inversion of roles’, as Hartog writes, 
‘meant transferring women from tht sphere of marriage into that of war and excluding men 
from the latter’.27 8 29 30 31 32Thtir mythical representations paint an interesting picture of Greek male 
psychology. Strabo indicates that tht Amazons would engage in physical relations with mtn 
from a neighbouring people, the Gargarians, once a year in order to ‘top up’ their female 
population?’ In contrast, Diodorus’ vtriice says that they did marry but that thtir menfolk 
metkly performed that which would have traditionally been ‘women’s work’.”0
Another inversion of Athenian norms may be seen in Diodorus’ account of the 
myth. He says that they remained virgins whilst pursuing thtir military activities but ceased 
to fight when marritd. Thereafter they become magistrates and went about Amazonian civic 
affairs?1 War then, according to this particular representation, is the business of virgin- 
Amazons. These would appear to constitute an agt group that Experiences the equivalent of 
a period of ephebeia, comparable to the malt equivalent and likewise brought to its conclusion 
by marriage?? This bears more than a passing resemblance to the Athenian Stranger’s plan 
for Magnesia’s female citizens. It is not a complete reversal of norms, as in tht cast of 
Amazonian culture—malt Magnesians also undergo this training and do not undertake 
‘women’s work’—but tht inclusion of women in traditionally malt rolts is quite rtmarkablt.
In the same passage of Diodorus mentioned above, ht also says that tht Amazons 
stared the breasts of thtir female children shortly after birth since these, if fuUy developed, 
would hinder them in combat. Thus they could bt said to resemble beardless, athletic (malt) 
youths with long hair. Tht image that tliis evokes is that of muscled, armoured and flat­
chested figure, who is androgynous but still clearly female.”” Sht retains the potential for the
27 In the Laws, female Magnesians must adopt a ‘masculine' attitude toward sex in terms of self-control and 
mastery of their desires. This sort of reversal is not considered ‘unnatural' but more like an upgrade from 
emotional femininity to rational masculinity, see below. The author of the Hippokratic text on Diseases of 
Women indicates (1.6) that the healthiest type of woman is ‘masculine', but such a one is less inclined 
toward maternity and conception.
28 (1988), p. 216.
29 Strabo XI.5.1; female children were kept and reared as Amazons, male children were returned to their 
fathers. But some accounts show a nefarious intent against the male sex. Amongst the Hippokratic corpus, 
the author of On Joints (53.iv.232, 7-13) discusses the dislocation ofjoints and adds the anecdotal detail 
that the Amazons dislocated the jPints of their male children who, thus hobbled, would be less capable of 
causing difficulties for the women. He admits that he does not know if this report is truthful, cf. Thomas 
(2000), pp. 61, 245.
30 III.35. Cf, GH, pp. 100-101, on male expectations of sexual passivity for Athenian women.
31 Cp. Hdt.IV.HOsq.
32 Hartog (1988), p. 217. Cf. my chapter III for more on the ephebeia.
88 Cf. GPM, pp. 101 sq. on ancient Greeks views of androgyny and women.
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sort of sexual liaison that is possible between a man and a woman. In some sense, this type 
of attraction is that which we would today call ‘homoerotic’. The androgynous Amazon is 
comparable to Spartan imagery found in bronze figurines, minor-handles and kylix interiors 
that, as Cartledge says, often ‘portray girls and young women with underdeveloped or de­
emphasised secondary sex characteristics’?4 As with Spartan representations, the image of 
the Amazon seems to present an idealised ‘receptive’ male, untamed, but with feminiir 
qualities.”” These are, after all, women who unabashedly undertake ‘men’s business’ with 
remarkable zeal if not always with success.
It was perhaps important that they were seen as having been defeated by mm. 
Amazons fought in vain on the Trojan side against the Greeks, led by Queen Pmthrsilra, 
whom Achilles slew.”” They stormed Athens either to lrtlirvr Hippolyte/Antiope’s girdle 
(or to rescue the queen herself and were either defeated or bargained with.”’ They fought 
BeUerophon, Herakles and Theseus with little or no success.”” They were represented on 
Athenian temple friezes amongst vanquished foes.”” Their greatness was plopagaidistiealfy 
transferred to their conquerors. Lysias wrote that the defeat of the Amazons ‘made the 
memory of city’s valour imperishable, and rendered their own country nameless on account
34 (2001), p. 114. Cf. Ibykos (fr. 58) on these figurines end Cartledge ibid. n. 47. Cf. Plut. Lyk. XIV.4-7 on 
the public nudity of prepubescent Spartan girls and cf. my chapter V for this practice in the Laws. Cf. also 
GH, pp. 193 sq.
35 Cf. Cartledge ibid. who says, ‘It is not, I think, fanciful to associate this feature with the strongly 
homosexual [sic] orientation of the average Spartan male’.
36 Homer, IliadW.239, VI. 186 -223; Arktinos ofMiletos (fl. 776 b.c.e.) wrote the Aithiopis as a direct 
sequel to the Iliad. It is best known for its opening scene in which Penthesilea and her Amazons come to 
the aid of the Trojans after the death of Hektor, Achilles kills the queen, then mourns for her. When 
Thersites makes ftm of him for this, Achilles slays him too. Cf. Aghion, Barbillon and Lissarrague (1996) 
s.v. Achilles and Penthesilea. Hardwick (1996), figs. 1-4 graphically depict many of these scenes of 
Amazon defeat.
Only fragments remain ofAithiopus, but Quintus of Smyrna is thought to have re-written Arktinos' poems. 
Cf. Quintus Smyrneeus (mid 4th c.e.), The Fall of Troy 1.61-66, 1.621,1.843-88.
5’ Plutarch, The Life of Theseus; cf. Isokrates, Panathenaicus 192,194 who says they lost and were all 
killed or expelled; Lysias’ Funeral Oration VI says they lost; Aristides’ Panathenic Oration 83-84 says 
‘now from this point, as if a rope had broken, all snapped beck, and the Amazons' march of empire was 
undone. And here too the city aided the whole race, and now it is doubtful if Amazons ever existed’. Cf. 
Aghion, Barbillon end Lissarrague (1996) s.v. Amazons.
55 Apollod. Bibl. II.3; Hom. niad6.2H9;Pmd. Ol. XIII.91 and 130; Plut. Mor. XVII.248. They battle 
Herakles/Theseus over Hippolyte's girdle. Antiope (or Hippolyte, depending on the story) is abducted, and 
married King Theseus in Greece (cf. Euripides Phaedra and Plutarch’s Life of Theseus).
35 Cf. Romm (1988), p. 200 sq. for these. Interestingly, they are also credited with having been the first to 
mount horses and use iron, cf. Lysias, Funeral Oration IV.
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of the disaster that they suffered in our land’.40 41 42 43 44 45This is one of a long line of vtctcrttt named 
as preceding (and spun as presaging) the defeat of Persia at Marathon, Salamis and Plataea.*
The Amazons are martial heroes who are recognizably feminine.4. When they have 
been conquered, as Hardwick says, the ‘defeated individual Amazons are presented as 
assimilated to the property- and power-oriented framework of exclusive cttiztnthtp and 
oikos., by displaying qualttitt of submission and loyalty valued in Greek familitt’.43 Their 
place in Athenian ideology and identity seems clear if perhaps a bit strange.'* They were 
‘women behaving badly’ who have the potential to be ‘rehabilitated’. Their reversal of 
normal values made them attractive to more men than those in ancient Athens and, 
especially for the latter, it seems to have invited their conquest and reform—if only in artistic 
representation and myth.4”
This contextual backdrop helps inform our understanding of the 'Laws.46 47The fact is 
that Plato’s narrator wants his Magnesian women to be like the Amazons. But ‘like’ is not 
‘the same as’. Pie too displays the particularly Athenian inclination toward their reform. His 
will be ‘tame’ Amazons who marry and rear offspring of both sexes. They will not sear their 
breasts but, departing from Athenian custom, they wdl engage in exercise. This wdl make 
them more muscular and martial than was the norm. The sort of heroic qualities associated 
with the warrior-women of myth wdl be encouraged and refined in Magnesian women as 
they put on armour, train and fight, if necessary, Hke men* The mythical Amazons were 
imagined as retaining their pecuHar psychosocial/ptychostxual identity through selective 
inculcation and education. The Athenian Stranger is certainly proposing something akin to
40 II.6; cf. Blundell (1998), p. 55-6.
41 Cf, Harrison (2000), p. 37, for the common association between Amazons and Persians in Herod^s and 
amongst Athenian speechwriters.
42 Cf. Pindar Oh XIII.87-90, for Bellerophon’s defeat of the gimaikeion straton of Amazons,
43 (1996), p. 166.
44 Hall (1989), pp. 62-8. She argues that they, as with other barbarians, acted as a foil for Athenian self­
definition; cf. my chapter IV.
45 Cf. ibid. pp. 175-6 and Just (1989) chapters 9 and 10, who regards them as ‘the savages without’ as 
opposed to ‘the enemies within’. He indicates that the Amazons belonged to a category of women defined 
by their alien quality, like Medea, in whom this trait is associated with emotional forces perceived as a 
threat to civilised society. Thus they were outsiders in need of ‘proper’ acculturation.
46 Strabo (c. 63 b.c.e.- 21 c.e. or later), Diodorus Siculus (F‘ c.e.), 'Plutarch (c. 46-c. 126 c.e.) and others 
cannot count as cultural context for Plato. They are representing the views of different eras altogether. But 
many of them will have approached their subjects having read ancient writers like Herodotos, Lysias and 
others who lived closer to Plato’s era.
47 Hdt. IV. 180 describes a similar practice amongst the barbarous Machyles and Auses, near Libya, whose 
maidens dress in armour and practice war games in honour of Athena.
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this in the production of his new femiiniinty./” Magnesian woman is to bt ‘manly’ and heroic 
yet, at tht same time, fertile and motherly.
Communal Meals
There is not a great deal to be found in tht Lams detailing the social hves of Magnesian 
women but what there is bears scrutiny. All social activities, and especially those involving 
women, art to bt subject to intense supervision and regulation by forces of the polis. One 
such Magnesian social function is that of the pubhc messEs (syssitidp* These art meant to 
unite tht Magnesian people through thtir participation in a common event (i.e. eating). As 
with the Spartans, these meals offer a diet especially formulated for the promotion of tht 
citizens’ health.”0 Like many other communal activities in Magnesia, they seek to preserve 
and reinforce the harmony of tht polis through calculated ideological influencts.
The Athenian Stranger has a high regard for the Kretan institution of communal 
meals (625c). This custom is described by Athenaeum who indicates that each dining hah 
accommodated the citizens of a single heiaireia (similar to phratries);" We are told that every 
citizen contributed one tenth of his produce and ahnost every participant was served an 
equal share (except for young boys who received ihghtla less). A woman presided over tht 
meal and assigned the best portions to citizens who had earned distinctions of merit. 
Aristotlt’s account of Kretan communal meals differs somewhat from that of Athenaeus on 
the extent of female participation, as dots Plato’s in tht Laws}2
The Spartan practice of communal dining, which evidently did not include women 
together with mtn, provides a contrasting model for Plato’s narrator. Xenophon says that
48 Cf. my chapter III on education and sex role stereotyping.
49 Cf. my chapter III for a discussion of the educational uses of Magnesian syssitia and some comparisons 
with similar Spartan practices.
50 Like the Kallipolis of the Republic, the sorts of healthy foods served at these, according to Wilkins, 
Harvey and Dobson (1995), p. 8, will consist of‘the staples wheat, barley and wine, to which strong 
flavours are added by vegetables and nuts... meat and the works of pastry cooks'. Cf. my chapter V on the 
Spartan diet.
”* FGrH 3B:458, F2; 4.143a-d, quoting Dosiadas of Krete (end of the 3rd century b.c.e).
52 Politics 1271b20-1272b23. At 1272a21 he confirms that ‘women children and men' ate at these 
communal meals. Sealey (1990), p.54, says that the Kretan communal dining houses (hetaireiai) were 
probably a near-approximation of the Athenian phratries in that they were both similar types of hereditary, 
civic organisations but ‘to say that is to explain the unknown by the little known'. Presently, this chapter 
will consider some of the ‘little known' about Athenian phratries.
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Lykourgos instituted public messes (andreia) as a preventative measure against neglect of duty 
and disobedience. They were maintained by a specified quantity of food donated by each 
citizen.”” By contrast, Athens had no such tradition of communal dining. Their formal 
banquets were sexually segregated with citizen women dining apart from the men.”” These 
were held by individuals of the upper classes and could not be considered communal dining 
in the same sense as that imptied by Magnesia’s syssitia—although they are similar in some 
ways. The closest Athenian equivalent to this Spartan or Magnesian practice comes in the 
form of dining certain (male) individuals of public distinction at state expense.””
In Magnesia, both sexes partake of communal meals and seem to do so together. 
Newlyweds are to be exhorted, and probably compelled, to continue their prescribed daily 
practice of attending the common messes just as before marriage (780a8-b2). The Athenian 
Stranger uses this subject to launch into a larger discussion on the role of women in both his 
hypothetical polis and perhaps society in general. Note that he does not seem to think that 
women were included in the either in Spartan or Kretan syssitia-.
For your benefit, Kleinias and Megtilus, the custom of communal meals for 
men has been beautifully established by some divine necessity, but a legal 
provision concerning women is in no ways rightly neglected and the practice 
of communal dining by women has not come to tight,”” but the species of 
our human race naturally more secretive and cunning,”’ the female sex, 
because it is weak, has been wrongly left behind in a state of disorder due to 
the misguided concessions of the legislator.”” But because of this neglect, 
many things are thoroughly absent from you that could be considerably
55 As Xenophon, Lak. Pol. IV, 2-5, indicates, the result being ‘that as long as they are together, their table is 
never without food’; cf. Pomeroy (1997), p. 212, on the notion that the Spartan andreia were ‘hotbeds’ of 
institutionalised seme-sex activity.
54 Wilkins, Harvey and Dobson (1995), p. 8
55 Ibid., p. 30; ‘Solon ruled that those who dined at state expense at the town hall—the most signal honour 
Athens could provide—should receive maza [barley-cakes] on ordinary days, and wheaten bread only 
during festivals’. Sokrates had, with irony, suggested this honour as his penalty in Plato’s Apology 17c- 
42a. Cf. MacDowell (1978), pp. 253-7.
55 e’i; xd (jcoc; ^kcoc
57 KaQpaibTEpov jiaXXov kcC. femtKXoKwiEEpov fejru
55 This suggest that a charge of undue license may be levelled against Spartan and Kretan women if we are 
to believe Euripides (Andromeda 595 sq.); On the phrase ei; -d 4>c<; as a poetical expression cf. Prot. 
320d, Theaet. 157d, Tim. 91d, Laws 869c, and Rep. 461c.
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better than they are now, if women were thus administered under law. For 
not only is the disorganised supervision of women half the problem, as one 
might presume, indeed this female nature, as far as we’re concerned, is 
inferior toward the pursuit of virtue to that of the male sex, in this much it 
differs twofold.””
Such points as women’s perceived ‘weakness’, along with his clicked statements of their 
‘natural’ inferiority, seem contradictory with his plans for reforming them through training 
and education.”0 This would seem to be an indication of the persistence of traditional 
conceptions. The Athenian Stranger’s solution to the 'problem that he has identified is 
innovative. He continues in the same passage, saying:
And so, to take this matter up and amend it, the organisation of all practices 
in common for both women and men is better for the happiness of the state; 
but just now the race of humankind has, as it happens, not yet arrived at that 
point (780d9-781b6).
The Athenian Stranger goes into great detail here (and also at 806e2-807a3 sq.) in developing 
a clearer picture of this major feature of Magnesian Hfe. The inclusion of both sexes in the 
pubHc communal messes emphasises a radical difference between the roles of Magnesian 
women and their real-world counterparts.
It may also represent a cunning strategic manoeuvre on the part of the Athenian 
Stranger. The fact that the state feeds its citizens communally would appear to grant it a 
powerful force for influence in terms of implanting its values and ideology. Citizens come
59 Philo of Alexandria, fond of merging Platonic philosophy with Judeo-Christian ideas, considered the 
female sex to be more inclined toward sensuality and thus naturally impeded with regard to virtue 
(Allegorical Interpretations 111.56). He identified Eve with sensory perception and associated with her the 
Pleasure principle. The Judeo-Christian Fall, as Philo and others have interpreted it, brought consequences 
for women such that they must to bear children through painful labour and then rear their offspring whilst 
the men-folk toiled and developed technical skills (associated with the Mind). Additionally, Philo believed 
that a direct consequent of the Fall was that women should lose their freedom and accept the mastery of 
their husbands (On Creation 167). Plato’s narrator, as we have seen, has Magnesian women bound by 
marriage and engaged in childbearing but he has also provided slaves and servants to educate and rear the 
offspring. It is difficult to determine how subservient a Magnesian wife would have to be to her husband in 
consequence of her questionable nature.
9° Their ‘disorderly’ characterisation here recollects similar observations made in my chapter IV on 
Platonic andreia, cf. too chapter V.
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together three times per day under the icrutiea of authority. Since women participate in tht 
Magnesian government and throughout tht city in various official and other capacities (not 
to mention thtir important role as mothem of future citizens), it stands to reason that they 
should bt included amongst tht city’s communal tables. Their induction into tht official 
ideology would be at least as important as that of mtn if not more so since they represent 
the ‘first round’ of influence to which future citizens (thtir children) will bt exposed.
His comments about the ‘secretive’ and ‘cunning’ nature of women should perhaps 
be read less as an expression of Plato’s own opinions and more a statement of tht dominant 
sentiments of his era.”1 Tht view that women art tht more ‘secretive’ and ‘cunning’ stx is 
not unique to tht Laws.62 It is not unreasonable to suggest that such an attitude developed as 
a result of women’s segregation in tht private sphert. Xenophon’ idealised port^iayal of 
domesticity within an upptr/middle class, citizen family, for Example, provides a model of 
behaviour that severely limits a woman’s public access. His narrator, Isrhomachoi, indicates 
that ‘it is seemly for a woman to remain at home and not to be out of doors; but for a man 
to remain inside is a disgrace’.””
If an Athenian woman was seen outside at parties with mtn, it could be sttn as 
proof that sht was a courtesan and not a lawful wife.”4 When citizen-women in Athens were 
seen crouching in doorways asking those passing by on tht streets about news of thtir 
husbands, fathers and brothers after the disastrous naval defeat at Chaercnea, one sptaktr 
described this as ‘degrading both to them and tht city’.”” Tht simple act of talking to men 
other than her husband or malt relatives (in the presence of her husband) could bt taken as
61 The use of such language in describing women, as Scott (1986), p. 10, argues, may be regarded as casting 
them in an implicitly negative light or ‘verbally projecting' such characteristics upon them.
62 Eupheletos (Lysias 1.6) indicates that, after marrying, he kept a close eye on his wife's activities and that 
her indiscretion with Eratosthenes was in part the result of his later laxity in exercising this supervision.
68 Oik. VII.30
64 Isai. III. 13-14.
”8 Lyk., contra Leokrates 40.
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affront to a woman’s modesty and a potential threat to her chastity.66 Even mentioning her 
name in a public context such as the lawcourts could be scandalous.67
If women’s ‘weaknesses’ were a purely natural deficiency instead of the product of 
socialisation, then why would the Athenian Stranger feel that he could educate them at aU 
and allow them to serve in the government and armed forces? His language suggests that he 
regards them as inferior in some vague way. He seems to think that there is something 
intrinsic in female ‘nature’ that inclines them to be less orderly and more emotional.68 * *This 
condition is perceived to be surmountable to an extent, though, through the ‘proper’ psychic 
alignment toward ‘manly’ order. Either he is being contradictory or the above statements on 
‘natural inferiority’ should not be taken as a comment on women’s innate characteristics.
Sexually integrated syssitia will promote the official paradigms of male and female 
behaviour. They will also be integral in granting Magnesian women wider admission to the 
public sphere. But Plato appears conscious of his readers’ sensibilities. Since the rest of the 
world is not as philosophicaUy advanced as the Athenian Stranger and his companions (or 
the hypothetical Magnesians), he admonishes MegiUus and Kleinias saying ‘therefore bear in 
mind not to mention this in other places and city-states’ where they would find such 
progressive ideas disturbing.^
Pbtatties
There will be phratries in Magnesia, as weU twelve tribes (phylaif and women will play an 
active role in all of them.’0 Plato perhaps assumed that his audience would be acquainted
66 Cf. Lysias III.6-7; Demosthenes XLVII.35-38; and see too Euripides, Electra 343-4, where Electra’s 
husband warns her that ‘it is shameful for a woman to be standing with young men’. See too Lysias 1.4 
where one of the charges against Eratosthenes was that he entered Euphiletos’ house and sew his wife 
privately.
67 Schaps (1977), p. 330. Cf. Dem. XXXIX.9 where Mantitheos, suing to prevent his half-brother from also 
calling himself Mentitheos son of Mantias, reveals thr name his half-brother’s mother, Plangon, in the 
speech but not his own mother’s.
Cf. my chapters III, IV and V for this leitmotif. This appears to • be a common, male conceptualisation of 
women.
® 781b8-c2. This may be ‘tongue-in-cheek’ since Plato would have been aware that many individuals who 
might take issue with these ideas would be reading the Laws. In addition to acknowledging ohr 
opposition’s views, io may also serve to stress the fictional or ‘mythic’ quality of this dramatic dialogue.
Cf. my chapter II.
™ Laws 745a sq. and cf. 457a sq. on how 12 tribes is a convenient division of the 5040 households.
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with these institutions but, to his modem readers, they are somewhat obscure. A phratry was 
a kind of kinship-group. It was closely affiliated with the oikos but consisted of a wider range 
of individuals. Such civic groups may not have been indicative of actual family relations, 
although there was a perceived connection of kinship amongst their members.’. The phratry 
was interested in property and its inheritance and arguably held greater sovereignty over 
these than did the oikos. It played an active role, in connection with that of the oikos, which 
related more broadly to matters of the polis?1
In order to understand the significance of admitting women to phratries in Magnesia, 
recourse must be made to the cultural context out of which the practice derives. 
Membership in an Athenian phratry was crucial for determining a male’s legitimacy as citizen 
and heir. There are reports of the practice of citizen-men joining these kinship-groups at 
least as far back as the era of Home..7. No consensus has yet been reached on whether a 
single system of such groups ever existed in Classical Athens to which aU male citizens 
belonged (e.g. the Kletsthentc demos, trittys and phyle) or whether they particularly had to be 
members of phratries, in addition to these others, to be considered true citizens. The 
evidence points to the latter. Athenian sons, especially those who were heirs, were first 
introduced into their fathers’ phratries and later became fuU members themselves.71 72 73 4
As Lambert suggests ‘both deme and phratry were conceived of as intimately 
associated with citizenship and...the character of the Unk, subtly different in each case, can 
be explained in terms of the nature and functions of each institution with respect to the 
qualifications and to the other criteria for citizenship’?. The special relationship between 
kinship-group and individual status may be observed from the late 5th century onwards in the
71 Engels (1977), p. 176, suggests, such evolving social institutions within the polis had ‘created a public 
force which was now no longer simply identical with the whole body of armed people.. .it divided the 
people for public purposes, not by groups of kinship, but by common place of residence’. Cf. Hall (1997) 
on the perceived kinship relations in phratries.
72 Cf. my chapter V for the phratry’s relationship with the oikos in terms of inheritance,
73 Nestor, trying to calm dissent amongst the Achaian camp, says, ‘The man who loves the horror of war 
amongst his own people is an outlaw, withoutphrateres and without a home’. (//. IX.63-4).
74 It was a two-stage process. Males were first introduced in infancy at a ceremony called the meion, they 
were later admitted, during adolescence, at a ceremony called the koureion prior to being inducted into 
their fathers’ demes at the age of eighteen. Cf. Lambert (1993), p. 36, pp. 172-4. The speaker in Isaios, On 
the Estate of Apollodoros, VII. 16, says that the genos and phratry have the same admission policies, he 
says ‘they have the same law, whether one introduces one’s born son or an adoptive son. With one’s hand 
upon the sacrificial victims one must swear that the son whom one is introducing, whether one’s by birth or 
by adoption, is the child of a female citizen and has been rightly born’. “Rightly born,” as Sealey (1990), p. 
34, indicates ‘was a circumlocution for “born to a woman united by engyesis to the father.’”
"(1993), p. 31.
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granting of Athenian citizenship to foreigners who had performed some outstanding service 
for tht city-state. There are some exceptions, but generally tht new citizen was assigned 
membership in both a deme and a phratry?6 Tht intrinsic connection between these is
highlighted in Aristophanes’ Birds where ht uses the word phrated almost as a synonym for 
‘citizen’.77
In the Athens of Plato’s tra, citizenship was dependent on tht legitimacy of both 
parents.7" Female children possibly played a greater rolt in thtir fathers’ phratries after 
Peiiklts’ citizenship law (451/0). Since the mother’s descent had to bt valid, phratries appear 
to have exercised a kind of oversight in regard to tht daughters and wives of thtir malt 
members. Isaios provides us with some evidence that female children might have been 
introduced to tlieir father’s phratry as part of determining thtir ability to inherit. Tht speaker 
is seEking to demonstrate that ont Phile was not the legitimate offspring of Pyrrhos, whose 
estate was in dispute, and a sister of Nikodtmos; tht speaker says that cht (Pyrrhos) had the 
option, if ht had really married tht sister of NikodEmos, of introducing tht daughter who is 
allegedly htrs to his phrateres as his own legitimate child, and of leaving her as heirEss of his 
whole estate’.7"
This speech alone, however, is not necessarily indicative of actual practices in all 
phratries. It is possible to deduct from tht sourcEs, as Lambert has done, that a.) in some 
phratries (but not necessarily aU), daughters intended to become epikleroi were introduced to 
thtir fathers’ phrateres, b.) in some phratries, daughters other than intended epikleroi were 
introduced to thtir fathers’ phrateres, and c.) in so me phratries, daughters who were not 
epikleroi were not introduced by thtir fathess.8” But were they ‘introduced’ to tht phrateres in 
ptrice? Tht speaker in Isaios III is ccetenticu.ily describing an event that did not happen 
and might have never happened under normal clrrumstaerti. Classical sourcEs, which 
should be regarded as the most accurate on this matter, specifically describe the enrolment 
of malts only. A decree of the Demoticnid phratry, as Pomeroy says, ‘the only extant
" W., p. 32, pp. 43-9, 53-4.
" 764-5. ‘What is normally shameful', boast the birds, ‘is creditable with us...Anyone who is a slave and a 
Karian like Exekestides, let him grow wings with us, and he'll become a phrater'. Cf. Calkwell (1997), pp. 
103-4.
78 On Perikles' citizenship law, cf. Lambert (1993), pp. 43 sq., Rhodes (1981), pp. 331 sq. and MacDowell 
(1978) pp. 89-90. Also, cf. Plut. Per. XXXVII.5, for Perikles allegedly being allowed to introduce his son 
by the foreign woman Aspasia into his phratry.
" Isaios III.73. But this translation may be misleading, see below.
80 (1993), p. 181; cf. Isaios III.73, 76.
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complete decree describing admission, describes the introduction of a son and does not 
mention daughters’.81
Byzantine writers refer to Greek girls being personally introduced to phratries at the 
gamelia seemingly as a matter of legal registration.8. Pollux and the scholiast’s statements 
cannot be taken to indicate that they were admitted as members of phratries in fifth- to 
foulth-crntuly Athens—although this may have been the case signiiieantly later.83 *In 
Dindorfs edition of the Scholia to Aristophanes’ Acham. 146, he cited the Suda (s.v. 
meiagogein) and embellished the Greek text to give the impression that both boys’ and girls’ 
names were inscribed on phratry lists.** This emendation, which had been regarded as 
important evidence for the registration of girls, is now omitted in the current edition of the 
Scholia.85 * 87After betrothal and marriage, a Greek husband in the Hellenistic age may have 
personally introduced his wife to his fellow phrateres. A sacrifice and a ceremonial meal 
would follow as in the Classical tradition.8”
Both Isaiss8. and Demosthenes”® speak of presenting a marriage feast to the phratry, 
as part of the gamelia., ‘on behalf of (t>K£p) a wife. This would suggest that a man presented 
the name of his newly wedded wife to his phrattres and they, perhaps having done some 
discreet investigation into her background, effectively accepted her as capable of bearing 
male children whom they would eventually receive as phratry members and citizens. Their 
official acknowledgement of female children who could bear legitimate offspring was 
apparently a prerequiiiteS” In this capacity, an aspect of the public sphere profoundly 
influences the private. The connection between this scrutiny and the transferr-al of property
81 (1995), p. 117.
82 Pollux VIII. 107 and £ Ar. Ach 146. It is notable that the gamelia was not mentioned by Thecmnrstos 
and Apollodoros in their prosecution of Stephanos for his marriage to the non-Athenian Neaire in Drm. 
LIX. He may have introduced hrr end the prosecution intentionally neglected to mention it—but this is not 
certain.
22 Ao VIII. 107, he describes the gamelia as the female equivalent of the koureion.
8*11855), 346; lines 5-7.
25 Cf. Pomeroy (1995), p. 117 and esp. n. 23 and n. 24
25 Isaios III.76, 79; Pollux VIII. 107. A fragment from Didymos describes ‘the introduction of women to 
the phrateres', FGrH 325 F 17; but cf. HarpokraOion (s.v. yagT|Xia) who declares that Didymos reported 
OhaO Phanedemos definition was in error. Although Didymos’ report states that Phanedemos had said that 
wives were introduced into the phratry at the gamelia, it is contested whether he (Phanedemos) actually 
said such e thing (cf. Pomeroy 1995, p. 117).
87 III.79.8.
8® LVII.43.
25 Lambert (1993), p. 183 and n. 220. ‘In other words’, as Pomrroy (1995), pp. 117-118, says ‘the gamelia 
served cs an occasion at which a marriage was made public and created witnesses to Ohe legitimacy of the 
children born as e result of iO’.
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should be especially noted along with the female participant’s relatively passive role in the 
proceedings. If an Athenian father did not personally introduce his daughter to his 'phrateres, 
why then should we expect a husband to have personally introduced his newlywed-wife? The 
Classical phratiy was, after aU, a ‘brotherhood’. Whatever else it may have implied to an 
Athenian woman’s status, the gamelia did not, as Lambert says, ‘bestow actual phratiy 
membership on her’.””
The Magnesian phratries seem represent a significant shift from Athenian practices 
inasmuch as they extend their membership to both men and women.”* It follows that 
phratiy-on&AAcd functions would constitute some of a citizen woman’s social interaction in 
the public sphere. Other than registrars of citizenship status, the precise activities to be 
undertaken in Magnesian phratries remain uncertain. Presumably there would be banquets, 
sacrifices, plus some type of ceremonies and business meetings. It is also a hkely possibility 
that women’s role in these would also extend to the Marriage Guardians and their scrutiny 
over married couples.
Family members and the local community, through traditional phratries, undertook a 
similar sort of ‘supervision’ in Athens and elsewhere. Plato has taken existing customs and 
refitted them for his second-best state (and, as with other Magnesian nomoi, he seems to have 
presaged future practices). He has metamorphosed existing cultural institutions into more 
formalised agencies of the government and allowed women full (or nearly full) 
participation.”. It is perhaps typical of the Athenian Stranger’s broadly utilitarian approach 
that he has permitted them unparalleled access to phratries.
Government and Law
Magnesian women have the right to be chosen for state duties. The Athenian Stranger has 
stated that the Magnesian legislator will not be limited by sex in his choice of officials for 
duties of civic administration, saying that ‘the law has already granted him permission, and 
still gives him permission, to choose whomever he wishes of the men and women of the 
state for public commission’ (813c6-9). There is every indication that Magnesian women.
9” Ihid, p. 184. Each phratry’s laws (nomoi) for the gamelia would have been different as well.
”* 785a3-b2; From their first year of life, every Magnesian citizens of either sex will have their names 
inscribed on the register of their respective family’s phratry.
92 See below for more on this issue of women’s perceived ‘inferiority’.
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past the childbearing age, will be included amongst the Guardians of the Laws and therefore 
the nukterinos council. However, their numbers amongst these will probably be fewer than 
men and it appears that most citizen-women in positions of authority will be Marriage 
Supervisors and Supervisors of Children’s nurses.93
Magnesian women are also allowed to participate in courtroom affairs both in terms 
of prosecuting a case and being prosecuted themselves should they be accused of 
committing a crime. For example, if someone has been slain by another with forethought, 
the Athenian Stranger indicates that it is the duty of anyone related to the deceased ‘on either 
the male or female side’ to bring the matter to court and prosecute the alleged murderer 
(871a-c). If a woman should kill her husband out of rage, she is to suffer the same penalty as 
a man who slays his wife under the same emotional circumstances.94 There will be a trial 
and, if found guilty, the murderer can be banished from the city for three years (868e). 
Citizen women are to be granted the same legal footing as anyone else with regard to attacks 
on their person (882c). However, one tiling will not be permitted for women (or anyone 
else) to do in terms the legal sphere. A trial must be a sober and austere occasion. No one is 
allowed to speak with oaths for the purposes of persuasion, or to curse themselves or their 
families, or to employ unseemly supplication or ‘womanly wailings’ to sway the case.95
The degree of freedom allowed Magnesian women stands in stark contrast to the 
reality of Plato’s era. Only a few ancient Athenian women were known to have actively 
participated in court.96 There is the example is the wife of Megakles of the Alkmeonid clan 
who seems to have upheld her civic virtue in testifying—but the case was an extraordinary 
one and she a woman of foreign birth.97 Agariste was one of the three witnesses who gave 
evidence that Alkibiades illicitly celebrated the mysteries in the house of Charmides in
I
93yfhe ‘women in charge of marriages’ (yuvaiKE? hm.peXou|a,feveq xcov ydgcov); cf. 783b-784b, and 
930cl-7 where they are consecrated to Eileithuia (Artemis of Childbirth) and meet each day in her temple; 
see below.
94 At 73 Id, the unjust soul may be tempered toward justice by ceasing from ‘womanly’ (yuvaiKeicoq) 
i aging. This is another example of excessive emotionality being associated with femininity. Cf. the 
Pythagorean Table of Opposites in my chapter IV.
95 ...irqxe c'ikxok; yovaiKeioig—949b 1-3. This recollects Sokrates’ comments at Apology 34c sq. where 
he makes much of refusing to bring in his relatives to beg melodramatically for his acquittal as was 
apparently not an uncommon occurrence in such cases.
96 Cf. e.g. Thuc. 11.24,2, Dem. XXVIII.3, LIX, LVII.37, pseud. Dem. XL, Isai. V.5, VI. 12, X.4 and below.
97 Agariste was the daughter of Kleisthenes, ruler of Sikyon, and the mother ofKleisthenes the famous 
reformer. Cf. MacDowell (1978), pp. 67, 87.
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connection with the Sicilian disaster.”® If a citizen- or metic-woman needed to initiate legal 
proceedings, then a male relative or sponsor would undertake the case on her behalf.”” Men 
were the only ones who brought cases to trial and who sat on the juries. When women are 
mentioned in a courtroom setting, their names are frequently avoided unless they were being 
disparaged. A woman who was sufficiently visible in the public eye could accrue shame. 
‘The most respectful way to refer to a woman’, as Schaps states, ‘was not to say what her 
name was, but to indicate whose wife, or daughter, or sister she was: for indeed, if she was a 
proper woman, the jurors would not be expected to know her, but would be expected to 
know her kyrios1.10°
Magnesian women, in sharp contrast, have the right to become highly visible and 
publicly known by name. The law allows women fuU access to the courts. They also appear 
to be entitled to vote and stand for ministerial positions*”* The right to do so is extended to 
aU the kyrioi, to individuals who possess heavy weapons (including members of the cavalry 
and infantry) and to veterans of wartime activities*”. A large number of men would qualify 
having been trained to fight with the requisite arms or by simply being kyrioi. As we have 
seen, female Magnesians also have the opportunity to be -trained in the use of heavy weapons 
and the art of horsemanship*”® It follows that some women could nominate someone as well 
as be nominated themselves—providing they meet the requirements of possessing certain 
arms and/or having fought in a war. The restriction of participation based on possession of 
heavy weapons would appear to be more of a limiting factor for Magnesia’s lower property
9® Andokides 116; Cf. Rhodes (1981), p. 465, on the rules governing the celebration of the mysteries and 
of. MacDowell (1978), pp. 198-9.
99 As MacDowell (1978), p. 84, indicates, ‘a metic woman might have no male relatives in Athens and so 
be ‘kyrios of herself (Demosthenes LIX.46), though, as a metic she would have a sponsor (prostates) who 
might speak for her in legal affairs’. Cf. ibid. pp. 85-103.
’9” (1977), p. 330. Cf. Dem. XXXIX.9 and above.
101 At 715c9-10, the Athenian Stranger says ‘and those who were called “rulers” (hp/ova^) I have now 
called “ministers of the laws” (tonipfe'irxq rti£ vdpcis), not for the sake of coining a new phrase, but in the 
belief that the -salvation or ruin of a polis hangs upon nothing so much as this’. These elected “ministers of 
the laws” have more limited authority than the appointees on the nukterinos council —to whom the 
Guardians of the Laws ultimately answer.
102 753b-c. Curiously, at 715b-c2, the Athenian Stranger stated that ‘we will not apportion offices in your 
city on the grounds of someone’s wealth or any such - possessions, whether physical strength, size or 
descent’. He seems to have backtracked somewhat on the issue of wealth and possessions in terms of 
selecting magistrates. Indeed, amongst the four necessarily unequal property classes of Magnesia (outlined 
at 744a-745b), when it comes to ‘offices, revenues and distributions, the honour due to each individual 
person will depend not only upon the virtue of his ancestors and himself, and the strength and 
handsomeness of bodies, but also according to the way one uses wealth or poverty’ (744b5-c2). There is a 
clear sense that the wealthy may have greater inclination for arete.
103 Cf. my chapter III.
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classes than for the female sex in general. However, the number of women standing for 
election, and perhaps voting, would be significantly lower than that of men.
In addition to including women in governmental activities, albeit to a clearly limited 
extent, Plato’s narrator has also admitted an uichalactrristieally high degree of democracy 
into the second-best state. Magnesia’s partially democratic election system is modified by 
this society’s peculiar attributes. AU citizens, engaged as they are in the pursuit of arete, 
should posses a better technt for political decisions than the populace of the average Greek 
democracy. The utopiailsatioi of democracy is part of the reason why Magnesian women 
are granted such an unprecedented political status.
CounseUors in the boult of 360 are chosen according to property class (90 from each) 
and, whUe aU citizen males of the first and second classes are competed to vote under 
penalty of fine, the right to vote is afforded to ‘anyone who wishes’.1”4 This statement, 
echoing Socman values, would also appear to include certain Magnesian women as weU—if 
not aU of them. There are thirty-seven special officials of the state apart from the elected 
boult and the unerrcted nukterinos council. The list of nominees for ‘ministers of the laws’, 
military commanders, hipparchs, phykirchs and taxiarchs is to be placed in public for thirty days 
and ‘anyone who thinks it fit’ may remove any name they wish*”” This feature demonstrates 
some the limitations imposed on democracy inasmuch as erltaii people might always tend 
to be excluded or included by the time of election. The nukterinos eouncill Guardians and 
sitting officials will scrutinise these undertakings with care. The ministers already in office 
take the first three hundred of the remaining names (in alphabetical order?) and place them 
on a baUot for the citizens to cast a second round of votes again by deletion.
The magistrates choose a hundred names from the second short-listing and then 
‘anyone who wishes’ may cast their actual votes. The thirty-seven who receive the most 
votes will be examined by and, if they pass, are installed in office (753c-d). It is unclear 
whether or not the ‘anyone who wishes’ who are permitted to strike names from the list of 
candidates and then to vote on them refers to those who possess heavy weapons or are from 
the citizen-populace at large. The Athenian Stranger appears to mean that the selection of 
candidates for nomination is to be limited to those who possess the requisite arms. The
’”4 756c9-10; this process is quite elaborate end involves a random lottery aO the final stage, after all Ohe 
rounds of voting, to decide Ohe candidates who then must be scrutinised, sre below; cf. Plut. Solon XVIII.4- 
5 end sq., for this common democratic formula of ‘anyone who wishes’ in Solon’s reforms.
105 755b sq.
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actual short-listing and voting would seem to be the privilege of the citizen populace as a 
whole including many men and some women. It is unclear whether women wiU sit on the 
supreme nukterinos council.106 * 108 109 110Since its members are appointed from the eldest of the 
Guardians of the Laws, it is possible to assume that they might be included—although this is 
never explicitly specified.1”7 Women’s role in higher Magnesian politics is clearly marginal, 
but their implied potential emphasises the contrast between the ideal world of a second-best 
utopia and the realities of ancient Greece.
‘Big Sister’ is Watching
The case of the Marriage Supervisors is perhaps the clearest example of Magnesian women 
in the public sphere. These are citizen-women who work for the polis yet regularly enter the 
oikos to make certain that state policies are properly adhered to in the private lives of married 
individuals. This important office is ranked highly in the value-system of Magnesia. Its 
agents serve an implicitly civic role through the infiltration of the private household with the 
express purposes of ideological manipulation and behaviour modification.
Bearing children who wUl eventually become heirs and heiresses of their parents’ 
immobUe estate is the desired goal of a Magnesian marriage. The Athenian Stranger stresses 
the necessity of ttknopoiia to replenish the state in a proposed lecture to his hypothetical 
populace*”8 His persuasive exhortation, as we saw in the last chapter, states that one ‘must 
naturally hold onto the Everlasting by always leaving behind children and grandchildren after 
one that they may render service unto the God’.*”” He follows this preamble with binding 
constitutional guidelines on correct procreation in marriage**” These and other activities 
come under intense scrutiny. The supervision of married couples may be taken as an 
example of Magnesia’s efforts to reduce privacy to a minimum (739a-740a). In this way, a
106 They are officially identified as functioning in a ‘watchdog’ capacity, making recommendations and 
keeping the ship of state ‘on course’ (960-65), but their actual power is nearly absolute—just below that of 
the laws. Cf. my chapter III on their special education and II on their authority. In many ways, they are 
reminiscent of the Spartan Gerousia, cf. Cartledge (2001) pp. 34-5, 60, 84 on their powers.
,07951d8-e4; of. 813c6-8.
108 Cf. my chapter II for more on such legal preambles.
109 773e5-774al. This would appear to be an example of the sort of ‘mystification’ (or idealisation) that 
certain modern feminists accuse some men of associating with the act of reproduction; cf. O’Brien (1981), 
pp. 8-15, 46.
110 Cf. my chapter V.
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link is established to allow direct intervention in the oikos on behalf of the polis. Magnesian 
women’s labour of teknopoiia (that which is most essentially ‘their own’) is to be subordinated 
to the win of the state and their lives directed, along with those of the men, toward the aims 
of the state’s official ideology.l1l
The Magnesian women chosen as Marriage Supervisors observe their assigned 
couples for up to ten years—providing that children come in suitable numbers and the 
marriage remains solvent (784a sq.). An intimate relationship is suggested between them and 
the couples being observed. Regular contact to scrutinise their private affairs will be the 
norm. If a couple does not produce the appropriate amount of offspring or rear them 
properly, then they may either divorce or, as we have seen, ‘the female officials wiU go into 
the home of the young people and admonish and threaten them to cease their error and 
ignorance’ (784c2-4). The preferred solution is that they be lreoicllrd, through eounsrlling, 
avoid divorce, and promote the official myth of family concodd.1*.
Marriage Supervisors are chosen by the rulers of the city and wUl meet in committee 
each day at the Temple of Eileithuia (Artemis of ChiJ^c^liit^d^liSlio discuss, amongst other 
matters, those couples whose activities do not seem to be inclined toward ‘what was 
enjoined upon them at the marriage sacrifices and sacred rites’ (namely the proper manner of 
begetting and rearing childrin8.l1 They wUl make regular reports to the ‘women magistrates’ 
and Guardians of the Laws who have the necessary legal authority to intervene directly, as 
they deem appropriate, in the lives of members of a c\Xi7,zn.-oikos. FaUure to comply with the 
Guardians of the Laws may result in deprivation of the privUege of attending weddings and 
parties that are celebrating births (with strict penalties for defying the pumshmen)..11” The 
Marriage Supervisors, therefore, may be construed as serving both as observers of families 
and as potent agents of influence. A married couple in Magnesia wUl not only have the state
111 Cf. McKinnon (1982), p. 518, for Ohe characterisation of this sort of thing as a principle means of male 
domination of women through the deployment of Ohe socio-economic forces eO Oheir disposal.
112 Cf. my chapter V.
”5 Eileithuia figured prominently into Athenian women’s religious lives. Wr are told that Ohe robes of 
women who had died while giving birth were dedicated to Artemis at Brauron who was patroness of the 
life cycle of women (Eur. Iph. Taur. 1404-9). Cf. also Seeley (1990), p. 37 and Cole (1998), pp. 36 sq. on 
woven items offered along with gold and silver representations of breasts, vulvee and end wombs. 
Artemis, along with Apollo end Ohe Dioskuri, was a principle deity of Sparta, cf. Parker (1989), p. 145 sq. 
114 784a-b. Cf. Lambert (1993), p. 182, for similar ‘sacred rites’ in Athenian marriages.
”5 784dl-5. Cf. my chapter V on Ohe relative harshness of this penalty.
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rules of procreation with which to contend. The Marriage Supervisors wiU ‘advertise’ official 
doctrines in close quarters for at least ten years of their charges’ lives.
Akin to these, the Supervisors of Childrtn’s Nurses oversee all those to whom the 
care of the young is entrusted (including nurses, tutors and slaves—794b sq.). Twelve 
women are to be chosen by the female Guardians of the Laws who oversee the Marriage 
Supervisors, vaguely implying that such upper-echelon female Guardians will exist, to keep 
order over a particular ‘herd’ of children for a one-year term**” During their tenure of 
office, they have the authority to command the city’s servants or slaves and to punish both 
male and female slaves along with strangers to the city (e.g. hired teachers) who violate 
Magnesian strictures.
These women even have the mandate to exert their authority over a Magnesian 
citizen—subject to specific conditions. If one of them does so, she must have a clear case in 
order for her indictment to hold. Being a citizen, the accused has the right to dispute her 
claim through due legal process. If this happens, then she must take up the matter with one 
of the City Wardens (&CXD>v6i101) and if he/she upholds her claim against the accused, then 
the law will ‘let her punish even a citizen’ on her own authority (794b7-c2). It seems correct 
to anticipate that more Magnesian women wdl become Marriage Supervisors and 
Supervisors of Nurses than wdl make up the higher ranks of the Guardians of the Laws, the 
city’s magistrates or the nukterinos councd.
Prostitution
Prostitution of any sort is to have no official legal status in Magnesia. The Athenian Stranger 
is fearful that there might be instances of it nonetheless. He has framed some legislation to 
deal with its possible occurrence. What he does not say about this issue may speak louder 
than his words (which are relatively few). This particular segment of the Magnesian 
population is notorious not so much in its presence, but in its absence. Their position in this 
society is marginal in the extreme but there potential, so disturbing to the Athenian Stranger, 
informs this examination of sex and society.
lt6 Cf. my chapter III for the Spartan connotations of‘herds’ (&y£Xxi) of children.
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Plato’s narrator has made regulations on the subject of extra-marital intercourse that 
contain implicit indications that there might be individuals who hire themselves out for 
sexual favours amongst the citizenry of the second-best state*’’ This is not the ideal marital 
behaviour that Magnesians are intended to foUow. However, the Athenian Stranger seems 
to anticipate that, even in the second-best state, not everyone wUl pursue artte with equal 
vigour. This may be said, at least, to lend a dimension of realism to Magnesia. He provides 
a law in the event that some men cannot uphold the ideal, saying that there wUl be harsh 
psychological penalties for anyone who does so ‘except he keep it secret from aU other men 
and women’.**® The inclusion of such a ‘secrecy clause’ in this law admits the possibility that 
some Magnesian men might engage in sexual intercourse with someone in the polis other 
than their wives. There is a special concern that tliis might include hired or un-hired liaisons 
with young boys or male youths.1’” Aside from any doubts that this might cast on the 
practicalities of the pursuit of artte, a further question is raised: who, in aU Magnesia, would 
be the prostitutes?
It is clear that citizen-women, by virtue of their status and the expectations that it 
entaUs, are not expected to faU even loosely into the category of prostitute. Magnesia is 
meant to be a society where almost every citizen is either married, engaged to be married, 
too young to be engaged or too old. The official myth of famUy, as we have seen, does not 
favour the single lifestyle. AU citizens are held to a high standard that carries with it certain 
legal restrictions as to what types of sexual and other activities they may undertake without 
incurring pubUc shame and/or official action.
There is a law, for example, that precludes both male and female Magnesian citizens 
from running a bushies..* 118 * 120 Such base commerce would interfere with their compulsory 
pursuit of artte. Therefore the running of any business of prostitution would be prohibited 
in the extreme for any citizen. AU citizens (including spinsters, unwed maidens and boys) 
would be excluded from the role of ‘sex-worker’ on the same grounds. The overriding
1,7 ‘Ideally no man’, says he, ‘would dare to have sexual relations with a respectable free-woman other than 
his wedded wife, nor would he dare to sow unhallowed and bastard seed among concubines, nor sterile 
seed in males contrary to nature’ (841dl-5). Cf. my chapters V and VII.
118 841d6-e4.
”0 Cf. my chapter VII.
120 743d2-6. Running a bordello would be considered a banausic trade.
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mandate for the pursuit of virtue excludes aU citizens, regardless of their sex, from being a 
prostitute or running a procurement service for cthets.l21
There will be resident aliens in the city-state who are permitted to run businesses. 
Such individuals must possess some relevant craft to provide their livelihood and are allowed 
to stay no longer than twenty years without special dispensation (850b-c). Whoever engages 
in the retail trade must be either a metic or a stranger to the city (920a). Resident foreigners 
pay no special alien tax, as they would have in Athens and elsewhere, ‘except that of being 
moderate’.*.. Slaves and foreigners who educate or rear children, as previously indicated, wdl 
be held to a high standard and bear much scrutiny. There is htde or no indication that the 
rest of the resident-aUen population is to be so closely supervised. It may be the case that 
they wdl be permitted to abide by Magnesia’s morality of temperance to a lesser degree than 
citizens.
They appear to provide a possibility for the sex-trade in Magnesia if only inasmuch 
as they alone can provide goods and services for profit. However, the prescription that they 
must be ‘moderate’ in order to be allowed to remain in the city suggests that any resident 
aliens who might hire out prostitutes could only do so under the constraints of extreme 
secrecy and the appearance of propriety. A resident alien man or woman might engage in 
prostitution him/herself or serve as a procurer for others. There is also the possibility that 
some amongst the ubiquitous slave population of Magnesia could serve as a citizen’s 
personal concubine—albeit perhaps at great risk to both master and slave. Resident aliens 
might also hire out slaves, again poteniiady at great risk, as prostitutes.
They appear to be the likeliest choice. Resident aliens would have to be subtle to 
avoid the Guardians of the Laws and City Wardens, but they are to be somewhat less 
supervised than Magnesian citizens or their slaves, teachers and nurses. It is reasonable to 
posit that, if they keep it quiet, the use of prostitutes could be a common state of affairs 
amongst them. They might also be hired out discreetly to citizens. However, they wdl be 
famdiar with the Athenian Stranger’s decree of ‘abstaining from any female field in which 
you would not want your seed to spring forth’ (839al-3). If they ‘dare to sow unhallowed
121 Cf. Dem. LIX.87, Aiskhines. 1.14, 183-184 and Pin. Solon 23.1 for Athenian penalties for citizens who 
undertook prostitution or ran a procurement service.
122...JtAfv too ara)t>fp>veiv—850b3. On metic taxation in Athens, cf. MacDowell (1978), pp. 76 sq.
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and bastard seed in concubines’ or other prostitutes, then she (or he) would probably have 
to be purchased through the mercantile class of resident aliens.
The issue of ‘prostitution’ in the ancient world is complex, but the Athenian 
Stlangrr’s brief mention of the subject is revealing. It points to a ‘two-type’ model that may 
have been a prominent feature of ancient views on sex. The distinction that he makes is 
between the kinds of woman with whom citizen men may have legitimate sexual iitrleoursr 
(citizen-wives) and the type with whom they may not (the lest).l23 The terms given to 
designate a Magnesian man’s proper sexual partner describe her as the ‘women who entered 
into his household under the sanction of the gods and the sacred marriage ceremony’ or, 
more simply, his legally wedded wife. The ancient Athenians appear to have followed a 
similar formula in distinguishing a legally ‘married wife’ or ‘a wife married according to the 
laws’ from the mass of other women.*"
The distinction between a lawful wife and ‘the rest’ is important in determining the 
role of a citizen-woman in Magnesian society. Anyone other than one’s ‘lawfully wedded’ 
spouse is automatically excluded from the list of sanctioned erotic choices for men and 
women. However, the Athenian Stranger does suggest a couple of the possibilities (namely 
other men and pallakai, ‘whether hired or procured by some other means’) with whom a 
citizen should not have sex—but theoretically could.
The restrictions against Magnesian citizens undertaking prostitution echo 
conservative Athenian values. The law quoted by Aiskhines, in his case against Timarkhos, 
reads ‘because the legislator considered that one who had been a vendor of his own body for 
others to treat as they pleased, [they] would have no hesitation in selling the interests of the 
community as a whole’.1*5 The prostitutes who, as Dover says, ‘phed their trade in brothels 
and paid the tax levied on their profession.. .were presumably for the most part 
foreigners’.1*" A similar ideological slant seems to be operating in Magnesia. Unlike Athens, 
there is no legal permission for prostitution of any sor't. The Athenian Stranger, however, 
seems to recognise the fact that the complete prohibition of something desirable is ultimately
123 The distinctions between prostitutes, concubines end sexual companions (pommi, pallakai, hetairai), 
exclusive to non-citizen women, ere complex, cf. my chapter II and below. Of course, ‘the rest’ could also 
include males as well as females, cf. my chapter VII.
”4 Davidson (1997), p. 77. Cf. my chapOer II for more on prostitutes in ancient Athens.
125 1.29-32. Cf. GPM41, 289 sq., 302. As Dover (GH p. 20), indicates, Ohe ‘sale of one’s own body’ is 
rendered from Ohr verb ‘peporneumenos' which ‘is Ohe perfect par^^ciple of the verb porneusthai, “behave 
as a porne or pornos'".
”6 GHp. 32. Cf. Aiskh. 1192 sq., 123 sq.
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impossible.,’27 He instead, as we have seen, focuses his efforts on other discouragements of a
more psychological nature to this end.
Rehgious Life and Death
There are to be annual festivals for both the men and women of Magnesia. They take part 
in these sometimes together as a community and sometimes separated by sex (828c5-6). 
Sexually integrated public ceremonies did take place in the Greek world (e.g. funerals), but 
there is also some indication that they could be stressful to the normal boundaries of sexual 
decorum.’28 Magnesia goes beyond Athens in these matters, AU shrines are public and so, as 
a consequence, all religious activities wiU be highly civic in character. The Athenian Stranger 
is adamant that Magnesian shrines are to be exclusively public institutions. His warning 
against the establishment of private shrines is especiaUy aimed at women whom, he indicates, 
are more likely to do so than men.’2"
The reUgious ceremonies to be performed consist of a series of hymns, tncomia and 
prayers to the various gods, heroes and spirits that meet with the approval of the Magnesian 
authorities (801 e). Plato’s narrator insists that no one will be permitted to sing such praises 
in honour of notable citizens while they stiU Uve. When they have passed on, they may be 
officially deemed worthy of public displays of adoration and only then wUl it be appropriate 
to add their names to the sacred lists. Sacred songs constitute a major component of 
Magnesia’s religious ceremonies. Different songs wiU be chosen according to rhythm, meter 
and content, relative to the particular religious occasions, in order to correspond properly 
with the sex of the individuals who partake of them. There are certain types of songs 
specific to men’s religious events, others specific to women’s and some deemed suitable for 
both when the occasion requires them to be togethe*.* 13”
127 Cf. my chapter VII on the questionable prohibition of same-sex intercourse.
Cf. Lysias 1.8 sq. where Euphiietos indicates that it was at his mother’s funeral that his wife met
Eratosthenes. The only relatives of the deceased permitted were of the family’s anchisteia, see below and 
my Chapter V.
909e3-8; this would seem to be addressing another aspect of their perceived ‘secretiveness’.
I38 Cf. my chapter VI on the characterisation of these typed of music according to sex.
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The right to be honoured in sacred songs for living a virtuous and noble life is 
extended equally to both sexes. The Athenian Stranger says let aU these things be in 
common amongst us for both men and women and those of either sex who are 
conspicuously good’ (802a3-5). This process of state-sanctioned apotheosis would appear to 
provide exemplars for ordinary citizens to emulate through their pursuit of arete. It would 
also provide an incentive for good behaviour as well as a tremendous honour to the family 
to whom the heroic deceased belonged. Perhaps the Athenian Stranger intends that most 
families wdl have at least one relative amongst the ranks of ‘city heroes’ thus democratically 
spreading the honours.
Twelve festivals for the twelve Olympian gods, who wdl give their names to the 
same number of Magnesian phylai, wdl be undertaken annually. These consist of monthly 
sacrifices held explicitly in the public sphere and accompanied by other fesiivitie*.131 
Gymnastic events, musical contests and choruses figure prominently in these. Magnesia’s 
priests and priestesses ‘wiU distribute the women’s festivals, as many as it is appropriate to 
celebrate, apart from men and as many as are not’ (828c5-6). Little is actually said about 
those religious festivals specific to women except for the passage that deals with the offering 
of woven goods to temples on special occasions (mentioned above—956a-b) and the 
‘moderate’ type of music they are permitted to perform.132 As with many aspects of his 
hypothetical constitution, the fine detads wdl be ironed out by the Magnesian officials 
working in their offices rather than by the Athenian Stranger with his companions on the 
road to Mt. Ida.
The burial of the dead and its accompanying funerary affairs provides a significant 
religious context in which Magnesian citizen-women partake of both the public and private 
spheres—yet act in a largely civic capacity. The Magnesia cemetery is, amongst other things, 
an area for the public display of familial descent. This places its political ends alongside 
those of its Athenian counterpart amongst others. But the differences even in this single 
respect are striking.
The Athenian cemetery was a place to display patrilineal kinship-groupings in which 
women played a largely secondary role. The monuments were constructed, as Stears says.
131 In chapter V, we saw that private religious ceremonies are forbidden in Magnesia.
132 Cf. my chapters III and IV.
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‘with emphasis in the diachronic and agnatic affiliations, the oikos and perhaps the gtnod.^ 
Athenian women, she goes on to say, ‘were important for the construction and cohesion of 
the cognatic kin-group the anchisttia, a limited bilateral grouping centred on an individual, 
through which ran the line of inheritance’.’3* Women’s importance granted them a 
permanent place in the funerary monuments as members of this cognatic kinship-group, but 
this ‘memorial’ was probably figurative rather than phy^al!’.* 13” The anchisttia was 
considerably less prominent than the oikos or gtnos in terms of funerary representation. Its 
function was no less significant. Athenian women’s tombs, as in Magnesia, served a 
particularly political role. They were important to the oikos, gtnos, dtmos, phratry and polis as a 
means of claiming, demonstrating or countering refutations to one’s inhefiaance.™
The Athenian Stranger has insisted that later religious legislators give equal 
consideration ‘whether the deceased be either a man or a woman’ (958d3-6). He advises that 
plain grave markers {sttlai) of a simple type wUl be erected in common style for aU deceased 
citizens with only a few exceptions.13’ As discussed in the previous chapter, the undertaker 
wi1 ‘make the stone grave-markers no larger than as much as wUl contain not more than 
four heroic lines of tncomia on the life of the deceased’ (958e8-959al). This dignity is 
extended equally to both sexes.
The honouring of women in death through symbolic representation and inscribed 
commemoration echoes traditional Athenian practices to an extent but definitely steps 
beyond them. As Osborne says, ‘women had a major place in the symbolization of relations 
between humanity and the gods in archaic Athens, but virtually no place at aU in the 
symboHc language in which the loss of human life was marked’.’™ They were only 
infrequently represented in funeral monuments before c.500 b.c.e.; however, from the 
middle of the 5* century onwards they appear in symboHc representation virtually as often as
138 8 1 9‘^^5), p. 114.
I3” Ibid. In Stears (1998), p. 116, she describes the anchisteia as ‘a bilateral kinship grouping centred on an 
ego and extending to the children of cousins’.
’3 Stears (1995), p. 114.; cf. Sealey (1990), p. 15 on the anchisteia and inheritance. In Aristophanes’ Birds 
(1650-52), Pisthetairos startles Herakles by accusing him of being a nothos (more or less translatable as 
‘illigtimate’) since his mother was an alien women. He cites legal code to prove this (1660-66) saying that 
the nothos has no anchisteia if there are legitimate (gnesioi) children present.
'3 Lysias I; Isaios VI.64; Aiskh. Fais. Leg. XXXIII. 1. This will not be a problem in Magnesia as the 
public rolls and the registries ofphratries will be comprehensive and accurate.
n Temple robbers and parricides are to be denied interment within tombs (960b). A similar statute existed 
in ancient Athens whereby temple robbers were denied burial in Attica (Xen. Hellenika 1.7.22). See below 
for other exceptions due to class and status and cf. my chapter V.
p. 11.
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men. The archaic stelai are not unlike those to be used in Magnesia except that they were 
more excessive in terms of carving and embeliishmnne.s”
The equality of Magnesian men and women in death is emphasised by their inscribed 
commemoration on the burial monuments. Both sexes will receive an equal number (and 
presumably quality) of lines of heroic encomia on their respective stelai. This is a marked 
difference from the real world. ‘Although women were depicted in [Athenian] funerary 
monument images as frequently as men’, according to Stears, ‘they were not recorded in 
inscriptions as often’.1*” The simplicity of Magnesia’s grave-markers, their placement on 
graves without regard to the sex of the deceased and the limitations on funerary expenditure 
emphasise a significant point of equality between aU Magnesians in death. However, this 
democratic ‘equality’ is moderated by economic class and social statue.l8l
His plans reflect Athenian funerary practices and, to a lesser extent, Spartan. Unlike 
Magnesia, the Spartans evidently buried their citizen-dead within the city and placed tombs 
for their kings outidde.e. MicheU suggests that this was to prevent the angry spirits of 
vengeful duarchs from entering the city and bringing their miasma on the peoltiees3 The only 
names inscribed on their ceremonial stelai were those of warriors who had died in battle or 
women who had died whilst performing sacred offices. This was perhaps because they 
believed that spirits of the dead could not find their tombs unless their names were inscribed 
on them. By thus limiting the inscriptions they sought to risule that only ‘virtuous’ souls 
would return to influence the livinge88 Plato’s narrator may have borrowed somewhat from 
these Spartan traditions but he democratically extends the same privileges in death to all of 
his virtuous elite.
13” Cf. Ibid. pp. 11-12 and Stears (1995), p. 113 sq.. The Athenians stopped erecting these around c.500 
possibly due to democratic reforms being legislated, but this remains uncertain (cf. Cic. de leg. II.26.64-5). 
4” (1995), p. 114; 88 extant monuments record a male and female couple, yet amongst Ohe single 
inscriptions there are 234 male examples as opposed to 102 female ones.
14* Cf. my chapOer V and below.
142 PluO. Lyk. XxVII; Herod. VI.58. Cf. also Plato Minos 315d, Michell (1964), pp. 62-3 and Cartledge 
(2001), p. 200, n. 71. Michell suggests that this was to prevent the angry spirits of bad kings from entering 
the city.
14” (1964), p. 62.
144 Herak. Pont. FHGII, p. 210, frs. 2,8. Michell (1964), p. 63.
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One of the Guardians of the Laws will administer a final duty of supervision in the 
act of overseeing the funeral preparations undertaken by the deceased’s family**5 He/she 
does so to make sure that the rule of moderation is upheld. The Guardian’s authority is 
backed by official sanction and the threat of shame. ‘Let it be a noble thing to his credit’, 
says file Athenian Stranger, ‘when the matters regarding the dead transpire well and in due 
measure, but a shameful thing if they transpire ignobly’ (959e3-5). The funeral procession is 
to be highly regulated and a sober attitude of sophrosyne must accompany all funerary events. 
‘To command that that there be weeping for the deceased or that there be no weeping’, says 
the Athenian Stranger, ‘is unseemly, but the singing of threnodies and the raising of voices 
outside of the household (fe^CO tj o’lK'lOt^) is forbidden’.*" The deceased’s remains wiU be 
prepared for burial ^rothesi?), as was the tradition in Athens, at home by women and 
probably slave***’ The Athenian Stranger does not say whether a religious ceremony might 
take place in the oikos as in the case of an Athenian prothesis}^^ The prohibition against 
establishing private shrines would seem to apply here, although he has not specified it.
The Athenian Stranger’s guidelines are designed to make the Magnesian funeral a 
reserved and dignified affair. The corpse must not be carried ‘open to sight’ on the roads 
and the ekphora has to be out of the city before daybreak. Crying aloud is forbidden whilst 
the remains are being borne through the Magnesian streets to the city’s cemt^ec^ry**” There 
win be a yearly ritual in honour of aU Magnesia’s deceased at which a similar ‘orderliness’ 
(K6cjl0£^) is to be maintained by the participants. *55 Outward expressions of grief are strictly 
confined to the oikos alone and, as with unseemly behaviour in court, women have been 
specifically singled out as the ones who run the greatest risk of breaking this taboo.
An exception to the general rule of equality in funerals arises in regard to the burial 
of deceased ‘priests of Apollo and the Sun’. The assembly of the entire citizen population
145 Morrow (1960), p. 203, has observed that ‘even in rare cases in which a guardian acts alone—as in 
making arrangements for a funeral—the penalty for disobedience is determined by the board’ of Guardians 
acting together.
’44 959e7-960a2. This compares well with Solon’s funeral legislation, see below.
14’ Stears (1998), p. 114. The mouth would be closed and the body, as she says, would be ‘washed and then 
wrapped in a number of layers of fabric, including a shroud and a top cover. On the bier it was laid out 
with the feet toward the door and a pillow under the head. It was then decked with herbs and sometimes 
with garlands and occasionally jewellery...’
ii® Cf. Ibid. p. 18, and above, for the prominence of women in these ceremonies in Athens.
149 960a3-5. Solon’s reforms also required the ekphora to be completed before dawn as well as limiting 
public expression of grief; cf. {Dem.} XLIII.62, Plut. Solon XXI, Cic. de leg. H.64, and see below.
150 717e. Cf. my chapter V on this yearly ceremony and its relation to the family. -
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will choose these honoured individuals each year (946a-b). This may be based on a similar 
practice of honouring deceased priests in Classical Sparta but this is questionabree”l The 
Magnesian connection with Apollo, here as elsewhere a major deity, has more obvious 
Lakonian overtones*” The Athenian Stranger indicates that the assembly is to make its 
choices from the citizens over the age of fifty and to ‘present three men from amongst their 
number to the god’.1”” This, possibly as with the Spartans, seems designed to produce a 
propagandistic effect. He does not specifically indicate whether women might be chosen for 
these positions. It could be the case that they are eligible and that the Athenian Stranger is 
simply generalising with the term ‘men’ to include both sexes; yet, the specification of ‘men’ 
in particular allows the possibility that women might be excluded.
The funerals of those elected priests of Apollo and the Sun will be elaborate affairs 
of Magnesian patriotism. They entail lengthy celebrations with choruses of boys and girls 
singing poetic hymns during the entire day before the burial. As with ordinary citizens, no 
dirges or lamentations wUl be permitted (947b5-6). At dawn the bier is to be carried by a 
hundred young men from the gymnasion who are chosen by the drcrasrd7s relatives. The 
procession consists of unmarried youths in light armour along with cavaky and infantry in 
heavy armour. Boys singing the national anthem go in front and £gkls wUl follow behind 
along with any women who have passed the ehUdbeariig age, and after these the city’s 
priests and priestesses’.*”4 The crypts of these revered dead, as with ordinary citizens, are to 
be constructed underground and made of porous stones for eidur•aner. These are 
considered extraordinary citizens and they merit special attention in the commemoration of 
their virtuous lives. A sacred grove of trees wUl be planted around their sites. Each year
’5i Cf. Hdt. IX.85 and PluO. Lyk. XXVII.3 and Parker (1989), pp. 144-5, esp. n. 4 for some explication of 
these.
’52 As Parker (1989), p. 146, writes ‘The Spartiate who looked up at Ohe colossal archaic statue of Apollo at 
Amyclae, 45 feet high and doubtless the most secrrd object in all Laconia, saw there an image of a 
supernatural warrior, with bow in one hand, spear truculently raised in the other’. Cf. Aghion, Barbillon 
and Lissarrague (1996), pp. 45-6.
153 tivSpag abrcw xpeig—945r6-946al.
’54 947dl-3. As apparently was also the case amongst Ohe Spartans where comparable religious ceremonies 
involved children of both sexrs together; cf. Plut. Mor. 239c as well cs Hodkinson and Powell (1999), p. 
110, n.l07. Cf, Parker (1989), pp. 143-4 and 146. See below on Ohe exclusion of women of childbearing 
age not in the deceased’s anchisteia.
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musical, gymnastic and equestrian contests will be performed by the citizen body in honour 
of the city’s heroic dead and attended by the populace at large*””
Even in the case of the funerary events for priests (and possibly the priestesses) of 
Apollo and the Sun, moderation and propriety must be maintained. In any Magnesian 
funeral there can be no outpouring of public grief, no manifestation of excessive emotion 
outside the oikos. In these respects, it seems that the Athenian Stranger’s plan is related more 
to Athenian ideals than any other. Magnesian funerals bear considerable resemblance to the 
kinds that were supposed to occur in Athens after the reforms of Plato’s famous ancestor 
Solon*”” Strict rules were meant to govern the displays of wealth and public grief that could 
be acted out by Athenian citizens on such an occasion. Solonian funeral legislation has been 
considered as an effort to promote democratisation. It was designed, in part, to limit ‘the 
participation of women in funerals’, as Pomeroy says, ‘for mourning by large numbers of 
women had been a means for ostentatious families to parade their wealth’.’”’
Solon’s funerary laws, Hke Plato’s, forbade the singing of dirges during the tkphora. 
Except for women over the age of sixty, those who were not members of the deceased’s 
anchisttia could not attend. In Athens, as in Magnesia, there appear to have been no 
limitations to the number of men who could be present at the ekphora. The Athenian 
Stranger’s statutes permit young women to follow behind young men in the funeral 
processions of notables although he does not specify whether they could do so in an 
ordinary citizen’s funeral. One can surmise that they would not. As MacDowell says, the 
strictures of Solon’s legislation, in terms of who may or may not participate in funerals, seem 
‘to have been to ensure that a funeral was a discreet family event, not an occasion for 
extravagant displays of feminine grief to disturb the general public’.’”™ But the goal was 
probably the prevention of inter-kinship-group conflict. Wealthy families might flaunt their 
status with ‘professional’ mourners (some of whom would be women) who would weep very 
loudly and lacerate their flesh for pay. This could provoke social unrest and possibly rouse 
old clan rivalries. As Stears indicates, ‘the legislation was directed at excessively disruptive
155 There is evidence for a similar practice of annual ceremonies for certain ‘honoured’ dead in the 4® 
century. But, unlike the Magnesians, these wealthy individuals set up foundations to secure their tomb's’ 
continued attentions and observances of ceremony; cf. Pomeroy (1997), p. 108.
156 Pseud. Dem. XLIII.62; Plut., Solon 4, 21. These reforms, if they actually occurred, were probably not 
always practised; cf. Michell (1964), pp. 62-3.
15’ (1975), p. 80.
15®(1978), p 109.
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and even socially dangerous display by kin-groups and not at womm per re’.*”” This theme is 
compatible with Magnesia’s goal of self-harmony and these borrowings from Solon may also 
represent a form of homage to Plato’s famous ancestor.
Some of the specific restrictions placed on the participation of women in Magnesian 
funerary rituals may be reveal a cultural disposition toward childbearing, death and pollution 
{miasma). Note that in both the cases of an ordinary citizen’s ekphora, as well as that of the 
priests and priestesses of Apollo and the sun, the only women allowed who are of 
childbearing age are those immediate members of the deceased’s anchisteia (prepubescmt girls 
are permitted at the priests’ ekphorai and women past childbearing age at both). This is 
basically in keeping with the spirit of Athenian custom. The exclusion of women not of the 
anchisteia along with those who were of childbearing age seems to have been designed to 
avoid miasma.
Athenian mothers who had just given birth did not take an active role in the religious 
rites involved in incorporating her offspring into the family. This was, as Stears says, ‘most 
notably because she was thought to be still polluted by birth, perhaps until the cessation of 
post-partum bleeding’.*”” The association between blood (whether menstrual or post­
partum) and pollution, as well as that with death, perhaps came into active psychological play 
in the context of public burial. There appears to be some perceived connection between 
women and the realm of the supernatural in both Athens and Magnesia. This sets limits for 
the roles that they play in transcending both public and private spheres through the 
celebration of death. It is, after aU, they who greet mourners coming into the oikos and help 
prepare the body of the dead during its prothesis. It is they who uphold the public philotimia 
of their oikos, anchisteia, genos, deme and husband’s phratiy in performing the ritual lamentations 
correctly and honourably during the ekphora^ Women are uniquely integral to the rites of 
death and burial and this point has not been lost on Plato’s narrator in the Laws.
Mourning cuts off some of the perhaps more feminine aspects of the Magnesian 
household from public life as much as it provides a venue for public and private spheres to 
interact. Magnesia, in this respect, reveals the ideals of post-Solonian Athens, as Humphreys
159 (1998), p. 117. Even so, she indicates that women have been particularly identified as the ‘central 
producers of noisy lamentations at the funerals’. Cf. Plato Laws 800e and Hdt. H.61.
160 (1998), p. 119. The baby, as we have seen, would go through a series of public presentations (especially 
if it was male) overseen by the bride’s father and husband.
i9i Ibid., p. 122. Cf. {Dem} XLIII.63 where the absence of an opponent’s wife and mother at a familial 
prothesis and ekphora was used as evidence in the rival claim of an estate.
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indicates, such that ‘in the privacy of the oikos grief could be given full expression; but its 
pubHc manifestations had to be controlled’.’”2 The degree of moderation and sobriety in the 
funerary customs of Magnesia may be seen in terms of the controlled pubHc displays of 
emotion and the clear segregation of the private expression of grief from the public. This 
indicates a conscious attempt to impose a ‘manly’ quaHty of discipHne on affairs that could 
otherwise deteriorate into a state of ‘feminine’ emotionjHty. The latter could otherwise 
threaten Magnesia’s harmony and potentially provoke civil unrest. The societal norms of 
behaviour regarding funerals and the dead in Magnesia indicate the Athenian Stranger’s 
desire for his hypothetical citizenry to maintain ‘masculine’ self-mastery over their emotions 
even at times of severe emotional duress such as when a loved one has passed away. The 
participation of women in the public sphere through funerals appears constrained both in 
terms of the number and type, according to age and kinship, aUowed by the Athenian 
Stranger’s rules as weU as the degree of emotional expression that they are permitted to 
exhibit.
Conclusions
The role of citizen-women in Plato’s Magnesia contrasts markedly with that of their 
analogues in Athens, Sparta and elsewhere. At the beginning I mentioned the Athenian 
Stranger’s ‘Lakonisation’ and ‘Sauromatianisation’ of his hypothetical female citizenry—but 
the ‘mascuHnisation’ of Magnesian citizen-women goes beyond this. They have been 
granted aU manner of legaUy supported degrees of enfranchisement including equal or nearly 
equal education in both martial and scholastic subjects,’”” legaUy sanctioned participation in 
government and law at almost every level (if not at aU levels) as weU as partaking of other 
traditionaUy male institutions such as phratrits.
Magnesian women’s assimilation into the sphere of the polis entaUs a loss of certain 
aspects traditionaUy associated with femininity. Many of the negative traits that the Athenian 
Stranger would seek to purge from his hypothetical citizen-women are seen as the products 
of improperly managed societies. He sees no reason why, through the proper supervision, 
women should not be ‘led into the Hght’. In order to do this, the Athenian Stranger seeks to
162 (1983), p. 15.
163 See my chapter III on education for a more detailed analysis.
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limit aU forms of emotional expression as much as possible that have been identified as 
feminine and, in their place, to instil certain ‘manly’ virtues. Part of Magnesian women’s 
masculinisatioli may be observed in their wearing armour (like Pallas Athena) and being 
trained to fight (Hike Amazons, Sauromatiai women and presumably some female Spartans) 
along with the general rule of keeping their supposedly excessive incHnations for 
rmotionaHty to a minimum—especially in public*”” They wiU not remain at home as much 
as Athenian women, but when they are out in the public sphere they wiU have a specific 
reason to be there.
Emancipation is a modem notion with modem impHcations. The Athenian 
Straigrr’s ‘new femininity’ is not liberation; rather, it is a demand of efficiency imposed by 
his utopian plan. Everyone in Magnesia is in some way constrained by the unique stlieturrs 
of that society. The greater degree of equaHty (although it is by no means true equality) 
between the sexes is, paradoxically, a consequence of these constraints. There stiU remains 
the unresolved issue of women’s perceived ‘inferiority’ and one could argue that Plato has 
not thought this matter through. He certainly contemplated the ‘proper’ role for women 
enough to frame the statutes and write the discussions that deal with this matter in his final 
opus. It is clear that, in order to fulfil the requirements of this somewhat idealised role, 
Magnesian eitizri-womri wUl have to behave and become more Hke (simUaiiy idrahsrd) 
men.
164 E.g. in court or aO a funeral. Ser my chapOer V for more on funerary practices and the restrictions of 
emotionality directed specifically toward women.
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Chapter VII
Magnesian Moral Hygiene: Same-Sex Relations and the
‘War Against Pleasure’
And alien tears will- fill for him 
Pity’s long-broken urn,
For his mourners will be outcast men, 
And outcasts always mourn. 
—Oscar Wilde1
Introduction
Are those who would partake of same-sex intercourse to be banished from the second-best 
state of Magnesia and, if so, why? Has Plato changed his mind on the matter? As concerns 
the second question, it seems fitting to point out that nowhere in the extant corpus of Plato’s 
works is there a comprehensive statement of his philosophy, as it stood at any given period 
of his Hfe, detailing its axioms or systematically explaining its methods or offering proof of 
its conclusions. It would appear fair to deduce that there was an ongoing evolution in his 
thinking that took place exterior to, but reflected in, his writings at various stages. The fact 
that we do not know the exact dates of the composition of each text (although the Imws is 
generally thought to have been his final work) heightens the difficulty of forming a 
comprehensive picture of his thoughts. To say that he has changed his mind on the issue of 
same-sex relations is dangerous if not utterly ludicrous: we don’t know what he ever thought 
about it at any given point in time.2 There are only the words of his speakers in the surviving 
texts that provide a clue to the philosopher’s perceptions.
Plato’s narrator is less than clear on the evocative subject of same-sex intercourse but 
he has nonetheless delineated a hypothetical process by which the calculated use of language 
(with the aid of fear, shame and the authority of the state) may be employed to influence 
people’s thinking, and therefore their actions, with regard to that which we would today
1 From the Ballad of Reading Gaol, ed. Ross (1991), p. 47,
2 It is absolutely essential to bear in mind that Plato had no concept of ‘homosexuality’ or ‘heterosexuality’ 
in the modern sense per se because this dualism is actually a cultural construction of the last century or two 
in the industrialised West. When I employ the term ‘same-sex’, I mean it in reference to sexual acts 
involving members of the same sex (men with men and women with women—as opposed to men with 
women, or ‘mixed-sex’ relationships). Cf. my chapter I.
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designate as sexuality? The primary means by which values are to be transmitted in Plato’s 
Magnesia, as with most anywhere else, is through the medium of words and speech. The 
official philosophical position, designated as ‘correct argument’, maintains that one who is to 
be wise must avoid becoming a slave to fleshly passion and thus become a master of one’s 
self? Same-sex intercourse is particularly associated with a state of the soul characterised by 
a lack of self-mastery over pleasure.
In order to gain a thorough insight into the subject, this chapter goes through the 
principal passages in books I and VIII and examines them with regard to thek relevant 
textual, cultural and philosophical contexts. Some of the linguistic issues that arise are 
problematic, but they are essential to this analysis of the subject. Recourse wUl be made also 
to other Platonic ideas on love and desire as expressed in the Symposium, Phatdrus and 
elsewhere and thek connection with the Laws. Finally, this chapter wiU analyse the Athenian 
Stranger’s ultimate summation of the law on sex and some difficulties and ambiguities that 
arise from it. Taking all these things into account, it wiU be possible to determine what sort 
of resolution (if any) is to be made about same-sex relations in the second-best polis.
The Passages in Book I
In the narrative structure of the Laws, the first several books have a decidedly theoretical 
inclination. The subject of conversation tends to wander broadly over many related topics in 
which some general issues are perused. Later, the narrative focuses mosdy on the details of 
hypothetical legal arrangements. The opening books, by contrast, provide a fertile ground 
for the narrator’s philosophical expositions on social theory and practice. Beginning with his 
discussion of the Greek customs of gymnastics and common meals in Book I, the Athenian 
Stranger proceeds to a seemingly tangential argument that becomes his initial thesis 
opposing same-sex intercourse. He levels his criticism chiefly against Sparta and Krete as 
city-states that he perceives to have sanctioned same-sex behaviour..5 He maintains that
3 Cf. Cairns (1993) pp. 27-47 on ‘shame-culture’ in the ancient world in general and pp. 142-3 for instances 
in Homer and cf. my chapter VI.
4 Laws 626d sq., 839e sq. Cf. Republic 430e sq., 443d sq.
3 Cf. Iliad XX.231 sq. on the Kretan reputation for boy-love (which rivalled if not exceeded that of the 
Spartans), see too Athenaeus XIII.602 and cf. Aristotle, Politics 1272a24-26; Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhonism 
III.199; and Maxwell-Stuart (1975), pp. 13-15. One must take care in differentiating pederasty from the 
state of being sexually interested in members of the same sex. One must also take care not to impose
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these pr•aetiers have yielded not only civil discord but also an institutionalised form of same- 
sex indulgence that is ‘contrary to nature’. He says:
Whereas these gymnasia and common meals now benefit your cities in many 
other ways, they are harmful in the event of civil strife 
(TCpdq 5k TOLg aidcJEPg)—as the example of the youths of MUetos, Boeotia 
and Thurii demonstrates—additionally this practice seems to have corrupted 
an ancient custom* 2 * * * 6 according to nature (Ktaxd <P)cypv) concerning sexual 
pleasures (TCpP Td d^poStOPCC t|5ovo^^)7 8not only of human beings but of 
beasts as well. And someone might first accuse your cities of these things 
along with as many of the others that avidly use the gymnasia*
That gymnasia and common meals might have been major causal factors of factionalism and 
civil discord in these cities seems a precarious assertion at best. He has implied this 
indirectly rather than declared it as fact. Perhaps it is only ‘in the event of civil strife’ that
modern ethics and morals upon the ancients who lacked our current insights. As will be shortly seen, what 
the Athenian Stranger is criticising here and in Book VIII is largely sexual relations between consenting 
individuals of Ohe same sex and not simply pederasty or boy-love.
2 England (1921), p.230, accepts Boeckh’s JidXai v6|i.i|Aov in his edition but indicates that Burnet’s
reeding of manuscripts A and O was TaCKxidv vdjiov, corrected by Ohe writer to 7teA,aic5v ydg^cov. England
says that he examined the passage in A and ‘thought iO was by a laOrr hand’. He believes that a later rditor
altered Ohe cPs back to o and wrote v6|il.^cv as a varianO for vdpov in the margin. Likewise, England says 
that cO is a mistake to take v6pov as bring in apposition to odg Tepi cd dj>po5icna f|Sovdq as he reckons 
this to be Ohe erroneous view of some scribe who took xaxd -bacv, along with aaXaidv, Oo qualify vdpov. 
He states that ‘the OiSova^'t are (jixerc as opposed to vdpcp, end Ohe force of Ohe passage seems weakened if
they arr spoken of as vd^tog’ (ibid.). Whilst I am frequently inclined to agree with England’s views, I 
believe that he has missed thr mark on this one. I prefer Oo follow Schbpsdau’s commentary (1994), p. 203, 
n. on Laws 636b4-6, which indicates that Ohe texts of A and O (raXacdv v6gov) are rightly supported by 
Burnet and, he writes that ‘xal Ka-ud (jjjcnv ist parallel zu rcaAxi6v als AtOribuO euf vdpnv zu bezcehenl 
and ‘tdq rcepi td d^ppo-iaca, i^5cvdt<;...01r|piccv ist Apposition zu rcaXaidv vbgov, das secnrrseits Objekt zu 
8ie(O0apK6vaO ist’.
2 Literally td d^fpotoua means ‘Ohe things of Aphrodite’. There is really no direct Oransletion for this term 
in English (as there is no truly equivalent term in Ancient Greek for the English word “sex”) except 
perhaps the archaic use of ‘venereal’ which maintains in its etymology the divine name of Venus. Of 
course, the modern connotations of this term make iO useless as viable translation nowadays. The ancient 
Greeks spoke of wheO wr think of as ‘sex’ in terms of gods such as Eros end Aphrodite which were integral 
Oo their cultural ethos. Pengle (1980) , p. 515-16 n. 35, helpfully suggests ‘thr erotic things’.
8 636bl-cl. Cf. Theaet. 162b, 169a-b. According Oo Cartledge (2002), p. 102, the fact that they performed 
athletics in thr nude indicates that the ‘Spartans put e premium on gymnastic exercise’ and that ‘the cult of 
the nudr male body is likely to have been pushed to extremes, as it is known to have been in other Greek 
cities’. Thuc. 1(6.5, suggests that the Spartans were the ones who first established the custom of exercising 
naked.
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one might expect them to play any great role at aU. Under such circumstances, any trained 
and fit individuals could possibly contribute to an ensuing conflict. But the Athenian 
Stranger is still at the theoretical stage of constitution-building. Later, he outlines the 
legislation for common meals despite having alluded to some of the dangers that they might 
represent. In book VI, they are considered to be so useful an institution that continued 
attendance at them by both men and women is compulsory? Perhaps his criticism of 
existing institutions of a similar nature might have more to do with their: lack of regulation 
by the stabilising powers of philosophical Reason.
In the world of Plato’s time, the events mentioned by the Athenian Stranger in the 
above passage were not insignificant in the shaping of history and thus bear some closer 
inspection. The Ionian city of Miletos, on the coast of Asia Minor, experienced an oligarchic 
revolt in 405 b.c.e. that was allegedly instigated by the Spartan admiral Lysande2*2 In 
Thebes, the principal city of the region of Boeotia, an oligarchic faction that was opposed to 
Sparta arose in the years following the Peloponnesian War and eventually gained superiority 
over the pro-Spartan (also oligarchic) faction that had dominated for many years." Thurii 
was a colony in southern Italy, originally founded by Perikles, which was often troubled by 
civil strife—especially following the Athenian naval defeat in Sicily. Thereafter it reportedly 
adopted Spartan customs and a pro-Spartan pohcy?2 Ohaer than the Athenian Stranger’s 
implications, there is no indication that same-sex practices facilitated these conflicts.
The real threat that the gymnasia represented would appear to be in regard to physical 
and martial training, Since the youths of the cities in question were so well trained for 
physical combat, they were readily able to assist in the military action required to overthrow 
the governments of each region." The link between institutions that make people physically 
fit and factionalism seems tenuous at best. Any state should be concerned with the health 
and fitness of its populace and Plato’s Magnesia is certainly no exception." Prssumably the
2 780-781. He is aware that there will be opposition to women attending. Cf. Morrow (1960), p. 393 sq.
10 Plut. Lys. VIII. Cf. also Freeman (1950), pp. 165-66.
" Cloche (1950), pp. 95-112.
12 Aristotle, Politics 1307a27, 1307b6.
13 The Athenian Stranger seems to be implying that the youths in these cities named were literally
“spoiling” for a fight because they were so well trained. Aristotle (Politics v. 7) in discussing the 
factionalism at Thurii says -cve? 7tcXel.UKcY tmv veccTepccv. Cp. Alkidamas (4th century b.c.e.),
Odysseus 1.19 who states that
ob8’ kv naXaioTpia obS’ kv <Jugnoc^cc, kv0a (nX kpiSaq nXetcnag xal AorSoprctf; yevfeaOai.
14 Theirs is to be a highly supervised form of physical fitness. Cf. my chapter III.
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dangers of common meals, in terms of aiding factions in their forming, manifest themselves 
through providing an ideal venue for the plotting of conspiracies amongst comrades whilst 
they dine together. This, as with the gymnasia, seems an unavoidable possibility that may or 
may not come to pass but is not necessarily the fault of the institution itself.15 * * *Gymnasia are 
institutions that have a decidedly oligarchic/aristocratic quality. But their long relationship 
with same-sex intercourse is the precise point that the Athenian Stranger has here associated 
with his notion that they have likewise urged civil strife.1" A real connection between same- 
sex practices and factionalism is not particularly overt, but it is present nonetheless and 
provides a springboard for him to launch into a discussion on the malefactions of its 
indulgence.
As we can observe, a sort of public discourse on the subject of sexuality had been 
underway in ancient Greek culture for many generations prior to and including Plato’s 
participation in it. There were, quite naturally, many degrees of difference between the 
various traditions. Popular variants of myths existed with alternative interpretations and 
morals (usually cashed away, doubtlessly to our great benefit, in one of Aristotle’s catalogues 
of allegedly ethnographic data). The position that Plato’s narrator in the Laws takes with 
regard to myth and history represents one particular line of interpretation with its own 
peculiarities. In other mytho-historical traditions, which he deliberately excludes, the custom 
of same-sex relations between men yielded more positive connotations.
The Athenian Stranger does not mention that same-sex relationships have been 
associated also with the preservation of freedom from tyrants and tyrannical regimes. These 
are reported by later authors along with those of Plato’s era. For example, Athenaeus of 
Naukratis (2nd-3” century c.e.), attributing his intelligence to Hieronymus the Peripatetic (of 
Rhodes, 3"' century b.c.e.), reported that love affairs between young men became widespread 
because, in the vigour of their youth, ‘the mutual sympathy of thek companionship brought 
many tyrannical governments to an end’." This phenomenon was widely considered to have 
resulted from the fact that, when their partners were present, lovers became more willing to 
suffer the hardships of battle, and thereby gain victory, rather than incur a reputation for
15 Book V of the Politics lists many revolutions that occurred through public festivals, but no one ever says
that festivals should be banned as a result.
" On their associations with same-sex intercourse, cf. Ephorus of Kyme, FrGH'lQ, 2a; F149.14 and F97.3.
" Deipnosophistae XIII.602a. Aristotle {Politics 131^^16-18) has also indicated that some tyrants fell due 
to a lack of control over their desires as evidenced in their pursuit of same-sex pleasures.
253
cowardice in the opinion of their favourites. Interestingly, in the Symposium (179a), Plato 
puts virtually these same words into the mouth of his Phaedrus. Athenaeus also claimed that 
the military benefits of same-sex relationships were proven by the Sacred Band at Thebes 
and by the ‘murderous attempt on the Prisistratidar made by Harmodios and Aristogeiton; 
and again in Sicily by the love of Chariton and Melamippus’.18 In the Symposium, Pausanius 
had argued that barbarian tyrants tended to outlaw same-sex affairs because they are fearful 
of strong attachments arising amongst their subjects. He reformulated the unwillingness 
between lovers to tolerate disgrace in battle (also indicated by the character of Aristophanes 
at 178d4-179a2) into an unwillingness to acquiesce under threat of tyranny. Pausanias, again, 
cites the instance of Harmodios and liis lover Aristogritoi who, according to popular lore, 
overthrew the tyranny of the Peisistratids at Athens and thereby cleared the way for 
democracy (182b6-c7). Aristotle indicates that Harmodios attacked the Peisistratids for an 
offence done by them to his sister.1" Even so, Harmodios’ lover Aristogeiton is said to have 
joined in the attack due to his strong affection for Halmodio2.20
Conversely, a tyranny could be overthrown due to the overmdulgent sexual forays of 
the tyrant himself. Aristotle cites several examples in the Politics where certain tyrants’ erotic 
relationships with members of the same sex, or their indirect participation in such things, 
became harmful to them in the long term. A conspiracy is purported to have arisen against 
Petiander, the tyrant of Ambrakia, because he jokingly inquired of his male favourite, ‘Aren’t 
you yet with child by me?’ (1311al6). Pausanias made an attack against Philip of Macedon 
reportedly due to the fact that Philip had allowed him to be sexually outraged (tiPpi^nv) by 
Attalos and his friends. An attack against the tyrant Amyntas by Derdas was said to be due 
to the boasting of the former that he had enjoyed the ‘youthful favours’ of the latter (al7).
HeUanokrates of Larissa was reported to have joined with Krataios in making an 
attack against the tyrant Archelaos of Macedonia. HeUanokrates’ complaint against 
Alchrlaos was aUegedly that, despite having enjoyed his sexual favours, the tyrant refused to 
uphold his promise to restore him to his native city. Krataios had been carrying on a stormy 
sexual liaison with Archelaos and, developing resentment for his lover, nurtured a yearning 
for revenge (Aristotle suggests that another cause of this conflict was due to Arehrlaos
" Deipn. XIII.602a7-bl. Cf. Plutarch. {Pelopidas 18) who attributes the founding of this order to Gorgidas. 
"Pol. i3iia38.
20 Cf. also Aiskhines 1.132-140.
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breaking his promise to let Krataios marry one of his daughters—alY-18^). It could be 
argued that same-sex activities were more or less incidental to this and other such potential 
tyrannocides. Aristotle suggests that ‘living luxurious hves, they [tyrants] make themselves 
contemptible, and offer their assailants plenty of opportunities’ (1312b33). All of these 
examples are anecdotal. However, they demonstrate some means by which those within 
same-sex relationships may, to their credit, resist a tyranny and/or bring about its demise. 
This would seem to cast same-sex acts in a positive light.
Plato’s narrator in the Laws does not seem to favour such a Hie of mytho-cultural 
tradition that would promote the potential benefits of same-sex relationships as indicated by 
the above examples. Same-sex practices by the citizens of Magnesia are to be subject to 
some kind of potentially aggressive legislative restrictions along with moral and social 
reprobation. The Athenian Stranger aims his argument (first in Book I) against the Spartan 
and Kretan acceptance of same-sex activity as part of everyday Hfe. His claim that the myth 
of Ganymede and Zeus is a false invention of the Kretans (636d) is unique to Plato and 
ought to be read alongside the denunciation of myths about the sexual exploits of the gods 
found at Republit 390b-392c.21 Same-sex intercourse, the Athenian Stranger asserts, is both a 
corruption of ancient nomos and constitutes an indulgence in excessive desires. He elaborates 
on the situation in a general condemnation of it in a tone that echoes the sentiments of many 
modern opponents: 22
And whether one ought to regard these things in a playful way or seriously 
(TCClitoV'tCC site O’TCO'uSdCpVTCX, one must bear in mind that this [sexual] 
pleasure seems to have been naturally (KaTCd (jh)GW) granted to male and 
female for the act of mutual procreation; but [sexual pleasure] between men 
and men, as well as that between women and women,23 ^^^ms contrary to
21 Cf. Euripides’ Ion for similar criticisms of myth,
t The views expressed at Republic 468b and Aristophanes’ and Pausanias’ speech in the Symposium could 
be taken for evidence that this passage in the Laws might represent a change in Plato’s attitudes towards 
same sex relations-but only if they truly represented Plato’s own sentiments on the subject.
23 This is the only passage in the Laws that refers directly to same-sex intercourse between women. There 
is an implied reference to the erotic activities of female youths at 836a6-b2. Its sparseness in Plato’s works 
is fairly typical amongst ancient Greek writers and may reflect an unspoken cultural taboo on the subject.
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nature (TCOtpcd- ef'civ)^ and the audacity seems to have come about prominently
(TGOV 7tpC0DOV) due to a lack of control over pleasure
(to T63jxri}T euvxt 61’ &KpdT£itav tiSovri^—636<^1,-6, emphasis mine).?*
There are certain semantic issues in this passage that demand attention. We shall return to 
‘prominently’ and ‘audacity’ in a moment—but it is absolutely crucial whether the Athenian 
Stranger is speaking ‘in a playful way’ or ‘seriously’. Dover suggests that the correct way to 
consider this matter is not so much as a contrast between the humorous and the solemn, but 
as ‘playing an intellectual game’ and ‘saying what one really thinks’^
If he is just ‘playing an intellectual game’, then what follows on the subject of same- 
sex relationships, here or elsewhere, should not ntctssarily be regarded as having any real 
legislative potential.2 It could be little more than philosophical speculation. The discussion 
is hypothetical in character (much of the passage is dependent upon SoKSl), yet a distinction 
is made and this question of ‘naturalness’ is a central factor in determining the exact quality 
of the argument. Nussbaum favours a radical position saying that ‘same-sex conduct is not 
singled out for special blame’, and that ‘there is no evidence that Plato regarded same-sex 
conduct as morally worse than other forms of sexual conduct’?8 This is a curious 
proposition. In response to Nussbaum’s allegation, Rist maintains that her statements are 
‘highly misleading if not simply false’, since ‘even in the Phatdrus Plato condemns most same- 
sex intercourse, only in a few special circumstances giving it limited approval’^ It appears 
clear that the act of same-sex intercourse has been singled out, as Rist suggests. Whether this
24 Taped (rimv, in its six occurrences in the Laws, has the sense of ‘contrary to nature’ or ‘unnatural’ as 
opposed to Kxx<d c^bcii/, ‘according to nature’, and these phrases occasionally occur together in pairs to 
denote opposed states such as in the above passage and at 655el-3, and 733a7-8.
25 The Athenian Stranger later explicitly prohibits sexual intercourse between any free person and slaves of 
either gender (777eC-774a4). Gould’s (1963), p. 144. avowal that ‘Plato draws a, for him unprecedented, 
distinction between heterosexual [sic] pleasure, which he calls natural, and homosexual [sic] pleasure, 
which he calls contrary to nature’, while pertinent, reminds us to have a care in distinguishing between 
Plato and his narrator, the Athenian Stranger.
" Dover, Letter III, qtd. in Nussbaum (1994), p. 1630, n. 423; he cites Symposium 197e7 and the Gorgias 
as examples.
27 Paul Friedlander (1958), p. 288, asserted that ‘Although, if men would listen to him [Plato], his goals 
were possible of achievement, he understood fully that his proposal was visionary (632e, 712b), an old 
man’s game ofjurisprudence (685a), and he had no expectation that his ideal would be realised in practice. 
He was merely insisting upon the necessity of abstraction or hypothesis as controls in societal inquiry 
(739e)’.
33(1994), pp. 1579, 1581, 1581, 1648.
" Rist (1997), p. 78. He also argues that Dover and Nussbaum are contradicted by Laws 636b-c.
256
represents Plato’s opinion is another matter beyond the scope of modern discourse. His 
nar-rator disapproves of it on moral grounds.
A piece of evidence in support of the Athenian Strangn’s seriousness on this subject 
occurs in book VIII, to be considered later, where he is framing laws against sexual 
misconduct. There he indicates that no freeborn male citizen of Magnesia should engage in 
‘sterUe and unnatural intercourse with males’ (841d4-5). The fact that there might be 
exceptions to the rule in both the Jaws and the Phaedrus is suggestive. At the very least, 
nothing has been set in stone. Unfortunately the issue of the Athenian Strangn’s (or Plato’s 
own) ‘seriousness’ about this subject remains uncomfortably uncertain. The association 
between the inclination for same-sex intercourse and a lack of control over the desires 
meshes into the greater discussion on pleasure throughout the Laws, considered below.
The Athenian Stranger posits these notions about sexuality, not insignificantly, with a 
view toward the overall happiness of his populace. This is a state of being that he would 
encourage through the drawing of pleasures in moderate measure (636d8-r3). As Rist 
suggests, if citizens are willing to abstain from sexual delights for athletic victory, then ‘why 
would they not abstain for a victory over pleasures and the acquiring of the virtue of self- 
restraint?’30 Persuading the Magnesian populace that most forms of sexual activity (including 
perhaps same-sex intercourse) are ‘fine’ in private and in secret, but otherwise shameful 
seems to be the best alternative.31 Perhaps it is wrong to talk about the Athenian Stlangrr’s 
contemplation of same-sex desire in terms of legislation (or even as a matter of legality). He 
could be engaged in an experimental foray into the possibilities and moral considerations of 
exercising a specific psychological/sociological influence on theoretical subjects. However, 
there may be more ‘seriousness’ to it than not.
The passage at 636cl-6, quoted above, has some other difficulties beyond whether 
the Athenian Stranger takes the matter ‘in a playful way’ or otherwise. I rendered 
KOtt T(5v TpcOTCOV TO ccdAlirUJ rivai 8l dtKfptTTtav IjScuf.^ (636c6)32 as ‘and the audacity 
seems to have come about prominently due to a lack of control over pleasure’, following
30 (1997), p. 78. Cf. Laws 839e5-840bl for Ikkos of Tarentum who was said to have avoided sexual 
activity during training before athletic events.
31 This corresponds to Nussbaum’s (1994) reading at 1637-1638.
32 England (1921), p. 231, indicates that it is difficult to understand why rivai is in the present after 
dctoCEr6<c0oc'L He also says that Si’ (xcKtidisiiav O|5ovijg makes an awkward predicate for rival—although 
both he and Burnet keep rlvai in their editions of the text.
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England’s notes.. This rendition may be in error, Dover offers two alternative versions; ‘a 
crime of the first order, committed through the inability to control the desire for pleasure’ 
(italics mine), and ‘a crime caused by failure to control the desire for pleasure’.* 34 * *Nussbaum 
has questioned Dover’s translation asking why one’s weakness should cause something to be 
classified as a ‘crime of the first order’. ‘Weakness’, she says, ‘might, of course, cause the 
commission of a crime, but it seems implausible that weakness should cause something to be 
“among the first” in the ranks of crime, which is what the sentence so construed would 
say’?. She takes TODV Tp(XTCO to mean ‘of the first people to do it’, which was the rendition 
that England rejected.
The fact that the Athenian Stranger has been talking about the occurrence of this 
sexual practice in the gymnasia of Sparta and Krete might lend some credibility to her 
interpretation (note that the Athenian Stranger does not appear to think it strange that males 
will find other naked males attircyvci.tt Nussbaum argues that these sorts of sexual 
relations cannot be a ‘crime of the first order’ since ‘he urges his citizens to believe that this 
conduct is kalon provided that one does not do it within the cognisance of others at that 
time,37 38a teaching that he certainly does not promulgate for murder, theft, sacrilege, and 
other major crimes’?8 The passages at 839d-842a—to be presently considered—at least 
appear to lend some support to Nussbaum’s claim that same-sex acts do not constitute a 
‘crime of the first order’. Likewise, England’s rendition as ‘prominently’ might be due to his 
own prejudices leaking into his commentary on Plato’s text. The passage could easily be 
rendered ‘of the first ones to do it’. Even so, the ambiguity of this section is heightened as 
much by xCOv tcp^cov as by tdXliTiiicx.
The word 'icOAp/rijliX refers to an act of daring that does not necessarily, in and of 
itself, constitute a state of criminal ‘audacity’. Taylor’s translation of the passage at 636c6-7 
as ‘the crime... [e.g. of same-sex intercourse] is a capital surrender to lust of pleasure’.. (italics
’ (1921), p. 231. England points out that the use of TpcoToq to mean something like ‘prominently’ or 
‘especially’ can be found at Philebus 44e (npdq rdc Tppoa |ieyfe0ei).
34 GH, pp. 186 and 165. It seems a curious thing that many of the philological issues of textual validity in 
the Laws, but not all, seem to occur around the subject of same-sex relations; see below.
’ (1994), p. 1626, italics in original
t Cf. Aiskhines, Against Timarkhos, I. 134, where same-sex, male attraction is also not considered 
abnormal.
37 She cites Laws 839d-842a (considered below), in support of this.
38 Cf. LSJ, p. 1627.
’ Qtd. in Hamilton and Cairns (1989), p. 1237.
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mine) appears at once inconsistent with TO^pTU-lOC and altogether slanted. The 9”’ edition of 
Liddell and Scott cites Laws 636c as an instance of this word which could be rendered as ‘a 
daring or shameless act’, but this only indicates that ‘shameless act’ was thought to be 
appropriate because of its use in some passage or passages between the 6‘* century b.c.e. and 
the 9* century c.e. ‘Daring’ is provided as a viable alternative to ‘shameless’.4* In fact, since 
this is the only occurrence of T6XJJL.T])-Lii in aU the works of Plato, one ought to construe this 
noun consistently with its originating verb ToCpOLco which occasionally means ‘to endure’ 
and more often ‘to dare’. This un-compounded verb occurs 123 times in the Platonic corpus. 
It always indicates an action that is either bold or daring and, as Nussbaum states, 
‘sometimes the context wdl show the daring to be good, and sometimes the context wdl 
show it to be bad’.*1
In light of these observations, Nussbaum attests that Dover has since recanted his 
previous rendering of dll/ruica as ‘crime’ and has suggested ‘venture’ as a correction.*2 
This also lends further support to reading TCOV TpdJTOOV as ‘of the first ones to do it’ rather 
than ‘prominently’ or ‘of the first order’ as it would be unclear what was meant by a ‘venture 
of the first order’ here. Wherever the truth may he, same-sex intercourse as a ‘crime of the 
first order’ seems an uncaUed for and heavy-handed translation at best—yet those hke Taylor 
(and sometimes Dover) who have favoured ‘crime’ are certainly picking up on themes which 
are present in the passages under discussion. Who, then, were the ‘first ones’ that were 
possessed by such daring? It is difficult to say for sure but the Athenian Stranger later 
suggests that Laios, the father of the infamous Oedipus, may have been to blame. What is 
not difficult to say is that same-sex intercourse appears quite clearly to have been designated 
here as a thing that is ‘contrary to nature’. Whether this is meant to be taken merely as 
paramyth or ‘noble He’, rather than a statement of fact remains uncertain. It wdl be told, 
nonetheless, to the Magnesian populace with a persuasive intent. * * * *
40 LSJ s.v. T6X|ir|piX.
41 (1994), p. 1627; cf, Phaedrus 247c on daring to speak the truth; Symposium 177c, on the daring required 
to give worthy praise to Eros, 179d, for the daring of one who gives his life for a loved one, 179e, on
Achilles daring to risk his life to avenge the death of Patroklos; Republic 474b and 503b4, on the daring 
proposition that philosophers ought to rule a city. At Laws 661a, the Athenian Stranger uses tcA,.^,tioc in 
reference to the daring involved in military courage.
I* Nussbaum (1994), p. 1628, n. 416.
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Thr Argument in Book VIII
The Athenian Stranger states at 835d2-el that he is eonerlnrd with how to manage a state in 
which the youths are in fine physical condition and ‘free from harsh labours that serve most 
to quench hybris (Ol k-OcAicyTCX b^pv opvwbtCGlV). He indicates that tlie laws, 
magistrates, state institutions and system of education already have implicidy in their charge 
the role of checking many of these illicit desires (bmQBpiiov) that lead away from 
sdphrooyne? He vehemently warns that the uncontrolled ‘erotic love (xd 8e xC £pc6KCCV) of 
youths both male and female, and the love of men for women and women for men’ have 
long been the bane of cities and individuals (836a6-b2). It is not just same-sex indulgences 
that constitute a yielding to excessive desire but lust for the opposite sex is likewise included. 
This comes as a prelude to the Athenian Stlangel’s more in-depth discussion of same-sex 
intercourse in book VIII.
His treatment suggests its categorisation as one particular manifestation of general 
sexual desire—unlike a modern tendency to group same-sex relations (called homosexuality) 
as a separate psychosexual state alongside heterosexuality and sometimes bisexuality.43 4 45It is 
evident that the Athenian Stranger is striking out on a rather unorthodox approach when he 
tells Kleinias and MegHlus that, whatever their other contributions to his hypothetical 
constitution, the Spartan and Kretan city-states are themselves opposed to his postulations 
about sexual desire (836b5-8). Certainly there would have been some opposition amongst 
the Athenians against embracing his policies with open arms. Many of Plato’s 
contemporaries would probably have considered his ideals of sexual behaviour- overly 
restrictive.
The Athenian Stranger brings up same-sex intercourse prior to his discussion on the 
three types of lovet5 His tone could be taken as at once declamatory and less ambiguous 
than the hypothetical material in Book I. Addressing his Kretan and the Spartan 
interlocutors, he says:
43 805e2-836a6. Cf. my chapter III on education.
44 Cf. my chapter I.
45 See below.
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For if someone following nature (&KoXoo>0Oo xf) (jAJO’Esl) should posit the 
law that existed prior to the time of Laos/6 rrguing that it was always light*’ 
for a man not to partake of sexual acts with a young man (v£cov) as he would 
with a woman, presenting as evidence the nature of beasts and demonstrating 
in respect to such things that male does not cHng closely to male because this 
is not natural, then he would probably pursue with an unper^su^asive argument 
and one which is in no ways harmonious with your city-states (836b8-c7*
Except for his philosophical position against excessive pleasure, the primary exemplars with 
which the Athenian Stranger has framed his argument would seem to be ‘ancient custom’ 
and the behaviour of animals. These would appear to be the only premises on which he has 
based his declaration that same-sex intercourse is particularly unnatural. Later, in the same 
book, it is affirmed that the citizens of Magnesia should behave no worse than ‘birds and 
many other creatures... [that] live in continence and unspoiled virginity’ until the appropriate 
age when they pair off in opposite-sex Nntis and live together ‘in steadfast piety and justice’ 
(840cll -e2). This argument from the perceived ‘nature’ of animals is problematic at best*.
Consider Philebus 67b, where Plato’s Sokrates stated that ‘the many’ prefer to use 
such arguments from the natural world as authoritative fact rather than divining deeper 
truths from philosophy?0 ‘The many’ are seen to look on animal behaviour as in some ways 46 * * * 50
46tpd koo Aalou; manuscripts A and O omitted the npd before the toO, L preserved it; all the early editors 
before Stalb omitted the ton. On the myth of Laios and some alternatives (which I shall later examine) cf. 
Athenaeus XIII.602f sq.
’ 6p0co<; efyev is here what England (1921) calls the ‘philosophic’ imperfect and indicates something like 
‘it was right, as you see’, or ‘it was always right’ (343). This is comparable to the imperfect of customary 
action, cf. Smyth (1984 ed.) p. 424, par. 1893.
44 xd%’ Av xpmTO rcWavcp Abyco ko! Ttoig hpeiepaiq irdXeaiv obSagog aujicfjccovi is indicated in the 
MSS; however England, Dies and Badham all concur in reading Arci0av(5 and England proposes, with 
confidence, to read au>x.<t>c6vq) for aupujccvoi. Yet Hermann’s suggestion is to keep rcrGavco and read 
e’l Kai for Kai thus rendering the passage ‘... his argument would probably be persuasive, even if not at all 
in harmony with your cities’. I am inclined to agree, in part, with England (1921), pp. 342-343, where he 
says that the subject of the whole passage (835d-842a) ‘is the regulation of sexual passions in general. The 
Cretan vice of paederasty is an extreme instance of unregulated “sexual” passion’. England also states that 
this passage deals with ‘unnatural lust’, and he groups paedophilia together with same-sex relationships in 
general.
66 Cf. Hdt. 11.64 and IV. 180 where animalistic sexual behaviour amongst ‘savage’ barbarians is identified 
as excessively promiscuous and impious. Cf. Rosellini and Said (1978), pp. 955-66 for more on this theme 
in Herodotos and also my chapter V.
50 In the Philebus passage above quoted, Sokrates is discussing pleasure and argues that one ought not 
derive one’s way of thinking on the matter from the beasts and birds. Of course, I suppose that this does
h
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paradigmatic of how they ought to behave. Plato’s use of this argument from animal nature 
in the Laws is, as Nussbaum says, ‘a powerful rhetorical device that will have a serious effect 
on his citizens’ and possibly nothing more.51 It is perhaps the Athenian Stranger’s concern 
with the issue of excessive pleasures and desires that permits him to frame his most plausible 
argument against same-sex relationships. There is no indication that same-sex acts are 
essentially wicked or immoral. They are, however, identified as being extremely pleasurable 
and therein hes the rub. It appears that one of the Athenian Stranger’s primary interests is, 
in Dover’s words, ‘to reduce to an unavoidable minimum aU activity of which the end is 
physical enjoyment, in order that the irrational and appetitive element of the soul may not be 
encouraged and strengthened by indulgence’.52 53 Same-sex intercourse is perceived as 
producing too much fun for the sober-minded Magnesians.
Aspersions have already been cast against those who give in to excessive desires back 
in Book 1 at 650a2-5, where Plato’s narrator has raised concerns over the dangers of allowing 
such individuals to participate in the daily hves of other ‘normal’ citizens. A ‘safe’ way of 
testing Magnesian citizens’ psychic solvency (e.g. through supervised drinking parties) is 
preferred to discovering their inadequacies before they actually commit a crime of passion.” 
This is preferable, he says, to making a ‘test of one whose soul yields to pleasures, by placing 
him in charge of ones daughters and sons and wives, so, by endangering one’s loved ones, 
the character of his soul is revealed’. The dangerous and potentially criminal characteristics 
associated with the lack of tnkrattia over their desires for pleasure highlights the recurring 
theme of the (albeit sometimes ambiguous) declamation of same-sex intercourse as a specific 
type of indulgence that indicates a lack of self-mastery.
It is worthy of note that daughters, sons and wives are all included as being subject 
to the potential dangers posed by those whose souls are improperly aligned. This suggests 
much less differentiation between mixed- and same-sex desires than we make today. More
not exclude the possibility that one might draw logical conclusions about pleasure from animals should 
their actions happen to be in accord with philosophy—but this is not what is said in the text.
51 (1994), p. 1631
” GH, p. 167. Rist (1997), p. 71, believes that Plato has outlined (in the Phaedrus) a hierarchical ranking 
of the types of erotic relationship wherein the best condition is that in which any same-sex desires may be 
sublimated into genuine friendship but the lovers ‘refrain from [sexual] intercourse’. The second-best tier 
is much like the first except they do engage in occasional sexual intercourse and this ‘partial enslavement’ 
results in the eventual abandonment of the life of philosophy. This position is not necessarily in conflict 
with the view expressed in the Laws.
53 By ‘psychic solvency’ I refer to the ideally Platonic state of the soul wherein Reason (implicitly with the 
aid of moderation) has command over the appetites. Cf. my chapter III for the supervised drinking parties.
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emphasis is placed on the act of indulgence itself—resulting from the incumbent psychic 
disharmony that is intrinsic in the souls of those who are ruled by the appetites. The ‘one 
whose soul yields to pleasures’ is here considered a sexual threat to both sexes as this widens 
the scope of condemnation to place samr-sre intrreoxrsr alongside rape, again in an implied 
manner, as both being symptomatic of the same root cause. This perhaps propagandistic 
juxtaposition of same-sex intercourse with other criminal acts occurs not only here and in 
the law on rape but likewise in its associations with hybris that wUl shortly be discussed.
The Athenian Stranger, at 836b8-c7, mentioned a law ‘prior to the time of Laios’. 
This would seem to indicate that he (or possibly Plato himself either followed a mytho- 
cultural convention that, as Athenaeus says, ‘Laios initiated such erotic acts when he was a 
guest of Pelops’,54or it indicates that he would prefer for his hypothetical subjects to believe 
such a thing. Aroused by and enamoured with Pelops’ son, prince Chrysippos, Laios 
reportedly stole him away to Thebes in his chariot?” I draw attention to the wording of the 
passage which refers to a ‘custom’ (x6v vdpov) ‘prior to the time of Laios’ (Tpd TOL Aaiov) 
because it denotes an assumption, or at least an implication, that before that time no such 
same-sex practices existed in Greece. Or, to be precise, it seems to be taking as fact that the 
dominant sexual ethic before Laios’ time was contrary to same-sex intercourse, itself 
introduced as a custom by the deeds of the mythological king of Thebes (and possibly his 
son). The seriousness of such a proposition seems unlikely but not beyond possibility. The 
Athenian Stranger would appear to posit (whether only as a fable for the Magnesian 
populace or as a given fact) that there was some custom of sexual interaction, exclusively 
between members of the opposite sex, which dominated in the time before Laios. He has 
deliberately excluded other mythical possibilities that might call his statements into question. 
One such alternative, maintained directly following Plato’s era, is afforded by the 
fragmentary account of Timaios of Tauromenion (c350-c260 b.c.e.) who claims that these
- XIIL602f8-603a3.. .'tcuKocv feptCsccov Adtov -evccQOwcc.
” Praxille of Sicyon (5th century b.c.e.), according to Athenaeus (ibid), said that prince Chrysippos was 
actually carried off by Zeus. However it is also a possibility that it was by both Laios and Oidipus that the 
handsome youth was loved and this has been considered by some as the source of conflict between the Owo. 
This is supported by Schol. Eur. Phoen. 60, who declares that
xcv6q S6 (xxarv 6xi Adtog dcvpipfeOi bnd OiSiTtoSog 6xi dcx4j)TE^fx^i, fipov XpnactTTOV. Cf. also Devereaux 
(1953), pp. 32-141. As with the myth of Ganymede and Zeus, Plato deals with the Homeric tale of Achilles 
and Patrokles by positing, through his narrators that the former was erroneously called the lover of the 
latter {Symposium 180a). Cf. Aiskhines 1.133-144 sq. on a varying interpretation of Achilles’ end 
Pati-okles’ relationship. In Euripides (fr. 840), Laios declares helplessly, in reference to his actions with 
Chrysippos, that T have understanding, but nature forces me’.
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practices of same-sex intercourse were derived from the Kr•eians themselves and thence 
introduced to Greek culture.56
Excluding the fable of Ganymede and Zeus as spurious, as the Athenian Stranger has 
done (636d), there is another fictitious Kretan to consider. In Rhadamanthys’ tale too there 
is the hint of an ongoing cultural debate being expressed through popular myth. Ibykos of 
Rhegion, a lyric poet of the 6th century b.c.e., informs us that Rhadamanthys engaged in tiros 
with a youthful male lover named Talos.57 The chHd of Zeus and Europa, brother of King 
Minos of Krete, Rhadamanthys became one of the three judges in the underworld due to his 
having led a Hfe on earth characterised by justice. This son of Krete and paragon of virtue is 
praised by the Athenian Stranger at 948b for his wise discernment in all matters judicial and 
for his just insights in determining the truth. If Plato was aware of a version of the myth 
that portrayed Rhadamanthys as a partaker of same-sex delights, he has chosen to make his 
narrator ignore it.
One may, as we have seen, present alternative versions of a given myth and it is at 
Plato’s discretion to do so. Perhaps we are to assume that such a myth cannot be true (to be 
regarded as a fiction, like that of Ganymede, concocted to justify same-sex acts) when 
considered in the light of Sokrates’ condemnation of slanderous myths that portray an 
erroneous image of the sexual practices of the gods at Ktpublit 390b-392c. Yet it is not 
unreasonable to question the assumption that ‘prior to Laios’ a sexual ethic allowed sexual 
intercourse exclusively between members of the opposite sex. The fact that the Athenian 
Stranger has used the phrasing ‘prior to the time of Laios’ to introduce his discussion on 
same-sex acts sets a particular tone for the argument which is more important than whether 
or not Plato thought Laios was the actual originator of the custom. The implications of 
sexual perversity associated with Oedipus and the cursed Theban royal house add fuel to the 
Athenian Stranger’s condemnation of same-sex intercourse as ‘contrary to nature’. Virtually 
everyone in the Greece of Plato’s time would have been aware of the sexual taboos broken, 
albeit unwittingly, by Oedipus and liis mother (not to mention the crime of, again 
unwittingly, slaying his father). I would argue that the mere mention of Laios here in 
association with same-sex acts carries with it a great many weighty connotations that serve, 
psychologically, to bolster the Athenian Stranger’s arguments against same-sex intercour-se.
: -/ o 201.
77pLG, iii.247.
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Three Kinds of Affection
Also in book VIII, Plato has provided his readers with a pithy philosophical discussion on 
the subjects of love, affection and desire. Through the voice of the Athenian Stranger, he has 
posited in the Laiws a threefold definition of (JllXlca, Of its three parts, the proper expression 
of it is said to occur in a non-physical manner between individuals who are most ‘like’ one 
another in ‘goodness’. This definition, postulated chiefly for individuals of the same-sex 
who have some kind of attraction for one another, favours non-corporeal, ‘soul to soul’ 
(Platonic) love. This is said to work best toward the ideal telos of arete. The Athenian 
Stranger also suggests a procedure of sublimation,”” functioning through ‘soul to soul’ love, 
which is meant to free the soul from the base desires that threaten to ensnare it.
On this complex issue. Field asserts that ‘Plato himself always strongly disapproved 
of physical intercourse between individuals of the same sex’, but ‘he recognised the 
prevalence of the tendency even among men who, in other respects, had the highest 
potentiaHties for good...his discussion of it may be taken as an attempt to show that the 
desire may, in our modern phraseology, be “sublimated” into the pursuit of knowledge and 
goodness’.”” Plato certainly appears to have given much consideration to the subject of the 
conquest of baser desires through the (proper) love of the Good—not only in the Lawsf 
His concern with such matters may be largely derived from his philosophical/metaphysical 
interest in the immortaHty of the soul and the after-Hfe in relation to the pursuit of 
excellence in Hfe. The desire, officially favoured in Magnesia, to attain a type of immortality 
through the generation of children (not an exclusively Platonic idea) and the PlatonicaUy 
subHme passion for ‘eternal reaHties’ represent the higher forms of ‘affection’ for which an 
individual seeking the Good must strive. The definition of (nlVa in the Laws does not
581 am aware that the use of the term ‘sublimation’ carries with it a Freudian connotation. I am not 
employing this term in the strictest Freudian sense (although there are similarities) but ‘sublimation’ seems 
to be the best term to describe this process that the Athenian Stranger recommends. Vlastos’
‘transmutation’ would suffice as well.
” (1969), p. 123.
60 See Lysis 218a, 221 ; Phaedrus 237d sq., 253d sq.; Philebus 35b sq., 41c sq., 34c sq.; Republic 430b sq., 
437d sq., 558d sq., 559a sq., 571c sq.; Symposium 191 sq., 200 sq. (cp. Phaedrus 237d sq., 251);
Theaetetus 156b; Timaeus 69d sq.—although these provide a good example of the sheer amount of 
passages concerned with love and desire, some of which will figure heavily into this chapter, it is by no 
means a complete list of all the love-references in Plato. For a good, broad spectrum of the subject of love 
in the works of Plato, see Gould (1963).
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appear to be something new that is peculiar to Plato’s final work. The Athenian Stranger’s 
formulation signifies a further development of a longstanding Platonic tradition. It seems to 
represent a logical continuation of previous lines of thought already well developed in his 
works.61
The Athenian Stranger, at 837a-d, posits some notions on the nature of 
(jlAl'Ca between individuals presumably (although perhaps not exclusively) of the same sex. 
His discussion of ‘three types of pbilid comes directly after his fairly lengthy disquisition on 
the inherent problems of same-sex relations (836 sq.). It appears to be the case that Plato’s 
narrator here is employing philia in terms of non-sexual affection as well as in an erotic sense. 
He has done this before in the Lysis (221b7-8) where, as David Konstan says, ‘Socrates 
casually collapses the differences between philia, tros, and tpithumia (cf. Imws 8.837al), and the 
discussion moves freely among cases of parental affection, erotic attraction, attachment 
between friends, and even the appeal of inanimate objects’.62 * 64Dover points out that the verb 
<lXeiV (containing the same base as <lXA(X) may be used as easily to denote familial love—as 
in Aristophanes’ Clouds 79-83, where Strepsiades demands of his son, Pheidippides, whether 
or not he has philia for his father—and also in an erotic context—as in Xenophon’s 
Symposium IX.6, where a pair of dancers enact the romantic legend of Dionysos and 
Ariadne.”
The narrator of the Lmws indicates that the subjects under examination are those of 
‘affection and its attendant passion’ (iTj^ (nlXac; T£ KX'l £7Cl0O)|JLii:a<; dtpa) and that of ‘so- 
called love’ (AyGUL-WOP EpuTOOV—836e5-837a2).” He supposes that much confusion has 
resulted from a misunderstanding of the fact that these things are not really two, but three: 
from the two types he postulates a third category, the mixed product of both, all signified by 
the single term philia. It is possible that this apparently new division should be read in terms
61 I suggest that his particular definition of (|niVi.a in the Laws ultimately signifies an extension of earlier 
Pythagorean thought transmitted and developed throughout the whole of the Platonic corpus. The subject of 
Pythagorean influences in Plato is too vast and complex to be here adequately discussed. Cf. Burkert 
(1972), pp 8, 27, 57-71, 79-83, 85,92, 201, 371 sq., Kingsley (1995), 88-115, 131-132, and Burnett (1920), 
221-299, for more on Pythagorean connections in Plato. Leonid Zhmud (2001) has recently pointed out 
that Kingsley’s criticism of Diels doxographic placement of Empedokles, along with his particular 
reformulation of Pythagorean history and philosophy, are not without their faults. He likewise has 
questioned Burnett’s approach to Diels’ Doxographici Graeci. Nonetheless, Zhmud freely acknowledges 
the profound Pythagorean influence upon Plato.
” (1997), p. 73
” Cf. GH, pp. 49-50.
64 Cf. Symposium 200a sq., where kpctv is associated with fm0v|j.£iv.
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of the distinctions made in Pausanias’ speech at Symposium 180d, on the subject of 
£pcO£ TcdS§r|XO^ and Epcog ChXdVlCg or in terms of Diotima’s characterisation of ‘birth in 
beauty’. It is also possible to view this new division as a reworking of the myth of the two
horses at Phaedrus 246b.
The Athenian Stranger’s discussion of affection has some novel features about it. As 
Dover says, ‘Plato handles eros very mistrustfully in Laws 836r-837d, as the philia which 
amounts to need and desire and the philia between those who are attracted by their affinity; 
the passage is strikingly unlike those in his earlier works, and a stage more remote from 
ordinary Greek attitudes to eros and love’.”” The distinctions given in the Imws are 1.) ‘(jlAa 
between opposites’, 2.) ‘<j)lXla between those who are similar’, and finally, 3.) the mixed 
combination of categories 1 and 2. Furthrlmolr, the Athenian Stranger says, ‘whenever 
each one becomes intense, we designate it “erotic love”’ (SpciTO, k7eovoll(r6op,ev—837a8-9). 
In this respect, philia has not simply been conflated with eros but, under certain 
eirexmstaners, it has the capacity to evolve from just friendship or affection into something 
more erotic and, thrlrforr, much more dangerous.”6 It is precisely this aspect of eros (philia 
run amok?) that the Athenian Stranger wants his hypothetical citizens to avoid through the 
lofty, non-physical affection expressed between souls rather than in the customary manner 
between bodies.
The first of these, philia between opposites’ (fVQVTicov), is described as ‘violent and 
unrestrained and most often not reciprocated’.”’ This rvokrs a hypothetical situation in 
which onr individual has a strong passion for another who (perhaps because he is opposite 
in character, status, economic class, education, etc) does not return the same affection. Even 
if the beloved returns some affection, the Athenian Stranger suggests that such a relationship 
wUl always be characterised as ‘violent and unrestrained’, which cannot possibly encourage 
one to become O'i6<t)pel'V.64 The corporeal lusts for tlSovi] must br reined in and brought
” GH p. 50, n.20.
” Prodikos, in Ohe laOr 5* century b.c.e., defined eros as ‘desire doubled’ (emi^T\)Ll^<a) and added that ‘eros 
doubled is insanity’ (DK, B7). Likewise, Xenophon (Mem. III.9.7) said ‘that those whose aberrations are 
slight arr not considered by most people as insane, but just as one calls strong desires “eros,” so one calls 
substantial distortion of a person^ thinking “insanity.”'
” 837b2-3. So too in the quasi-scientific speech of Eryximechcs in the Symposium do we hear of the 
stormy affecOlons between opposites (xo 5e &v6jlctcv &VO|ooi(DV entGuppt X8 Kat kpa-186b).
” Cf. Phaedrus 253d sq., and Republic 571c where fleshly desires are said Oo be in conflict with Reason; 
also cp. Laws 686e sq. where similar sentiments ere expressed.
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into ‘accord’ with ‘right-thinking’ in one who is to be wtte (696c9). Therefore, affection 
between opposites amongst the Magnesians is to be avoided at all costs as a matter of 
course.
The second category, philia between those who are similar’, seems a far more 
promising route for one to pursue—sans eros—in the daily affairs of the second-best state. 
Such a relationship, the Athenian Stranger says, is both ‘gentle and has continuous mutual 
affection throughout Hfe’ (f](pep6c, xe Kotl KOWf 8td plOD—837b3-4). Non-physical philia 
between the souls of those who are similar in ‘goodness’ (j'lAOV...6pLO'lOV b^olco—837a6) is 
considered the to be ideal.”’ This commonplace expression of Plato’s can be found too at 
Lysis 214b3 and elsewhere.’0 The ‘likeness’ and ‘equaUty’ in this type of a relationship must 
be such only in terms of ‘goodness’. The notion of non-physical love experienced in the 
mind/soul alone reflects attitudes expressed at Philebus 41c sq., where ‘the body stands apart 
from the soul and has no convenience with it in respect to its affections’. It also has a 
paraUel in Xenophon’s ideaHsed account of Lykourgot’ reforms, in the Spartan Constitution, 
where he reports that the love of souls—Hke brotherly love or the love of parents for 
children—was deemed more worthy than the love of bodies between men and youths which 
was, in consequence, discouraged.’* However, the Athenian Stranger indicates that the most 
Hkely manifestation of philia in a real-Hfe relationship is going to be some combination of 
categories 1 and 2 (|i.etKXl) 6e £K xohxcov—837b4) in which eros may or may not enter the 
equation.
When one has been persuaded to pursue the ideal form of ‘soul to soul’ love, it 
should be ranked higher in value than any potential physical love. If this is achieved, as 
Vlastos says, ‘mere physical beauty wdl now strike the lover as a “smaU,” contemptible
” He quotes Odyssey XVII.218 here.
70 There it is rendered in a similar manner, as b bpoiov kco b|ioi<p dvdyKri del (AXco ervai. Cp. Gorgias 
510b2, where icov is employed as a synonym with the qualifying Kax’ dtpexfV (see Lysis 214d), which 
is to be taken both with biioiov and’Krov. Plato’s Sokrates (Lysis 214a6-bl) quotes OdysseyXVH.2%, 
saying aiel xoi x6v bpoiov dyet 0e6; do x6v bpoiov xal none. yvcpiipdv Homer’s view stands opposed 
to Hesiod’s (Works and Days 25) which maintained that the closer two things are to being like one another, 
the more they are repelled. Amongst other things, the subject of whether or not ‘like’ is actually attracted 
to ‘like’ is taken up to no small degree in the Lysis, Although no real conclusion on the matter is therein 
attained, Sokrates delineates three kinds of friendship (212b-d) suggesting that someone is ‘neither the 
friend of the another unless both love each other’, and he allows ‘like’ to be attracted to ‘like’ at 219b-c. 
Similarly at 214d-e, it seems to be the case that ‘like’ is attracted to ‘like’ in some ways since only ‘the 
good man is a friend to the good man alone, but the evil man never engages in friendship’ with anyone.
71 Lak,. Pol, 11.13. But this was probably not the case in the terms that Xenophon describes, cf. Carttedge 
(2001), pp. 91, 189-90.
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thing’.72 * 74 75The following is, according to the Athenian Stranger, an acceptable way for two 
such people to behave and so is prescribed as a paradigm which he hopes his citizens wiU
emulate when faced with the egregious affliction of the desire to engage in excessive sexual 
indulgence:
But when he holds that the desire of the body is secondary, gazing upon his 
beloved rather than engaging in tros (bpoov 5e pcxXXcv f| epcov))7" yearning 
for the soul of his beloved with his own soul,’4 he will beHeve that the act of 
satisfying body with body to be hybris, but while respecting and revering 
moderation (xd crco^pov), and especiaUy courage (dciSpECOV^ and 
magnificence (p.SYaA,O7CpE1X£g) and good sense (xb (pbviXCV), he would 
wish to remain chaste with a chaste beloved (837c3-dl).
In this instance, Kleinias remains sUent as MegjUus and the Athenian Stranger approve of the 
moral imperative outlined above for the benefit of the Magnesian state. Through a mental 
process that might strike us as akin to Freudian sublimation, the lover is meant to reassign 
his fleshly passions for the beloved to the status of an intellectual ideal (admiration of the 
beloved’s beauty/goodness/nobiUty/etc.) rather than the alternative outlet of joining in 
sexual union with the physical person of the beloved.
In this passage there are also some difficulties in translation and interpretation. 
Taylor’s rendering of hybris, in c5, as ‘wanton shame’ seems imbued with an unnecessary 
degree of judgement. Pangle’s version, truer to the text, posits ‘wantonness’ for hybris, 
appearing to follow Taylor’s lead but leaving off ‘shame’. It is the case that Liddell and Scott 
give ‘wantonness’ as a primary translation for hybris, but I would recommend something
72 (1973) p. 23; Platowas,nonethelesl, cle arlyaware of sof cxI remedegree of sof ceptibility to physical 
beauty as indicated at Phaedrus 250c-e and Symposium 219c4.
" ‘To use St. John’s phraseology’, as England (1921), p. 346, says ‘f| ^100X10, tou t^arsK6<; is replaced by 
1] bTCiuu'T<a xwv b<0aAji<5v. The eye may be the instrument or handmaid of the “higher” nature, as well as 
of the “lower.”—Plato was doubtless attracted by the assonance’. That is ofdpcov 8k pdAXov f) bpcy.
74 According to Vlastos (1973), pp.22-23, the sort of srme-cex love that is fully sensual but denies 
consumation, ‘transmuting physical excitement into imaginative and intellectual energy’ was suggested in 
the Symposium as a ‘rebuff to Alkibiades’ attempt at seduction in 219b-d. It is, however, clearly indicated 
as a superior form of love at Phaedrus 250e and 288e-28Ce and at Republic 403b-c.
75 The Athenian Stranger has also made a similar association between courage, moderation and justice at 
630b.
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more along the lines of ‘outrage’ here as a more plausible rendering rather than ‘wanton 
shame’." Taylor also gives dtlSpeiov as ‘manhood’ and derives ‘chastity’ out of thr litany of 
reverences that the Athenian Stranger lists in c6. In fact, Xd ^0^01/ may be translated as 
‘chastity’, perhaps picking up on dCCVETJEiV (to keep pure) in c7, but it would appear that 
‘moderation’ would be a more reasonable rendition.* 77 It seems more conrct that 
‘moderation’, rather than ‘chastity’, would br a better rendering of Xd CCOipiv given that no 
Magnesian citizen is expected to br wholly chaste but they are rxprcted to be moderate in 
thrir pursuits of pleasure. Hybris, howrvrr, represents another level of complexity 
altogether.
A Matter of Hybris
What is this hybris that concerns the Athenian Stranger so much and allegedly afflicts those 
who satr bodily desires with other bodies? The word hybris is itself employed twenty-two 
times throughout thr text of the Laws in one form or another. It is often associated with 
those who break thr laws or who are unjust but sometimes, depending on context, the 
indication is not so srverr. The Athenian Stranger declaims the hybris ('bpptccxai) of 
mercenaries at 650b6. Hr warns, at 641 c3, that those who win many victories run thr risk of 
becoming too hybristic (b|0plcyK6x£pOl) and that this hybris brgrts even more hybris (641 c5). 
He drclarrs (661 r2) that dir man who is beset by hybris can never be truly happy and, not 
insignificandy, he associates thr state of bring hybristic with injustice (662a2, 761r7). 
Similarly, a man with excessive wealth is said to be potentially inclined toward a type of hybris 
(tippiC,) that can lead to injustice (679cl).
Thr Athenian Stlaiger’s statute that would severely Mmt (if not altogether banish) 
dowries, as we have seen, is in part framed with thr intent of making wives less hybristic 
through any monetary controls that they might otherwise gain over their husbands (774c7). 
Magnesian masters are encouraged to be just toward theit servants as this, in turn, will 
discourage them from committing hybris (i)Pp'l^riV-777d4). Those who are hybristic toward
" LSJ, s.v. ^ppig.
77 England (1921), p. 346, says OhaO ‘the introduction of xrYaA,07;p£'rcfe<; takes from the passage the air of 
a stock philosophical quote’.
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their parents (885a3), orphans (927c2) and the laws (885a6, b2, 927c8) may be subject to 
fines and penalties in the second-best state. We are also told that ungoverned children, 
lacking in the proper guidance, become the ‘most hybristic of beasts’ (bppiGTdaTOOV— 
808d7).78 * 80 81Hard labour, of which the Magnesian citizens will be free, is just the sort of thing, 
the Athenian Stranger says, which quenches hybris in the young (835el).78 In a paramyth 
designed to encourage his hypothetical citizens to follow the rules, he states that hybris, 
injustice and imprudence destroy while justice and moderation lead to salvation (906b). In 
almost aU of these instances, Pangle has rendered hybris as ‘insolence’. There is a trnte of 
‘overstepping bounds’ or ‘going to excess’ in these uses of hybris. There are fewer frames of 
reference for an association between hybris and sexual matters. Even so, it is possible to 
derive a context-based translation.
In discussing the benefits of shame (ataxo^) as a means of correcting and 
preventing inappropriate behaviour, the Athenian Stranger cites a Hst of undesirable mental 
states which, especially when they run unchecked, are not conducive to the pursuit of 
virtue. ** He says that ‘vehement anger, erotic love (fepco^), hybris, ignorance, the love of 
profit, cowardice, and even yet such things as wealth, beauty, strength, and many other 
similar particulars that drive a man out of his mind through the intoxication of pleasure’ 
should each be carefully controlled and directed (649d4-7). Pangle renders hybris here again 
as ‘insolence’ and Taylor, somewhat curiously, gives it as ‘pride’. The term is employed in 
juxtaposition to the Athenian Strangrr’s condemnation of excessive pleasures. This 
indicates, as Fisher says, a vice ‘that must be controlled in a well-run state, and in a well- 
ordered soul’.8* Plato’s placement of hybris alongside fepco^ is telling, as are its other 
associations with pleasure. Here as elsewhere, it is considered to be a state of mind that 
both can accompany and also encourages certain types of excess. Too much of almost 
anything, it seems, inclines undisciplined humanity toward hybris.
The only other occurrence of hybris in a sexual or erotic context (aside from its use in 
describing male same-sex relations) appears during the Athenian Stranger’s discussion on the
78 Cf. Carttedge (2001), p.p. 83-5, on comparable terminology amongst the Spartans, and cf. my chapter III.
" Pangle (1980), p. 486, transslates hubris here as ‘wantonness’ as does Taylor (1934). Fisher (1992), p. 
482, says that ‘the traditional associations of hybris with youth, energy and leisure naturally are equally 
appropriate to this use of it as the dominance of excessive sexual desires’.
80 Cf. my chapters III and IV on the uses of shame/modesty in Magnesia.
81 (1992), p. 480.
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penalty for rape at 874c. Tf someone should use force’, says he, ‘in a sexual manner 
(TSf)'! TdL dt^poSicaia), agai/nst either a free woman or o youth, let him then be slain with 
impunity by the party who has been forcefully outraged (b»cb XS xob bf3pooQ£lXC^ plot) or 
by that one’s father or brothers or sons’.82 Hrre the sense is of a violent sexual act that 
constitutes hybris., as an outrage or effrontery, against the victim. The one who submits to 
excessive desires so much as to commit a rape outragts the injured party in the commission of 
said act. This picks up on the transitive use of hubrisyin in the sense of an active 
psychosexual assertion (or physical insertion) carried out on one individual by another. One 
may also consider this as an indication thot hybris denotes a ‘missing the mork’83 84 85 86 *which results 
from the actions of one who is a slave to base urges and excessive desires. In both instances 
of hybris mentioned in a sexual context (that of rape and of same-sex intercourse), the 
indication is one of an outragt arising from a lack of control over excessive desire®.*6
We may draw several conclusions, based on context, about the reference to male 
same-sex relations (sating body with body) as a commission of hybris. First, it is observable 
that the Athenian Stranger uses such a term with a view that same-sex intercourse amounts 
to a type of yielding to excessive deskes. Added to this is the implication that such yielding 
will cause even more instances of yielding to excesses to come in the future. If the 
‘penetrative’ partner may be construed as forcing himself (and thereby submitting to 
uncontrolled excess) on the ‘receptive’ parmer, then he may be seen to have outraged him by 
the impoittion^ That is, it is possible to draw such a conclusion if one subscribes to the 
active/penetrator and passive/penetrated model espoused by Dover, Foucault, Halperin tt 
al?G Thus one could interpret the use of hubriiyin as denoting the passive partner suffering a 
demotion of status by being so outraged and even a loss of honour®’
82 874c2-5. Fisher (1992), p. 482, indicates that this law is very similar to that at Athens in terms of crime 
and punishment (Demosthenes XXIII.53). Cf. also Morrow (1960), p. 465 sq. and MacDowell (1978), pp. 
89, 124 for Athenian parallels. Cf. my chapter V.
83 LSJ, s.v. Opp^g.
84 Cf. Republic 349 sq. for the notion that those who seek to ‘outdo’ or ‘get the better of (pleonexzein) one 
another lack the control of Reason and thus suffer from a disorderly psychic state; cf. too Laws 757 sq. for 
the idea that, amongst ‘equals’, there must be no seeking advantage over one another even in the pursuit of 
Reason.
85 ‘When Sokrates makes a speech in the Phaedrus on the same subject as the speech which Phaedrus has 
recited, he treats eros as desire which induces hubris and is in conflict with Reason (Phdr, 237cd, 238bc)’ 
(GHp. 43, n.ll).
86 (1990), p. 30; cf. Foucault (1984), p.215.
" Aiskhines (II. 150-1) on the case against Demosthenes.
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This model of penetrator/penetratrd, however, is problematic® In the case of 
Drmosthrnrs, in Aiskhines II, a demotion in status dur to his role as an object of pleasure 
for others is certainly impHed. But Taylor’s rendering of ‘wanton shame’, in his version of 
Laws 837c3-dl, dors not appear enticely solicited. As Cairns says of this passage, ‘here, then, 
aidos involves positive respect for standards of decency and leads one to avoid outrage or 
excess’® Same-srx intercourse between consenting parmers cannot bear the same 
implications as those in the case of the Magnesian law on rape (there is no mention of thr 
beloved slaying his lover due to his ‘outrage’). In discussing same-srx relations in terms of 
hybris, a sense of yielding to excessive desires is indicated but not precisely thr same sort of 
hybris as in a criminal act. Yet, by employing such terminology as the Athenian Stranger has 
chosen, hr conceptually attaches criminal connotations.
In terms of thr Athenian Stranger’s condemnation of same-srx intercourse as a type 
of hybris} the emphasis is perhaps placed more on the loss of self-control and lack of 
moderation than on one individual ‘outraging’ another through sexual penetration. Both 
partners in a same-sex relationship are described as becoming less ‘virtuous’ since the lover 
win have lost sophrosyne and the consenting beloved will have lost courage due to his softness 
\ifnalakia)?{} There is an external sense of dishonour in such a relationship with regard to the 
beloved, for whose welfare thr lover allegedly gives no concern, and a quality of internal 
shame for thr lover who has subjected himself to, as Fishrr says, ‘the enslavement to the 
W3_r.r desires, and the acceptance of madness (which is not now handled with any 
sympathy)’® Malakia in the soul is perceived as a great threat to arete. Only appropriately 
‘manly’ individuals wtil act heroically and, as Hobbs says, ‘not falter through sofmrss of thr 
soul’.* 89 * 91 92 As far as thr Athenian Stranger is coier.rnrd, one who submits to such hybris has 
failed to rrcognisr that hr/she has unseated Reason (which ought to rule over his/hn soul) 
in favour of thr part that should br ruled—i.e. the appetites—for the • hedonistic purposes of 
srli-gratification. Hybris in this sexual context becomes a diabolical antithesis of moderation
'' Cf. Davidson (2001), esp. 13 and 17; and my chapter I.
89 (1993), p. 378, n. 103.
9* F’fWr (1992), p. 486; cf. FouceulO (1984), p. 220 and .Davidson (1997), p. 169.
91 (1952), p. 487; cf .P.ricr (1989), p. 123 sq. and GH, p. 167; cf too Cairns (1993), p. 377.
92 (2000), p. 152, cf. my chapter IV.
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and denotes a state of psychic disharmony. It constitutes a failure of individual souls to 
serve Reason, tlie gods and the ‘proper’ order of the kosniosf
Based on these passages in the Imws and other texts, Dover and Foucault’s 
theoretical approach construes the ‘active’, male parmer in a same-sex union as committing a 
type of hybris on the ‘passive’ partner in terms of dominance and submission and contrary to 
accepted sex-role stereotypes. It is not so easy to see what sort of hybris the ‘receptive’ 
parmer commits. The answer appears to He not so much in his supposed ‘passivity’ but in 
his perceived ‘softness’ (effeminacy) and insatiabtiity for sex* In the Problemata., attributed 
to Aristotle, the subject of those who are ‘female-ike’ is discussed. The author indicates that 
sexual desire arises in the pelvic regions that are swoUen with moisture and semen. These 
fluids find release through ejaculation. However, in some men the passages to the testicles 
are thought to have been blocked and these ensuing fluids collect instead in his anal region. 
As Davidson says:
This can happen to some extent to those who overindulge in sexual 
intercourse but with those who are by nature effeminate aU moismrr is 
secreted in this region... [smce they are] unable to find release, their desire 
can never be properly assuaged ‘wherefore they too become insatiable 
(aplistoi Ht. “unfiUable”), just Ike women’.*
While there may be little of scientific value in such a notion, it reflects elements of pubHc 
opinion at the time. Examples of women as being sexuaUy insatiable and having a lack of 
self-control are certainly attested in Classical drama and elsewhere.** 6 This may point to the 
hybris of the receptive eromenos., to which the Athenian Stranger has alluded, as a ‘feminine’ 
lack of control over his destrr for sexual gratification. He has already been characterised as 
‘soft’ and therefore more Hke a woman. The receptive partner’s quaHty of effeminacy 
represents a state regarded as inappropriate for a virtuous man (836d5-7, el-3). But he is not
93 This position was later taken up by other authors but never to such an extent as in Plato. Cf.
Theopompos of Chios (b.376P.c.e.) FGrH 1 If F213; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1149b20 sq, 1149b30-
6.
94 Cf. Davidson below for this line of reasoning.
95 Davidson (1997), p. 176.
96 Aeschylus fr. 243 in Nauck (1962); Sophocles fr. 932; Aristophanes’ Thesm. 504sq., Ecc. 468-70, 616­
20, Clouds 553sq. Alkiphron (1.6.2) depicts female sexual voracity as a ‘Charybdis’, and warns another 
man that his hetaera will devour him whole (3.33).
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alone. Interestingly, both partners in a same-sex union are construed as having fallen into a 
negative condition, ideologically connected with hybris, of ‘sexual frenzy and madness’.97 98 99 100
An Invitation to Madness
The Athenian Stranger seems to be aware that the citizens of his Magnesia are not always 
going to measure up to the standards that he would preerr.® Even though a man is 
encouraged not to sow ‘unhallowed and bastard seed in concubines’ (841 d sq.), as we have 
seen, he may enter into the bed of a woman (and the context appears to indicate only a 
woman—but this is ultimately unclear) other than his legally wedded wife on the condition 
that he keeps the affair a secrrt. Should the tryst be discovered, says Plato’s narrator, 
‘we’d be right to exclude him by law from the award of state honours, as one that has 
proved himself a stranger indeed’ (841e2-4). The prominence of social pressures for 
conformity is a good example, as Fisher says, of Plato’s ‘persistent tendency to incorporate 
elements from his understanding of the strengths of Spartan society’?™ As psychologically 
damaging as the punishment for being caught might be, nonetheless it is very interesting 
that the Athenian Stranger has allowed for a kind of tightly managed legitimacy, providing it 
is undertaken in secret, for this particular indulgence at least between members of the 
opposite sex.
It remains uncertain whether or not a Magnesian might also engage in a similar sort 
of clandestine same-sex, exira-moriial intercourse. It may be the case that some degree of 
excessive sexual desire for the opposite sex (albeit manifest in secrecy) is to be tolerated, 
perhaps because it is potentially reproductive, while any same-sex expression of passion 
whatsoever wUl be banned. If this is true, then the discussion of three types of philia along 
with the principles of sublimation of desire are aimed primarily, if not exclusively, at the
97 X-hvcrig feparaKfig Kai gavia,("-839a9-bl.
98 See below on the Athenian Stranger’s final summation of the law on sex where I have treated this matter 
in greater detail.
99 Saunders (1972), p 76, points out that ‘one cannot be quite sure, but kXenOfepov, which all translators 
understand in the general sense of “free”, is probably to be taken in the more restricted sense of “citizen” 
women. The complementary adjective yeivv'uov surely excludes foreign women, as with rare exceptions 
aliens in Magnesia are anything but Yevvata’ (of. 841 e, 850a sq., 919c sq., 952d sq.). Cf. my chapter V.
100 Fisher (1992), p. 483. For a (perhaps somewhat idealised) view of the Spartan emphasis on consensus 
and social ostracism in the control of their citizenry, cf. e.g. Xenophon Lak,. Pol; 2.10, 5.5-7, 6.2, 8 and 
Aristotle, Politics 1270b28-31, 1275b9-13. Also cf. Pierart (1973), p. 416 sq.
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would-be practitioners of same-sex intercourse alone. It is not clear whether there is 
legitimacy of any sort to be given to this kind of sexual expression except that, apparently, 
no physical interaction should ensue between those who have such desires. We do not 
appear to have in the Lam a comparable discussion that specifically addresses the subject of 
excessive desires for members of the opposite sex to such an extent. That is, unless the 
three types of philia may also be applied to mixed-sex desires. Since moderation is 
necessary for the achievement of wisdom, it follows that anyone who would be wise (of 
whatever sex) must practice it in terms of aU sexual expression and not become a slave to 
the gratification of excessive desires.
He has dealt with the subject of the regulation of the desires of citizens for 
members of the opposite sex. This occurs primarily in the law on rape, mentioned above, 
and in regard to marriage laws and rules of procrretion.101 102 103 104'These strictures appear to be 
more limiting to women than to men who pursue the opposite sex in order to gratify their 
desires. The implicit necessity for moderation in the case of romantic relations between 
members of the opposite sex has been suggested and reinforced through the myth of the 
family. This reflects similar philosophical tenets in the Phaedms where sophrosyne is 
considered the hallmark of a true lower'’2 Whether or not Plato means to uphold the same 
notions in the Laws is uncertain although it seems probable. Sokrates, at Phaedrus 250e3- 
251a, declares that those not recently initiated into the ‘mysteries’ of philosophy or whose 
purity has been stained cannot behold the Beautiful. They as perceived to be fixed on 
temporal beauty alone and so cavort, in a bestial fashion, with women and presumably also 
with men contrary to nature (ftapd (riicaiv).1'53
This citation from the Phaedms may shed some light on the same phraseology in the 
Laws. What is actually ‘contrary to nature’ may not be the same-sex act itself, but the 
indulgence in excessive desires for pleasure that provokes one to engage in such an 
exceedingly pleasurable act in the first pacce.1** This might seem Hke ‘hair-splitting’, but it
101 Cf. my chapter V.
102 Cf. 250e3-251a; of. 254.
103 On this see Rist (1997), p. 66, n. 4 and Nussbaum (1994), p. 1578.
104 It is altogether possible that Plato did not actually share the same attitudes that he would impose upon 
his subjects—not that it is necessary for him to share them. Rist (1997), p. 78, says ‘the fact remains that 
he [Plato] separated reproductive love from spiritual love, which at its highest is celibate, involving male or 
“really male” (i.e. female) souls alone. In addition to condemning same-sex intercourse, Plato did not 
marry. In this he differed from the inhabitants of the second-best city of his Laws, where, as Price says, 
‘non-one is expected to be wholly abstinent’. Cf. Price (1989), p. 232. It is necessary to bear in mind that
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may br thr crux of the Athenian Stranger’s argument that is ostensibly derived from his 
philosophical and metaphysical interests in the human soul. Same-sex desires arr 
considered to possess thr quality of introducing instabilitirs into the psychic harmony of 
individuals. Such instabilities are percrivrd to be exacerbated if they indulge in excessive 
pleasures. Thr Athenian Stranger has particularly singled out same-sex relations as one of 
the most ‘dangerous’ of sexual pleasures. They arr, as wr saw earlier, deemed to br 
somehow ‘too’ pleasurable. Whereas, in contrast, copulation between married, mieed-sre 
couples is evidently not so dangerous dur to it perhaps bring less plrasurable than samr-srx 
intercourse.
The verbal associations between samr-sex acts and other acts considered morally 
reproachful in the Laws, a standard text on Magnesia’s ‘required reading’ list, appears to br 
part of the Athenian Stranger’s employment of calculated language to achieve his societal 
ends. Appealing to his citizens with popular aphorisms and persuading fables is another 
level of this.105 106In the passage at 836b8-c7, the Athenian Stranger has again employed an 
argument from nature against samr-srx iitrr•eoulsr. As we saw earlier, he claims to favour 
thr restoration of an (imagined) exclusively mixrd-sex-orirnted sexual nomos as it is 
perceived to have rxisited ‘prior to Laios’.
This would be ‘following nature’. Likewise, wr saw that he suggested that his 
hypothetical citizens should take an example from thr ‘nature’ of animals since they do not 
rngagr in samr-sex intercourse. He restates his assertion from Book I that srx between 
males is ‘unnatural’?06 tt is possible to see that the very mention of Laios in connection 
with samr-sex intercourse constitutes an association with incest that furthers the Athenian 
8traiger’s argument. This portrays the concept of samr-srx intercourse, perhaps in thr 
mind of an impressionable listener who has heard this story throughout thru; lifetime, in 
such a way that it is supplied with unnatural, criminal and sacrilegious connotations. At 
838b-c the Magnesian law against incest is framed. The Athenian Stranger indicates thrrr
Rist cannot know for certain whether or not Plato actually married but there is precious little evidence Oo 
suggest iO as opposed to others (like Sokrates) on whose family life more has been recorded.
105 Cf. Hesk (2001), p. 153-6, 159-62 on Plato’s use of ‘pharmacological’ lying end pp. 177-8 on ethical 
falsehood. Cf. my chapter II.
106 A recent Channel 4 (2002) production indicated that not only do animals engage in same-srx 
intercourse, but many people have been selectively denying this fact for some time—especially in terms of 
arguing for Ohe ‘unneturalness’ of iO in humans. Animals that have been scientifically proven Oo partake 
sexually of the same-srx include, but err not limiOed Oo, swans, chimpanzees, dogs, sheep, seagulls, African 
buffalo and dolphins. A longer list includes many types of birds, reptiles and mammals.
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that no one questions the unnoturolness of incest and the proscription against it is socially 
reinforced by religion, popular scorn and ‘serious tragedy’. This would appear to give us an 
indication of Plato’s understanding of the uses of socialisation and psychological persuasion 
through methods of repetitive indoririnotion to achieve the desired end in terms of moral 
hygiene.
Turning rather swiftly from the subject of mcest to other sexual acts deemed 
contrary to nature, our narrator then makes the proposition, as Dover says, ‘that the 
religious sanctions which already operate against ioctst, so that “not so much as a desire for 
such intercourse enters most people’s heads” (836b), should be extended to sexual 
legislation in general’?". The Athenian Stranger states:
For in this was the very thing that I was saying, that in regard to this law 
(TOV Vdpov) I might have a craft of making use of sexual ioiernoui^se, 
according to nature (Kmcd (yucoiV), for the generation of children, on the 
one hand abstaining from the male, not deliberately killing the species of 
humankind, nor sowing seed in rocks ond stones, where it will never take 
root and yield natural fruio?0® and on the other hand abstaining from any 
female field in which you would not want your seed to spring forth. For in 
the first place it [this law] is laid down in accord with nature (KOCtd jxJOV), 
and it serves to prevent erotic frenzy omd madness 
(AfalXlS 5e fepiOC;lKT]^ Kto'l JiavtaQ), oll manner of adultery, all excesses in 
food and drink ond it mokes men become friendly and dear to their own 
wives (838e4-839bl).
The low under discussion here (and it should be noted, again, that the Athenian Stronger is 
speaking hypothetically) promotes, through social indoctrination, mixed-sex intercourse only 
between properly married couples. This state of affairs has been defined os ‘natural’ or ‘in
107 GH, p. 166
108 This view is subject to much debate and I deal with it more in chapter V. What appears to be indicated 
here is the notion that each sperm, or ‘seed’, was thought to contain a whole and immature human being 
which would then germinate in a woman’s womb to develop into a baby. Therefore same-sex intercourse 
between males, as well as masturbation, could be seen to amount to a kind of merder-‘ki^mg the species of 
humankind’.
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accord with nature’ (Kcaxd Same-sex tniercourte, masturbation and adultery have
been grouped into the opposite category.
The Athenian Stranger has again associated same-sex intercourse with excessive 
indulgences, ‘erotic frenzy’, and insanity (!PCtViid,c). The relationship between same-sex 
intercourse and mania is derived from the Athenian Stranger’s formulation that Reason 
should rule in the souls of his subjects over their desires. Such a state of psychic disharmony 
in which Reason is unseated in favour of the appetites amounts to an ‘unnatural’ disorder 
according to the philosophical model that he has defined. According to Dover, his 
‘condemnation of same-sex acts as contrary to nature was destined to have a profound effect 
on the history of morality’.109
However, it seems appropriate to siress again that nowhere does Plato’s narrator 
consider the desire to engage in sexual acts with members of the same sex to be unnatural.”” 
Elsewhere he cites instances in which someone might be tempted to partake of these 
activities and there is no indication that such a state of attraction per se would itself be 
considered abnormal. The Athenian Stranger here appears to have struck out on a position 
that is somewhat divergent from those of many of his contemporaries in seeking to stifle 
same-sex sexual expression altogether. One can potentially see Plato working out his own 
thoughts on sexuality, through the media of these discourses. His is one voice in a chorus of 
many. The new ethic of sexuality in the Laws is, in many ways, both opposed to many 
contemporary practices and also at once derived in no small part from them. The views that 
are expressed in his works may not have been taken very seriously in his own lifetime and he 
was probably aware of this.”1 The Laiws (as with any Platonic text) may be taken as both a 
philosophical and rhetorical exploration of cultural ideas. This exploration takes place 
against the backdrop of Plato’s native time and culture. Whilst he steps beyond the norm in
109 GH, p. 168.
110 Cf. also Republic 474d; and cf. too Aiskhines 1.135-137, for an indication that same-sex attraction was 
regarded as quite normal in fifth-fourth century Athens. A hypothetical ‘Athenian father’, as Dover, GH, 
pp. 88-9, says, ‘who sternly told his fourteen-year-old son never to speak to strange men on the way home 
from the gymnasium, yet betrayed by a glint in the eye and a curl of the lip that he was not wholly 
displeased by a rumour that his twenty-year-old son had “caught” the fourteen-year-old boy next door, was 
acting as humans act’.
111 As Winkler (1990), p. 172, says ‘Athens was a society in which philosophers were often ignored and, 
when noticed, were easily represented not as authority figures but as cranks and buffoons’. Ameipsias had 
a chorus of‘thinkers’ or ‘worriers’ (phrontistai); Eupolis’ Flatterers portrayed the wealthy Kallias with his 
household of dodgy philosophers; and, of course, there is the comical representation of Sokrates in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds.
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proposing certain radical changes, hr still viewed his world in many ways through the ‘lens’ 
of perception necessarily imposed on him by his life and times.
Back in Book I, at 636bl-cl, the Athenian Stranger spoke of the tendency for samr- 
sex acts to occur in the milieu of thr gymnasia almost mattrl-of-faedy as if it wrrr a forrgonr 
conclusion that such attractions were commonplace. At 839b, hr mentions the potential 
protest that a youth ‘bursting with srrd’ might make to such lrstlietions on same-srx 
intercourse as discussed in the passages citrd above. Howrvrr, according to thr model that 
Plato has constructed, one who is overcome by the desirr to copulate with another of thr 
same sex, to such an extent that thr desire causes them to partake of the deed, is showing a 
lack of control over thr appetites by the rule of Reason?^ The desire itself is not unnatural. 
As we have seen, it appears to have been a cultural norm taken for granted, but the 
submission to that desire to such a degree that it manifests in same-srx intercourse amounts 
to the unseating of Reason from its proper psychical position and thr consrqurnt 
domination of the undisciplined soul by thr desires and appetites. It would seem that the 
same argument could be applied to the indulgence of excessive desire for, e.g. food or drink, 
wealth or power along with sex as means of producing this psychical disharmony—but srx 
has been particularly targeted as an important manifestation of the sort of excessive 
indulgence that is said to invite madness.
Excessive Indulgence and Double Standards
It is necessary to recall that the Athenian Stranger is theorising about a second-best polis for 
which srcond-best rules and regulations arr bring framed. His discussions of samr-srx 
intrrcoxlsr are often more theorisation than legislation. He has identified a hypothetical 
youth, ‘bursting with seed’ (JtoAAoB CT^tspj^CXxo^ [^{^<5x6^), who would ridicule any 
legislation that places such limitations on sexual activity (esprcially same-srx activity) as 
‘fooUsh and impossible restrictions’ (839b4-6). Such a protest would not necessarily stand in 
the way of thr legislation but it does demonstrate at least one of the problems that could 
arise from thrusting this novel moral codr on a society that would probably react strongly 
against it.
U2 GH, p. 168.
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The muted legitimacy granted to extra-marital, mixed-sex intercourse does not seem 
to cover same-srx intercourse. This is only so inasmuch as no declarative statements to that 
effect have been made. But his ultimate position remains far from certain and the 
proscription of same-sex activity may not actually comr to pass. There is a degree of 
uncertainty that the Athenian Stranger reveals (and possibly Plato as well) in terms of dealing 
with some of these finer points of sexual law. Hr is unclear over whether or not to pass 
legislation to limit same-srx acts or whether exclusively psychological influences might serve 
brttrr for this end. In a potential reversal of his normally aggressive approach to thr legal
codification of nomos, Plato’s narrator srems to be favouring ‘unwritten laws’ on matters of
• 113same-sex intercourse.
He indicates here (as before at 835rl) that hard work serves to quench excessive 
drsirrs (841a6-8) and hr hypothesises that the desired result of ‘proper’ sexual conduct 
might br achieved without legislation ‘if it were not possible to undertake sexual intercourse 
without shame’.14 Through shamr, the act of engaging in sexual indulgence may br 
curtailed and the frequrncy of such indulgence is meant th decrease the sway hf this 
‘mistress’ over them.”5 Those who fail th master thrir desires are said to br ‘weaker than 
thrmselvrs’ (O'b^ flXXODQ O.t)^eev—841b7-8), and it is hoped that they will be lured into thr 
expected mode of behaviour through thr socially inculcated mores of reverence for the gods, 
thr love of honour and desire for thr brauty in souls rather than bodies (841c4-6). 
However, in England’s words, ‘it is too much to hope that these motives would keep all men 
perfectly virtuous’.1^
The employment hf shame, along with other socirtal infuences, as a psychological 
force to prevent sexual indulgences represents one side of the Athenian Stlaiger’s plan. Thr 
usr hf actual legal code is thr other. He might choose one over the other or he could decide 
that both will work better together. His treatment of thr issue, as wr have seen, indicates a 
drgrrr of indrcisivenrss (and perhaps discomfort) about how best to deal with matters of 
srxual conduct. Proof of this is observable in thr apparent ‘loophole’ that is introduced by
113 Cf. my chapter II on ‘unwritten lew’.
1.4 dva'lSeta—841a8-9. Pangle (1980) p. 233, renders divciSeia hereas ‘awe’.
1.5 The ‘mistress’ in question, Sfceroiva, represents excessive desires which master Reason. Taylor (1934), 
p. 1406, translates it as ‘the tyranny of the appetite’. Cairns (1993), p. 144, highlights the importance of 
early socialisation for this use of shame as a means of behavioural control in ancient societies.
116 (1921), p. 12, italics in original. .
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which one could effectively breach the normal mode of sexual conduct (one assumes, 
referring to mixed-sex activities alone, but this remains unclorified). He soys:
Let it be the rule of custom ond unwritten low that it is noble for them to do 
these things secretly, and let the oct of not doing them secretly be shameful, 
but not necessarily die commission of the ont.n7
This clause focuses greater emphasis on maintaining the appearance of appropriate 
behaviour even when that is only on illusion. As Cairns points out, the uses of shome in 
Magnesia ore ‘designed to foster concepts of honour which focus on the outward aspect of 
actions ond encouroge conformity rather than commitment’.”® A Magnesian who breaks 
with the approved sexual conventions runs the risk of public censure ond public shome. The 
added feature of public scrutiny mokes getting caught, when his/her illicit gratification 
becomes excessive, a greater likelihood. The fear of shome may be considered a sufficient 
deterrent against breaking this custom of secrecy since there is the indication thot the use of 
force (or stringent penalties) wiU be employed against any would-be transgressors. A type of 
fixed penalty is later introduced in the final statements of the (speculative) low on sex.
At 841c, the Athenian Stronger proposes two ordinances—either or both (and 
possibly neither) of which might ultimately be put into legal practice. It is evident thot he 
would Hke to eliminate some-sex practices altogether from his second-best state but whether 
this con be done, or wUl be done, he does not soy for sure. The passage begins with some 
uncertainty (whether only a prayer or a mydi-841 c), evoking the aid of a higher power, and 
then, somewhat paradoxically, concludes on a definitive statement thot this wUl be the low 
on ‘sexual matters’. There appears to be o high degree of ambiguity here inasmuch os it is 
never quite resolved which, if either, of the two lows wUl actually be enforced:
117 ...dXX’ oi) X> ixfi rctivTox; Spocv—841b2-5.
118 (1993), pp. 376, but, as he rightly indicates (p. 377), ‘it is important that, if possible, the [Magnesian] 
citizens should be rather than merely seem good’. For similar uses of shame cf. Laws 631e-C32c, 634a, 
663c, 671 e, 711c, 721d, 730b-731a, 742b, 755a, 762a, 762c, 773e, 774c, 784d, 808e, 841e, 879e, 881b-c, 
921d-922a, 926d, 944d-e (the coward to be treated as a woman). Cf. my chapter IV.
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And perhaps (x<d%a S’ dev),”9 if God be willing, we might enforce one of 
two laws concerning sexual matters (TEpi EpOXlKCOV) either [1.] no one 
whatsoever should dare to touch any well-born and free woman except his 
own wedded wife, nor is he to sow bastard and unhallowed seed in 
concubines, nor is he to sow fruitless seed in males contrary to nature; or [2.] 
we should prevent sexual intercourse between males altogether 
(xS |xev xchv dppEVtov Tap.Tav dc<j>eAcoiie0’ &v), and concerning women, 
if someone should have intercourse with anyone except the woman who 
entered into his household under the sanction of the gods and the sacred 
marriage ceremony, whether purchased or obtained in any other manner, 
unless he escapes the notice of all other men and women., we would probably 
(xd%’ dv) seem to legislate rightly by rnarttng that he be punished by 
depriving him of honours within the city since he actually is a stranger. 
Then let this law be established concerning sexual matters and aU things 
erotic (TEpi &<'))pc8icira)v Kai. &Ttdvx<ov xo5v EpoxiKrnv), inasmuch as we 
do rightly or wrong!!12” in associating with each other because of such 
desires. (841c8-842a2—emphasis mine).
While MegiUus the Spartan laconically nods assent, it is worth noting again that Kleinias the 
Kretan refrains from stating his opinion on the matter. In the first instance, the Athenian 
Stranger says that his regulation of sexual activity will forbid extramarital affairs (between 
citizen men with free-women and courtesans) and will actively discourage ‘finNi:less 
intercourse between males against nature’ (TCaxd (j^iOTLV), The second option intends ‘to 
prevent sexual intercourse altogether between males’ and then allows the discussed 
‘legitimacy’ for extra-marital affaks (presumably) only between members of the opposite 
sex—provided that they are kept quiet (dl-5). I have made much of this passage in this and 
previous chapters, but its significance justifies repeated recourse to it.
119 England (1921), p. 356, says that, in the Athenian Stranger’s use of xd%a S’ dv, ‘he passes, I think, from 
the region of aspiration to that of what he may hope for as possible in the actual present “with God’s help”; 
even though the love of spiritual beauty should not generally develop’.
120 MSS. A and O omit the words xe xal oPk bpOrng which are added in the margin of A.
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The two ports of this low both deal with some-sex intercourse and mixed-sex 
intercourse but both ports contain clauses that would seem to bon some-sex intercourse. 
The Athenian Stronger is aware of the difficulty of such legis^^^tiion (in practice or in theory) 
ond he admits thot perhaps his statutes on sexual behaviour moy exist only in myth rather 
than reality (841 c6). Even so, he concludes his discussion on the twofold statute of sexual 
behaviour saying ‘let this low be established, whether we coll it one or two, concerning sex 
and aU things erotic’ (841e5-842al).
As indicated, both lows single out some-sex activity for exclusion. As England soys, 
the ‘two lows’ in question ore ‘one inasmuch os they try to secure the some end, but differ in 
that the second threatens only dishonour, not a definite penalty for the minor offence’?.. The 
first low, at 841 dl, states the ideal form of sexual behaviour—with no implicit penalty for 
those who break it. The second port allows for a kind of tightly-managed legitimacy for men 
who secretly hove exilo-moritol affairs—essentially a restating of the ‘loophole’ which 
demands secrecy but not abstinence. Failure to obey (not keeping one’s trysts secret) bears 
the penalty of public defamation ond deprivation of honours (841e2-4). The first low clearly 
represents the Athenian Stranger’s ideal ond the second one, seeming to anticipate thot such 
problems will occur, is potentially more suited to the real world of the second-best state. 
But can it be thot some-sex intercourse will also be allowed the some ‘legitimacy’ if it is done 
in secret.1 oo Or is it the cose thot, os Price soys, ‘homosexuality [sic] is always excess, never 
necessity’ ond therefore never to be suffered ony degree of tolerance in this imperfect 
utopOaOioo Unfortunately, the Athenian Stronger has left us room for doubt ond it is virtually 
impossible to soy for certain either way.
By the time of the laws, Plato has seriously considered some philosophical grounds 
for forbidding certain types of sexual octs. Some-sex intercourse, in particular, has been 
specifically targeted os o type of behaviour to be discouraged if not banned outright. The 
Adleoion Stronger has levelled such charges against it to the effect that it is sterile, unnatural, 
that it constitutes ond encourages indulgence in excessive desites ond, os such, that it is 
potentially harmful to the souls of both lover and beloved ond therefore to the sooctiiy of
121 (1921), p. 357, italics in original.
122 England (1921), p. 356, reckons that both of the alternative represent ‘a state of society in which the fear 
of God and the fear of man either (1) kept men altogether straight in sexual matters, or (2) both (a) confined 
their unlawful connexions [sic] to those with women, and (b) made them hide even these from the rest of 
the world’.
123 (1989), p. 234.
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the polis™ As previously discussed, the argument from the ‘nature’ of animals is dubious at 
best and ambiguous at least given both the passage at Philebus 67b. It seems more intended 
to convince the populace by means of paramyth or ‘noble lie’.124 25 The ‘sterile’ (dyOPO;) quality 
attributed to same-sex intercourse (at 841 d4-5) is another matter.
The importance of mixed-sex couplings for the production of offspring is not lost 
on Plato’s narrator and it would appear that he has expended no small effort in framing his 
laws to govern such unions. The essential necessity of procreation is deliberately and 
significantly connected to divinity. The Athenian Stranger, as we saw in chapter V, exhorts 
his hypothetical citizenry to marry saying that ‘one must naturally hold onto the everlasting 
by always leaving behind children and grandchildren after one that they may render services 
unto the gods’ (773a5-774al). It is y^veat;, the primal force of reproduction, that grants 
humankind a necessary foothold on immortality.i22 It would therefore be a mistake for an 
individual to conclude that all of creation exists for them alone and not for its own 
purposes.127 128The Magnesian state exists as a microcosm mirroring the universe and the 
Magnesian citizenry must strive to serve the state in much the same way as cells, or organs, 
‘serve’ the body. Ideally, proper children will be produced through proper marriages and so 
the institution of marriage is therefore carefully regulated to ensure a stable population 
within the state’s 5040 land divisSon2.l28
Since Magnesia has been designed to encourage the family unit with a view toward 
maintaining a stable population, all acts of sexual intercourse become subject to official 
regulation. Non-reproductive sexual union is regarded as acceptable only in a limited sense. 
The fact that same-sex intercourse happens to be ‘sterile’ would not seem to qualify it as a
124 Cf. Phaedrus 239-241 c on the harm done to the beloved by an intemperate lover. As Price (1989), p. 
232, says, ‘it is evident that Plato is far from the more recent attitude which finds same sex activity 
“unnatural” to the extent that it manifests a disposition of same sex desire; he lacks the conception to make 
that objection’.
125 On the Athenian Stranger’s use of‘noble lies’ in the Laws reflecting Spartan (more so than Athenian) 
policies of statecraft, cf. Hesk (2000), pp. 157-62.
126 The Athenian Stranger says that yfeveoi; is the principle process whereby humankind may render 
service to ‘the Good’, the supreme object of religious worship (td Tdvxcov dpiaxov—728dl). He 
indicates that those who render service to the Highest have contact with tij; detYevoi)<; (jibcrecoc;, which 
corresponds to true, indestructible Being. At 903c, he says that every Yfevecn; fashions an instrument for 
helping to secure the happiness of the universe as a whole. This would seem consistent with Diotima’s 
thesis at Symposium 206e2-5 where eros is described as both a longing for offspring ‘in accordance with 
the Good’ and , at 207a3-4, as ‘the longing for the Immortal’. Cf. my chapters IV and V.
127Cp. 721c6; also cf. Aristotle, De An. 415a29, ...iva, xou del Kal xoo Oelou gexeycocnv, fj 86vavxai.
128 Of. my chapters V and VI.
f
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special case for prohibition. The view that Price ascribes as ‘more acceptable to Plato' 
should be to allow any sexual act of the non-reproductive type ‘so long as they fall within a 
sexual relationship that as a whole is reproductive in kind’?29 Why would the Athenian 
Stranger object to one's failure to be reproductive in one instance if one is successful at it in 
another? Not every act of sexual union need produce offspring.
Elsewhere he enthusiastically supports methods of contraception and abortion, as 
well as fertility treatments, in order to maintain his stable population.”0 Maintaining a stable 
population, one of the Athenian Stranger's foremost concerns, allows for and encourages 
certain types of ‘sterile’ intercourse. Curiously, only the married and mixed-sex variety is 
granted any real degree of legitimacy. In Plato’s Magnesia it is not the case that ‘nature’ 
requires everyone to remain open to the perpemation of the immortality of the species in 
every instance of sexual union. One could arguably posit that same-sex intercourse between 
some people ought to be encouraged (or, at least not actively discouraged) in order to 
prevent overpopulation beyond the specified 5040 famtiial units. This particular- 
inconsistency is never fuUy addressed or resolved. In addition to the difficulty of any 
plausible argument from the nature of animals, the ‘sterile’ quality of same-sex intercourse 
does not alone appear to provide reason enough to single it out to be expunged from the 
second-best state.
The Athenian Stranger's idiosyncrasies in respect to same-sex erotic expression, as 
indicated hypothetically or otherwise in the Laws, are at variance with such theoretical views 
that Dover and Foucault maintain were part of the ancient Greek cultural ethos. The point of 
contention Hes in the fact that Plato's narrator has condemned not only the ‘receptive’ 
partner of a same-sex coupling but also the active.”1 This diverges from Dover and 
Foucault's presumptions about the dominant attitudes amongst Plato's contemporaries.”2 
Enjoying the ‘passive’ (or ‘receptive’) sexual position, Dover argues, was not favoured for a 
male who would one day assume the status of Athenian citizenship (or at least one who
129 (1989), p. 233. A similar attitude was taken by the commission whose majority report recommended to 
Pope Paul VI that certain acts of contraception should be permitted within a marriage so long as its general 
purpose remain reproductive. For an account of this cf. Napier (1969).
130 Laws 740d; the ‘highest and most distinguished’ official is to be appointed to oversee population 
control. Cp. also 818d8, Protagoras 345d, and Simonides of Ceos (556-448b.c.e.) Fr. 5. Cf. my chapter V.
131 See my chapter II for Classical instances where the ‘active’ penetrator may also be accused of failing to 
master himself by submitting to ‘feminine’ overindulgence in sex.
132 Cf. Davidson (2001), 20-23.
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might pursue a political career).133 134Such a one could incur the disdain of the community as 
well as the designation unnatural™ However, the ‘active’ male partner, according to Dover 
and Foucault’s cultural reconstruction, would still be playing the dominant sex-role regarded 
as appropriate to manly behaviour.
Plato’s narrator, in condemning the act itself as a kind of outrage, faults both lover 
and beloved. The active lover who has his way with another of the same sex is accused of 
intemperance (836d7), and of submitting to an excessive desire for pleasures against which 
he is too ‘soft’ in character to be true to the test of virtue (d9-el, cf. 636c6-7). His ‘softness’ 
is derived from allowing his ‘masculine’ Reason be subverted through a ‘feminine’ loss of 
control and the tendency towards seeking excessive pleasure. The eromenos, in addition to 
running the risk of some psychical damage (having his Reason unseated), is also charged 
with ‘softness’ (effeminacy). This state of being is construed as inappropriate for a man 
(836d5-7, el-3).
According to a standard Platonic formula, both partners ultimately fall short of being 
‘masters of themselves’.135 Submitting to excessive pleasure (e.g. through same-sex 
intercourse) amounts to the superior part of their soul being dominated by the base or 
appetitive part.136 One who yields to the domination of pleasures may be thought to have 
succumbed to ‘madness’ Qiavidtc;),137 and a state of ‘slavery’.138 Rather, as Konstan says, the 
Athenian Stranger praises laws (839bl) that ‘will teach men to despise “lustful madness” 
(lutta erotike) and all forms of excess and make them instead “proper friends,” or perhaps 
“dear relations” (oikeioiphiloi), to their own wives’.139
It is again important to bear in mind that the Athenian Stranger has been framing his 
laws with a view toward the most attainable net quantity of happiness for his populace. 
They are ostensibly meant to undertake the pursuit of virtue through their whole lives. 
Happiness, he maintains, is to be reached through overcoming the ‘slavery’ to the desire for 
excessive pleasures (840c5-6 with 636d5-el). At 733e-734b there is the firm indication that
133 Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.6.1384al5-20; cf. GPM, p. 215 and Foucault (1978), p.243.
134 As in Aiskhines 1.185; cf. GH, pp. 67-8. However, nowhere does Aiskhines clearly indicate that 
Timarkhos was the ‘receptive’ partner; rather, the issue is that he has allegedly prostituted himself and that 
he submits to excessive pleasure.
135 Cf. Laws 626e7; Republic 430c7; Phaedrus 232a4-5.
136 Cf. Republic 431a3-b2.
137 Laws 839a7; cf. Phaedrus 241a4 and Republic 403al0.
138 Laws 838d5; cf. Republic 577d2, 579dl0 and Phaedrus 238e3; GPM, p. 208.
139 Konstan (1997), pp. 71-2.
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the moderate, prudent and courageous (manly—6vSpeiOq) life is ‘healthy’ and happy since it 
is a life that is mild, with gentle pleasures and pains, and characterised by desires that are 
similarly mild and loves that are not mad (KOI SpOTOC^ oi)K hppLOCElQ). Opposed to this is 
the unhealthy life of the imprudent, the cowardly and the intemperate. Such a Hfe is 
characterised as being filled with intense pains and pleasures, frenzied physical desires and 
loves that are as mad as possible (Kta'i fepoocac; dl6v TE EppaVECrrdTou^). The mfider 
Hfe is considered to be the more pleasant, accepted and desirable goal for the Magnesians to 
attain.
The greatest victory is that over one’s self (626e2-3). However, a rational appeal to 
nature (troubled though it be), along with the distinguished authority of the legislator 
(721b7-c8), may not suffice to produce the desired result in the hypothetical populace. The 
various methods employed by the Athenian Stranger to support his propositions on pleasure 
and happiness include stories and songs to which Magnesian youths will be exposed (840cl- 
3), the problematic (though popularly persuasive) examples of the behaviour of birds and 
other animals (d2-e3), physical exercise as a distraction from sexual appetite (841a6-8), an 
inculcated ethic which emphasises the need for physical privacy (b2-4), religious respect, love 
of honour and a ‘mature’ passion for the beauty of mind over that of body (c4-6). In 
fashioning his laws for the second-best state, the Athenian Stranger has posited an ideal 
statute that prohibits aU extra-marital affairs while at the same time he has proposed a more 
realistic law that requires them to be undertaken, if they should happen to occur, always in 
secret. Notably, such extra-marital affairs wHl be potentially reproductive in nature. The 
Athenian Stranger has anticipated that there might arise a gap in the practices and values of 
the hypothetical Magnesians, as tends to be the case with human nature, between the ideal 
and the real.
The real question is this: why does same-sex intercourse amount to an excess in 
pleasure and thence an indulgence of excessive desire for the gratification of such a pleasure? 
Some of the possible explanations have already been considered, but I believe that the 
answer may He in the Platonic formulation of Reason as a type of control over the chaotic, 
appetitive elements identified within the soul. What has to be overcome by Reason’s rule 
consists of intemperate appetites and emotions that are perceived to have feminine 
characteristics. Lovibond’s assessment that ‘a successful outcome is equated in Plato’s 
imagination with a successful estabHshment of the male principle in its proper position of
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command’ seems plausible.”0 In this way, a loss of control over sexual desire, manifesting 
especially in same-sex intercourse, is construed as unmanly and therefore improper. The 
Athenian Stranger has ' indicated that same-sex intercourse amounts to an act of hybris—using 
the term with implied criminal connotations. This particular use of language, whether 
Plato’s narrator believes it or not, is bound to have a powerful psychological effect on the 
citizens of the second-best state who read the Laws as part of thek classroom curriculum}'
Both of the participants in same-sex intercourse (whether male and male or female 
and female) fail to master themselves and thek appetites through the conquest of 
(masculine) Reason over (feminine) deskes. This would appear to be the underlying 
complaint against the practice of same-sex intercourse. By designating same-sex acts as 
‘unnatural’, the Athenian Stranger seems to have adopted the position that the sexual role of 
‘penetrator’ belongs properly to the male and the role of ‘penetrated’ belongs properly to the 
female. The fact that he has done this in addition to characterising those inclined toward 
acts of same-sex intercourse as indulging in excessive pleasure is doubly damning. He will 
tell his Magnesian citizenry that these roles have been ‘naturally '(KOTO (xhcaiv) granted to 
male and female for the act of mutual procreation’ (636c).
It would seem fak to ask whether it is possible for two people of the same sex to 
consent willingly to a relationship and thus partake of sexual congress without it constituting 
an act of hybris. Why could such a thing not transpke between two individuals who are 
‘alike’ in terms of ‘goodness’? The Athenian Stranger’s answer, it would appear, is that they 
cannot. In the first instance, such an inversion of the ‘natural’ sex-roles, according to his 
formulation, has been characterised as necessarily ‘contrary to nature’—for whatever 
reasons.”. Secondly, since the act of same-sex intercourse corresponds to what is defined as 
an excessive indulgence in the appetites, it becomes impossible for two people, alike in 
‘goodness’ as it is defined, to engage in such actions and remain alike in ‘goodness’. This is 
so because the act is delimited as a breach of the normal rules of ‘goodness’, namely an 
excessive indulgence in the appetites which amounts to a state of ‘slavery’ whereby the baser
140 (1994), p. 94. Cf. my chapter IV.
141 Cf. my chapter III on education.
142 Cf. my chapter I.
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elements of the soul rule the higher elements—i.e. Reason suborned by base Desire which 
amounts to a type of erotically induced madness.143
Anyone who seeks to subvert such a ‘natural’ state of affairs is perceived to do so as 
a consequence of the loss of control over excessive desire. The Athenian Stranger appears 
to uphold the premise that the desire for same-sex intercourse is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, but that the expression of said desire through sexual acts results in an 
upheaval of the proper sex-roles as defined by the ethos that has been framed for the 
Magnesian populace. Lacking mastery of self, in terms of submitting to excessive desires 
likewise amounts to an ‘unordering of the psych? and this is contrary to the proper, masculine 
structure that is meant to be maintained by Reason’s rule.
On these grounds, die Athenian Stranger has established that the act of same-sex 
intercourse, singled out as a highly and dangerously pleasurable form of sex, constitutes 
indulgence in excessive desire. While he reveals a degree of uncertainty or discomfort with 
the general subject of sexuality in general, he also seems unsure as to whether a policy 
opposed to same-sex activity would or could be implemented on a real populace. Both of 
these factors are represented in the Athenian Stranger’s arguments. This is evident as much 
in the hypothetical nature of the discussion itself (whether ‘in a playful way or seriously’) as 
also in the ambiguities throughout the wording of the laws of sexual conduct.
It is unsound to propose that Plato has changed his mind on the subject of same-sex 
intercourse. The erotic exploits of his mentor Sokrates, alleged in Plato’s own works, 
constituted a major factor in his thinking. The fact that he considered the subject at all is 
evidenced by the sheer quantity of material in numerous dialogues so devoted and implied. 
One is inclined to wonder why a thing condoned in the Republic and elsewhere may be 
banished from the La/s. It is impossible to say whether the Athenian Stranger’s views are 
Plato’s or whether any or none of the verses attributed to him actually reflect their maker’s 
true beliefs. Yet, it remains for us to wonder if the Athenian Stranger’s assertion that same- 
sex intercourse is in fact excessively (dangerously) pleasurable is true and, if so, how did he 
lmow? .
143 Of course, madness has also been associated with the pursuit of philosophy in the Phaedrus, but 
evidently that sort of ‘madness’ is not of the harmful variety. Cf. Phaedrus 244-245c and 249d-e on the 
‘good’ type of madness send by the gods.
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Diotima’s ‘Bitth in Beauty’ and the ‘Two Horses’ of the Phaedrus
England, in his commentary on the Laws, has said that the Athenian Stranger’s proposed 
legislation on erotic matters ‘amounts to a distinct recantation of many of the views 
expressed in the earlier erotic discourses (Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus), and the inculcation of a 
far stricter code of sexual morality’.1” If the subject of same-sex erotic love in the Laws 
signifies a shift from earlier positions, it would seem that the Athenian Stranger has not 
recanted the fundamentals of previous Platonic views. Rather, he has revised them to an 
observable extent.
His preference for the term (hX.OC, as we have seen, with regard for the three types 
of affection discussed in the Laws (as in the Lysis) may be an attempt to downplay any sexual 
elements of friendship as much as possible. It signifies a departure from the term spcop 
which may signify, as Gould says, ‘his word for friendship in the Symposium and PhaedrrUf 
The Athenian Stranger does employ £pooc; elsewhere in the Laws and it would be foolish to 
conclude that Plato did not distinguish between it and (jlXlOC whatsoever. Certainly he did, 
but in some instances (iXia may convey sexual connotations (as in the three types of 
affection) and at other times it does not. Sometimes the terms <l2A<X and may be
treated as interchangeable.
Through her famous speech in the Symposium, the character Diotima has shed some 
light on Platonic conceptions of love that are also observable in the Lawr.146 She argues that 
love is not a god, as perhaps many might believe, but a spirit.”’ At 203c5 sq., Diotima 
indicates that erotic love (EptOp) is the offspring of the deified principles known as 
Resource (TI6pO£) and Want (HeviOt) who were joined together in divine sexual union. 
Eros’ conception, she says, not surprisingly coincided with Aphrodite’s miraculous birth. His
”4 (1920), p. 345.
145 (1963), p. 144.
146 That is, if we are to take her words seriously (although it would be imprudent to regard Diotima, or any 
other Platonic character, as an exclusive ‘mouthpiece’ for Plato’s innermost thoughts).
147 203a6-8. Whether or not love (Eros) is a god is a subject of much discussion in Plato. For example, in 
the Phaedrus, Eros is characterised as a great god (242d sq) and therefore incapable of evil (242e). Eros' 
divinity is further supported by the Platonic Sokrates praying to it . at Phaedrus 257a. Nevertheless, we 
should not disregard Diotima’s suggestion that it is a spirit on account of these things as Plato is perfectly 
entitled to change his mind on the matter. Clearly Eros is considered by Plato to be a divine entity (or 
spirit) of a metaphysical and powerful nature.
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state of being is described as ‘neither mortal nor immortal’, rather he is enigmatically 
somewhere in between these two (204d8). Eros becomes identified as a sort of spirit that 
embodies infinite longing for infinite fulfilment. No corporeal resource obtainable can 
perpetually supply this longing. This includes acts of sexual intercourse. Diotima maintains 
that all forms of eros are really a desire for the perpetual possession of the Beautiful/Good 
(206all~12). She asserts that only through the illuminating effects of ‘birth in beauty’ can 
this aim be attained (206b-c).
Plato’s allegorical description, through Diotima’s speech, characterises love as a 
spiritual entity ‘in-between’ Want and Resource. Unlike mortals, divine beings are generally 
described as lacking nothing. On this, we have the account from Homer’s Iliad to the effect 
that the gods are generally free from the pains of mortal existence.”8 The philosopher 
MeUssos (c.440b.c.e.) later maintained ‘that which [truly] is’ does not feel pain or grief 
because, in addition to its other metaphysical features, it is necessarily ‘healthy’.”2 
Xenophanes of Kolophon (2nd half of the 6* century b.c.e.), who was probably a strong 
influence on MeUssos’ thinking, had held that divine beings ‘lacked nothing’, which is to say 
that their existence is perfect.”” It follows that divinity would be free from any sort of 
desire—of which love, here defined, is a specific kind. Diotima’s speech seems somewhat 
problematic inasmuch as it posits love as a type of in-between-divine-and-base, eternal 
yearning and attraction for eternal fulfilment. If the gods want for nothing, and Love is 
divine, then how can Love be said to desire anything? The issue may not be resolvable with 
recourse to traditional metaphysics. Plato’s conceptualisation of eros defines it as ‘wanting’ 
eternal fulfilment. This is an integral aspect of its metaphysical character. Then again, he 
may be constructing another metaphorical ‘fable’ that should not be taken too seriously on 
theological grounds.
Plato’s Sokrates has stated that mortals may strive to attain eternal fulfilment through 
seeking ‘birth in beauty’.””. In this way, a chance is provided for human beings to become 
Hke the gods as much as they possibly can. The fact that something base (e.g. the part of 
love’s nature which corresponds to Want) may desire and be attracted to something eternal 
and perfect (e.g. that part of its nature which corresponds to Resource) is prevalent in Plato’s
148 XXIV.525-6
149 fr. 7.2-6 (DK)
150 A 32.24-25 (DK)
”‘Cp. Republic, 437d sq., on mundane vs. ‘higher’ desires.
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narrators’ considerations about imitation of divinity and the immortality of the soul in the 
Laws and elsewhere. However, human beings are not gods and are subject to base desires. 
The Athenian Stranger is aware of this and it is clearly on his mind as he tries to delineate a 
hierarchical value system of those desires that are acceptable and functional to some degree 
(e.g. mixed-sex desires within certain limits) and those that are purely excessive (e.g. same- 
sex desires actuahsed in deeds).
In the Phaedrus (246b sq.) is ‘the myth of the two horses’ which represents one of 
Plato’s earlier notions about love and sex.”2 It is noteworthy that this narrative on love 
comes as part of a greater discussion by Sokrates on the immortality of the soul—a concept 
that resurfaces at Laws 714a, 894b sq. and 966d-967d.”® In the Phaedrus myth, the human 
soul is likened to two winged steeds being steered by a person in a flying chariot. The souls 
of gods are considered altogether good and free from any discord (perhaps this is why love 
must be a spirit in the Symposium). The souls of mortals, in contrast, have two ‘horses’ of 
which one is wholly good and noble and the other possesses the opposite inclinations 
(246b). The two generate a sort of strife between them—one tending toward the good and 
the other toward its opposite. Rist, in discussing Plato’s views toward same-sex relations, 
describes a feature of one of these ‘two horses’: ‘When 'we see the “lovable vision,” part of 
us thinks of using force [e.g. the presence of t)3p£CO£ at 253e3]: we want to “leap on” the 
beloved (254a2-3). Such urges, apparently irreducible in human beings, must be vigorously, 
even violently suppressed; “modest restraint” must prevail. But our darker side (typified by 
Plato’s “black” horse) will try seduction along with force: we will be “compelled” to 
approach the beloved boy, reminding him of the pleasures of sex’.”4
This dualism within the soul generates much conflict and presents a problem for the 
‘charioteer’ trying to ‘steer’ his soul aright. The two principles of action that are 
distinguished within it, according to Price, are an innate desire for pleasures (k7C0Ot)lia), and 
an acquired judgement (56%x) which aims at what is best (237d6-9).”5 These two psychical 
forces may agree or, more often, be in dispute (d6-10). If they are in conflict, then one or
152 As Gould (1963), p. 139, says, ‘we have little evidence that Plato actually ceased to believe in the 
description he gave of love in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Indeed, the Phaedrus may well have been 
written fairly late in Plato’s life’.
153 For immortality of the soul in Plato see also Letter VII.334e; Meno, 81b, 85c; Phaedo, 72e-76, 85e-91 
sq. 105 sq., 107c; Republic, 498c, 608c sq., Timaeus, 41c sq., 69c; Symposium, 208c, amongst others.
154 (1997), p. 69.
155 (1989), p. 60. Cf. my chapter IV on doxastic self-mastery.
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the other may prevail (el-2). When good judgement has mastery, it leads the soul toward 
that which is rationally ‘best’. This is synonymous with self-mastery and moderation 
(acotjtpoabvri). The rule of the opposite inclination, desire for indulgence in ‘base’ things, 
drags the soul irrationally toward the perpetual and compulsive gratification of these 
excessive desires (e2-238a2). A definition of eros arises from the Phaedrus in the following 
words of Plato’s Sokrates:
For when Desire (f^T^l^O'^jupca), having gained mastery in the absence of logical 
judgement (which urges one toward what is right), bears one toward pleasure 
in respect to beautiful things, and, in turn with desires kindred to itself, it 
then rushes on the beauty of bodies, conquering in its mode of conduct, 
taking its name form the force itself (pC)JX|)—this is called eros (Epco^— 
238b9-c4).
Eros may thus be construed as a ‘state in which a certain species of desire prevails over 
Reason’.””® Rival impulses threaten to distract and confound the lover.”7
On the one hand, says the Athenian Stranger, the lover wishes to enjoy the charms 
of the beloved whilst, on the other hand, his Reason forbids it. One who craves the body of 
his beloved ‘as if he were so much ripe fruit’ (copaC KaOdtJtep b7t(Csoxc KElVCOV-note the 
pun), does so ‘without giving a thought to the character of his darling’s soul’ (837b8-c3). 
Here he is clearly talking about the relationship between an erastes and eromenos. The subject 
is one of bodily desire versus moderation in a same-sex context. Desire can have as its 
object either Beauty/the Good or something ‘base’ and ‘bodily’. Judgement may, of course, 
rein in ‘improper’ yearnings (which encourage a state of yielding to excess) and beget 
wisdom in one through ‘divine philosophy’.”® However the passage at Phaedrus 237d4-5 
suggests, without actually saying it outright, that all desires are really desires for the 
Beautiful—misdirected or otherwise. The ‘horse’ that inclines against the Good (clearly an 
agent of Strife) corresponds to the mortal part of human beings that fails, through ignorance
156 Ibid. p. 61.
157 These ‘rival impulses’ may also result from confusion on the part of the lover between the active and
passive senses of tfiXoc;, as at Lysis 212a
158 Phaedrus 239b.
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and through not surpassing its own limitations, to be attracted to the proper object— 
namely, the Beautiful/Good.
Any form of eros, even that which desires the Good as its object, still has the dubious 
distinction of being a species of madness. 159 This is troubling because the definition holds 
not only for human love-objects but a comparable form of mania is also positively associated 
with both philosophy and mystical practices.”” As Vlastos says, this ‘convergence of 
and VOD in love does not seem to intrigue commentators’.”1 Pieper objects to ‘madness’ as 
the meaning of mania due to the fact that it ‘suggests ties with the orgiastic Dionysian 
rites’.*® Even so, there is ample evidence (including the passage at Symposium 218b) that such 
orgiastic Dionysian rites were not entirely disagreeable to Plato’s narrators.1® In the Yarns, 
we also have a comparable instance in which the Athenian Stranger praises ‘divine erotic 
passion’ (epcoc, 0llOQ) for producing prudence and justice that, again, seems contradictory in 
light of the negative connotations of mania (711d6 sq.). We are left with a seemingly 
contradictory notion in which one type of ‘madness’ is acceptable whereas another is not. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that, by the time of the Phaedrus, Plato had made the formulation that 
the rule of the appetites in the soul amounted to a particularly malevolent variety of 
madness.
If we read the Laiws with recourse to Plato’s earlier works that deal with same-sex 
issues, a pattern emerges. The Athenian Stranger discourages immoderate behaviour in 
favour of the rule of Reason and ‘self-mastery’. Diotima’s allegory of ‘birth in beauty’ in the 
Symposium supplies a means by which one may achieve the proper psychical alignment 
through the focusing of desires on their proper object, the Good. In the ‘two horses’ myth 
of the Phaedrus, logical judgement helps the charioteer steer toward what is rationally best. If 
desires are allowed to run unchecked, they then incline the charioteer away from the goal of 
self-mastery. Not to be master of one’s self is to invite (negative) mania into one’s soul. A
159 mania-Phaedms 265a-266a sq.
160 This issue was likewise glossed in the Symposium (218b) in that Phaedrus, Agathon, Eryximachus, 
Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes and Sokrates have all had a taste of this ‘philosophic and Bacchic 
madness’ (nfig (nAo<a5()ou paviag xe xal paK%ei.ag).
01 (1973), p. 27. n.80
162 (1964), p. 49 sq.
’O’3 Indeed, the Athenian Stranger recommends a sort of ‘Dionysiac treatment’ for mothers to use in putting 
babies to sleep at Laws 790e, and, at Republic 479d-e, the narrator Sokrates informs Glaucon that the 
revellers at the Dionysiac festivals bear a certain likeness to philosophers.
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gateway for this mania to enter is perceived to open through the impulsive pursuit and 
gratification of excessive pleasures.
Both the Symposium and Phaedrus provide guidelines for moral behaviour comparable 
to similar guidelines found in the Laws. Since the act of same-sex intercourse has been there 
defined as a pursuit of excessive pleasures, one who engages in it must not have the Good as 
his/her goal and likewise could be viewed as yielding to the ‘dark horse’ of base desires. 
When we read the Laws through the lens of textual context, there is a strong presence of 
certain unifying themes. The difference between such works as the Phaedrus, the Symposium 
and the Laws, is that the latter is a hypothetical venture constructing a society in which 
philosophical ideas are not merely being discussed in a purely theoretical context; rather, they 
may be imposed on hypothetical individuals with the force of law. The Athenian Stranger 
has legislated that the Magnesians, in their pursuit of arete, must become resistant against 
yielding to their (so defined) negative or ‘dark’ influences. Sound judgement is to be 
inculcated in their souls by legal and social forces. They are taught to strive to place Reason 
on its proper seat as ruler over their fleshly desires for gratification. The goal for most 
citizens is the attainment of arete with the option open to some of them for a telos of ‘Birth in 
Beauty’.
The fact that a kind of erotic love, not dissimilar from the type of erotic expression 
(identified negatively in the Laws) felt by partners in a same-sex relationship, may be 
(positively) felt toward philosophical enlightenment is not insignificant. It is likewise 
noteworthy that Plato’s narrator has associated a sort of ‘sublimated’ erotic love with the 
pursuit of philosophical truths. This has a higher value above and beyond any ‘base’ loves 
experienced by his hypothetical citizenry. Elsewhere in ancient Greek literature, the 
language of love is frequently employed as a rhetorical metaphor in the context of poltiics.164 165
When Perikles, in the Funeral Oration, indicates that citizens ought to become, as Monoson 
says, ‘lovers (erastai) of the Polis he ‘is proposing that the Athenians can—and should—turn to 
their ordinary understanding [of eros\...£ot guidance in thinking about the demands of 
democratic citizenship’?® The Athenian Stranger in the Laws does not make a similar claim 
for the Magnesians (nor Sokrates for the Kallipolis). Philosophy (along with the ‘virtue’ that
164 Cf. Thuc. 11.43.1 for Perikles’ erotic imagery and Aristophanes, Knights 732 and 1340-44 for a mocking 
of Kleon’s overuse of this type of language.
165 (2000), p. 64.
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leads to philosophical enlightenment) is the only thing' that should be the object of such 
erotic desire—however ‘sublimated’ and ‘mad’.
Women, Men and the Problem With Lesbians
As we have seen, the Athenian Stranger has indicated that an ‘ancient custom according to 
nature’ {kata phasin'), regarding sexual practices, has been corrupted by those who engage in 
same-sex acts (636bl-cl). Again, at 636cl-6, he declared that sexual activity ‘between men 
and men, as well as that between women and women, is contrary to nature’ (para phusin). 
While no further explanation is given at that point, presumably the ancient custom (nomos) of 
which he speaks is that of purely mixed-sex behaviour (with the male engaging in sexual 
penetration and the female in penile reception). As discussed in my first chapter, the ancient 
Greek conception of sexuality did not recognise a dichotomy between the character types of 
the homosexual and heterosexual (or Z/cchotomy of homo-, hetero- and bisexual). Dover 
and Foucault assert that that which we designate by the term ‘sexuality’ was regarded largely 
as a series of hierarchical relationships consisting of active, pleasure seeking males (subjects) 
in contrast to receptive females, youths or men (ohjicc)s).166 167This view, however, as we have 
seen, is too unilateral to be completely accurate. It was not a simple case of ‘zero-sum’.i 
Both penetrator and penetrated appear to have taken pleasure in these acts of sex. While 
this sentiment is clearly present in the Laws, the role of penetrator is to be reserved for the 
adult male alone with the only ‘natural’ objects of sexual penetration by men in Magnesia 
being their wedded wives. This is because same-sex intercourse (presumably involving 
members of either sex) is deemed to be excessively and dangerously pleasurable.
The construct of penetrator and penetrated does not work so well for women who 
partake of same-sex intercourse. There is no ‘active’ and ‘passive’ in the sense of penetration 
(unless we allow for the use of prosthetic devices). Female sexual parmers are not indicted 
for becoming ‘softer’ in the same way as the male receptive partoer in a same-sex act. Yet 
they too have little place in Magnesia, opposed as they are to the official myth of the family,
166 Halperin (1990), p. 25, maintains that ‘sexuality’ in general is a modern construct that is defined as a 
‘separate, sexual domain within the larger field of man’s psychophysical nature’. While I do not disagree 
with this in principle, I do believe that one • can speak of ancient concepts of ‘sexuality’. One does so even 
if they are defined in terms of ‘active’ 'subjects and ‘passive’ objects-aithough any such conceptualisation 
of ancient thought is at least reductive' arid, at best, highly inaccurate.
167 Cf. my chapters I and II, and cf. D'aVfe&n (2001), p. 27.
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since they generate no offspring through their sterile sexual unions. But they must be 
considered ‘soft’ in respect to self-mastery in much the same way as men who yield to the 
desire for excessive pleasure. The perceived sex-role reversal comes about when women fall 
prey to their ‘feminine’ lack of ‘masculine’ control over the appetites.1® This is a curious 
notion but seems to be what the Athenian Stranger is driving at. Women presumably fall 
into the same category as men in terms of their ‘erode madness’. Same-sex intercourse 
between women—with or without penetration of some type—must also be regarded as 
excessively pleasurable and therefore dangerous.
The Athenian Stranger’s diatribe against same-sex relations condemns ‘men and 
men’ and ‘women and women’ in terms of seeking sexual pleasure through intercourse. If a 
woman is always meant to be the ‘passive’ object of a man’s desire, then how can she have 
an ‘active’ desire for another woman? The Athenian Stranger’s admission that such a state 
of affairs can and does take place allows that a woman might partake of a role that Dover, 
Foucault and Halperin’s models of ancient Greek sexuality would associate exclusively with 
the sex role of a man. Halperin suggests that this state of affairs is that which has been 
characterised here as ‘contrary to nature’.*®
A woman who seeks to perform ‘active’ sex with another woman, just as a man who 
seeks the ‘passive’ position in sexual acts with another man, would appear to constitute a 
reversal of their ‘proper’ sexual roles. This could be seen to hold true not only regard to 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ sex roles but also in terms of psychical alignment. However, the issue 
again appears to be that of submitting to excessive desires for pleasure that is considered 
‘contrary to nature’ rather than any appeal to ‘active’ or ‘passive’ sex roles—although these 
are conceptually related to the formulation. Women in a same-sex union presumably also err 
in regard to the fact that they are not engaged in producing children, which is a significant 
part of their designated role in the Magnesian state. Male and female Magnesians must 
adopt a ‘masculine’ attitude toward sex in terms of self-control and mastery of their desires. 
This sort of reversal is not considered ‘unnatural’ but more like an upgrade from emotional 
‘femininity’ to rational ‘masctHnity’. Nonetheless, it is the women who are meant to occupy
168 Cf. my chapter V.
169 Halperin (1990), p. 41.
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the receptive sexual position of penetrated—evidently denied to Magnesian men—whilst 
paradoxically remaining emotionally ‘masculine’?7”
The Athenian Stranger has condemned both male partners of a same-sex union for 
lacking mastery over their appetites for pleasure and this would appear to extend to women, 
in terms of same-sex relations, as well. Whatever the citizens may be led to believe about the 
‘naturalness’ or ‘unnaturalness’ of same-sex intercourse, what is ‘contrary to nature’ appears 
to be only justifiable on philosophical grounds in terms of the lack of self-mastery in the 
absence of Reason’s rule. Later authorities have picked up the notion that a loss of control 
over sexual desire might be the impetus for a reversal of normative sex-roles. A writer of 
the middle 5* century c.e., Caelius Aurehanus, translated into Latin an adaptation of an 
earlier Greek work on chronic diseases by Soranos (early 2nd century c.e.). By this point, 
Roman attitudes of dominance and submission appear to have informed Soranos’ (not to 
mention Caelius’) view's.*’* Either Caelius or Soranos (or both) may have been familiar with 
Plato’s arguments on the subject of sex in the Laws. At the very least they appear to have 
known of later ideas derived from Plato.
Caelius’ model indicates that those males who choose the objective/receptive role, as 
with females who seek the subjective/active, do so out of excessive desire. Desire is 
perceived to defeat their sense of shame and thereby force them to use parts of theit bodies 
for sexual acts unintended by nature. The individual so afflicted thus takes on the 
characteristics of an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ role contrary to their ‘natural’ role as defined by sex. 
In regard to same-sex interactions between women, Caelius says ‘for just as the women 
called tribades, because they practise both kinds of sex, are more eager to have sexual 
intercourse with women than with men and pursue women with an almost mascuhne 
jealousy... so they too are afflicted by a mental disease’?’2 But ‘active’ or ‘receptive’ must 
have a different meaning for a same-sex relationship between women than they would for 
one between men. There is no real comparison to ‘penetrator’ and ‘penetrated’ present— 
except again, perhaps, in terms of the employment of artificial prosthesis. Even so, the 
employment of prostheses lacks the same quality as the penis (essentially part of a man) and 
the sense of physical penetration is one step removed from user. The ‘unnaturalness’ of
170 The Hippokratic text On Diseases of Women indicates (1.6) that the healthiest type of woman is ‘
‘masculine’, but less inclined toward maternity and conception.
171 Cf. Davidson (2001), p. 28 sq.
172 De morbis chronicis, IV.9.132-3.
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female same-sex relationships in Plato’s Lam, as we have seen, is due to the manifestation of 
uncontrolled sexual appetites, unseemly in a woman as much as in a man, brought about 
through a lack of self-mastery. This is what is called ‘contrary to nature’ and ‘madness’ in the 
Lams. That is, it amounts to a mental disorder characterised by a reversal of the ‘proper’ sex- 
roles and spurred on by excessive desire.
The Athenian Stranger’s argument against same-sex acts amongst the citizens of 
Magnesia comes about in consequence of both the manner in which he has structured his 
hypothetical society and the views on sexuality that were, to the best of our knowledge, part 
of the cultural ethos of the Greek world in Plato’s time. Magnesian citizens are intended to 
pursue ‘excellence’ {aret^-P A major feature characterising this pursuit is that their appetites 
be ruled by Reason (644-much as in the Republic). We have already seen that the Athenian 
Stranger considers same-sex intercourse to constitute a type of hybris in which the one party 
‘outrages’ both the other party and hifnself. This would appear to be a mutual ‘outrage’ 
rather than the sort of ‘zero-sum’ relationship suggested by Dover and Fouccuutlt.173 74 The 
condemnation of same-sex acts as ‘unnatural’ may be seen in part as producing mutual 
outrage and mutual psychical damage.
‘Masculine’ and ‘feminine’, and the ‘unnatural’ reversal of these, seem to have 
different connotations for Plato’s narrator than merely the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ sex-roles. 
Men must behave as men and women as women. Or rather, as it turns out, women must in 
many respects behave Hke men. In terms of self-mastery, they must overcome their 
‘emotional’ and chaotically ‘feminine’ psychic elements in favour of the rule of Reason which 
is why many (including Rist above) tend to view aU souls, in the Platonic context, as really 
‘male’ souls. A major physical difference is implicit inasmuch as women only bear children. 
A disruption of the ‘appropriate’ sex-roles, especially one that constitutes a state of yielding 
to excessive desires over Reason, cannot be conducive to the pursuit of ‘excellence’. It is not 
as simple as ‘active’ and ‘receptive’ corresponding to the proper roles for male and female— 
although just such an attitude may have informed the Athenian Stranger’s (reconstruction of
173 Cf. 847a5-b2; .. ."cfiv xqq dpexj frugeXeiav.
174 Aiskhines condemns Timarkhos as a man ‘who has outraged (hubrizein) himselfcontrary to nature’ 
(qtd. in GH, p. 60). Dover says that ‘if Aeschines really means that same sex relations in general are 
unnatural, he is adopting a standpoint otherwise expounded only in one strand of the Socratic-Platonic 
philosophical tradition’ {ibid.).
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sexuality for Magnesia. Plato has expressed, through his narrators, some novel ideas about 
‘the masculine’ and ‘the feminine’, beyond sexual penetration and being penetrated.
The resolution of this issue lies in the characterisation of same-sex acts as excessive 
indulgences of the desires. Such a state of affairs, as previously indicated, comes about in 
one whose soul is ruled by the appetites rather than by Reason. It is interesting and 
revealing that this condition of disorder in the soul has been associated with «/nnanlOr^^tss^.175 
Elsewhere, at Lepublic 431b9-c3, Plato has written that, emotional diversity, instability and 
unpredictability are ignoble. They are associated with inferior types of women, slaves and 
the ‘worthless mass of so-called free men’. Modern models of ancient sexuality seem to 
express a similar sentiment. A ‘real man’, as Lovibond states, ‘is one who successfully 
subordinates the multiple, fluid and contradictory demands of feeling to a single, centralised 
agency of control which will resolve the contradictions between them’,17* Femininity is often 
expressed (by male sources) as a state of incoherence, plurality and indeterminacy. The 
feminine lacks the ‘male’ formative power and is given to excesses of emotion. By indicating 
that same-sex acts constitute excessive indulgence, the Athenian Stranger would seem to be 
proposing, as Davidson suggests, that the male who acts as eromenos is not ‘a sexual patHc, 
humiliated and made effeminate by repeated domination, he is a nymphomaniac, fuU of 
womanish desire’, and repeated sexual intercourse of this type is thought to encourage his 
‘womanish’ onclinations.’77 Effeminacy, then, may be associated somewhat less with 
‘passivity’ in the sexual act but more in terms of a ‘womanish’ inclination toward sexual 
indulgences. An effeminate male is paradigmatic, as Davidson says, ‘of the life of endless 
pleasure, the leaky vessel, the supreme example of the appetite unbridled’.17® In the Lams, a 
similar case is made for the erastes inasmuch as he too yields to a similar ‘womanish’ desire by 
actively pursuing same-sex relationships. Lack of self-mastery is a failing that the Athenian 
Stranger would assign to both lover and beloved. It is largely this lack of moderation 
(sophrosyne) and self-control (enkrateia) that is said to constitute an ‘unnatural’ state.
175 cf. my chapter IV.
”"(1994), p. 95.
177 (1997), p. 179. The notion that habitual practice can cause something to become ‘second nature’ can be 
found at Republic 359d, ‘when men persist in imitations long after youth is past, that imitative behaviour 
becomes their established habit and nature’. Aristotle likewise maintained that habit becomes ‘second 
nature’ (Rhet. I.11.1370a6-9).
178 Davidson (1997), p. 174. He is talking specifically here about Sokrates’ characterisation of the kinaidos 
in his argument with Kallikles over the nature of desire at Gorgias 493a-494e. Cf. Davidson (2001), pp. 
23-25.
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Conclusions
Are those who engage in sexual acts with others of the same sex going to be excluded from 
Magnesia or not? Regardless of his uncertainty in the framing his laws on sexual conduct, 
the Athenian Stranger is inclined to enforce such a prohibition if he is to follow the precepts 
that he has established concerning the ‘dangerous’ character of certain types of erotic love. 
He is bound by his established tenets to attempt the discouragement of same-sex 
intercourse. Its ‘unnaturalness’ may be construed less as a function of societal conceptions 
(perceived by Dover, Foucault and Halperin) of the proper ‘active’ sex-role of men and the 
proper ‘receptive’ role of women and more in terms of Plato’s philosophical determinations 
on the nature of self-mastery—itseil^f', as we have seen, grounded in cultural context.”'
As discussed in my chapter I, Dover and Foucault’s model of active/passive, 
penetrator/penetrated does not appear wholly to reflect actual ancient Greek societal views. 
The ‘unnaturalness’ of same-sex intercourse, as far as the Athenian Stranger is concerned 
should be considered in terms of (masculine) Reason subverted by (feminine) intemperance 
within the psyche. The beloved’s character is perceived to become ‘soft’. His soul is tainted 
through indulgence in excessively pleasurable sexual acts, deemed hybristic, and by the 
unseating of Reason in favour of chaotic nymphomania. It would appear to be difficult if 
not impossible for him to pursue arete in Magnesia. The lover who has allowed his 
(feminine) excessive desires to subordinate his Reason and thus pursues intercourse with 
other males ‘contrary to nature’ is not only corrupt himself but actively corrupts others. 
Same-sex intercourse, it would appear, is simply too pleasurable to be allowed.
There will be a kind of ‘War Against Pleasure’ in Magnesia. Official propaganda, 
allied with the forces of fear and shame, wiU condemn both male and female same-sex 
partners as ultimately failing at being masters of themselves through allowing their ‘feminine’ 
qualities to overrule ‘masculine’ Reason. Since the act of same-sex intercourse has been 
defined as ‘contrary to nature’, it can have no accepted place in a society where (masculine, 
orderly) Reason is meant to rule. Its participants are seen as suffering ‘a lack of control over 
pleasure’ which is incompatible with the standards of moral hygiene in Magnesia. For those 
unfortunates in whom Reason does not rule, and in whom there is this erotic ‘madness’ that
179 Cf. my chapters II, III and IV.
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urges them to indulge their appetites with members of the same sex, there can be no official 
suffrage under Magnesia’s laws. The only type of relationship that these outcasts might 
undertake would be illegitimate and therefore could only transpire in the form of furtive and 
clandestine liaisons. Such secret lovers must be skilful at acting their parts as ideal citizens 
whilst keeping their illicit activities utterly locked away in the ‘closet’ lest they risk public 
censure, demotion and potential exile. There will be little quarter in Magnesia for the ‘love 
that dare not speak its name’.
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General Conclusions
‘Thus we shall have as an accomplished fact and waking reality that result 
which, but a short while ago in our discourse, we treated as a mere dream 
when we constructed a kind of image of the union of Reason and the 
head...’
—The Athenian Stranger’
‘Pure livers were they all., austere and grave,
Andfea^r^ng God; the vety children taught 
Stern self-respect, a reverence for God’s word,
And an habitualpiety, maintained 
With strictness scarcely known on Lnglish ground.
—William Wordsworth^
The Laws is a large and complex text that lends itself well to an inquiry into issues of sex and 
society. It describes a hypothetical experiment in the directed development of humanity. Its 
narrator, the Athenian Stranger, seeks to promote human virtue through the careful 
application of philosophically informed social engineering. In many ways, Plato’s work is 
highly revealing in terms both of its cultural context and its significance to the canon of 
Western historical/philosophical texts. Perhaps the most striking insights present in the 
Laws relate to those points of social, philosophical and sexual morality that differ (sometimes 
quite dramatically) from our understanding of the ‘norms’ of the ancient Greeks. The 
ultimate importance of the Laws may be seen in its impact on modern academia through the 
latter’s (Hellenistic) tendency for introspection through constant re-interpretation of the 
significant ideas of our forebears. In this examination of the Laws, under the broad canvass 
of Cultural Studies, I have sought to scrutinise certain notions relevant to Plato’s life and 
times that reveal much about the ways in which we view the world today through our 
informed re-reading of these ancient ideas.
The Laws clearly stands apart from the rest of the corpus and, at once, may be seen as 
fuUy participating in the continuum of Platonic thought. like the Lepublic, it proposes a 
hypothetical, utopian vision of a city-state whose citizens wU strive for (and presumably 
attain) a virtuous existence. Unlike the Rallipblis of the Republic, Magnesia is to be second- 
best. The differences between these two idealised realms proceed accordingly. Magnesia
' Laws 969b5-9, cp. 964d sq.
2 From the Excursion in Morley ed. (1888), p. 417.
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will be ruled by a constitution of near-perfect laws (as opposed to philosopher kings/queens 
with absolute power) that permits a Platonically uncharacteristic degree of democratic 
participation on the part of the governed. Nevertheless, Magnesia is not to be a democracy. 
The citizens have a say in electing certain officials and magistrates but aU their lives are 
governed and regulated at almost every conceivable level by the strictures of their rigid 
constitution and the oligarchic agents of its enforcement. While they can have some say in 
the choosing of elected officials, they have little or no contribution to the law itself.
The Magnesian constitution, as outlined by Plato’s narrator, in particular seeks to 
direct numerous aspects of the citizens’ social and sexual lives in such ways that may be seen 
as strikingly significant to us in the post-OweUian world of today. The telos of the Athenian 
Stranger’s approach, as we have seen, is the production of the maximum degree of human 
virtue (arete) in his hypothetical citizenry and, thence, the maximum degree of happiness 
possible in a state that is second-best to the ideal. Magnesia’s underlying ideology asserts 
that the polis as a whole must exemplify ‘freedom’, enjoy inner concord (‘be a friend unto 
itself) and possess intelligence.3
The ‘freedom’ of Magnesia may seem somewhat problematic to the modern reader 
when one considers the degree of social/sexual regulation to which the Magnesians are 
subject. But ‘freedom’ should be read contextually in contrast to the (negative) state of 
slavery. It should also be read as a condition resulting, paradoxically, from the obedience to 
proper authority. The Magnesian education ensures that its subjects possess intelligence 
and, through its socialising functions it encourages concord and stability. It strives to 
inculcate obedience to the proper authorities. In order to achieve the desired end of virtue 
in its citizens, Magnesia’s educational system marks the beginning of the process of 
preparation (some might say ‘indoctrination’) for a citizen’s participation in the second-best 
state.
This educational system is particularly interesting to modern students of pedagogy 
and it represents the nucleus of educational methodology still in use today. It is compulsory 
and employs imported teachers at public expense. It is designed to be thoroughly 
comprehensive covering such broad topoi as music, literature, arithmetic, geometry, 
astronomy, athletics and philosophy. Strikingly, it aims at basic literacy and numeracy for all 
citizens and includes the option for more advanced studies according to the relative abilities
3 70Id, cf. 693 b-c.
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of individual students. The fact that this education is open to Magnesians of both sexes 
highlights a significant point of divergence from the standards of Plato's era and culture.
The system enables agents of the polis to track students' abilities according to 
performance and moral outlook. This, in turn, contributes toward determining their future 
place in society. The function of the Magnesian education may be regarded as a means to 
prepare its subjects for their future roles in life within the polis. Female students must take a 
break in their education for a mandatory decade of childbearing and child-rearing whereas 
their male equivalents pursue a type of tpbebic military career in roughly the same time period. 
Women have the option of taldng up military training providing they perform their 
mandated task of ttknopoiia. Ensuring a continuous and regular supply of offspring is a 
primary concern of the Magnesian state. It is mainly through the constraints of 
reproduction that women may be seen as subordinated by this society. It wUl be a culture in 
which the act of bearing children in accordance with the wiU of the law is regarded as an 
important value. This is inculcated from birth and supported, pirc^p^fi^r^rdi^^iic^a^Uy and 
otherwise, by institutions of the state.
AU students in Magnesia, whatever their abilities, wiU be impressed with a sense of 
obedience and conformity to their constitution and the importance of each fulfilling his/her 
proper place in society. A young Magnesian may grow up to become one of the many 
citizens whose sole purpose is to practice virtue (but not to partake of higher political 
offices) or, if his/her aptitude so indicates, he/she may become a Guardian of the Laws or 
even a member of the powerful nukterinos councU. The Magnesian education represents a 
fundamental means of social control and ideological inculcation from a very early age and 
thus functions as an agent for the perpetuation of such state-sanctioned ideals as 
obedience/freedom, intelligence and concordi.
A significant social value that Plato’s narrator seeks to encourage in the Magnesian 
men and women alike is that of andrtia. Normally rendered as ‘manliness’ or ‘courage’, the 
Athenian Stranger’s special definition of this concept makes it an integral social/sexual value. 
Its implicitly sexed characterisation makes its embodiment somewhat different in a man than 
in a woman. More emphasis is placed on the greater difficulty (and therefore extra effort) 
required for women to attain manly self-mastery. In reductive terms, the virtue of andrtia 
represents a state of being able effectively to resist both pleasures and pains. It may be seen 
as a principal component of the freedom that the Magnesians are meant to embody as a
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vigorous elite. The opposite state is characterised as a kind of ‘soft’ and ‘effeminate’ 
psychological slavery to excessive desires and emotions that are considered ‘womanish’ or 
‘feminine’. The Magnesians cannot achieve their goal of being ‘free’ if they are slaves to 
their baser psychical aspects. The second-best state safeguards its populace and its ideals by 
encouraging and reinforcing the value of andreia through educational and civic institutions, 
propaganda, religion and the myth of the family.
The Platonic concept of andreia is employed to mould the characters of Magnesian 
women and men according to the characteristics represented by this ideal. As a result, the 
role that Magnesian women are meant to adopt is more ‘manly’ than that of most of their 
counterparts in the real world. Andreia is considered to be able, when properly applied 
according to the Athenian Stranger’s formulae, to drive out certain negatively identified 
‘feminine’ qualities such as a lack of self-control over one’s desire for pleasure. Another 
application of this ethic occurs in the morally hygienic removal of ‘dangers’ identified as 
inherent in the partaking of same-sex intercourse. The foremost identified ‘danger’ of this is 
that it is perceived to promote c state of slavery to excessive desire and, as such, it erodes 
psychical solvency. One with sufficient andreia should be able to overcome these dangers.
To be free, to possess andreia, is not to be a slave. For a man, being effeminate or 
‘soft’ means that he is in some ways Hke a woman. In traditional ancient Greek societies, 
women were typically subordinate to men. Effeminacy or excessive ‘womanhness’ is 
equated with a state of yielding to excessive pleasure (being ‘soft’). This denotes a particular 
lack of freedom and thus slevishness. The Athenian tendency to portray the Persians as 
effeminate, and therefore slavish, is a pertinent example of cultural context informing the 
Athenian Stranger’s reasoning. In the Laws, being enslaved by one’s own desires for pleasure 
considerably reduces one’s andreia. Since it is identified as an essential ‘good’ intended for 
the benefit of Magnesia, nothing must be allowed to harm it. He uses such a line of 
reasoning to determine the social roles for men and women in Magnesia as weU as many of 
the regulations governing their sexual conduct.
Magnesian women are intended to be more ‘manly’ (Amazonian, Sauromatian 
and/or Spartan) than their Athenian counterparts. It appears, in fact, that the Athenian 
Stranger would prefer them to be more hke the mythical Amazons and imagined 
Sauromlctians than even the .idealised Spartans. A central feature of the concept of andreia in 
the Laws is that it represents order, structure and reason. There are many negative aspects
t,A. o-
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associated with (unsupervised) femininity such as disorderliness, lack of reason and 
emotional instability. The Athenian Stranger intends for his revised ethic of andreia to 
overcome most of these negative traits linked with women (e.g. secretiveness, cunning and 
disorderly emotionality). This unfortunate state of affairs, as he has indicated, comes from a 
lack of appropriate supervision on the part of legislators who do not understand how to deal 
properly with matters of sex.
Magnesia supervises its women (and its men) to ensure that they develop properly 
according to the Athenian Stranger’s plan. Their education and degree of participation in 
society serves to shape these hypothetical women’s characters. Socialising forces are 
designed to persuade them to pursue arete no less than men. They encourage women to 
adopt a more orderly, ‘manly’ character of self-control. Granting them greater degrees of 
participation than one would expect to find in an ancient Greek society is integral to 
achieving this idealised state of mind. Magnesian women have the opportunity to be 
educated equally with men, according to their individual talents, in all academic subjects. 
They are expected to learn military sltills and the option is available for them to pursue these 
courses of study in greater depth. Magnesian women are able to hold public offices 
including those of the Guardians of the Laws and the Vigilance Committee. They are also, 
as we have seen, expected to bear a state-sanctioned number of offspring during a specified 
decade of their lives. They must, at aU times, keep any excessive emotionality that they 
might experience down to a controlled and orderly minimum. The constraints of 
social/sexual regulation appear to apply somewhat more stringently to women than to men. 
Or, at least it may be said that the regulation of women presents a special case to the 
Magnesian legislator differing, as it must, from the regulation of men.
True sexual equality as we conceive of it in the modern era is out of the question for 
Plato’s Magnesia. It may be observed that the decade of childbearing places a real temporal 
restriction on a woman’s participation in society in the public sphere of the polis. Her role as 
mother, however, is a major way in which she, by virtue of her sex, plays an active part in her 
society through the semi-private sphere of the oikos. As an agent of reproduction (in a sense, 
a state-sanctioned sex-worker), she serves in the civic capacity of ensuring a number of 
offspring appropriate to sustain a stable population amongst Magnesia’s 5,040 citizen-family 
units. This sexual regulation by the state limits women’s power in the household whilst 
other laws give them greater access to the public sphere. It cannot, however, be said that a
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true balance between the sexes has been struck—neither is it the Athenian Stranger's plan to
do so.
There are other inequalities worth noting. For example, Magnesian men appear to 
have the option to engage in extra-marital sex provided that they keep it a secret. No such 
freedom is suggested for married women. Their greater scrutiny in reference to their 
perceived limitations for the pursuit of virtue would seem to hinder this to a greater extent 
than with men. More decision-making power appears also to have been extended to men 
with regard to their role in the family. A Magnesian man has the potential to become the 
kyrios of a household with accompanying authority as a 'consequence. The inheritance laws 
appear framed to give greater importance to sons rather than daughters since sons are the 
ones who become kyrioi. Women could possibly become kyriai in Magnesia as well but this 
is nowhere confirmed or denied by Plato’s narrator.
While they are destined to play significant roles at all levels of society, one may 
surmise that ttknopoiia limits them sufficiently to ensure that men will fill the majority of 
Magnesia’s positions of power. The goal of a ‘good’ Magnesian should be neither the 
attainment of sexual equality nor the acquisition of high-status offices of state. It is meant to 
be nothing less, for aU citizens, than the unhindered and orderly pursuit of artte. The laws 
and customs wiU encourage this. In the respect of this pursuit, Magnesian men and women 
appear to stand on more or less equal ground. Yet, as we have seen, there also remains the 
nagging implication that women are regarded as possessing a poorer inclination toward this 
pursuit than men.
The Athenian Stranger has described a societal role for Magnesian women that 
stands in sharp contrast to the perceived lifestyle of Athenian citizen-women as well as that 
of other ancient Greek women, Whatever limitations a Magnesian woman may have 
imposed on her (e.g. a mandatory decade of bearing and rearing children), she is intended to 
possess much greater freedom of participation in the public sphere than her Athenian 
counterpart. Magnesia’s approach to women stands in stark contrast to the paradigms 
expressed by Xenophon’s Oikonomikos, where an idealised representation of the role of 
women limits them rather severely through the ideological constraints of their defined 
relationship with the oikos.
Magnesian citizen-women are granted far greater' access to aU levels of society. They 
are not to be relegated merely to domestic activities. Perhaps most striking is their
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education, which is virtually equivalent to that of male citizens. Their participation in 
military and governmental affaks widens the gap between the real world of ancient Greece 
and Plato’s idealised Magnesia. Part of this near-sexual equality is achieved, as we have seen, 
through the ‘masculinisation’ of Magnesian women with recourse to the philosophical tenets 
of andreia and arete. The state of women in Magnesia represents a revolutionary departure 
from the norms not only of Athenian society but Greek society altogether as we understand 
it.
Thek state-mandated task of teknopoiia should not be underrated. Like Athenian 
citizen-women, as with most other ancient Greek women in general, they too function in the 
capacity of bearing offspring and ensuring familial continuity through marriage and 
inheritance. They also play a part in passing on citizenship through legitimate hek-s. The 
importance of legitimate parentage for defining citizenship is given somewhat less 
significance in Magnesia than post-Periklean Athens. Magnesian women are not bound to 
the sphere of the oikos in the same way as thek Athenian counterparts are thought to have 
been. They are granted considerably greater liberties of societal participation than apparently 
were thek Spartan and Kretan counterparts. Implicit in the Athenian Stranger’s formulation 
of a role for Magnesian women appears to be an underlying assumption that the female sex 
is capable of far more than just bearing children and tending to the business of the 
household. This is an assumption not shared by the vast majority of Plato’s peers.
As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, the Athenian Stranger has been drawing on 
models from Spartan, Athenian and Kretan society, amongst others, in formulating his role 
for women in Magnesia. It is his intent that his women should surpass all of these. The 
degree of participation available to them outstrips even the most imaginative notions of 
Spartan and Kretan women by far. Magnesian women appear to have more in common 
with the women of myth and legend such as the Amazons and ideaHsed Sauromatians, wives 
of heroes and mortal daughters of the gods. Nowhere in the reaHty of Plato’s time could 
there be found a single model for the role of women in Magnesia. Though it reveals 
identifiable aspects of several traditions (mythical and otherwise), it would appear to be the 
case that this remarkable phenomenon is a unique synthesis and one that owes much to 
Plato’s imagination
Whilst Magnesian women are granted unparaUeled degrees of participation, it should 
be noted that both they and Magnesian men akke are subject to considerable scrutiny and
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regulation. There is every indication that Athenian citizens experienced sexual ‘policing’ 
through both the agents of law, kinship groups and society at large (e.g., the cases of 
Timarkhos and Demosthenes), but nowhere is there the suggestion that Athens did so on 
the same level as Magnesia. We hear of no ‘marriage supervisors’ in ancient Athens. In 
Magnesia, these female agents of the state wiU work with the Guardians of the Laws (male 
and female) to scrutinise and regulate the family lives of citizens.
While there is perhaps something sinister, in an Orwellian sense, about Magnesia’s 
‘marriage supervisors’ (e.g. ‘Big Sister’ is watching), their task of sexual scrutiny is designed 
for the express purpose of ensuring marital stability along with the state-prescribed number 
of offspring. Arguably, the ‘marriage supervisors’ could be regarded as an extension of a 
role performed by certain family members and kinship groups in the real world in terms of 
their supervisory and regulatory capacity in a given familial relationship. The difference 
between inter-kinship-group sexual supervision and the Athenian Stranger’s programme is 
notable. This may be seen inasmuch as Magnesia’s ‘marriage supervisors’ are not only given 
the backing of state authority but in the fact that the state itself should take so intense and 
active an interest in the act of regulating. While Sparta appears to provide some precedent 
for this, there seems to be no model in the real world of Plato’s time comparable to 
Magnesia’s degree of scrutiny
Sexual regulation in Magnesia is not imited only to the oikos. Myriad slaves, tutors 
and their supervisors wTl keep vigilant watch over the sexual development and behaviour of 
Magnesia’s youth. Magnesia’s citizens are to be under intense scrutiny and subject to 
correction at all times. In addition to the Guardians of the Laws, ordinary citizens are 
encouraged to observe fellow citizens and may report them to state officials for breaching 
Magnesia’s sexual and other codes of conduct. Couples are expected to uphold their vows 
of marital fidelity (with some leeway granted to men who keep their affairs secret) and even 
non-citizens are meant to follow similar rules of practice. While many of these situations are 
perhaps not especially at variance with the spirit of Greek law and custom. Magnesia 
represents a higher standard of conduct than we might expect from any given culture at the 
time. This higher standard is consistent with the philosophical aims of the Laws.
The question of same-sex intercourse in Magnesia is conceptually related to the 
perceived psychical characteristics of women. It has been singled out as deserving the 
strictest social/sexual regulation. In part, this appears to be due to the pre-eminence of the
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family’s role in the structure of Magnesian society. The pursuit of same-sex relationships 
might undermine the myth of the family and thereby threaten the stability of the polis. 
However, the primary complaint against it is rooted in philosophy. The issue of andrtia 
arises as a significant factor in relation to same-sex. It is especially notable in terms of the 
freedom/slavery construct that forms so pivotal a role in the ideological underpinnings of 
the second-best polis. The Athenian Stranger never makes it clear whether same-sex 
intercourse wiU be prohibited by law or only discouraged through official custom and 
persuasive rhetoric. His discussions on the subject, however, suggest that he favours 
reducing same-sex activity to a minimum in Magnesia and his argument falls just short of 
banning it outright.
The Athenian Stranger dieorises that the tromtnos in a same-sex coupling fads to 
master himself by submitting to the desire for excessive pleasure gained through committing 
the act itself. Ruled by his appetites and repeatedly submitting to them, he is perceived to 
develop a ‘womanish’ character. This proves him to be a slave to his appetites and he is 
regarded as morally (physically and metaphysically) ‘soft’. His manliness is reduced and he is 
assimilated into a role hke that of a slave. Plato’s narrator also faults the trastes on similar 
grounds. The degree of emphasis that he places on this fault is more intense than was 
probably the norm in Greek culture. Through his engagement in same-sex intercourse, the 
trastes is seen to have demonstrated a lack of self-mastery and a slavish submission to 
excessive desires. He may also be cttilStrued as criminally contributing to the delinquency of 
his tromtnos.
Very little is said about female same-sex relations except that they too evidently fit 
into the formula of failing to master one’s self also due to the fact that they are excessively 
pleasurable. They too should therefore be avoided lest those who partake of them lose self­
mastery. Any such influences that might threaten the Magnesians in their pursuit of artte whl 
be identified and reduced if not eliminated. According to the Athenian Stranger’s reasoning, 
same-sex intercourse of any type appears to represent a threat to the moral hygiene of his 
polis.
All of Magnesia’s sexual and social regulations strive to uphold the philosophy of 
freedom, concord and intelligence. The degree of intelligence amongst Magnesia’s populace 
is secured through the state’s comprehensive pedagogical methodology. The educational 
system also serves as a primary means of socialisation, indoctrination of sexual values and as
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a powerful force for encouraging obedience to the laws. Other institutions of scrutiny and 
management police the Magnesian citizens’ public and private lives at aU levels of society to 
ensure that citizens are properly engaged in their appropriate pursuits. The goal of arete is to 
be achieved in no small part through the philosophical/sociological influence of the ethic of 
andreia. This fact, in turn, particularly affects sexual regulation. Men and women in 
Magnesia have clearly defined sex-roles. These are partially dictated by the constraints of 
human reproduction and the structure of the family. However, the ‘programming’ of the 
hypothetical citizens’ psychosexual make-ups appears to represent one of the more subtle 
and influential forces at the Magnesian legislator’s disposal.
Magnesian citizens are tracked from birth according their abilities, educated 
appropriately and guided toward the ultimate role that society chooses for them. Platonic 
values regarding such concepts as andreia, sophrosyne, wisdom and justice are ‘programmed’ 
into each citizen’s mind from an early age and throughout their lives. The sexually specific 
aspects of this ‘programming’ are abundant. Since sex is so powerful a force, it is perceived 
to demand careful management by both citizens and the polis. A citizen should ideally be 
free from both external and internal slavery. Magnesian sexual morality teaches sexuaUy- 
specific modes of behaviour, sanctioned by the official religion and the state, that form the 
citizens’ psychosexual identities. The ultimate goal seen to justify this, as we recall, is to 
obtain the maximum degree of arete, and therefore happiness as it is defined, for aU members 
of the Magnesian society as a whole.
While it Os unclear whether or not Magnesia will prohibit same-sex acts altogether, it 
is appears fairly safe to suggest that they wUl be strongly discouraged. Religious prohibitions, 
about which the Athenian Stranger has theorised, figure prominently as part of this 
discouragement. This appears inconsistent with our understanding of ancient Greek societal 
norms. The Athenian Stranger, condemning both the eromenos and erastes for failing to 
master their desire for excessive pleasure, seems to have taken the sort of Athenian attitude 
(that would vilify someone Hke Timarkhos on account of his alleged excesses) to an entirely 
new dimension. While this would seem to uphold some contemporary Greek modalities, the 
vigour with which he has declaimed same-sex intercourse is atypical.
It may be observed that the Athenian Stranger’s views come as part of a new ethic of 
sexuaHty. This new ethic posits that it is the ‘natural’ role of a man to pursue women as their 
only permissible sexual counterparts within the constraints of sanctioned, monogamous
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relationships. This is further reinforced by Magnesia’s ‘new femininity’. It seeks to achieve 
this new ethic through a logical extension of Platonic philosophy to the effect that giving in 
to excessive desire for pleasure is not conducive to the pursuit of artte. This idea marks the 
beginning of a dominant ideology that lasts (with changes) to the present day. The alleged 
importance of the family, and its official ‘myth’, is given considerable status and legitimate 
sexual activity becomes confined to relationships between a man and a woman, sanctioned 
by religion and the state. As with the role of Magnesian women, there is some cultural 
background informing such a radical view. However, Plato’s narrator appears to have made 
a striking leap in an unexpected direction.
There can be little doubt that Plato’s writings on the subject of sexuality have had a 
profound influence on many individuals and societies since the Classical era. The views 
expressed by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws can be seen as figuring prominently into this 
influential discourse. As this thesis has demonstrated, the attitudes toward sexuality in the 
Laws differ—sometimes quite dramatically—from the norms expressed in other sources 
contemporary with Plato. This difference is particularly noteworthy with regard to matters 
of same-sex intercourse and the role of women. It is appropriate to consider what 
significance can be gleaned from Plato’s narrator’s ideas on these subjects. We may likewise 
wonder why Plato has chosen to express these views, through the medium of the 
philosophical dialogue, that appear to vary sometimes quite extraordinarily, from the 
apparent attitudes of his time and place.
The value of the Laws’ contribution to the history of philosophy, along with its 
influence on the past and future history of civilisation, is beyond question. It is possibly, and 
not insignificantly, the first example of a comprehensive, written constitution. Perhaps even 
more important is the remarkable proposition, featured prominently in the Laws, that the 
fundamental qualities of the human character may be moulded and shaped by the policies of 
an ideologically interested and socially interactive state. The Laws may be seen as an 
exploration of the proposition that society, for whatever reasons, can be changed by the wUl 
of Mind with the aid of philosophy and imagination. This notion has affected the lives of 
millions of people thousands of years after Plato’s death. In this examination of the 
Athenian Stranger’s constitutional and other methods to direct the psychosexual aspects of 
his hypothetical citizenry, we have also seen many other areas of related social engineering. 
Perhaps even more so than the Kallipolis of the Republic, Magnesia represents a kind of
\
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practical methodology for managing a state according to specifically outlined ideological 
goals. This model represented in the Laws has far-ranging applications in any era—allowing 
for particular extrapolations and interpretations.
The particular contribution that Plato has made with his Laws to the ongoing 
advancement of the science of Sexuality, as it is currently being pursued in academics today, 
is worthy of note. The Laws demonstrates a hypothetical means by which both societies and 
individuals may be ‘moulded’ according to an ideological theme. In the case of Magnesia, 
this theme is set by a specific definition of virtue with recourse to a particular interpretation 
of the ancient Greek concept of arete. The implimentation of this plan involves the careful 
and deliberate use of language to affect the ways that people think. This emphasis on this 
function of language anticipates modern philosophical trends. That which we would today 
call sexuality is perceived to be particularly subject to linguistic effects. Plato’s narrator has 
demonstrated that the use of a particular type of calculated rhetoric (with fear, shame and 
officially ‘correct argument’ amongst other forces to support it) can influence people’s 
thinking, and therefore their actions. He has also intensively explored many hypothetical 
avenues of the psychological effects of this method on human sexuality in order that it might 
be (reconstructed according to his plan.
It is not possible for us to speculate on whether such a system as is proposed in the 
Laws would work in reality or if it would fail due to a potentially erroneous tendency to 
assume that human behaviour can be so completely controlled and directed. Such is beyond 
the scope of this inquiry and neither does it appear to have been Plato’s aim in composing 
the Laws. It is possible, however, to conclude that all these considerations bear relevance to 
modern civilisation in its ongoing task of self-examination. This is a task that we have 
inherited from the ancients and we can benefit from the. light that Plato has shed on matters 
of sex and society. His ideas and ideals will continue to influence the world so as long as we 
follow in the paths of Sokrates, Plato and Aristotle in our love of learning and our 
affirmation that the unexamined life is not worth living. The limitations of the text, as Plato 
was aware, prevent us from interrogating his narrator and questioning his ideas in living 
discourse. Otherwise, as MegiUus suggests, we would ‘detain this Stranger here, and by 
prayers and every possible means secure his co-operation in the task of settling the polls’4
4 969c8-10. By the phrase ‘in the task of settling the poliY (...eui xf|v xf|Q rcdAecoc; Kaxoixiaiv), he means 
‘to settle’ it in the sense of colonisation, bit the double meaning in English seems apt here.
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